Forced conversion: civil-military relations and national security policy in the Carter administration, 1977-1981 by Mini, John D.
  
 
 
 
 
Forced Conversion:  Civil-Military Relations and National Security Policy in the Carter 
Administration, 1977-1981 
 
 
 
 
 
John D. Mini 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate in History in the 
Department of History. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill  
2010 
 
 
 
 
      Approved by: 
                                                     
             Advisor: Richard H. Kohn 
                   
                      Reader: Joseph T. Glatthaar 
                              
                      Reader: Wayne E. Lee 
 
             Reader: W. Fitzhugh Brundage 
 
             Reader: Peter D. Feaver 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 
John D. Mini 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN D. MINI: Forced Conversion:  Civil-Military Relations and National Security 
Policy in the Carter Administration, 1977-1981 
                               (Under the Direction of Richard H. Kohn) 
 
     President Jimmy Carter took the helm as commander-in-chief at an important juncture 
in American civil-military relations.  Civil-military conflict prevailed throughout most of 
Carter’s term primarily because of the president’s attempt to exclude Congress from any 
role in defense policy and budget formulation.  Although differing with Carter on many 
issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still proved willing to compromise with their commander-
in-chief as well as most of their civilian superiors in the Pentagon.  Unanimous support 
from the Joint Chiefs for the SALT II treaty provided one of the best examples of this 
willingness to support their civilian superiors.  Despite such instances of cooperation 
between Carter and his military advisors, a military-congressional alliance formed over 
his four-year term in which key members of the legislature sought to overturn the 
president on many issues relevant to national defense.  Encouraged by frank testimony 
from the Joint Chiefs expressing their views of weaknesses in Carter’s policies and 
budgets, this military-congressional alliance largely blocked the administration’s plans to 
limit global commitments and economize in national defense.  In defeating Carter’s plans 
through a series of end-runs, this military-congressional alliance set the stage for one of 
the largest peacetime military buildups in the nation’s history.  Jimmy Carter’s bold plans 
to change national defense policy were defeated and only the most modest of reforms 
took place.  This dissertation details the course of this relationship between the Pentagon, 
 iv 
White House, and Congress in a topical chronology that examines three interrelated 
themes:  the civil-military dialogue surrounding the annual defense budget process, how 
civil-military relations affected and were influenced by the making of national security 
policy, and finally how specific events requiring close civil-military contact influenced 
the relationship.
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CHAPTER I 
 
TAKING THE HELM:  JIMMY CARTER BECOMES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
 
Prologue:  Blair House, December 10, 1976, 1:00 p.m.1 
    President-elect Jimmy Carter sat silently, smiling and nodding as General George Brown, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed him on the state of the nation’s military and on 
national security.  These meetings between presidents-elect and the nation’s top military 
officers were nothing new to Washington.  Jimmy Carter, however, had made it clear during 
his campaign that he planned to make many changes in terms of American foreign policy, 
defense spending, and U.S.-Soviet arms control.  He had also campaigned as a Washington 
outsider—a man who would return honor to a presidency disgraced by Watergate, a peanut 
farmer from Georgia who would shun the corrupt politics of the Capitol Beltway, an idealist 
who would restore American prestige following the national nightmare of Vietnam.  Jimmy 
Carter was definitely a fresh face in Washington, and the entire nation, including some of the 
highest ranking military officers present at Blair House, waited expectantly to see how he 
would handle the presidency. 
    Flanking the incoming president were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security 
Advisor, and Harold Brown, the incoming Secretary of Defense.  Both Brzezinski and Brown 
                                                 
1
 Blair House is a secure building across the street from the White House.  The date and time of this meeting, 
the first between President-elect Carter and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is taken from George S. Brown, "Daily 
Log, January 1, 1977 to June 30, 1977," CJCS Brown Files, Box 64, NARA II, College Park, MD.  General 
account of this meeting is taken from Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 264-266.  A 
Pentagon civilian present at the meeting confirmed Perry’s anonymously sourced account in Richard A. 
Stubbing and Richard A. Mendel, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of 
America's Defense Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 345. 
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shared Carter’s ambitious desires for change.  The president, however, planned to exert direct 
control in both of their realms—especially within the Pentagon’s defense budget and the 
NSC’s national security planning process.  Jimmy Carter, despite his relaxed posture and 
smile, listened intently to George Brown, absorbing the information of the briefing. 
    Jimmy Carter was the third president for whom General Brown had served as the senior 
ranking military advisor.  A decorated bomber pilot in World War II and Korea and a senior 
officer in the Pentagon during Vietnam, Brown had seen remarkable changes in both warfare 
and American policy during the Cold War.  He must have believed with deep conviction the 
underlying message of his briefing, which he delivered with a sense of urgency:  The Soviet 
Union’s growth in power over the previous decade presented a grave risk to America’s 
national security.  Brown indicated that he was “well aware of the intense pressure to reduce 
defense appropriations” but emphasized that he could not “stress too strongly that preserving 
the freedom and security of the United States requires well-equipped, trained, and ready 
armed forces whose power must be recognized and reliable.”2 
    Harold Brown, the incoming Secretary of Defense, remained taciturn and expressionless 
throughout the presentation.  Secretary Brown was also a veteran of the Pentagon during the 
Vietnam War, serving as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and later 
Secretary of the Air Force.  He obtained his Ph.D. at the age of twenty-three, and those close 
to him dubbed him nothing less than an “authentic genius.”  Harold Brown was a quiet and 
                                                 
2
 George S. Brown, "JCS Briefing to President Elect Carter, 1976," CJCS Brown Files, 001 Transition to 
President Carter, Box 4, NARA II, College Park, MD.  For General Brown’s service background, see Willard J. 
Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical 
Division (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 89-95, 147-148. 
 
 3 
introverted man; although not outwardly expressive of his opinion, he considered the Soviet 
Union as a grave threat and agreed with General Brown’s views.3 
    Around the edges of the room sat lower-ranking members of the military who served as 
aides or members of the service staffs in the Pentagon.  Sometimes referred to in Washington 
as “iron majors,” these officers had spent much less time in service than the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS).4  They had almost certainly seen combat in Vietnam, but not in World War II 
and Korea.  Despite their more limited military experience, they would play an important role 
in implementing the new president’s defense policies. 
    Carter smiled again and thanked General Brown for the briefing.  The President indicated 
that he would study the written copy detailing the relative inferiority of the U.S. vis-à-vis the 
Soviets.  Military stomachs probably churned as Carter announced that he planned to reduce 
and economize U.S. military spending while at the same time seeking “deep cuts” in both the 
Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals.  Then he asked a question, almost in an off-hand 
manner: “By the way, how long would it take to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 
currently in our arsenal?”5 
                                                 
3
 For Harold Brown’s background see Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 1947-
1997, ed. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1997), 96.  For quiet demeanor and leadership style see Bernard Weinraub, "The Browning of the 
Pentagon," The New York Times Magazine, January 29, 1978.  For quote on “authentic genius” see John Kester, 
interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 14 April 1998, OSD Oral History, 36.  For his view of the 
Soviet threat and understanding of the Joint Chiefs’ position, see Harold Brown, interview by Alfred Goldberg 
and Maurice Matloff, 8 October 1992, OSD Oral History, 1-4. 
 
4
 “Iron major” is, according to Pentagon correspondent Richard Halloran, “a term of obscure Army origin.”  
“Iron majors” were often lieutenant colonels and sometimes even full colonels.  The example “iron major” cited 
in Halloran’s account was a Navy commander with sixteen years of service. In Halloran’s words these officers 
“labor in the back rooms of the Pentagon drawing up the first drafts of anything from national strategy to 
military budgets to war plans.” Often the final drafts bore strong imprints of their initial work.  See Richard 
Halloran, "Of Paper Tigers Whose Joy in Life Is Red Stripes," New York Times, October 25, 1984, B14. 
 
5
 Perry, Four Stars, 265.  
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    General Brown hesitated, and he and Harold Brown exchanged uneasy glances.  The U.S. 
possessed thousands of nuclear weapons—carried by over one thousand land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, approximately 650 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 
and over two hundred nuclear-capable B-52 bombers—which formed a balanced strategic 
force known as the “triad.”6  The military considered all three mutually supporting and 
necessary.  They had come on line during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson 
administrations with approval by Congress in order to maintain a credible national strategy of 
deterrence against the Soviets.  Most defense analysts believed that even minor reductions in 
one part of the triad might have a major impact on the overall strategic balance.7  General 
Brown asked for clarification.  What kind of reduction did the president-elect have in mind? 
    Then Carter issued his “blockbuster” reply:  “What would it take to get it down to a few 
hundred?  Let’s say 200 missiles total.”  Silence fell on the room.  One military staff member 
present that afternoon later recalled, “You could hear a pin drop.”8  Stunned by the boldness 
of the reduction, General Brown was speechless.  He just stood looking at Carter.  After an 
awkward moment of silence, the reply came from the heretofore quiet Harold Brown, who 
cautioned that such an immense reduction would be a “fundamental risk.”  Carter nonetheless 
indicated that he wanted studies conducted on the matter immediately.  General Brown, 
                                                 
6
 United States Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1978), C-5.  Hereafter cited as FY78 Annual DoD Report. 
 
7
 For diversification and mutual support of the triad, see Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: 
Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (New York: Westview Press, 1983), 62-64.  For necessity of 
balance in the triad, see Brown, Thinking About National Security, 74. 
 
8
 Perry, Four Stars, 266.  
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“apparently overcoming his astonishment,” replied that he would ensure that his staff 
conducted the study.9 
    Within hours, some of the military participants leaked reports of the meeting to 
congressmen and senators on Capitol Hill, as well as to the outgoing administration in the 
White House, where President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were 
quoted as being “appalled.”  Political pundits wrote two accounts of the incident within a 
month, fed by further leaks concerning the meeting and Carter’s reiteration of the request for 
a “200 missile” study at a subsequent meeting in January.10  Since the Joint Chiefs had not 
dissented during the meeting, incoming Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told Kissinger that he 
felt the military was in favor of the reduction of missiles and defense spending.  After leaving 
office, Kissinger contacted the Joint Chiefs and told them that they “might be in for difficult 
times.”11  It appeared that relations between the civilian leaders of the new administration 
and their military advisors were off to a tense start. 
    In many ways, this first meeting between President Carter and his senior defense advisors 
was emblematic of civil-military relations during the first two years of the Carter 
administration.  Carter had bold plans to cut defense expenditures and reduce nuclear 
weapons, and they made not only the military, but also many of his civilian advisors, 
apprehensive.  Harold Brown, quiet at first, would gradually become more assertive in 
aligning himself with the Joint Chiefs and speaking out when he felt Carter’s plans went too 
                                                 
9
 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nuclear 'Blockbuster'," Washington Post, January 27, 1977, A23.  
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski also confirmed this account and the uproar it caused among the 
military.  See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985), 157. 
 
10
 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Carter's 200 Missiles," Washington Post, February 12, 1977, A15. 
 
11
 LTG William Y. Smith, "Memorandum for Record, Subject: JCS Meeting 1000 19 January 1977, January 21, 
1977," CJCS Brown Files, 001 Transition to President Carter, Box 4, NARA II, College Park, MD. 
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far; and the military would continue to resort to using press leaks and behind-the-scenes 
congressional lobbying, often termed the “end run,” to resist Carter’s plans.12 
    While certainly this first meeting between Carter and the Joint Chiefs showed that the 
civil-military relationship began on a tense note, one should not rush to judgment as to its 
long-term impact.  To understand and evaluate fully the relationship between President 
Carter, his military and civilian advisors, and the Congress requires a much deeper analysis 
which to date does not exist in the scholarship. 
The Carter Years and Civil-Military Relations:  A Gap in the Scholarship 
    Scholars have neglected the Carter Administration’s civil-military relations, perhaps 
because no major military conflict or civil-military “blowup” occurred in those years.  
Furthermore, even the secondary literature devoted to evaluating and chronicling Carter’s 
presidency barely mentions his relationship with his military advisors.  This omission is all 
the more surprising considering that Carter’s presidency came immediately after the Vietnam 
War, a conflict that had, in the words of military historian Allan Millett, “ended twenty-five 
years of American military superiority” and left many in the nation feeling “disaffected from 
both their political leadership and their armed forces.”13 
    For several additional reasons the Carter years provide an intriguing perspective for further 
research into the post-World War II civil-military relationship.  While civil-military relations 
during the Carter years may have been in somewhat similar to other post-war 
                                                 
12
 The definition of the term “end run” has varied, but in general the term referred to a maneuver in which 
impediments were bypassed, often by deceit or trickery.  The term has applied to football when the running 
back attempts to circumvent one end of the defensive line.  A less well-known usage connoted a high-speed 
maneuver by a submarine used to gain a hidden and advantageous firing position against an unsuspecting 
surface ship.  This second definition seemed particularly ironic given President Carter’s military service as a 
submarine officer and the fact that his policies became the “target” of such a maneuver by the military. 
 
13
 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 572, 607. 
 
 7 
administrations, certain factors make them unusual and worthy of more in depth historical 
study.  Several factors warrant reflection when one considers the situation Jimmy Carter 
faced when taking office in 1977 and the subsequent legacy of his tenure. 
    First, extreme distrust between the president and his generals and admirals characterized 
the last years of the Nixon Administration, often cited as the nadir of American civil-military 
relations. 14  Carter’s ascendancy therefore represented an entirely new administration 
coming to power at a potentially critical juncture for the future of civil-military relations.  
Just as the nation watched to see if Jimmy Carter would alter politics as usual in Washington, 
many high-ranking military leaders and “iron majors” at the Pentagon watched to see how 
this Democrat and self-proclaimed moralist would deal with the military. 
    Second, the Carter administration invited civil-military conflict because of the president’s 
desire to assert strong personal control over several areas in the Pentagon.  Not all presidents 
came into office with plans to do so.  Some commanders-in-chief and their Secretaries of 
Defense have taken a more “hands-off” approach from the start.  Arguably, the 
administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan took such an approach.15  Nixon’s 
first Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird (1969-1973), consciously tried to reverse the trend 
of civilian involvement under McNamara and stated that he was “striving to decentralize 
                                                 
14
 Richard H. Kohn refers to this period of time as the “low point” in civil-military relations in his interview 
with General David Jones. See GEN David Jones, interview by Maurice Maryanow and Richard H. Kohn, 
transcript, K239.0512-1664, IRIS# 01105219, USAF Oral History Collection, AFHRA, 197.  Political scientist 
Dale Herspring also agreed with this assessment, placing the Nixon Administration above all others in his “high 
conflict” category and contending that the JCS, when dealing with Nixon, “could not get over his lies, his 
deceitful ways, and his many efforts to get them to commit open violations of the chain of command.” See Dale 
R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 409, 415. 
 
15
 Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 86, 91-93.  Adam Yarmolinsky, writing in 1971, indicated 
that the Nixon Administration “appeared to be establishing a pattern of civil-military relations which reverses 
that of the Kennedy and Johnson years” and turned away from systems analysis as a means of problem solving.  
See Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, 32. 
 
 8 
decision making as much as possible” while “delegating to the Military Departments more 
responsibility to manage development and procurement programs.”16  Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger (1973-1975), although held in high regard by the military, was fired when 
the Ford White House initially would not support larger defense budgets, but under President 
Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the budget increased again with the FY77 
and FY78 submissions.  Ronald Reagan, never regarded as a “details president,” had this 
image confirmed by his first Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones, who stated that 
Reagan simply did not want to get involved in the intricacies of the Defense Department.17   
Thus, the Carter administration chose a bold course in the immediate post-Vietnam era with 
its desire to assert more presidential control over the Pentagon’s budgetary, procurement, and 
planning processes. 
    Third, the Carter administration also chose to increase civilian control in areas that had 
traditionally been closely guarded by the military, including retirement pay, officer 
promotions, contingency planning, and most importantly the specifics of the budgeting 
process.  While it would seem at first that the McNamara years, often cited as the pinnacle of 
civilian “involvement” in military realms, would not be comparable to the Pentagon under 
Jimmy Carter and Harold Brown, the contrast was not so straightforward.  Harold Brown, for 
instance, asserted more direct influence over officer promotions and assignments than any 
previous Secretary and differed sharply with James Schlesinger in this regard.18  
Additionally, Secretary Brown, although doing so to ease civil-military tension, increased the 
                                                 
16
 Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 86. 
 
17
 GEN David Jones, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 21 October 1987, OSD Oral History, 
31. 
 
18
 LTG Ray B. Sitton, interview by Marcus J. Boyle, transcript, K239.0512-1570, USAF Oral History 
Collection, AFHRA, 7-8 February 1984, 278. 
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authority of his assistant secretaries over the Service Secretaries, thus consolidating civilian 
control at an even higher level in the Pentagon.19  The Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) process, installed by McNamara as a means to increase civilian 
control of the budget, was still in use and Carter wanted to place Zero-Based Budgeting 
(ZBB) on top of it as an additional layer of control. 20  These factors, coupled with the 
president’s personal involvement in the defense budgetary choices, led in some ways to 
civilian control in the Carter years rivaling that of the 1960s. 
    Fourth, the Carter administration found itself to be the first Democratic administration to 
have to deal with a military officer corps becoming increasingly Republican—or, at the very 
least, more open in proclaiming its conservatism.  According to one well-known survey of 
senior Pentagon officers, as Carter entered office in 1976, 16 percent of all high ranking 
officers serving at the Pentagon characterized themselves as “liberal” and 61 percent as 
“conservative.”  By the end of Carter’s term in 1980, only 4 percent would classify 
themselves as liberal, with conservatives increasing to 72 percent.21  Likewise, the margin of 
preference among officers for the Republicans over the Democrats jumped from less than 3:1 
to almost 5:1 in the same period.22  While many scholars have noted the unique dynamics of 
                                                 
19
 GEN Louis H. Wilson, Jr., interview by Edwin H. Simmons, History and Museums Division Oral History 
Transcript, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1988, 116.  General Wilson found this to be “a 
disturbing trend.” 
 
20
 Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970's (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 85-88. 
 
21
 Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?:  Some Evidence 1976-
1996," International Security 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999), 13.  One must note how limited the data from 
Holtsi’s sample is.  His 1976 survey contained approximately 500 military correspondents, while subsequent 
surveys contained as few as 115.  Despite its limited scope, few other qualitative measures exist to measure 
political associations of the officer corps during this time period. 
 
22
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civil-military relations between the “liberal” Clinton administration and the “conservative” 
military under General Colin Powell, the Carter administration actually provided a precursor 
to this phenomenon.23 
    Fifth, the expansion and strengthening of the U.S. military after the Vietnam War, so often 
credited to Reagan’s buildup of the military, cannot be fully understood without attention 
given to the Carter administration.  All too often, Carter’s term has been associated with the 
famous “decade of neglect” thesis which stated that the 1970s represented a period where 
U.S. military power declined significantly.24  While the overall idea may have validity, 
holding the Carter administration primarily responsible for the decline in military strength 
does not seem justified.  Often overlooked, for example, is the fact that Carter’s final two 
budgets foreshadowed the flood of defense spending in the Reagan years. 
    Finally, understanding civil-military relations during the Carter administration offers 
insights into that administration which are not available in the current literature and political 
science models.  The civil-military dialogue created by the 1980-1981 defense budget 
process provides one significant example of this.  Many observers have cited Carter’s 
increase in these defense budgets as primarily a concession to conservative members of the 
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Senate in order to gain their support for ratification of SALT II.25  Such an analysis certainly 
has merit—Carter himself admitted his intentions in this regard.26  Closer analysis of the 
civil-military dialogue, however, demonstrates that Carter fought these defense budget 
increases until the end and was largely forced to accommodate the desires of an alliance 
between his own military advisors and conservative members of Congress.  Likewise, a more 
complete understanding of the civil-military relations within the Carter years can assist in 
explaining otherwise confusing outcomes that do not fit a particular political science model.  
As one example, political scientist Ole Holsti commented that there was little explanation in 
his study for why military officers would have expressed little disdain for Ronald Reagan’s 
stateside public relations assignment during World War II relative to Jimmy Carter who 
served with distinction in the U.S. Navy.27  As oral histories and personal reflections reveal, 
however, even Harold Brown’s special assistant John Kester, a civilian in the Pentagon, 
expressed doubt as to the meaningfulness of Carter’s military service and other reports 
indicated that senior admirals were “rankled” by Carter’s claims about his naval service.  
Taking these negative perspectives into account may help explain why the military officers in 
Holsti’s sample gave little credit to Carter’s military service compared to that of Reagan.  
Overall, these two points illustrate the value of further in-depth analysis of civil-military 
relations during the Carter administration. 
    While many of these important factors bearing on the Carter years tend to be overlooked, 
this period has not been utterly ignored in the scholarship.  Works dealing with the broader 
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topic of American civil-military relations usually devote a chapter to the Carter years, but 
their analysis tends to be very general, attempting to compare and contrast administrations.  
One example of such a study is Mark Perry’s Four Stars (1989) which examined civil-
military relations from the Truman to the Reagan administrations.28  Perry, a journalist, 
conducted interviews with field-grade military officers to craft an interesting portrait of a 
very strained relationship between Carter and the JCS, but because of his anonymous 
attributions and non-specific citations, his work is not in many respects a credible or 
respected source.  Relying heavily on Perry’s interpretations, Dale Herspring’s The Pentagon 
and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (2005) also 
dedicated a chapter to the Carter years.29  Both works concluded that, in part due to the 
tenseness of the first meeting between Carter and the JCS, the civil-military relationship 
began badly and never fully recovered.  Charles Stevenson’s SECDEF: The Nearly 
Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (2006) took a similar approach.  His comparative 
study explored the operating styles of various Secretaries, devoting a chapter to Harold 
Brown and concluding that he was an effective “team player.”30 
    Many scholars have attempted to explain why Carter’s defense and foreign policy changed 
over the four years, primarily using political-science models.  Gaddis Smith argued in 
Morality, Reason, and Power (1986) that the split between dovish Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance and hawkish National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was primarily 
responsible for the changes in Carter’s policies.  Gaddis showed that Carter at first relied 
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most on Vance, but by 1979, after a series of foreign policy setbacks, listened mostly to 
Brzezinski.31  Alexander Moens argued essentially the same thing using the “multiple 
advocacy” model in Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision 
Making (1990).32  Richard Thornton’s The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order 
(1991) posited the thesis that advances in Soviet nuclear weapons technology exacerbated 
this well-known Vance-Brzezinski split from the start of the administration.33  David 
Skidmore, in Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure 
of Reform (1996), claimed instead that it was primarily domestic political pressure which 
forced Carter into a more hardline foreign policy in his last two years.34  Most recently, Brian 
J. Auten challenged both Thornton’s and Skidmore’s interpretations in Carter’s Conversion:  
The Hardening of American Defense Policy (2008).  Focusing on defense budgets and 
nuclear weapons modernization, Auten argued that external geo-strategic factors primarily 
caused the administration’s “conversion” to a “harder” defense policy by 1979.35  While 
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there is truth to each of these interpretations, none of these accounts provide much attention 
to or insight into Carter’s relationship with his military advisors or his theater commanders. 
    The only historical account focusing exclusively upon Carter’s interaction with his 
military advisors is Steven Rearden’s volume in the classified official history of the JCS.  
Based upon extensive research in classified government documents and memos, in The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and National Policy Volume XII 1977-1980 (2002), Rearden concluded that, 
although the relationship between Carter and the JCS improved somewhat over time, it never 
became a relationship based on trust and cooperation.36  Rearden’s access to classified 
documents in both the Pentagon and the Carter Library proved to be one of the great 
strengths of his account, yet because of his exclusive focus on the JCS he tended to examine 
the defense policy formulation process to the exclusion of other areas such as the defense 
budget process.  The work also suffers from some of the limitations associated with official 
history.  As historian Martin Blumenson has pointed out, many scholars have been quick to 
criticize the perceived “partisan” nature of official histories and the “censorship” process 
involved in finalizing them.37  While most of these weaknesses have been overstated, the fact 
that Rearden’s official history remains accessible to only a small readership means that a new 
look at civil-military relations during the Carter years will be a significant contribution to the 
historiography. 
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A New Look at Civil-Military Relations in the Carter Years:  The Purpose and Thesis 
of This Study 
 
    This study will explore the characteristics of civil-military relations in the Carter 
Administration and explain why the relationship had these characteristics.  In doing so, it will 
contribute to the understanding of civil-military relations since World War II, which 
demands close study of how the highest ranking members of the military command structure 
have interacted with their civilian superiors.  As Louis Smith pointed out in American 
Democracy and Military Power (1951), in the age of “total war” since World War II, the 
civil-military relationship has required not only military subordination to civilian power, but 
also coordination with civilian policy.  In his words, such coordination is “imperative if the 
requisite power for sustained combat is to be maintained.”38  The debacle of Vietnam 
provides a modern example of failed civil-military coordination.  Some critics argue that the 
current Global War on Terror will yield a similar result.   Thus, understanding the American 
civil-military relationship today has powerful political and national security implications. 
    This dissertation will extend the existing historiography by examining three themes in 
civil-military relations which have often been examined only separately.  The first of the 
three themes will be the civil-military interaction surrounding the annual defense budgets. 
The defense budgetary process deserves this central role because it requires sustained, day-
to-day contact between the civilians and military in the government and also fully involves 
Congress, which can and does alter the defense budget through the appropriations process.  
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As one retired general who worked in the Pentagon put it, “attention to the budget never 
ceases throughout the year.”39  
     As a second theme, the dissertation examines how the national security policy of the 
Carter administration evolved over time and how it affected and was influenced by civil-
military relations.  National security policy is critical to understanding the civil-military 
relationship because ultimately military plans should support civilian efforts to form a 
coherent grand strategy. 
     As a final theme, the dissertation examines specific events in the Carter administration 
that involved substantial civil-military dialogue.  It will explore the events seen by key 
leaders and journalists as generating civil-military conflict or requiring significant civil-
military cooperation.  As an example, the military had little involvement in fashioning of the 
Camp David accords, so this episode, though important in the overall course of the Carter 
administration, will not loom large in this study; however, the SALT II treaty had major 
civil-military ramifications, so it will hold a central place in the study. 
    The seven broad questions that form this study will be:  (1) What was the political-military 
situation as Carter came into office and how did it affect civil-military relations?  (2) What 
were the incoming administration’s goals in relation to defense policy and budgets, and how 
did the military initially perceive these goals?  Related to this is the question of what kind 
relationship the incoming administration and the military expected to have:  Would it involve 
extensive collaboration, and how willing would the new administration be to listen to 
military advice?  How involved would the military be in the policy making process overall? 
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(3) What patterns of cooperation and conflict shaped the defense budget process through 
FY78, 79, 80, and 81?  Why did these patterns prevail? (4) What impact did major defense 
policy initiatives and decisions have on civil-military relations?  How did the military 
support or resist the administration’s national defense strategy as demonstrated by their 
public and private comments and/or actions? (5) How did the administration’s national 
defense policy evolve over time, and was the evolution influenced by the course of civil-
military relations? (6) What did JCS support of SALT II, a controversial position, say about 
the relationships between Carter, his military and civilian advisors, and Congress?    (7) Was 
the failure of the attempted rescue of the American hostages in Iran a manifestation of a 
failed civil-military relationship?  Answering these questions will describe the nature of the 
relationship between Carter, Congress, and his civilian and military advisors, explain why the 
relationship had its particular characteristics, and in doing this broaden the historiography of 
post-World War II civil-military relations and the Carter presidency. 
    The thesis of this study is that civil-military relations in the Carter administration were best 
characterized by growing cooperation within the Pentagon, increasing conflict between the 
Pentagon and the White House, and a strengthening military-congressional alliance—all the 
product of the administration’s attempts to change defense policy and the president’s 
unwillingness to accept the role of Congress in this process.  Carter and his staff had 
conducted extensive research into national defense policy prior to assuming office. Their 
desire to shrink defense spending was well publicized.  Assuming power after intense civil-
military conflict, both the military and Congress worried about the new president’s plans.  
Immediately upon taking office, Carter embarked on an ambitious effort to increase 
presidential control over the defense budget, but met resistance from a military-congressional 
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alliance.  Conflict was not the only aspect of the civil-military relationship during the Carter 
administration.  Military leaders gradually adapted to and cooperated with the civilians in the 
Pentagon, although Secretary of Defense Harold Brown never fully gained the loyalty of his 
first set of military Chiefs.  For both the military and for Congress, the main conflict came 
over early presidential involvement in the budgetary process and the administration’s attempt 
to change defense policies.  The military, often cooperating with civilians in the Pentagon, 
sought to circumvent Carter’s control of the budget and the policy-making process by 
increasingly lobbying Congress from FY78 to FY79.  The military recognized that the 
opportunity was ripe for such lobbying due to an opening rift between the White House and 
Congress.  This Executive-Legislative conflict was brought about by the inexperience of 
Carter’s staff and the President’s increasing attempt to usurp Congress’ role in formulating 
the defense budget and national defense policy.  The conflict culminated in the sustained 
presidential veto of the FY79 defense appropriations bill in late 1978, the height of President 
Carter’s assertion of authority in defense matters.  In part due to the veto nearly being 
overturned, and in part due to Carter’s better relations with his second set of Chiefs, the 
president and his staff began to recognize the importance of courting congressional favor and 
taking Pentagon and congressional advice in regard to defense matters.  This led to JCS 
willingness to testify in support of SALT II in hopes of it leading to higher defense budgets 
from Carter.  The president, however, resisted raising defense expenditures even until 1980.  
The situation proved too tempting for many iron majors in the Pentagon and many retired 
military members on the executive boards of defense contractors.  Playing upon Carter’s 
weakness in the foreign policy arena and holding SALT II ratification hostage in the Senate, 
the military-congressional alliance forced Jimmy Carter to raise defense budgets and change 
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his defense policies.  Facing some of the highest public disapproval ratings of any president 
in modern history, Carter was unable to combat these end-runs.  Later, while his relationships 
with his military and civilian defense advisors may have improved, his success in the defense 
and foreign policy arena did not.  Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue the 
American hostages in Tehran, ended in disaster and, although it was not caused by a failed 
civil-military relationship, did mark Jimmy Carter’s involvement with military and defense 
matters as an ultimate failure in the minds of many.   
    Although starting with bold plans to cut defense spending and limit American global 
commitments, in the end the military-congressional alliance forced Jimmy Carter to 
surrender most of his ambitions.  Carter’s late effort to become a Cold Warrior and boost 
national defense spending was thus more a forced conversion than a willing change of faith. 
The administration took credit for some evolutionary reforms but any great transformation in 
the realm of defense budgets and policy remained elusive.  The limited reforms of the Carter 
years, however, were notable:  the development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 
increased emphasis on American involvement in the Middle East, and increased civilian 
control and input into defense planning in the Pentagon.  In this regard, the legacy of the 
Carter years very much remains with us today.  Thus, although one may not see the Carter 
years as a watershed in American civil-military relations, the period 1977 to 1981 is an 
important one to chronicle and understand. 
    As much of the historiography of the Carter years has suggested, events in the second half 
of Carter’s term made it relatively different from the first half.  Dividing the administration 
into two-year segments is useful to gain perspective on why the administration changed or 
kept its policies consistent over time.  The annual defense budget process, central to 
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understanding civil-military relationships within the government, is the first topic explored in 
each two year segment, beginning with the FY78 and FY79 budgets.  The next topic 
examined is defense and national security policy.  The Carter administration’s first two years 
of defense policy were typified mainly by patterns of conflict in civil-military interaction 
while the second two years were marked more by compromise and cooperation between the 
White House, the Pentagon, and Congress.  Because of its continued and sustained 
importance to the course of civil-military interaction throughout the administration, the next 
segment of the study will be dedicated to revealing patterns in the relationship manifest 
through the process of SALT II.  Finally, the conclusion discusses how Operation Eagle 
Claw manifest patterns of civil-military conflict and cooperation present throughout the four 
years.  The dissertation ends by placing the Carter years in context with the broader stream of 
civil-military relations since the end of World War II and explaining how the study of civil-
military relations changes what we know about Jimmy Carter’s presidency. 
Evaluating Civil-Military Relations: Other Approaches and this Study’s Methodology 
 
    Historians and political scientists have studied civil-military relations in the United States 
using a variety of methodologies or approaches with diverse results.  Some have focused on 
specific events and attempted to gauge civil-military cooperation and conflict from the 
dialogue created during these crises.  An example of such a methodology, which examined 
the civil-military relations surrounding the creation of the Department of Defense from the 
former Navy and War Departments, is Demetrios Caraley’s The Politics of Military 
Unification (1966).40   Paul Hammond took a similar approach in his book Organizing for 
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Defense (1961), an “administrative history” of the military focusing on key events from 
1945-1960.41 
    A second approach has analyzed the civil-military dialogue created by the evolution and 
crafting of defense policy or wartime decisions.  The best example of such a work is Eliot 
Cohen’s Supreme Command (2002), which used case studies of national leaders from 
Abraham Lincoln to David Ben-Gurion to demonstrate successful civilian control over 
military leaders in wartime, even to the point of how war would be waged.42  An application 
of this approach to the Carter Administration is Sam Sarkesian’s Defense Policy and the 
Presidency: Carter's First Years (1979).  Because Sarkesian authored his work midway 
through the administration, he was unable to draw more than tentative conclusions about the 
civil-military relationship, which he characterized as strained but showing promise for 
improvement.43    
    A third approach has been to study the “politics of defense resource allocation” by 
examining the civil-military interaction involved in crafting defense budgets.  Edward 
Kolodziej did so in The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (1966).44  Similarly, 
Alex Mintz focused exclusively on the budget in The Politics of Resource Allocation in the 
U.S. Department of Defense (1988).45   
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    A final approach to the study of civil-military relations has focused primarily upon the 
interaction between Congress and the military since World War II.  Samuel Huntington’s The 
Common Defense (1961) is probably the most significant work of this type.46  Steven 
Scroggs’ Army Relations with Congress (2000) provides a more recent example.  Scroggs 
examined and compared the “congressional liaison offices” of each armed service and how 
each has become increasingly assertive in engaging Congress to gain support for desired 
programs and for a larger share of the defense budget.47  Overall, however, as historian A. J. 
Bacevich has pointed out, the field of military history has been slow to identify and evaluate 
this “politicization” of the military.48 
     One reason for the variety of methodologies used to study civil-military relations may be 
the difficulty in defining precisely what the term “civil-military relations” means. Samuel 
Huntington, in his landmark The Soldier and the State (1957), crafted the first broad 
definition of civil-military relations, perceiving it as a “system composed of interdependent 
elements.” Three primary components comprised this system:  (1) “the formal, structural 
position of military institutions in the government;” (2) “the informal role and influence of 
military groups in politics and society at large;” and (3) “the nature of the ideologies of 
military and non-military groups.”49  Douglas Kinnard truncated Huntington’s definition, 
describing it as “the relationship between the military and society” and “the politics of 
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defense policy and resource allocation.”50 Richard Kohn has often focused on civil-military 
relations “at the pinnacle of the government,” pointing out “the ménage a trois between the 
administration, Congress, and the military.”51  Most recently, political scientist Peter Feaver 
has examined civil-military relations in terms of an “agency theory” where “the essence of 
civil-military relations is strategic interaction between civilian principals and military 
agents.”52  The diversity of these definitions, all certainly accurate but with different points of 
emphasis, attest to the need for the historian to define the term as it applies to his work. 
    For the purpose of this study, civil-military relations are defined as the relationships 
between the president, his high-level military and civilian advisors, and the Congress.  High-
level advisors in this case include the president’s own staff and cabinet as well as the JCS 
and service staffs of the Pentagon.  The relationship is built upon communication, not merely 
control—although the president constitutionally assumes duty as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, all chief executives have to some degree taken the advice of their uniformed 
military advisors as to how to play this role, and this advisory relationship is codified in law.  
While the military remains constitutionally and legally subordinate to the president and his 
Secretary of Defense, high ranking officers have always resisted some aspects of civilian 
control.53 
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    Congress has always played a major role in the civil-military relationship and has always 
attempted, to a greater or lesser degree, to influence an administration’s national defense 
policy.  Members of the House and Senate Armed Services, Budget, and Appropriations 
Committees have particular power in the politics of defense policy and resource allocation.54  
The members of these committees have tended to be more conservative than the Congress as 
a whole, but like the rest have been subject to the pressures of their own parties and voters.55  
High ranking members of the military services frequently testify before various House and 
Senate committees, and Congress expects these officers to present their personal views fully 
and honestly when questioned on the issue, even if they disagree with an executive policy. 56  
There has always been some degree of doubt as to whether their testimony is full and frank, 
since future promotions or assignments, or relations with White House and senior civilian 
officials in the Pentagon, may be at risk if public statements prove damaging to official 
policy.57  Intrigued by this paradox, the press has often taken particular interest in the 
interaction between the military, the president, and Congress, all of whom in turn have used 
the press to influence public opinion. 
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    The military’s relationship with Congress has become increasingly significant to civil-
military relations since the end of World War II.  One of the central arguments of Huntington 
in The Common Defense was that, since 1945, the military has sought influence within 
Congress in order to “develop the mechanisms and support necessary for survival in the 
pluralistic world of American politics.”58  Each Service’s Congressional Legislative Liaison 
(CLL) office in the Pentagon, formed after the 1947 Defense Reorganization Act, 
exemplified such support mechanisms.  Each CLL has employed military officers with 
special knowledge of important service programs to influence members of Congress and their 
staffs.  Although officially each CLL conducts “liaison,” not lobbying (which is illegal for 
executive branch organizations), they have increasingly provided a conduit for direct military 
communication to lawmakers.59  The public relations division of the Pentagon has provided 
another support mechanism for post-WWII military dealings with Congress.  Dedicated 
public relations efforts have helped the military pressure Congress by using the press to draw 
public attention to controversial defense issues.60  Increasingly, congressmen have visited the 
military in the field, where one military legislative liaison officer stated that “our lobbying 
effectiveness is at its height” since in the field the congressmen can “see for themselves” and 
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talk directly to soldiers.61  Military-affiliated special interest groups, such as the Navy 
League, Association of the U.S. Army, and the Air Force Sergeants Association have also 
bolstered the influence of the military with Congress in the twentieth century.62  Finally, the 
increasing power of the military-industrial complex has allowed the Pentagon to adopt a 
“carrot and stick” approach with Congress, awarding the most lucrative contracts to districts 
represented by legislators who consistently voted “pro-defense.”63  Thus, political scientist 
Dale Herspring’s conclusion that “the military is now a bureaucratic interest group much like 
others in Washington” seems very accurate. 64  Any full appraisal of post-World War II civil-
military relations must therefore take the role of Congress into account. 
    In examining the interactions among the president, his military and civilian advisors, and 
the Congress, this study will use the annual defense budgetary process as a primary category 
of analysis because this process involves sustained, day-to-day contact between civilian and 
military personnel in the government and also draws the full involvement of Congress.  As 
one retired general who worked in the Pentagon expressed it, “attention to the budget never 
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ceases throughout the year.”65  This distinguishes the defense budgetary process from other 
categories of analysis which are often used to examine civil-military relations such as 
“official defense policies” and “key events.”  For instance, official written defense policies 
are only periodically reviewed and, according to former Chairman of the JCS General David 
Jones, fulfilling all aspects of written defense policies “would require tens of billions of 
dollars more than was within the budget even in the best years.”66 This is perhaps why long-
time Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) historian Alfred Goldberg commented that the 
defense budget “may be a better guide to strategy than the defense [policy] guidance.”67  
Likewise, the focus on only “key events” surrounding civil-military relations has significant 
drawbacks compared to the defense budget process in evaluating these relations because the 
sum of “key events” does not necessarily add up to the whole “day-to-day” process of civil-
military relations within a given administration.  Thus, the annual defense budget process is 
critical to any understanding of the civil-military relationship.68 
    The process of defense policy making is also critical to charting and explaining the course 
of civil-military relationships in an administration.  Ideally, the president’s policy guidance 
details how he plans to employ the military to meet national policy.  Examining the evolution 
of the Carter administration’s policy guidance and the associated civil-military dialogue can, 
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therefore, both help explain why the policy guidance evolved as it did as well as help to 
measure civil-military cooperation and conflict within the administration. 
    This dissertation will focus primarily upon the Carter administrations Presidential 
Directives (PDs) as a means to evaluate the civil-military interaction surrounding the defense 
policy making process.  Presidential Directives evolved from the first policy papers drafted 
by the National Security Council (NSC), which President Truman created in 1947.  Initially 
serving as informational tools for decision making, and created mainly from data gathered by 
the State and Defense Departments, the policy papers eventually evolved into summary 
memorandums signed by the president.  Each administration since Truman has modified and 
adapted the NSC policy creation process to fit its own style.  The Carter Administration 
dubbed their signed policy papers “Presidential Directives.”69 
    An understanding of the Presidential Directives from the Carter years serves many useful 
functions.  First, since these Presidential Directives provide succinct summations of the 
administration’s policies, many of them are particularly relevant to understanding how the 
military and civilians in the administration interacted, allowing greater study of civil-military 
relations.  Second, these documents have been declassified only recently (and even then not 
in full) and much of the secondary literature on the Carter Administration discussed these 
documents using only the interpretations of administration officials.  Conducting analysis and 
presenting these documents as primary sources will make a contribution to the evolving 
historiography of the Carter years.  Finally, the Presidential Directives form a chronological 
account that links important specific events which also had major influence on the civil-
military relationship within the government.  For all of these reasons the Presidential 
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Directives, and the associated defense policy process, will complement the annual defense 
budget as a subject for the dissertation. 
    Important specific events outside defense policy and budgets will not be ignored.  An 
entire chapter will examine the civil-military interaction surrounding the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT II).  The emphasis placed on this specific event during the 
administration is warranted for several reasons.  First, unlike many crisis-oriented events, the 
extensive SALT II process lasted virtually throughout Carter’s entire term.  Second, the 
SALT process occupied, in the minds of Carter’s advisors, “the central role in U.S. Soviet 
relations since the end of the Johnson administration.”70  It thus had major strategic and 
foreign policy implications at the time.  Third, President Carter himself felt that it was critical 
to have the JCS support for SALT II and he dedicated much of his dialogue with them in 
efforts to secure their support.71  Likewise, the director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon 
confirmed that SALT II was one of the most significant and time-intensive events taking 
place in the Pentagon during Carter’s term.72 Finally, SALT II had tremendous personal 
meaning for Jimmy Carter.  He desperately wanted to reach a nuclear-arms limiting accord 
with the Soviets and focused extensive personal and political effort into crafting and seeking 
ratification for the treaty.  In his memoir he listed the failure of his administration to gain 
ratification of SALT II as “the most profound disappointment” of his presidency.73 
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   The last chapter examines the failure of Operation Eagle Claw—the mission to rescue the 
American hostages held in Iran.  This specific event is significant for several reasons.  First 
and most importantly, it was the only time Jimmy Carter used military force in his term.  
Second, there are differing interpretations of Carter and the Chief’s handling of the operation:  
some cite it as a textbook case of how a commander-in-chief should involve himself in 
military affairs, others claim Carter’s meddling caused the failure.  Lastly, whatever the 
verdict on Jimmy Carter’s conduct, the disaster of Eagle Claw fatally wounded an already 
weakened presidency. 
Background:  The Military-Political Situation in 1976 
    Jimmy Carter’s term began at a troubled time but with high expectations.  President Carter 
recognized that he was taking office at a time of political turmoil, when the wounds of 
Vietnam and Watergate were still fresh.  He felt strongly that “Americans desired a return to 
the first principles of their government.”  He hoped to bind the nation together by basing the 
role of America in the world on “a sense of remembered history” that focused on his “most 
important values—human rights, environmental quality, nuclear arms control, and the search 
for justice and peace.” 74  He viewed nuclear weapons as evil and a great threat to global 
security; consequently, in his inaugural address, he proposed eliminating nuclear weapons 
from the face of the earth.75  Carter recognized the need to heal in some way the division of 
the country over Vietnam; therefore, one day after taking office, he issued a presidential 
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pardon for all those with outstanding warrants for draft evasion during the war.76  Yet, 
besides the lingering wounds of Vietnam and the high expectations which greeted Jimmy 
Carter upon taking office, there were at least five additional factors that were particularly 
important to the future of the American military and civil-military relations.     
    First, according to mounting Cold War rhetoric from defense officials and military 
officers, the capability of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviets had declined significantly.  
Outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lamented in his annual defense guidance 
that reductions in defense spending in the 1970s, combined with the enormous cost of 
sustaining the war in Vietnam, had severely “retarded the rate of modernization and 
expansion of U.S. forces.”77  At the same time, as General Brown emphasized in his briefing 
to President Carter, the Soviet Union had more than doubled its defense outlays relative to 
the U.S.78  Regardless of how one viewed the Soviet intentions, their capabilities appeared 
formidable—almost all of their modernization had gone into forces which constituted, in the 
words of defense analysts, a “direct threat to the United States and its European allies.”79  
Some argued that the fictional “missile gap” of the 1960’s had become a reality.  Since 1965, 
the U.S. had developed one new intercontinental nuclear missile; in that same period, the 
U.S.S.R. had developed seven, and three of their newest missiles demonstrated more 
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accuracy and power than even the best American model.80  Defense experts considered the 
Russian front-line tank in Europe superior to any tank in NATO.  Additionally, the Soviet 
Navy had embarked on a massive shipbuilding program and had just launched its first aircraft 
carrier, creating a “maritime problem” that constituted a “substantial and growing challenge 
to the U.S. and its free access to the seas.”81  Intelligence reports circulating in the DoD 
indicated that Soviet ballistic missile submarines had “started patrolling as close as three-
hundred miles” off the American coast and that the Soviet Navy was capable of developing a 
“depressed trajectory” submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which would provide 
“almost nothing” in the way of warning against a pre-emptive strike.82  Published just before 
Carter took office, the conclusion of the FY78 Defense Guidance emphasized that, “to a 
degree unprecedented in history, the United States has become directly vulnerable to 
attack.”83 When President Ford proposed a record setting $130 billion for defense in FY78, 
one Pentagon official explained: “The Russian’s aren’t coming—they’re here.”84  While 
many would dispute the validity of the Cold War rhetoric, the fact remained that it had 
reached a near crescendo by the time Jimmy Carter assumed office. 
    Second, the military faced a potential personnel crisis as it entered the second half of the 
1970s.  After the abolition of the draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force, the 
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military initially appeared to have stabilized its recruiting.  However, 1974 saw a significant 
drop in volunteers and by 1975 most Services, the Army especially, found themselves 
significantly short of people.  According to one Army official history, when faced with such 
challenges associated with the All-Volunteer Force, many high-ranking officers “began to 
question the efficacy of the concept once again.”85  The Army and the rest of the military 
were not alone in recognizing the problem: one independent study projected that by FY80 the 
military would need to recruit one out of every three eligible service-age males to meet “total 
force requirements.”86  The Air Force, in what was termed its period of “retrenchment,” also 
faced manpower shortages.87  As a result of this personnel crisis, one suggested remedy was 
the fuller integration of women into the military.  The U.S. military already by 1976 had 
130,000 women in service, the largest number of females of any military force in the world; 
yet, the roles that these soldiers would fill were still under debate, leading to much 
uncertainty within all of the services as to how they might have to adapt.88  Indeed, 
Congressional hearings concluded that in 1977 the military was “at something of a 
crossroads in regards to the cost of defense manpower.”89 
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    Third, this time period saw the military in significant fiscal turmoil.  Unprecedented 
inflation rates undermined the overall stability of the economy and threatened to wipe out the 
increase to the defense budget proposed by President Ford.90  The long-term impact of the 
1973 and 1977 OPEC oil embargoes had been to increase the price of fuel to the point that it 
was prohibitive for many services to conduct training exercises.91  Beyond the impact of 
inflation and fuel shortages, the military increasingly struggled to fund research, 
development, and procurement for new weapons systems because of rises in personnel 
operating costs.  One major increase in costs came from pay for retired veterans, over one 
million of whom drew government pensions in 1974, a 150 percent increase from a decade 
earlier.92  In FY1964 overall personnel costs accounted for only 28.7 percent of the defense 
budget, but by FY1976 rose to 36.5 percent, with projections close to 57 percent for 
FY1978.93  These “off the top” costs within the military budget drastically reduced money 
available for developing future weapons systems and for the procurement of more modern 
ones.94  Longtime Department of Defense (DoD) official William Perry, then chief of 
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research and development at the Pentagon, said that his “single most serious problem” was 
that by 1977 the U.S. defense technology budget had decreased by a factor of two since 
1964.95  This financial crisis meant that many within the military saw the new weapons 
programs proposed at the end of the Ford Administration as particularly critical. 
    The fact that Carter’s first year saw the emergence of these new weapon systems was thus 
the fourth significant factor bearing on the future of civil-military relations as he took office.  
Many high ranking military officers saw the procurement of these weapons as essential to 
balancing and eventually surpassing the Soviet Union’s military capability.  Today these 
systems are crucial to the fighting forces, but in 1976 many were hanging by a thin fiscal 
thread.  The Army’s XM-1 tank, Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, the Apache helicopter, 
and long-range Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) were all in the nascent stages of 
development.  After ten years in development, the Air Force’s crown jewel, the B-1 bomber, 
was about to enter limited production as the costliest aircraft in history.  The Navy was just 
starting to field its advanced “Aegis” air defense system and was fighting for funds to 
commission a fifth 97,000-ton nuclear-powered supercarrier.  The Marines were on the verge 
of replacing their obsolescent A-4 attack aircraft with new “Harrier” and F-18 jet fighters.  
All of these advancements would require continued funding in the defense budget and 
approval from the new president. 
    Finally, the political climate in national defense was shifting significantly.  In one aspect 
this seemed to bode well for the military, since some polls were indicating that public 
opinion now favored higher defense spending.  One such poll indicated that, while in 1972 
only 49 percent of Americans felt that military defense spending should be increased or 
maintained, by 1976 71 percent of Americans felt that way.  Similarly, in the same period, 
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those calling for reduced military spending fell from 37 percent to 20 percent.96  Echoing 
public sentiment, the U.S. Conference of Mayors in late 1975 refused to endorse a resolution 
calling for a shift from defense to domestic spending, despite the fact that their cities were 
hard pressed for funds.97  One senior Pentagon correspondent expressed his view of the 
situation by stating that Jimmy Carter would “take office enjoying an unusually wide 
agreement among hawks and doves that the Soviet military buildup is real and that the U.S. 
dare not cut its defense spending.”98 
    In addition to the beginning of increased public support for higher defense spending, the 
role of Congress’ oversight and involvement with the defense budget and policy making 
process had also increased markedly in the years prior to Carter taking office.  While 
Congress has always played a role in this regard, many senators and congressmen desired to 
become even more focused on debating and changing specific details of the defense budget 
in the post-Watergate years.  This more detailed congressional process of examining defense 
authorizations and appropriations line-by-line, debating them, and then changing them for 
presentation to the executive was still evolving during the years before Jimmy Carter would 
take office.  In the opinion of a Washington Post editorial this increased involvement of 
Congress in the defense process by 1975 amounted to “little more than a license to scrutinize 
certain Pentagon enterprises and not others and to do so in a piecemeal, ad hoc way.”99  The 
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Carter administration would therefore be dealing with a Congress whose power in regard to 
defense spending was definitely increasing, but still somewhat ill-defined.  
    Part and parcel to this evolving role of Congress in defense affairs, the political 
composition of several key committees in Congress which would directly affect the military 
had changed significantly in 1976.  Congressman Edward Hebert (D-LA), the long-time 
“dictatorial” chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who had always insisted 
“the Pentagon knew best,” retired at the end of 1976.  The Pentagon’s main challengers on 
the committee—Lucien Nedzi (D-MI), Robert Wilson (D-CA), Robert Leggett (D-CA), Les 
Aspin (D-WI), Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Bob Carr (D-NY), and Thomas Downey (D-
NY)—all won re-election.  In both the House and Senate, the budget committees had 
increasingly challenged the Armed Services with success.  In the Senate, Edmund Muskie 
(D-ME) enlisted the support of fellow members of his Budget Committee to overrule Armed 
Services Chairman John Stennis (D-MS) by refusing to fund an expensive nuclear-powered 
cruiser for the Navy.  Washington Post Pentagon correspondent George Wilson concluded 
that these changes would “promise a series of thoughtful and sometimes stiff challenges to 
Pentagon weapons and policies.”100 
A New Captain on Board:  The “Browning of the Pentagon” and the Initial Reactions  
  
    Amid this uncertain military-political climate, at a time where the armed forces were still 
trying to recover from Vietnam, the Carter administration began with ambitious plans 
economize the defense budget and change defense and foreign policy.101  Carter himself 
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wanted to pursue this course of action based partly on his own personality and partly on, in 
the words of his most senior military advisor, “serious reservations about what happened 
during the Vietnam War.”102  As a Naval Academy graduate and former submarine officer, 
Carter felt that he had unique qualifications to manage, institute budgetary control, and 
employ systems analysis in the Department of Defense.  His engineer-style approach was to 
“make a list, compare, establish priorities, and cost-out things” and, regarding his personal 
involvement in the defense budget, stated, “I thoroughly enjoyed that role.”103  His hero was 
Harry Truman, and Carter greatly admired the former president’s “strength in the face of the 
inevitable unpopularity of demonstrating the power of civilian control over the military” and 
admitted that he had “privately cheered” Truman’s decision to relieve General Douglas 
MacArthur for opposing civilian policy during the Korean War.104  When asked directly if 
Carter entered office with suspicions about the military, General David Jones, who served on 
the JCS for all four years of the Carter administration, did not feel that this was the case.  
What was clear to General Jones, however, was that Carter strongly believed that the 
military’s “priorities got mixed up during the Vietnam War.”105   
    Part of this perception about the military “losing its way” may have been linked to the 
president’s personal beliefs regarding the nature of the U.S.-Soviet conflict.  Whereas the 
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military and most previous administrations had focused upon the Soviet Union as the primary 
threat to American national security, Carter did not necessarily agree.  When later reflecting 
on his tenure, he unhesitatingly stated that unrest in Panama posed the “most serious and 
immediate threat” to U.S. national security.106  He, along with his closest foreign policy 
advisor, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, did not think of the U.S.-Soviet standoff in terms of 
a “Cold War.”107  His desire to seek immediate and far-reaching cuts in nuclear arms with the 
Soviet Union was indicative of his belief that the two sides would continue détente and work 
together.  He firmly believed that the time was ripe for nuclear disarmament and that he 
should aggressively revitalize the stagnating Vladivostok arms control agreement with the 
U.S.S.R. reached during Ford’s tenure.108  This was seen by some as a “political gamble” 
which challenged “grim predictions about Soviet military superiority.”109  President Carter 
came into office seeking peace and, when reflecting on his military service, assured listeners 
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on television that he felt “no aspect of militaristic inclination now on my part.”110  Jimmy 
Carter felt strongly about these ideals and sought to put them into practice when he assumed 
the presidency. 
    Although Carter may have dismissed his “militaristic inclination” and prided himself on 
his peanut farming business, he was not a defense policy neophyte.  He had in fact honed his 
understanding of national security and the defense budget for some time before taking office.  
During his campaign, he and his staff had conducted extensive national defense research.  
Despite the presence of some public opinion polls supporting a rise in defense spending, 
Carter was presented with other authoritative evidence that indicated that the time was right 
to go on the offensive against excessive military largesse.  In a memo which Carter 
recommended all members of his staff read, Harvard Professor William Schneider presented 
substantial data that the “public opinion trend since the early 1960s” had brought about “the 
destruction of the traditional pro-military consensus in the American electorate” and that 
“with so little consensus on military issues” it would be difficult to find any “valence 
sentiment likely to sweep the electorate in 1976.”111  Soon afterward, Carter’s staff requested 
background papers from the Center for Defense Information (CDI), an organization often 
critical of Pentagon claims and analysis, regarding the 1976 Defense Budget, defense 
manpower studies, the Trident SLBM program, and the B-1 bomber, as well as other defense 
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programs.  The staff began to compile such information into a series of “discussion papers” 
which were sent to Carter to expand his knowledge of national defense policy issues.112 
    Beyond the role of his staff in the process, Carter also took a strong personal interest in 
defense policy.  He corresponded with his Navy mentor and nuclear-propulsion pioneer 
Admiral Hyman Rickover regarding advantages and disadvantages of nuclear-powered 
aircraft carriers.113  He questioned former Annapolis classmate Admiral Stansfield Turner on 
the state of the U.S. military during a rapid fire session of “tough, intelligent, relentless” 
questions that left the admiral “mentally drained.”114  Carter also maintained close 
correspondence with Marine Colonel James Donovan at CDI.  Donovan authored no fewer 
than six briefing papers for Carter, always providing background information and evidence to 
refute or soften the strong Cold War rhetoric of the Defense Department.  Donovan’s 
conclusions were sharp; according to CDI research, claims of a decline in U.S. military 
strength vis-à-vis the Soviets had “no basis in fact.”115  This personal research into different 
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areas of defense policy and strategy provided the future president with much background 
information and many facts that he later used to argue against further military buildup. 
    Carter did not ignore the factors bearing on the future of the defense budget during his 
campaign for president; on the contrary, he and his staff calculated carefully every public 
comment that they made about national defense.  Convinced that in 1976 both Congress and 
the American public were “being subjected to the most extensive fear campaign since the 
1960 ‘missile gap,’” Carter remained on guard that “a crisis of confidence in United States 
military power” could be created.116  Veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke advised Carter 
that, even if they were not conducting the perceived military buildup, the Soviets were very 
much interested in who would win the 1976 election and could take steps to either promote 
or hinder Carter.117  Meanwhile, Carter sent his aide Stuart Eizenstat to visit the prestigious 
Brookings Institution to seek out advice on American national security policy and defense 
spending.  The institution’s report concluded that “the defense budget could be cut without 
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impairing our defense posture” and that many military troop deployments and warfighting 
plans were “anachronistic” and needed to be re-examined.  By increasing efficiency in the 
Pentagon and changing procurement policy to “stop buying the most expensive weapon 
systems,” the analysts at Brookings felt that Carter could safely reduce defense spending.118  
After President Ford released his FY77 budget, a staff consultant pointed out to Carter’s 
campaign headquarters where up to $8.5 billion could be “safely cut without endangering 
national security.”  The recommended cuts included the Air Force B-1 bomber, the MX 
missile program, the Trident SLBM, the Army’s Apache attack helicopter, the Navy’s 
proposed nuclear carrier, and reductions in retirement benefits for DoD personnel.119  Carter 
had done his research and was prepared to institute major change in defense policy. 
    Carter’s views and plans regarding the military and national security were not hidden.  He 
made bold and specific defense-related campaign promises.  He repeatedly vowed to cut the 
defense budget by $5 to $7 billion, commented often about “Pentagon wastage,” and stated 
that he wanted personally to assert control of, and “discipline” over, the Pentagon and its 
budgetary process. 120  He sought to gain more control over military officer promotions and 
assignments.  In particular, he saw military retirement pay, taking up to 7 percent of the 
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annual defense budget, as an egregious waste of taxpayer money given the fact that many 
pension holders pursued a second career in civilian government positions.121  He promised to 
institute rigorous “zero based budgeting” (ZBB) throughout the federal government, but 
especially in the Department of Defense, immediately after taking office.122  Additionally, he 
criticized several costly new weapons systems, especially the B-1 bomber as “an example of 
a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayer dollars.”123  
Beyond targeting specific programs such as the B-1 for possible termination, Carter indicated 
to the military through his transition team that he planned to employ the “controlled 
adversary process” which called for each service to compete against the others for resources 
and publicly critique the others requests during the annual defense budget process.124  
Clearly, President Carter’s plans for the Pentagon were ambitious, far reaching, and well 
known to the military as he began his term. 
    Carter’s choice of Harold Brown, a former “whiz kid” member of the McNamara defense 
department, as Secretary of Defense demonstrated a desire to increase discipline in the 
Pentagon and apply systems analysis to problems.  In choosing Brown, Carter felt he had “a 
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scientist with a thorough knowledge of the most advanced technology” as well as “a 
competent business manager, strong willed enough to prevail in the internecine struggles 
among different military services.”125 Brown had previously served as head of Pentagon 
Research, Development, and Engineering under McNamara and had shown a willingness to 
oppose major weapon systems such as the Skybolt missile and the B-70 bomber.  Like 
Carter, he was a “strong believer in reliance on the analytical capabilities of systems 
analysis.”126  This school of “systems analysis” carried a highly negative connotation for the 
military.  Many military officers considered McNamara’s reliance on systems analysis—and 
disparagement of military experience and judgment—as responsible for the failed military 
strategy in Vietnam.127  High-ranking military officers saw Harold Brown and McNamara as 
similar and worried as Brown took over the Pentagon’s highest post. 
    In addition to his appointment of a McNamara protégé to lead the Pentagon, other early 
actions during his term made it seem that Carter might have hostile views toward the 
military.  His decision to pardon draft evaders and deserters from the Vietnam War one day 
after taking office must not have registered well with many in the military.  During a March 
1977 visit to the Pentagon, several enlisted soldiers voiced their displeasure to the president 
at a news conference.128  Only a few days later on live network television, the president 
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tersely informed Walter Cronkite, when asked about the issue, that he was not considering 
any bonus to Vietnam veterans for their service.129  Such sympathy toward draft evaders and 
deserters, combined with dismissing those who had served in Vietnam led the national 
commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars to label the Carter administration “the most 
anti-veteran” in the nation’s history.130 
    The military was apprehensive about the administration’s plans for defense for several 
additional reasons.131  The JCS and other high-ranking members of the military were wary of 
Carter’s plans for extensive arms-control negotiations with the Soviets.  Most felt that the 
previous SALT I agreement under Nixon and the Vladivostok accords under Ford locked the 
United States into a “permanent position of inferiority” in the overall strategic balance.  In 
addition, there was a widespread belief among the military, substantiated by some 
intelligence reports, that the Soviets were cheating on the agreements.132  For these reasons, 
General Brown’s initial briefing to Carter on SALT stated that “the unfavorable trend 
between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces is of grave concern and will continue to 
worsen until the early 1980s, when U.S. Trident, B-1, and MX programs will affect the 
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trends.”133  Brown, a gregarious, articulate, and politically well-connected officer, had been 
assigned the heavy responsibility under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger of steering 
the procurement of these new strategic programs through Congress.134  As Chairman, Brown 
had more joint service in the Pentagon than any general officer at the time, and the JCS had 
high hopes that he could help reverse in Congress what was already seen as a steady 
weakening of U.S. strategic power.135 
    General Brown’s status at the outset of Carter’s term, however, proved to be another 
source of apprehension for the military.  On October 10, 1974, while addressing students at 
the Duke University Law School, he made anti-Semitic comments to the effect that Jews 
“own all of the banks in the country” as well as all of the newspapers, that Israel had 
“Congress in their hip pocket,” and implied that a potential solution to the problem might be 
a military coup of the federal government.136  His comments sparked an immediate firestorm.  
The Jewish War Veterans and the Anti-Defamation League called for his dismissal.137  
Joseph Califano, Jr., a prominent Washington lawyer who would later serve as Carter’s 
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Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, wrote an editorial in the Washington Post 
calling for Brown’s ousting because he had “irreparably damaged his ability to serve 
effectively as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”138  Brown apologized publicly and 
President Ford, despite considerable political pressure, refused to dismiss him.   Several 
weeks later Brown again seemed to lose control during an interview, telling a reporter that 
Israel was a “military burden” to the United States, that Britain had a “pathetic” military, and 
that the Shah of Iran was seeking to re-instate a “Persian Empire” in the Middle East.139  
Soon to be Vice-President Walter Mondale declared that Brown was unfit to be even a 
“sewage commissioner” and should resign immediately.140  The media lampooned Brown, 
with one editorial cartoon portraying him sitting at his desk in uniform writing a speech 
consisting of “ethnic remarks” with his head as a balloon tethered to his tie.141  Still, Ford 
refused to dismiss the Chairman.  Throughout his tenure the media continued to pay close 
attention to Brown’s public and private comments, leading to further calls for his resignation 
as late as April 1977.142  Given these misstatements and his political vulnerability, many 
high-ranking military officers saw Brown as weakened and unable to oppose strongly any 
plans of the civilian leadership.143 
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    Beyond the fear that the highest-ranking officer in the military would be unable to 
represent the military perspective effectively, many high-ranking officers also worried about 
Carter’s intentions to manage the defense budget.  The very areas in which Carter proposed 
to make changes—retirement pay, officer promotions, and personnel assignments—were the 
areas where the military had in the past most actively resisted civilian “interference.”144  
Carter’s proposed “controlled adversary process” approach to the annual defense budget also 
went directly against the traditional “logrolling” approach employed by the JCS, which, 
according to Lieutenant General Ray Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff, always generated 
decisions that were “a compromise position.”145  Carter’s “adversarial approach” was so 
unusual that it alarmed several high-ranking officers, one of whom wrote on a memorandum 
discussing the plan: “God help the U.S. and the DoD if we revert to type and do what this 
suggests—I am working with CSAF [Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Jones] to 
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see if we can stop it from happening.”146  Military apprehension of Carter’s plans for 
managing the DoD was great, but was not yet widely known. 
    Many of Carter’s top civilian appointees recognized these military concerns.  Harold 
Brown expected some difficulties upon entering office.  He knew that many of the current 
military leaders had been in the Pentagon during his tenure with McNamara and might 
question his leadership.  He also knew of the influence that retired military officers could 
have on their active-duty brethren, admitting that “in the fading memories of some of the 
retired chiefs I am remembered as one of the ‘whiz kids.’”147  Acutely aware of the 
perception that he was “introverted and likely to come across as cold,” Brown intended to 
make a conscious effort to mitigate, even if he could never fully overcome, this “problem.”148  
Robert Komer, Undersecretary for Plans and Policy, summarized Brown’s efforts well:  
“Harold was a veteran of the McNamara years,” but at the same time had “obviously studied 
carefully what McNamara did right and wrong, and had consciously tried to handle himself 
differently than Bob McNamara.”149  Secretary Brown was committed to making the civil-
military relationship in the Carter Administration as free of conflict as possible. 
    Trends and perceptions within Congress at the start of Carter’s term also affected civil-
military relations within the administration.  First, Carter had specifically campaigned as a 
“Washington outsider,” negating some of the advantage a Democratically-controlled 
Congress might offer.  He vowed to avoid “Washington habits which had made it possible 
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for the American people to be misled” and, in emphasizing this, placed even members of his 
own party on the defensive.150  General Alexander Haig, the politically ambitious NATO 
commander at the time, felt that the president “made it inevitable that the Washington 
establishment would treat him as an antibody to be driven out of the system.”151  Second, 
despite the changeover of key personnel in the committees relevant to the military, pundits 
noted that recently-published polls supporting increased defense spending had influenced 
Congress to be wary of supporting Carter’s call for reductions.152  Even the Brookings 
Institution, having advised Carter in early 1975 about waste in the Pentagon budget, noted 
these trends and declared that the FY77 defense budget should increase.153  Thus, as Carter 
prepared his first defense budget, Congress had reason to be less than supportive of his plans 
to economize on defense spending. 
    Congress demonstrated its apprehension about Carter’s plans for defense during Harold 
Brown’s nomination.  Brown expected a difficult confirmation, keeping a note in front of 
him reading: “Keep Cool. Say Less. Stop.”154  Brown did indeed keep his cool, holding up 
under five hours of “microscopic examination,” while addressing the Senators as a respectful 
younger man—rather than taking the brash, sometimes overwhelming approach of Robert 
McNamara.  He downplayed Carter’s proposed $5 to $7 billion reduction in the defense 
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budget, saying it should be seen as “savings rather than cuts.”  In the end, the Senate 
unanimously confirmed him, although Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) accused Brown of 
“withholding his views” on all major weapon systems planned for procurement.155 
    Soon after the confirmation hearings, Secretary Brown appeared before Congress with 
General George Brown to submit the unmodified Ford/Rumsfeld Defense budget, as was 
customary for the incoming Secretary of Defense.  Some members of Congress made clear 
their reservations about the new administration’s plans.  Senator John Tower (R-TX) told 
Brown that some of the administration’s policies appeared “a little long on eagerness and a 
little short on caution.”156  While such a statement might be expected from an opposition 
party member, Senator Sam Nunn’s (D-GA) made the unusual request to General Brown that 
the Joint Chiefs report directly to the Armed Services Committee because “in the past the 
President of the United States and the Secretary of State have ignored the advice of the Joint 
Chiefs.”  Although Brown seemed surprised, he welcomed the request and agreed.157  The 
pact would have significant ramifications throughout the rest of the administration, as the 
Pentagon now knew it had a powerful ally on the committee from Jimmy Carter’s home 
state.  Soon after General Brown and Senator Nunn’s agreement, the hearings ended with 
Secretary Brown proposing to modify and resubmit the FY78 defense budget by the end of 
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February—only a three-week deadline for a huge undertaking.158  As work started on the 
modification of the FY78 defense budget, the first major task requiring sustained interaction 
among the White House, the Pentagon, and Congress in the Carter Administration began. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONGRESSIONAL END-RUNS:  THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND CIVIL- 
MILITARY RELATIONS, 1977-1979 
 
Interlude:  The White House Cabinet Room, January 31, 1977, 4:00 p.m.1     
    Richard Stubbing, an analyst with Carter’s Office of the Management of the Budget 
(OMB), anxiously shifted several transparent viewgraphs at the head of the long oval table in 
the White House Cabinet Room.  Stubbing was a veteran of the Washington bureaucracy.  As 
a “defense specialist” in OMB he had helped craft every military budget since 1962.  He had 
given numerous briefings to important government officials, and he and his staff had full 
confidence that they knew all the details of the complicated defense budget and its various 
programs.  Yet, the situation now facing Stubbing was one that certainly gave him reason to 
be rather nervous. 
    At the center of the oval table a few feet from Stubbing sat President Jimmy Carter.  He 
had been in office only eleven days, but the president sat silently and confidently.  He looked 
intently at the part of the wall where the viewgraph projected its light, like an engineer eager 
to go to work on a challenging problem.  To the president’s right sat Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance and the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  On the left of the president 
sat Harold Brown and his deputy Charles Duncan.  Across the oval table from them were key 
officials from the Pentagon and OMB.  General George Brown, sitting directly across from 
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Harold Brown, was the only military member present.  Russell Murray, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Programming Analysis and Evaluation, sat to the General’s left.  Bert Lance, 
Stubbing’s boss and the head of OMB, sat directly across from the President, and James 
McIntyre, Lance’s deputy, sat next to him.  Stubbing had never briefed so many key officials 
at one time on a military budget and seldom had a president shown as much interest in this 
matter as Jimmy Carter. 
    This briefing was in fact extremely important to President Carter because the process of 
modifying the FY 1978 budget provided the first opportunity for him to become directly 
involved with the defense budgetary process and cut the defense budget.  In seeking to do so, 
Carter and Harold Brown immediately faced a quandary.  Carter had made his campaign 
promise of $5 to $7 billion in defense cuts before Ford and Rumsfeld had finalized their 
FY78 defense budget.  Just before submission, Ford cut his budget from $130 billion to a 
“lean” $123 billion, an amount widely considered to be a “bare bones” defense budget.  
Carter now faced the unsavory choice of having to break his campaign promise or break a 
previously negotiated NATO agreement that all members’ defense expenditures would have 
an above-inflation (real) increase of 3 percent per year.  Additionally, based on the structure 
of the Ford/Rumsfeld budget, any major cuts that Carter made would either result in a 
fundamental policy change or a challenge to “powerful vested interests,” such as base 
closings or personnel reductions.2 
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    The president did not shrink from the challenge and wanted to remain personally involved 
in crafting the defense budget.  As one of his first acts in office, he had directed Harold 
Brown and Bert Lance, Director of OMB, to work together to make the promised $5 to $7 
billion in cuts.  Carter’s instructions to them were to “eliminate those programs that 
contribute only marginally to United States and allied security” and to “defer programs 
where doubt exists about the value they add to combat effectiveness.”3  After three days of 
virtual “round the clock negotiation,” Brown and Lance, working with input from the 
military, settled on only $3 billion in cuts.4  Both men had met with President Carter on the 
Friday, January 27, 1977 and explained their proposal for the cuts.  The president expressed 
dissatisfaction with their work and refused to make a decision based on the information that 
they had presented.  Carter requested a briefing with more detailed information for the 
following Monday, saying he would decide only then if their proposal was acceptable.5 
    Stubbing felt haggard as he entered this meeting.  He had worked through the entire 
weekend with his staff to prepare it and spent the rest of Monday polishing the briefing now 
taking place at 4:00 p.m.  This had been no small task.  Stubbing and his staff at OMB had 
worked with civilians and military officers in the Pentagon to compile briefings on forty-five 
separate issues related to the defense budget, many of which addressed specific weapon 
system capabilities and offered in depth cost-benefit analysis.  They had consolidated these 
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issues into a briefing packet which they had delivered to the president on Saturday evening.6  
The core of the briefing, however, was a series of five viewgraphs representing “major areas” 
related to the defense budget, such as the overall spending on strategic weapons programs 
and U.S. defense spending supporting NATO.7  They were confident that these five 
viewgraphs should be sufficient for the briefing, since the president would probably only be 
interested in broad concepts and, since it was beginning so late in the day, the meeting would 
probably not last much longer than two hours.  Not wanting to be caught unprepared, 
however, the workgroup had made a viewgraph for each of the forty-five sub-issues on the 
assumption that the president “might wish to explore one or more selected issues in greater 
depth.”8  Lance leaned forward around General Brown and nodded his head to Stubbing, the 
signal that it was time to start the briefing.  In Stubbing’s personal reflection, what was about 
to happen at this meeting would be “far from the expected.”9 
    By the time Stubbing had finished with the first slide he knew he had made the right 
decision in preparing the backup viewgraphs for the specific issues.  It was also clear that the 
president had done his homework from the briefing book they had delivered to him on 
Saturday night.  Relentlessly, Carter plodded through each of the forty-five issues in detail, 
seeking input at various times from those present.  Russell Murray recalled that, although the 
president had spent only a few minutes on the slide pertaining to U.S. policy toward NATO, 
Carter examined the Navy and Marine Corps’ proposed CH-53E helicopter program in detail, 
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asking in-depth questions about the system’s capabilities and cost.10  “What were the 
advantages of three engines in the CH-53E versus two in the CH-53D model and was it 
worth the extra 10,000 lbs. of weight?  How much of an increase in range did this give and  
what would be this extra cost in terms of fuel annually?  Why did both the Navy and Marines 
want this helicopter for different purposes?  Would it be more cost effective for the Navy to 
use this helicopter for mine-clearing operations or would it be cheaper to build a larger fleet 
of wooden-hulled mine-clearing vessels?  Why did the Marines need this platform to carry 38 
fully equipped troops anyway?”11  Almost an hour passed before Carter felt satisfied enough 
to move on to the next viewgraph.12 
    Carter’s advisors were pressed to discuss the issues to the level of detail he requested.  
Harold Brown, as a scientist and former Pentagon head of research and engineering, proved 
even more knowledgeable about many of the systems than Carter, but the president seldom 
accepted his explanations and answers at this meeting, sometimes bluntly undercutting his 
Defense Secretary and moving on to the next question.  General George Brown, as the only 
uniformed member at the table, was often consulted but rarely felt able to give substantive 
input on such minute details.  The Chairman of the JCS was not renowned for his technical 
knowledge, and the meeting, now stretching into the night, was trying the patience of a 
general used to leaving the office at 5:00 p.m. on most days.13  He felt that the president was 
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trying to demonstrate his interest and knowledge of the defense budget by asking detailed 
questions, but seemed to have little concept of how all of these systems fit into the larger 
U.S. strategy of deterrence.14  Likewise, Zbigniew Brzezinski wondered if the president 
really cared about all of these details or if he was just trying to impress his advisors with his 
stamina.15  Russell Murray also longed for the president to skip the details and address 
higher-level issues such as the U.S. policy to NATO, but it was not going to happen at this 
meeting.16  The role of Congress in the appropriation and authorization process for many of 
these programs was barely mentioned.  In fact, very little of significance was resolved.  The 
seven-hour “marathon” adjourned at 11 p.m. with Carter indicating that he was still not 
completely satisfied and that he would decide on the final FY78 defense budget later.17 
    In many ways this first meeting between Carter and his defense advisors mirrored the 
civil-military interaction surrounding the annual defense budget for the next two years of his 
administration.  Assistant Director of OMB James McIntyre understated things when he said, 
“it’s accurate to say that for the first year Carter immersed himself in budgetary details.”18  
Indeed, the president’s intense personal role in the defense budget continued for two years at 
least.  While Carter agreed with many of the points and answers presented by Harold Brown 
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at the meeting, he continued to undercut and bypass him on defense budgetary matters.  As 
Stubbing observed after this first meeting, “Carter’s insistence on double-checking each of 
the decisions made by his subordinates raised doubts for the first time as to Harold Brown’s 
clout” while at the same time Carter “seemed unconcerned with the need to publicly support 
his Secretary of Defense.”19  Furthermore civilians and military within the defense 
establishment united in their disapproval of Carter’s behavior and it cemented civil-military 
cooperation inside the Pentagon, at least regarding the defense budget.  Finally, the president 
gave little concern or consideration to the role of Congress in the defense budgetary process.  
Carter, as commander-in-chief and a former naval officer, felt that he should ultimately 
dictate what programs in the military would continue to have funding, with Congress 
approving it pro forma, thinking that led ultimately to significant White House-
Congressional conflict over the defense budget and opened the door for a strong military-
congressional alliance and several very successful Pentagon “end-runs” to fund costly 
weapons programs that the administration did not want.  Altogether, Carter’s detailed 
interventions—really micromanagement—proved self-defeating in the end. 
The Test Case:  The Modification of the FY78 Defense Budget and Procurement Policy 
    Not long after the January 31, 1977 meeting, Carter approved the majority of the 
OSD/OMB budget proposal.  Harold Brown and General George Brown presented it to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24, 1977.  The new defense budget totaled 
$120.3 billion, a reduction of about $3 billion from the Ford proposal.  Yet, the reworking of 
the budget significantly affected all the military services.  The Army lost funding for the non-
nuclear Lance missile, the Apache helicopter, and the Bradley fighting vehicle; the Navy had 
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a prized “nuclear strike cruiser” cut along with a submarine and two frigates; the Air Force 
faced reduced procurement of B-1s and F-15s and lost a new cargo plane; and the Marines 
lost the CH-53E helicopter.  In addition, the major new nuclear missile, the MX, was cut 
from “full scale development” to an earlier phase known as “advanced development” that 
would delay it for at least a year.20 
    Publicly, the military acquiesced and supported these changes.  General Brown stated in 
testimony that, “It will come as no surprise to the Chairman or other members of the 
committee that the judgment went against me,” but that the new budget would “provide 
adequately for the immediate security needs of our country.”21  In its official statement on the 
budget, the Department of the Air Force confirmed its involvement in “every iteration” of the 
budget process and alluded to no “significant disagreements” during the process.  Admiral 
James Holloway III, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), testified that, despite the changes 
in the FY78 budget, the new submission had a “very fine balance between fleet readiness and 
force modernization” and would allow the Navy to maintain a “margin of superiority over the 
Soviet maritime forces.”22  Subsequent testimony revealed that, although “systems analysis 
people in DoD” proposed most of the cuts, the military had ample opportunity to take part in 
the budget debates.  Each of the Services accepted several of the original proposed cuts and, 
in all cases where the Services appealed the cuts, the civilians accepted their appeals in whole 
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or in part.23  Even the usually critical special interest groups expressed little opposition to 
Carter’s 1978 budget and declared that it was “understandable” that the new administration 
“barely four weeks in office” would “feel responsible for at least addressing some of the 
campaign promises they made.”24  Thus, the level of cuts that Carter had proposed, and even 
the systems that he proposed to eliminate or delay, did not generate significant controversy or 
dissention in 1977.  Many high ranking Pentagon officers seemed willing to work with the 
new administration, perhaps hoping for a change after several months of experience in office. 
    In hindsight, however, the administration’s modifications to the FY78 defense budget 
indicated a fundamentally different policy toward defense spending.  Carter shifted defense 
procurement away from quickly acquiring new high-cost, high-technology systems in favor 
of sustaining older, less costly alternatives.  The budget, in taking away from new systems, 
had added over $600 million to deferred maintenance and modification to older equipment.25  
This change in defense procurement priorities demonstrated an assertion of civilian authority 
that went against the desires of the military.  Generally speaking, the Department of Defense 
recognized three competing priorities in the defense budget:  force structure (number of units, 
people, organization, and equipment), modernization (upgrading of equipment), and 
readiness (the ability of forces to go into immediate battle, based on the training of people, 
maintenance of existing equipment, and logistical capacity).  The military had traditionally 
viewed force structure as the most important, followed by modernization, with readiness the 
last priority.  Military thinking espoused the view that if they could get enough people and 
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weapons, then they would receive more money for modernization, and they could put off 
readiness until a crisis forced a rapid preparation for combat.  Carter, backed fully by Harold 
Brown, sought to economize defense spending and reverse these priorities, placing readiness 
of existing forces first.26 
    Thus, despite their public statements in support of the budget, the military hesitated to 
accept the changes in procurement proposed by the new administration—and so did 
Congress.  Senator Howard Cannon (D-NV) of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
admitted that he received a call from Army General James Hollingsworth in Europe who was 
“very much concerned” with the cancellation of the non-nuclear Lance missile and thought 
the system “very, very worthwhile.”27  Admiral H.G. Rickover, Carter’s service mentor and 
the pioneer of nuclear propulsion, put strong, behind-the-scenes pressure on Congress to 
increase shipbuilding and procure additional A-7E aircraft for the Navy.28  Air Force officials 
in charge of the B-1 bomber project met with contractors from Rockwell Corporation at a 
Maryland hunting lodge.  Subsequently, Rockwell President Robert Anderson provided 
stationary, stamps, and envelopes to all of the firm’s 119,000 employees and urged them to 
write their congressmen in support of the new bomber.29  Although publicly supportive of the 
budget, the military clearly had the leverage to lobby quietly for important programs, and 
many congressmen and senators proved more than willing to listen. 
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    The military lobbying and congressional desire to control priorities in defense spending 
resulted in a completely revised FY78 budget.  Although Congress retained the monetary 
value of the cuts as proposed by Carter, it prioritized the spending back in line with military 
preferences for procurement of more advanced systems.  Congress restored the Army’s 
Lance missile and the Bradley fighting vehicle, additional F-15 fighters and new cargo 
aircraft for the Air Force, and the Navy’s A-7 aircraft as well as some additional ships.30  
New to office, the administration did not challenge Congress’ redrafting of the defense 
budget; however, according to Harold Brown, the process of the FY78 budget “set the tone” 
for the rest of the administration’s defense budgets and “it was a fight all the way after that 
on specific programs and on totals.”31 
The White House vs. the Pentagon and Congress:  Crafting the FY79 Defense Budget 
    The Carter administration kept to its course during the creation of the FY79 budget which, 
as part of the administration’s changes in DoD planning, began almost immediately after the 
approval of the FY78 budget.  In building up the FY79 defense budget, Carter intervened 
personally at the start.  He also involved the staff of the White House, the NSC, and the 
OMB in the process and attempted to enforce strict “zero-based budgeting” in building his 
administration’s first complete defense budget. 32 
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    The early involvement by the president exacerbated tense relations with the Pentagon.  It 
was now clear that Carter was not just attending defense budget meetings to become better 
informed about the process.  The president spent over eighty hours examining the details of 
the FY79 defense budget.  According to special assistant Hamilton Jordan, Carter arrived 
well prepared for every meeting so that “the Joint Chiefs couldn’t go in there and bedazzle 
him with either budget figures or technical talk.”33  Some officers in the Pentagon questioned 
whether it was “necessary or desirable for the president to get so deeply involved with the 
intricacies of defense planning.”34  When explaining the administration’s new five-year 
defense budget planning process to the House Budget Committee, Defense Comptroller Fred 
Wacker called Carter’s early involvement in the process “disruptive” but defended it as being 
“a step in improving the link between planning and budgeting.”  House Budget Committee 
Chairman Robert Leggett (D-CA) disagreed, warning that, “every place you turn in the 
Pentagon you are either going to run into a mutiny in the ranks or perhaps a mutiny in the 
Congress.”35  Leggett’s prediction, while overstated, was prophetic. 
    Beyond his personal involvement, the president also increased the role of the White House 
staff in the defense budget process, creating additional civil-military tension.  In the White 
House, the “change in atmosphere was striking” when Carter’s staff arrived, noted William 
Jorden, a veteran White House staffer and later ambassador to Panama.  “Suits were replaced 
with slacks and sweaters . . . haircuts were two or three inches longer . . .” and “it appeared 
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the average age of the White House staff had dropped about twenty years.”36  One of Carter’s 
senior advisors resigned after investigative reporters revealed he had used cocaine and 
marijuana.  Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s special assistant and later chief of staff, was also 
accused of drug use and lewd behavior.37  Many senior military officers in the Pentagon thus 
questioned if the members of Carter’s White House staff had “the competence to get deeply 
involved in military issues.”38 
    Carter also pushed Zbigniew Brzezinski and his NSC to become more deeply involved in 
matters related to the defense budget process, but this too met stiff resistance from the 
Pentagon.  When assessing the progress of his NSC in October 1977, Carter listed the failure 
of Brzezinski to oversee “budget analysis” and “defense matters” as his most significant 
shortcoming.39  Though Brzezinski tried to become more involved in the defense budget 
process, he was forced to admit that he never really succeeded in doing so, largely because of 
Harold Brown’s lack of cooperation.40  The National Security Advisor noted that at times the 
effort to break into DoD matters “was like negotiating with a foreign state.”41   
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    The administration’s changes to the defense budget process soon drew the ire of Congress 
and resulted in a military-congressional alliance against White House budget priorities.  
Fueled by the leak of an unclassified paper from the Defense Department ordered to be 
“tightly held in Pentagon circles,” four members of the House Armed Services Committee, 
led by Congressmen Robert Sykes (D-FL) and Robert Wilson (D-CA) wrote to Secretary 
Brown requesting a full explanation of the new budget process.  The congressmen indicated 
that the proposed changes “spell out a move toward an ever tighter control of budgeting 
processes by a civilian ‘general staff’” and that the proposed changes “would exclude the 
recommendations of military personnel until the budget is in sufficiently final form to 
preclude corrections.”  The congressmen stated that they were “gravely concerned” with this 
development and that they had “discussed the matter informally with various members of the 
military community who also are gravely concerned.”  They also stated their fears that too 
many military witnesses appearing before Congress were “in the position of either supporting 
the programs approved by the Secretary of Defense or being replaced.”  They concluded with 
their intention to “explore measures which will ensure that witnesses can testify in complete 
candor” because this “unfortunately, is not now the case.”42   
    The forging of this military-congressional alliance smacked of rebellion against any effort 
to restore the civilian dominance in the Pentagon that had characterized the McNamara years.  
Despite his efforts to distance himself from his “whiz kid” past, many still feared that Harold 
Brown was instilling McNamara-style civilian supremacy in the Pentagon.  Jimmy Carter, 
while certainly not as domineering as Lyndon Johnson, was definitely willing to pry into 
details of defense spending and question and overrule his military advisors.  Most of this 
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resistance was to come from uniformed military in the Pentagon below the level of the JCS, 
such as the “iron major” who probably leaked the confidential memo.  Conservative 
members of the Armed Services Committee understood these fears and their letter clearly 
demonstrated that they would oppose any efforts to return to the McNamara days. 
    A military-congressional alliance was not the only opposition to Carter and his staff’s 
involvement with the defense budget.  By early 1978, despite the friction caused by Harold 
Brown’s changes, the civilians and military in the Pentagon adapted and worked with each 
other to oppose further White House intrusion.  Harold Brown’s efforts as a mediator paid 
off, and the Joint Chiefs largely accepted him as a reasonable and effective leader. Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, and later Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones remembered that 
the Chiefs “welcomed the assignment of Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense” and added 
that they were able to have deep “substantive discussions with Harold Brown and 
understanding of our concerns, and greater accommodation on his part.”43  New York Times 
Pentagon correspondent Bernard Weinraub described Brown’s relations with the JCS as 
“straightforward and surprisingly friendly” and that “on important issues . . . the Joint Chiefs 
have, so far, fallen into line under Brown.”44  It appeared that what the press was calling the 
“Browning” of the Pentagon was working out well for the civil-military relationship between 
the Chiefs and their civilian superiors. 
    The high quality of many of Harold Brown’s civilian subordinates facilitated civil-military 
cooperation in the Pentagon.  Brown’s special assistant, John Kester, gained a reputation with 
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military officers as a “player.”  According to Kester’s executive assistant, Colonel Colin 
Powell, Kester employed a “hard-nosed style,” and those who worked with him respected his 
direct approach and candor.45  Brown’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Charles Duncan, the 
former President of Coca-Cola, was highly regarded and “had a particular gift for handling 
defense contractors and politicking on the Hill.”46  A technical consultant to the Pentagon 
since 1966, William Perry assumed the role of Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering.  Perry proved a remarkably adept manager and succeeded in keeping many 
advanced weapon systems, especially for the Army, in the defense budget.47  Also part of the 
respected Brown team was David O. “Doc” Cooke, the deputy assistant secretary of defense 
for administration—known in some circles as the “Mayor of the Pentagon.”  A former Navy 
Captain, Cooke was also a Washington lawyer who understood how to make things happen 
in the sprawling Pentagon bureaucracy and had served in the job since 1971.  He would go 
on to become a thirty-year veteran of the Pentagon, serving through four presidential 
administrations as one of the most respected civil-servants in the government.  Colin Powell 
may not have been exaggerating when he declared that, “Without Doc Cooke, the Pentagon 
would not open in the morning.”48  These experienced, savvy officials contrasted 
dramatically with Carter’s young White House staff and assisted Harold Brown in forging a 
strong partnership with the military. 
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    The relationships between the Service Secretaries, the military chiefs, and Harold Brown 
varied and were not always conducive to civil-military cooperation.  General Jones, for 
example, described his relationship with Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson as a 
“delightful arrangement,” yet Stetson “absolutely could not get along with Harold Brown” 
and resigned his post rather quickly.  Stetson’s replacement, Hans Mark, indicated that he 
“didn’t mix very well” with Jones, yet General Lew Allen, who replaced Jones in 1978, said 
he had “close and friendly relations” with Mark.49  General Bernard Rogers, the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, had “very tense relations” with Clifford Alexander, his Secretary, and 
even contemplated resignation.50  Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor’s outspoken 
leadership gained the respect of superiors and subordinates alike, later earning him elevation 
to Deputy Secretary of Defense.51  Harold Brown and special assistant Kester attempted to 
circumvent the often-embattled Army and Air Force Secretaries and dealt directly with 
military members of their staffs.52  One Pentagon reorganization study commissioned by 
Brown even considered recommending the abolishment of the Service Secretaries with their 
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positions being taken over by the uniformed chiefs.53  In the end, however, Brown did not 
take such drastic action, but instead chose to rely more heavily on his under- and assistant- 
secretaries to conduct day to day business with the Army and Air Force. 
    Perhaps as in any work environment, the Pentagon civilians and military had some good 
and some troubled relationships.  Yet, the FY79 budget process demonstrated a trend toward 
more united civil-military opposition in the Pentagon to White House involvement in the 
budgetary process.  Three major areas demonstrated this trend:  the imposition of zero based 
budgeting (ZBB), the “turf battles” between OMB and OSD over the budget, and Pentagon 
attitudes toward the Carter White House. 
    Although Carter demanded that all government agencies institute ZBB, the Department of 
Defense resisted with particular vehemence.  One reason was that the Pentagon already 
employed the “cumbersome” Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) that, “in 
effect, did everything for us that ZBB would do” according to “Doc” Cooke, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Administration.54  Deputy OMB director James McIntyre 
acknowledged that the Pentagon was “one of the most organized submitters of the budget.”55  
In short, explained Cooke, “we did not need the discipline or extra work of ZBB.”56 
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    For the Pentagon, Carter’s attempt to impose ZBB proved to be “the ultimate in micro-
management.”57  Carter himself acknowledged that Harold Brown and the Pentagon resisted 
ZBB “vociferously,” but he still insisted upon forcing them to use the system.58  Brown 
admitted his resistance, saying, “I thought it was not a great idea.  You can’t keep pulling up 
the plant to look at the roots every year,” while Assistant Secretary of Defense Russell 
Murray urged Brown to tell “the President and OMB” to “consider special considerations and 
arrangements from the standard ZBB procedures for DoD.”59  In the end, the civilians in the 
Pentagon largely ignored the policy.  Congress convened hearings to discuss alternative DoD 
budgets and noted that, “the Defense Department is not really conforming to the mandate of 
the president to carry out ZBB,” and lamented, “it is time that we did some real ZBB on our 
national strategies.”60  United Pentagon resistance to ZBB carried the day. 
    The wrangling between OMB and OSD over the defense budget created further conflict 
between the White House and Pentagon.  OMB Director Bert Lance viewed the Pentagon as 
fiscally irresponsible.  He urged Carter to become personally more involved in the defense 
budget in 1979, something that the Pentagon dreaded after the “fiasco” of the 1978 budget.61  
Secretary Claytor criticized Lance and his organization, saying that “the staff at OMB 
                                                 
57
 Stubbing, The Defense Game, 361. 
 
58
 Jimmy Carter, interview with Goldberg and Matloff, OSD Oral History, 6, 23. 
 
59
 Harold Brown, interview with Goldberg and Matloff, OSD Oral History, 23.  For quote by Murray see 
Russell II Murray, "Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: March 10 NSC Meeting on the Cg-
Information Memorandum, May 5, 1978," CJCS Brown Files, 550 Budget, Box 34, NARA II, College Park, 
MD. 
 
60
 United States Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Alternative DOD Budgets : Hearing before the 
Task Force on National Security and International Affairs of the Committee on the Budget, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, February, 22 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977), 14, 22.  Hereafter cited as HCOB, Alternative DoD Budgets. 
 
61
 Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Lance Hits Pentagon on Overspending," Washington Post, June 4, 1977, 
E41.  For “fiasco” quote see Russell Murray, “Memo to Sec. Def. 5 May 1978.” 
 
 73 
considers themselves the super-secretaries of defense and they’d like to make all decisions 
internal and external on defense.”62  Russell Murray warned that in the Pentagon, “the whole 
building seemed to be united” in its concern about too much outside interference in the 
defense budget, and that “the problem is not in this building but with OMB.”63  Clearly, key 
leaders in the Pentagon objected to what they deemed over-involvement by an outside 
agency in their area of expertise. 
    In April of 1978, the conflict between OMB and the Pentagon worsened during the FY79 
defense budget debate when Carter placed his support behind the “defense specialists” in 
OMB.  One such specialist was Randy Jayne, a former Air Force pilot characterized by 
Bernard Weinraub as “typical of a group of little-known officials, often relatively young, 
who have moved into influential policy-making positions” in the administration.  Twelve 
years earlier, Harold Brown, who had already served eight years in the Pentagon, had handed 
Jayne his diploma at the Air Force Academy.  Now the tables seemed to be turned, with 
youth trumping experience.  When Jayne and Brown pitched their final figures for the 
budget—Brown requesting $130 billion and Jayne arguing for $126 billion—Carter sided 
with Jayne and proposed a $126 billion budget for FY79.64 Carter supported OMB over the 
Pentagon during the final stages of the FY79 defense budget.   
    The attitude inside the Pentagon toward Carter and his White House staff provided a final 
source of the conflict between the two.  The youth and seeming inexperience of Carter’s 
staff, combined with the adverse media attention focused upon them, continued not only to 
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color the perceptions of military officers, but also Carter’s own Pentagon civilian appointees.  
John Kester likened the Carter White House to a “Where’s Waldo?” book, saying that it was 
“just a big muddle” with “people stumbling all over each other” and that “most of them 
didn’t really know much about the Pentagon except that it was sort of big and evil.”65  “Doc” 
Cooke classified the Pentagon’s relationship with Carter’s National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, as “complicated” because Brzezinski spent too much time building up 
his own influence with the president and “trying to out Kissinger-Kissinger.”66  Major-
General John Singlaub, whom Carter had fired as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in Korea 
when he spoke out against the administration’s troop withdrawal policy, compared the 
president’s advisors to “summer interns.”67 General David Jones, the Air Force Chief whom 
Carter would later appoint Chairman of the JCS and certainly one of the most cooperative 
leaders in the military, also saw Carter’s closest staff in a negative light, stating that they 
failed to understand how to operate in Washington.68  Clearly the Pentagon seemed united in 
its disdain for the Carter White House. 
    Several senior military and defense officials were not only contemptuous of the White 
House staff but also of Jimmy Carter himself.  While the president was proud of his prior 
military service in the Navy and felt that it gave him credibility when dealing with military 
officers, others did not agree.  Harold Brown, for instance, thought that the president 
“overestimated the waste in the military compared to that in all other departments of the 
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government” because of his prior service.69  General Singlaub commented that Carter’s 
“claim” to have been a “nuclear engineer” for the Navy “rankled many senior Navy officers” 
and scoffed at the president’s assertion that rising to lieutenant commander in the Navy had 
prepared him to make “difficult decisions.”70  John Kester had a particularly hostile view of 
Carter.  He claimed that there was “something wrong” with the way Carter ended his service 
in the Navy.  He felt that the president “really, deep down, did not like the military,” and 
even believed that Carter “took a certain perverse enjoyment in having four-star people call 
him sir and that sort of stuff.”71  At least one member of the JCS noted this “anti-military” 
sentiment in a more subtle light:  Marine Corps Commandant General Louis Wilson went out 
of his way in his oral history to state that the President and Mrs. Carter had “discontinued” 
the practice of inviting a member of the JCS to the White House for state dinners and that he 
felt it was a “downgrading of the Chiefs.”72  In the opinion of Charles Stevenson, additional 
dinner invitations may not have mattered; in his view, “Jimmy Carter provoked anger and 
hostility among many senior officers by his style and policies” and his sometimes 
“condescending and sanctimonious” demeanor toward subordinates created gulfs “so 
profound that no social amenities could bridge them.”73 
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    Although a negative perception of Carter may have prevailed, both military and civilians 
in the Pentagon came to recognize and appreciate Harold Brown’s quiet, reasonable 
demeanor.  They respected his behind-the-scenes battle with Carter and his advisors over the 
defense budget.  General Wilson, despite at times offering vehement criticism of the 
president, stated that he had “nothing but high praise for Harold Brown.”74  General Jones 
acknowledged that he and the other members of the JCS knew Brown had “fought hard” for 
higher defense budgets and more programs but had done so “in a loyal way to a great extent 
in the Oval Office.”75  Kester agreed, categorizing Brown as “total loyalty in that regard,” but 
adding that “Harold would take the heat for Carter but I don’t think that Carter ever 
appreciated it.”  In the end, Kester felt certain that “the budgets were bigger than they would 
have been had Harold not been there.”76  Russell Murray made an even more profound 
statement:  “Harold pretty much saved the defense budget.  I think that everything we got in 
the defense budget was due to Harold’s efforts.”77  Likewise, Harold Brown spoke favorably 
of General George Brown, who he claimed had always given him frank advice and was “very 
supportive, very helpful.”78  It seemed clear that military disdain for the administration did 
not always extend to the civilians in the Pentagon, and that the civilians in the Pentagon were 
increasingly cooperating with the military to oppose the White House’s budget reductions. 
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    At the same time that civil-military relations between the White House and Pentagon 
became more strained, the administration’s relationship with Congress also soured.  Events 
outside the realm of defense, such as Carter’s unpopular stand on the Panama Canal and 
energy conservation, cost him in his relationship even with his own party in 1977.  Political 
scientist and retired Air Force Colonel Sam Sarkesian, in his 1979 study of the first two years 
of Carter’s Administration, stated that “even Jimmy Carter’s most sympathetic supporters” 
concluded “that there was something wrong in the national security area” and the political 
consensus “seemed to be that the national security policies lacked initiative, were primarily 
reactive, and reflected the administration’s inability to ascertain a clear focus and purpose.”79  
Carter’s congressional liaison, Frank Moore, proved ineffective and House Majority Leader 
Tip O’Neill (D-MA) told him to “stay the hell out of my office.”80  As a result, Brzezinski 
added Madeline Albright to his National Security Council Staff in 1978 as a special 
congressional liaison for defense matters.  She confirmed the poor relations with Congress, 
stating that Carter “didn’t do a lot of the oiling and stroking activity” that was required in the 
presidential-congressional relationship.81  Likewise, Carter’s special assistant Hamilton 
Jordan could not think of a single popular initiative supported or proposed by Carter in his 
first year: “Everything was a political loser.”82         
    The combined effects of the contested FY79 budget, the military “end runs” to Congress, 
the increasing civil-military cooperation in the Pentagon, the tension between the Pentagon 
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and the White House, and Carter’s declining standing with Congress weakened the 
administration’s ability to win its own priorities for defense spending.  The military 
recognized the opportunity offered by the confluence of these events and, as a result, 
increased its lobbying by aggressively courting recently-retired officers to speak out publicly 
against Carter’s policies.  The Navy which possessed one the best-organized Congressional 
Liaison office of the services and which was further strengthened by the good relationship 
between Secretary Claytor and the CNO, mounted a particularly effective lobbying effort.83 
As the FY79 budget neared completion, the Navy especially, but the other Services as well, 
saw what was coming and reverted to their well-honed practice—the “end run.” 
Showdown on the Beltway:  Carter’s FY79 Defense Budget Faces the Military-
Congressional Alliance 
 
    President Carter submitted the $126 billion proposal to Congress with the message that it 
was “prudent and tight” and “consistent with campaign pledges” since it was $8 billion 
below the Ford projection.84  The Navy felt the stinginess of the new budget in particular, 
suffering the loss of a nuclear-powered supercarrier and a reduction in overall shipbuilding 
by 20 percent.85  The Pentagon did not wait long after the submission of the new budget to 
leak its views to the press.  A high-ranking naval officer lamented that the new budget would 
put “the Navy in a Coast Guard status.” Another “Pentagon insider” likened Carter to George 
McGovern, who had run against Richard Nixon in 1972 as a boldly anti-war and anti-military 
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Democratic nominee.86  Discontent spread within the Pentagon, and several correspondents 
wrote about strong objections to Carter’s budget.  An anonymous “senior military official in 
the Pentagon” indicated “that there’s significant concern about meeting our readiness and 
force level requirements.”87  The military effort to reduce Carter’s control and increase the 
defense budget had begun. 
    As Congress reviewed the budget, a number of recently retired and active duty military 
officers stepped up their lobbying effort.  Recently retired General Richard Stillwell and 
retired JCS chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer both weighed in against the plans to increase 
civilian control over the budget process and in letters to Congressmen likened Harold Brown 
to Robert McNamara.88  Two other generals contacted House Budget Chairman Robert 
Leggett (D-CA) and told him, with unconvincing hyperbole, that the defense budget should 
be “fifty times” higher.89  The Navy League, one of the oldest and most potent of the military 
special interest groups, published a statement to members of Congress stating alarm with the 
“downward spiral of U.S. naval strength.”90  Admiral Rickover again applied his back-
channel pressure on Congress to overturn Carter’s shipbuilding cuts and restore the nuclear-
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powered supercarrier.  As the House Armed Services Committee blasted Harold Brown and 
added the carrier back into the budget, Congressman Tom Downey (D-NY) conceded that 
“Rickover’s got a stranglehold on the committee.”91  In contrast to the FY78 budget, the 
military’s lobbying effort appeared overt.  It was also extremely effective, and used by many 
members in Congress who wanted to challenge Carter’s national defense policy. 
    While retired and active duty military invoked the “end run” to resist Carter’s plans, the 
Secretary of the Navy took a more direct stand in opposition to official policy.  In a private 
meeting with the president, Graham Claytor told Carter to his face that he could not support 
the reduced shipbuilding plan and would work with his contacts in Congress to increase it.  
President Carter supposedly only smiled in response.92  This was not the first time that a 
Secretary of the Navy had openly opposed the President.  In 1947, James Forrestal “did all 
that he could to obstruct” the plan for military unification that President Truman had 
submitted to Congress.  Truman did not feel that he could fire Forrestal without creating a 
civil-military crisis because the Secretary represented the views of all high-ranking Navy 
officers.  Instead, Truman sought to compromise his own position and co-opt Forrestal.93  
This approach worked and may suggest why Carter acted as he did, for as previous 
comments from Harold Brown and John Kester indicated, Claytor was by far the most 
popular and respected Service Secretary by 1978.  It may also help explain why Carter 
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actually promoted Claytor to Deputy Secretary of Defense later.  What remained certain was 
that the military-civilian alliance in the Pentagon strengthened throughout the 1979 budget 
process to the point that the senior Service Secretary felt capable of openly challenging the 
president. 
    Not only did the military and civilians in the Pentagon talk to the press, conduct a behind-
the-scenes lobbying effort, and privately inform Carter that they opposed his plans, but their 
FY79 congressional testimony conveyed considerably less support than in FY78.  In 
February of 1978, both Harold Brown and General George Brown categorized the FY79 
defense budget as “austere, but adequate”—hardly staunch support from the two ranking 
defense officials in the administration.  Both warned of no “cut insurance” in the submitted 
budget, and “if reductions are made, it will cut into muscle—not fat or padding” and any cuts 
at all “could very well erode the very slim margin of superiority that we have over the Soviet 
threat.”94  Army Chief of Staff Rogers stated that he wanted the Bradley fighting vehicle 
retained and felt that the current budget had “major shortfalls” in Reserve readiness.  
Contrary to FY78 testimony about a “balance” in the Navy budget, in FY79 CNO Holloway 
testified that it was “adequate only to maintain the very slim margin of superiority” over the 
Soviets and stated that the nuclear-powered supercarrier should be built.95  The Service 
Secretaries provided similarly reserved support for the budget.  Claytor told Congressman 
Les Aspin (D-WI) that he was “concerned about the future” because the Navy “could very 
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well be in trouble.” Air Force Secretary Stetson’s statement expressed qualified support for 
the budget and admitted that he saw “potential problems ahead.”96  Seemingly the only 
support for the administration came from General Jones, who although “disappointed,” 
supported Carter’s cancellation of the B-1 bomber despite rigorous questioning by 
congressmen, one of whom called Jones a “defeatist” for not lobbying behind Carter’s back 
to continue the program.97  Jones himself confirmed the pressure and admitted later that he 
was “asked by some members of Congress to help end-run the President” but refused to do 
so.98  Compared to FY78, it seemed that the military had waited for Carter to change his 
policies and when he did not, in FY79 the dissention became openly public. 
    While the congressional testimony illustrated the civil-military cooperation in the 
Pentagon and the tension between the Pentagon and the White House, the reaction by 
Congress showed the strength of the military-congressional alliance.  Senator Tower (R-TX) 
again assailed Harold Brown, indicating that the “compelling arguments and 
recommendations of our uniformed military leaders” were being given scant attention.99  
Congressman Robert Leggett (D-CA), traditionally sympathetic to economizing defense 
spending, classified the FY79 budget a “controversial one” and felt that significant cuts could 
result in voters “erupting in response.”100  Ultimately, Congress reworked the budget again 
and approved more high-technology items, including the Navy’s fifth nuclear carrier costing 
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$2 billion.101  Congress, in the same manner as with the FY78 budget, had brought the FY79 
defense budget more in line with military prerogatives and this time had been brash, openly 
questioning the administration’s policies. 
    Carter blustered at having his first complete defense budget submission re-prioritized by 
Congress.  He took the “daring” and “extraordinary step” of vetoing the defense 
appropriations bill.  Indeed, a defense authorization bill had never before been vetoed.102  
The press characterized the move as Carter’s “most serious challenge to Congress in sixteen 
months in office.”103  Carter’s veto message set straight his priorities for defense spending, 
stating that “we need more immediate improvements in our defense forces.  The Navy does 
not need a fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,” and the expenditure for such a ship would 
force cuts in Army and Air Force equipment maintenance and research and development.104  
Carter made clear his resentment of Congress altering his plan for defense spending and 
declared that he, as the commander-in-chief, would be the one to determine how defense 
dollars should be spent. 
    The veto message provoked an immediate and harsh backlash from Congress. Even 
congressmen who had voted against the nuclear carrier went on the record saying that “it was 
a poor reason to veto a defense bill.”  One deemed Carter’s action “irresponsible.”  Melvin 
Price (D-IL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sent a scathing letter to 
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President Carter, lecturing him on the process of defense authorization and appropriation, 
refuting the assertions in the veto message line by line, and explaining how appropriating and 
authorizing a $2 billion nuclear carrier did not equate to cutting funds from other areas of the 
defense budget.  Having made his point, Price could “only conclude, Mr. President, that you 
have been ill-advised on the process of Congressional authorization and appropriation.”105  
He went on to lambaste the tone of the veto message and met Carter’s challenge to Congress: 
    The burden of your message is that Congress does not have a place in 
defense policy-making except to ‘rubber stamp’ recommendations of the 
Executive Branch.  I reject that philosophy.  I believe Congress deserves to   
be treated as a partner in defense decision-making, not as a poor relation.106 
 
Price then assailed Carter’s past record on defense, referencing a letter he had written a year 
earlier concerning the cancellation of the B-1 and the slowdown of the MX missile program: 
    At that time, I expressed hope that the Congress could work with the 
Administration to provide necessary defense systems.  Since that time, we 
have had the cancellation of production for the enhanced radiation weapon, 
the indecision in response to the demonstrated need to protect the vulner-
ability of our land-based ICBMs, the proposed withdrawal of our forces from 
Korea, and now the veto of a Defense authorization bill and a determined 
effort to stop another large aircraft carrier.  I am deeply concerned as to the 
cumulative effect of all these actions on our defense capability and equally 
concerned as to their effect on the perception of potential adversaries as to our 
willingness to meet our national security commitments.107 
 
He further noted Senate opposition to Carter’s veto, including resistance from Senator Gary 
Hart (D-CO), who “despite being one of the most vigorous spokesmen in Congress for going 
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to smaller carriers,” had called on his colleagues to override the veto.  Price closed with a 
promise that he would ask the House of Representative to override Carter’s veto in one week. 
    Carter, having fully committed himself and his administration, fought doggedly to prevent 
the veto from being overturned.  Vice President Walter Mondale held daily meetings to 
coordinate the effort.  The DoD provided information to Mondale’s staff, suggesting that 
they emphasize that “money would be taken from urgent time-critical needs for a purpose 
that is not time-critical” and recommending that Carter promise a conventionally-powered 
carrier in the FY80 budget.108  Harold Brown, who was reported to have “mixed feelings” 
about the veto in the first place, was forced into the role of public salesman while at the same 
time conducting lobbying behind-the-scenes with influential Senators.109 
    Knowing of the congressional challenge to Carter’s veto, high-ranking staff officers in the 
Navy staged what some insiders termed a “revolt.”110  Admiral Thomas Hayward, who had 
been selected to replace the retiring Holloway, became CNO at the beginning of the struggle. 
Hayward sought to maintain order within the Navy Department, giving harsh verbal orders to 
his most senior officers not to oppose the veto.  While at first this may seem to have been 
unnecessary given the tradition of civilian control over the U.S. armed forces, the situation 
was actually closer to a rebellion than Hayward may have expected.  The new CNO’s orders 
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were so openly disparaged by his junior staff officers that the admiral later softened his tone 
in an official memorandum.  He appealed to the same set of senior officers whom he had 
reprimanded and asked that they try to understand that the “fundamental goal” of the Navy 
must be to “preserve the momentum” already in place toward obtaining the conventional 
carrier promised by Carter.111  So weak was the CNO’s wording that senior naval officers 
anonymously termed the memo “an exercise in ambiguity” and a “masterpiece of 
obfuscation.”112  Noticeably absent were any instructions to stay clear of the ongoing 
lobbying efforts to overturn the veto.  Many naval officers chose to interpret Hayward’s 
position as being “if you lobby to override the veto, don’t get caught.”113  These senior naval 
officers were aware of the administration’s difficulties and more or less openly exploited the 
politics of the issue in order to get another nuclear carrier for their service. 
     The Carter White House did not stand idly by in the wake of such a major challenge.  The 
Office of Media Liaison mounted an extensive public relations campaign, disseminating 
“talking points” to all members of the staff while emphasizing that Carter had not taken the 
decision to veto “lightly” and that “the key behind the President’s veto is the fact that the Act 
reverses our national defense priorities by de-emphasizing immediate strength and 
readiness.”114  The concerted effort paid off and, by August 25, 1978, Carter’s staff could 
celebrate the fact that newspaper editorials were running nine to one in favor of the veto.115  
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Thus, when Congressmen Price revealed his intent to override the veto in his letter of August 
31, 1978, the president was unmoved.  He knew Price did not have the votes.  Carter’s 
Congressional Liaison Frank Moore dismissed Price’s challenge, noting that “we will have a 
clear-cut victory” when it came to the motion to override.116  Carter and his staff were 
correct.  Not only did the attempt to override the veto fail, but, in part by promising to 
request a conventionally-powered carrier of Nimitz-class size in the FY80 budget, the revised 
bill eliminated the nuclear-powered vessel.  Carter had his victory over Congress, but it had 
come at the price of hardening an alliance between military leaders and civilians in the 
Pentagon and defense hawks in Congress, and at the sacrifice of a possible future executive-
legislative defense policy consensus. 
After the Battle: The Veto and Civil-Military Relations through the FY78 and FY79 
Defense Budgets 
 
    Although much of the press and subsequent historiography tended to cast the veto as being 
simply a fight over the procurement of the nuclear supercarrier, clearly much else was 
involved.117  The president was locked in a larger struggle with Congress at the time over 
executive authority.  Carter threatened to veto up to thirty other bills “to conform to the 
administration’s program of budget restraint.”118  By his veto, Carter was sending a message 
which once again asserted his desire to reverse priorities in the defense budget process so as 
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to emphasize readiness ahead of force structure and modernization.  He was challenging 
traditional DoD budgetary priorities.  Finally, the veto had a lasting and adverse impact on 
Carter’s relationship with Congress in defense policy.  In an effort to repair the damaged 
relations, Harold Brown himself wrote an apologetic letter to Melvin Price (D-IL) and 
Charles Bennett (D-FL), Chairman of the House Sea Power Subcommittee, the latter having 
held his first news conference in thirty years to protest the president’s handling of the veto.  
Both congressional leaders rebuffed the Defense Secretary’s efforts to smooth the 
situation.119    
    To view Carter’s veto as a climatic battle or a decisive turning point in post-World War II 
civil-military relations would exaggerate its significance.  Nonetheless, if the budget was as 
important to civil-military relations as those involved at the time believed, it does provide a 
logical breaking point in examining the first half of the administration’s defense budgets.  
His future defense budgets were to be much larger, but the pressure of the military-
congressional alliance forced them even higher.  But by 1979 Jimmy Carter did not have the 
political capital to veto another defense bill. 
    In addition, Carter’s views on defense and foreign policy began to change by 1979.  Most 
secondary literature has attributed the change to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.120  At 
least one senior Defense Department official called the invasion a conversion-like 
experience:  Carter was “reborn after Afghanistan.”121  Yet, Carter had promised to increase 
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defense spending long before the Soviet invasion.122  Several other incidents—a Soviet 
combat brigade being “discovered” in Cuba, the seizing of American hostages in Tehran, and 
polls indicating a sharp rise in the popularity of defense spending in late 1978—also 
influenced Carter’s change of mind.123  As the next chapters will illustrate, these events 
combined with the strength of the military-congressional alliance, forced Carter to submit 
higher defense budgets in his last two years. 
    The defense budgets in FY80 and FY81 were less controversial and relatively larger than 
FY78 and FY79.  By the end of 1978, liberal members of Carter’s staff who had previously 
resisted any rise in defense spending began to support Pentagon requests for more money.124  
Harold Brown also became more vocal and assertive in pressing the president for higher 
defense expenditures.125  Publicly, Carter himself began to emphasize plans to increase the 
defense budget rather than decrease it, even while making cuts in social programs.126  The 
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president did this despite strong attacks from the liberal wing of his party.127  David Cooke, 
who felt that the defense budget “bottomed out” in FY79, conceded that in the last years “of 
Carter’s administration there was an upturn which foreshadowed the flood of the Reagan 
years.”128  Air Force Chief Lew Allen went a step further when he stated that Carter’s growth 
rate in defense, “had it been sustained,” would have been “a higher growth rate than the 
Reagan administration.”129  Allen was correct:  the administration’s FY80-81 defense budget 
requests were much higher than FY78-79.130  Indeed, by 1980 Carter emphasized how much 
the administration had boosted military spending in its last two years.131  Regardless of the 
motivation, Washington Post Pentagon correspondent George Wilson observed accurately 
that, by 1979, Carter had “chosen a far different path” than the campaign promises that he 
had made in 1976.132 
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    Finally, as Chapter IV will show, Carter became less personally involved in the FY80 and 
FY81 budget processes.  Harold Brown later admitted that Carter’s “strong personal role in 
defense decisions” had tapered off by the last two years of the administration.133  Consistent 
with limiting his personal involvement in the process, Carter also began increasingly to 
accept the advice of his military advisors.  The president had never shut out military advice.  
He just seldom followed it in his first two years in office.  As Carter distanced himself from 
the defense budget process, he proved more willing to listen to his advisors, although he 
resisted raising the defense budget to the levels which the JCS recommended. 
    The FY78 and FY79 defense budgets thus ended a phase of civil-military relations in the 
Carter Administration.  Growing cooperation within the Pentagon, increasing conflict 
between the Pentagon and the White House, and a strengthening military-congressional 
alliance best characterized civil-military relations during this phase.  This pattern prevailed 
because of Carter’s personal involvement in the budget process and his desire to re-prioritize 
defense spending.  Carter took office in the wake of the Vietnam War, during a period of 
great uncertainty about the future of the military.  His campaign promises and his initial 
intervention in the Department of Defense budget process demonstrated his far-reaching 
ambitions.  The military, apprehensive about increasing civilian interference and reduced 
defense spending, lobbied behind-the-scenes to Congress to defeat many of Carter’s 
modifications to the FY78 budget.  As the administration continued through the FY79 budget 
process, the military and civilians in the Pentagon formed a better working relationship.  
While civil-military cooperation in the Pentagon increased through the FY79 budget process, 
friction between the more-unified Pentagon and Carter’s White House also increased.  
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Carter’s relationship with Congress continued to deteriorate through 1978, and the military, 
along with some civilians in the Pentagon, sought an even stronger alliance with Congress to 
oppose Carter’s efforts to reshape and reduce the military establishment.  The veto of the 
FY79 defense authorization bill was the result. 
    Clearly, the primary point of contention for the military was presidential involvement early 
in the budgetary process and different priorities in spending, even more than the actual 
budget cuts.  While the military certainly wanted to keep all of its major programs, and some 
officers saw Carter’s ending his first meeting with the JCS with promises to cut the defense 
budget as a “parting shot,” there were also some realists in the military like Jones who knew 
that cutting the defense budget was not unique to the Carter administration.134  Jones stated 
bluntly that “everybody cut the defense budget” at some point in their terms:  “Nixon had, 
Ford had, and Carter cut it even more.  We didn’t like it.”135  The source of conflict was 
larger than any one program; it lay in Carter’s effort to reshape the allocation of resources in 
the military from force structure and modernization to readiness and maintenance, to impose 
OMB-controlled zero-based budgeting on the Pentagon, and to involve himself personally in 
many of the minute details. 
      The Carter administration found itself at odds with the military and Congress beyond 
defense budgets.  Carter’s desire to economize was also linked with several fundamental 
changes that he wanted to make in defense policy.  Moreover, the administration planned to 
change not only the substance of defense policy, but the manner in which defense and foreign 
policy were formulated.  The transition to new policies and a new policy-making process was 
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stormy—and again put the desires of the military and Congress in at odds with Jimmy Carter.  
Just as with defense budgets, there was significant conflict surrounding defense policy from 
1977 to 1978.
  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
CONFLICT:  DEFENSE POLICY AND PLANNING IN THE CARTER 
ADMINISTRATION, 1977-1978 
 
Interlude: The White House Situation Room, April 11, 1978, 3:15 p.m. 1 
 
    Zbigniew Brzezinski closed the door to the White House Situation Room.  This was a 
familiar place for him—as the National Security Advisor to President Carter he regularly 
conducted National Security Council Meetings here, many of them with the president in 
attendance.  Although Jimmy Carter was not here for this meeting, the president had ordered 
it to take place. Brzezinski would take charge and ensure the group discussed the important 
matters ahead. 
    The subject for the afternoon meeting was the overall East Asian strategy for the Carter 
administration.  The two most salient issues were the withdrawal of troops from South Korea 
and the future normalization of relations with China.  Each of the issues taken separately 
represented a major defense and foreign policy change for the United States.  Taken in 
concert they presented a series of very difficult challenges.  First, the individuals in this room 
would have to agree on courses of action which might conflict with their own agency’s 
interests or their own personal views.  Second, whatever consensus the president’s advisors 
reached, they would then have to gain congressional approval for these major shifts in the 
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nation’s defense and foreign policies.  This would prove very difficult given the president’s 
strained relationship with Congress over the first year of his term.  Finally, whatever 
decisions the civilian advisors reached in this room, they would have to gain tacit 
endorsement from another group—the uniformed military.  Though this certainly was not the 
constitutional role of the military, courting military approval remained part of civil-military 
relations in many administrations.  All of these factors had to be taken into consideration and 
presented complex problems for the group assembled in the White House Situation Room. 
    Brzezinski exuded confidence as he sat down at the head of the rectangular table in the 
center of the room.  The National Security Advisor took a sort of relish in these meetings.  
For him this was the policy making process as it was intended.  A group of senior staff 
members discussed the problems, developed solutions, and later one person (preferably 
Brzezinski himself) offered a sterile, emotionless briefing to the president who would then 
select one of the solutions.2  Though he knew chairing this meeting would not be easy, the 
fact that he was on his own turf boosted Brzezinski’s confidence.  He also enjoyed the 
company of three fellow NSC members—Deputy NSC Advisor David Aaron along with 
Michael Armacost and Michael Oksenburg, two senior NSC staff members.  Brzezinski and 
his NSC would have not only the home-field advantage, but also a numerical advantage over 
the two other departments in attendance—State and Defense. 
    Representing the State Department was its head, Cyrus Vance.  Described by one reporter 
as the “quiet and cautious member of the Carter cabinet,” the Secretary of State was indeed 
taciturn as the meeting began, peering over his glasses at Brzezinski.3  Known for being 
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“scrupulously polite” and one of the most “well-liked” men in Washington, it was unlikely 
that Vance would be difficult during the meeting even though his views and those of the 
National Security Advisor might clash.4  Supporting Vance in this meeting was Richard 
Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.  He would fill 
in some of the details regarding the situations in China and Korea with which Vance might 
not be so familiar.  In this meeting the State Department’s primary concern was moving 
ahead with the normalization of relations with China. 
    Harold Brown represented the Department of Defense.  He had brought only one aide to 
the meeting, Morton Abramowitz, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.  The reserved Defense Secretary leaned back in his chair anticipating the start of a 
contentious meeting.  Though certainly he would have to deal with the normalization of 
relations with China, the Defense Department’s main concern at this meeting was the issue of 
troop withdrawals from South Korea. 
    Notably absent from the meeting, by design and not by happenstance, were any uniformed 
service members.  In the Nixon White House, the uniformed military had often been part of 
the policy making process.5  Some argued that the integration of the uniformed military had 
reached a dangerous level when General Alexander Haig resigned his commission to take on 
the role of President Nixon’s chief of staff.  Back on active-duty, the general was later 
nominated and confirmed to be the vice-chief of staff for the Army and later the even more 
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influential position of SACEUR.6  Although merging the military and the political in 
Alexander Haig may have been a perversion of civilian control of the military in the Nixon 
administration, the Chairman of the JCS would almost certainly have been present if this 
meeting had occurred in the Nixon or Ford years.  The Carter-Brzezinski policy making 
system, however, had specifically sought to limit the role of the uniformed military, and 
General George S. Brown was not in attendance for this important meeting.7 
    Brzezinski began by asking Harold Brown to brief his area of concern:  the proposed 
withdrawal of troops from South Korea.  Brown himself had never thought that the troop 
withdrawals were a good idea, but when President Carter had made the promise during his 
campaign and again when he was elected, the Secretary of Defense became the principal 
defender of the decision both in public and before Congress.8  Both the JCS and the military 
commanders in Korea objected.9  When Major General John Singlaub, the Chief of Staff of 
U.S. Forces in Korea, publicly indicated that Carter’s decision would “lead to war,” the 
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president had recalled the general to Washington and fired him.10  Following this incident in 
March of 1977, Congress launched what reporters had termed a “frontal assault” on Carter’s 
Korea policy, calling Singlaub to testify.  Many prominent congressmen, such as Samuel 
Stratton, and senators, including John Tower and John Stennis, strongly opposed the 
withdrawals.11  Now, a year later, the Secretary of Defense recognized that in April 1978 the 
greatest problem with continuing with the plans for troop withdrawals was gaining 
congressional approval. 
    Brown explained that the President Carter favored troop withdrawals at a rapid pace—one 
full brigade by the end of 1978, with another by June of 1980.  Carter wanted to proceed with 
these withdrawals as planned, even if the Congress was not willing to vote the required 
military aid to South Korea that was part of his withdrawal plan.12 “It is not clear that that 
option is viable on the Hill, and even if it were, it would come at considerable cost to our 
credibility in East Asia,” Brown admitted.  Richard Holbrooke added that it would be seen as 
a “retreat policy from East Asia.”  It was therefore not compatible with normalization with 
China, which required strong credibility in the region.  Two other options included delaying 
the troop withdrawals even further or delaying the entire process “at the behest of Congress” 
until they agreed to vote for the compensatory package to the South Korean Army.13 
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    “The way I see it, this is a no-win proposition,” Secretary of State Vance interrupted. “If 
the president delays, then he intensifies his image as a vacillator at home.  If he persists with 
the reduction, he loses in his credibility abroad.”  Vance therefore suggested deferring to the 
Congress, letting the legislature take the initiative and the president follow its lead.  Richard 
Holbrooke agreed, indicating that if Carter proceeded with his preferred course of action he 
would be “hard hit on the Hill.”14 
    Brzezinski was the only presidential advisor who had supported Korea withdrawals from 
the outset, and he pressed hard for following Carter’s desired course of action.  He did not 
see it as inconsistent with China normalization.  “This may have been the wrong decision, 
but now it has been made.  We cannot afford to go back on it,” he asserted.15 
    Morton Abramowitz then broke in with another point that Harold Brown had been 
reluctant to bring forward.  General John W. Vessey, the four-star commander of U.S. forces 
in Korea, strongly opposed Carter’s plan.  Abromowitz, who had at various times solicited 
informal advice from the JCS regarding Korea, stated bluntly that if the group chose to 
follow the president’s preferred option, “we will also face the resignation of our military 
commander.  Vessey is likely to resign under those circumstances.  Second, we will lose the 
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JCS.”16  The room fell silent as these civilian advisors contemplated the political 
ramifications of such a split with the uniformed military. 
    After further discussion the group began to arrive at a consensus that it was best to delay 
troop withdrawals and seek an increased compensatory package for the South Korean forces.  
This was not the president’s preferred choice, but it would at least meet his goal of reducing 
U.S. presence in Korea.  It would also be less objectionable to the military and was more 
likely to be approved by Congress. 
    David Aaron, known as the head of the more “liberal” staff of the NSC, had listened 
silently thus far, but now felt compelled to speak up:  “Why delay?  The watchword of this 
administration is becoming ‘delay.’”  Contempt creeping into his voice, he went on: “Let’s 
go to the heart of this matter.  Congress is playing for a veto over the troop reduction.  It is 
opposed to the President’s policy.”17  Aaron, like the president himself, resented having to 
compromise to reach political accords with Congress. 
    Harold Brown cut Aaron off.  “That is not correct,” the Defense Secretary interjected, “the 
congressional attitude is due to a combination of factors.”  He explained how the troop 
withdrawals had become politically linked with “Koreagate,” a recent scandal in which 
prominent Congressmen had been indicted for taking bribes from South Korean officials in 
exchange for votes for economic aide.  Holbrooke supported Brown, adding that he had 
almost daily contact with members of Congress.  He indicated that the majority were in favor 
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of the president’s plan for withdrawals, but were fearful to vote for any sort of aid package 
because they feared “retribution at the polls.”  Harold Brown argued that troop withdrawals 
should be delayed even further, since more time would separate the aid from the scandal and 
make Congress more supportive.18  “One has to recognize the military consequences of 
taking out our first combat forces,” Brown appropriately noted, “They guard key mountain 
passes.”  The Defense Secretary then again brought up the political implications of this 
military issue:  “If adequately armed replacements do not take their place, we will be 
susceptible to conservative charges in the U.S. that we are threatening the safety of the 
remaining two brigades.”19  As a civilian appointee, Brown certainly felt obligated to include 
such political ramifications of military decisions.  Had the Chairman of the JCS brought up 
this point the politics of the situation may not have played such a prominent role.  In the 
politically-charged atmosphere of this meeting, however, straightforward military advice, 
such as the threat posed by the North Korean forces, might have seemed less relevant. 
    “Let’s be clear about one thing.  It is not the president but Congress which is not fulfilling 
our commitment,” Aaron broke in again, “Congress is not leading.  The president remains 
credible on this issue.”  The Deputy National Security Advisor strongly objected to any delay 
in troop withdrawals because he felt that it would be politically damaging to the president.  
“The question is whether the president is in command of his own house,” added Richard 
Holbrooke.  “We can’t tell the East Asians that the president is credible and the lack of 
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American credibility is with the Congress.  That simply underscores the weakness of the 
president.”20 
    Vance felt compelled to resolve the impasse.  “I share all these concerns,” he admitted. 
“We must also recognize we are running out of time.”  Congress would soon adjourn and a 
series of already controversial measures were before it, including the Panama Canal treaty.  
Vance again proposed that the administration try to talk to congressional leaders to get them 
to come forward and ask the president to change his course of action and delay the 
withdrawals.  Then, the Secretary of State insisted, the action “will not be perceived as 
additional presidential vacillation but as a presidential response to congressional pleas.”21 
    Brzezinski conceded that this might work, but still pressed to meet the president’s 
guidance.  He suggested that in response to the congressional “plea” that Carter agree to a 
phased withdrawal of combat-ready units, one battalion at a time.  “I know I am going 
against my Asian experts on this, but I think that the president cannot change his decision.  
He must begin as scheduled, but he could slow down the pace.”22  The National Security 
Advisor was a powerful advocate of continuing Carter’s course of action. 
    One of Brzezinski’s advisors again brought up the fear of military resistance to the 
president’s plan.  “This proposal may make the issue even more contentious,” Michael 
Armacost pointed out, “for the Chiefs may claim that we are endangering the remaining 
American forces and demonstrably lowering our preparedness on the Peninsula.”23  The 
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specter of military opposition scuttled Brzezinski’s proposal to execute the president’s 
desired policy as others in the room acknowledged the necessity of JCS support. 
    As the group proposed a series of possible modifications to the withdrawal plan, David 
Aaron again brought up the conflict between the president and Congress.  He felt strongly 
that if Carter backed down in the face of congressional opposition on the troop withdrawals, 
then Congress would “exercise a veto power on normalization as well.”24  The administration 
seemed unable to come to a consensus on how to deal with Congress, and strong elements 
within this particular group seemed unwilling to take into account congressional concerns or 
accept congressional advice. 
    Frustrated by the inability thus far to reach a consensus, and knowing that he would have 
to convince the legislators of whatever proposal this group reached and the president decided, 
Harold Brown closed down the debate.  “We are, in brief, playing ‘chicken with Congress,” 
the Defense Secretary forcibly interjected.  The others around the table sensed his frustration 
and listened closely.  “I am not opposed to that if one feels confident that one has the votes 
and the capacity to deliver.  But I am not sure that situation exists.”  Taking off his glasses 
and wiping them with his handkerchief, Brown leaned back in his chair and muttered, “We 
seem to be willing to act more firmly with Congress than with the Russians.”25 
    Sensing that the issue would not be resolved in the manner he wanted, Brzezinski moved 
to get the input from the principal advisors, Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance.  Both 
men wanted to delay withdrawal with the strong compensatory package to the South 
Koreans.  Brzezinski acceded to their pressure, still holding out the hope that troop 
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withdrawals that had already taken place could be seen as “an indication of the president’s 
determination” on this matter of policy.26  The meeting adjourned with the group having 
agreed to a compromise position that would probably not please the president, but that would 
be palatable to the JCS and to Congress. 
    This meeting between the top civilian advisors in the Carter administration was in many 
ways emblematic of civil-military relations in 1977-1978.  First, Carter and his civilian 
advisors consciously chose to exclude the uniformed military from their deliberations.  
Second, the same inability to work with important members of Congress that had plagued 
executive-legislative relations on the defense budgets also prevailed in national security 
policy formulation.  Finally, as had been the case with the defense budget, Harold Brown 
found himself frustrated when supporting administration defense policies.  With little support 
from others in the administration, Brown had to balance loyalty to the president with 
resistance from the military-congressional alliance. 
    While in some ways more in keeping with a proper civil-military relationship than what 
had taken place under Nixon’s tenure, the exclusion of the uniformed military from the 
policy process developed into its own set of problems in the Carter administration.  First, 
civilians in the Carter administration often valued the JCS for the quality of their military 
advice, but even more so for the political value of their support for administration policies.  
The JCS recognized this and adjusted to the new administration’s way of business, 
supporting many controversial policies, including the Panama Canal Treaties and SALT II.  
This, however, created a second problem, evident by the looming threat of General Vessey’s 
resignation.  Even as the JCS compromised and supported some administration defense 
policies, military officers more removed from the Pentagon, especially theater CINCs like 
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Vessey, thought that the Carter administration was “muzzling” the JCS.  The military outside 
the Pentagon therefore often resisted administration polices even when the JCS supported 
them.  While not unique to the Carter years, the administration’s political weakness and 
growing unpopularity intensified these problems. 
    As this chapter and the next will demonstrate, understanding the civil-military relations in 
policy making in the Carter administration provides powerful insight as to why certain 
defense and foreign policy decisions took the course that they did.  Historians and political 
scientists have often written about the foreign and defense policies of the Carter 
Administration.  Most agree that Carter’s policies, like those of all presidents, evolved over 
time.  The consensus—typified by the edited essays in Abernathy, Glenn, and Williams’ The 
Carter Years—has been that Carter based his early policies on rather idealistic principles, yet, 
because of domestic political failures and foreign policy setbacks, gradually shifted his 
policies to reflect a more pragmatic approach.27  While in broad terms this assessment seems 
accurate, most scholars have neglected the role of civil-military relations in the Carter 
administration’s policies.  
    Most of those detailing the evolution of Carter’s policies have focused upon the accounts 
of the key individuals in the administration.  Among these accounts they have found 
supporting evidence for the theory of Carter’s policies moving from idealism toward 
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pragmatism.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, admitted that there 
was a “highly liberal” tone to the first two years of the administration, but that through his 
efforts and with hard-learned experience this “bias was contained.”28  General William 
Odom, then a colonel serving on the NSC staff, agreed that the administration “sailed in one 
direction for two years and slowly came back around the other direction in the last two.”29   
    Some policies were much more relevant to civil-military relations than others.  The Camp 
David Accords, although a cornerstone to Carter’s term, did not require significant military 
input and resulted in little civil-military conflict.30  Similarly, normalization of relations with 
China, although hugely significant for American foreign policy, appears not to have required 
as much civil-military dialogue as the Korea troop withdrawals.  Other policies and decisions 
made during Carter’s term, however, generated significant civil-military friction. 
    The Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) and Presidential Directives (PD) of the 
administration provided the framework for these civil-military interactions.31  These 
important documents evolved from the first policy papers drafted by the National Security 
Council (NSC), which Congress created in 1947.  Initially serving as informational tools for 
decision making, and created mainly from data gathered by the State and Defense 
Departments, the policy papers eventually evolved into summary memoranda signed by the 
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president.  These signed and approved “national security instruments” articulated the official 
policy of the administration.  Each administration since Truman modified and adapted the 
NSC policy creation process to fit its own style.32  The Carter Administration dubbed their 
requests for organizational studies as “Presidential Review Memoranda” and their signed 
policy papers “Presidential Directives.”33 
    An understanding of the PRMs and PDs from the Carter years serves many useful 
functions.  First, since the Presidential Directives provide succinct summations of the 
administration’s policies, many of them are particularly relevant to understanding how the 
military and civilians in the administration interacted, allowing greater study of civil-military 
relations.  Second, these documents have been declassified only recently and much of the 
secondary literature on the Carter Administration discussed these documents only through 
the interpretation of administration officials.  Analyzing these documents as primary sources 
will make a contribution to the evolving historiography of the Carter years.  Finally, this 
work will contribute to the overall historiography of American diplomatic and political 
history by demonstrating the evolution of U.S. policy formation from 1977-1981.  As the 
following chapters will demonstrate, the administration’s policies did indeed evolve over 
time, but due not only to external experiences, but also because of the internal influences of 
civil-military relations. 
A New White House, A New Way of Business:  PD-2 and the Carter Revision of the 
NSC and Defense Policy Process 
 
    Jimmy Carter entered office intending to change American defense and foreign policy.  
Just as he had with defense budgets, Carter had spent a great deal of time prior to his election 
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studying these policies.  At least one close advisor told the future president that he should 
make ending U.S. “foreign policy fumbling a major campaign theme.”34  Carter apparently 
heeded the advice, giving an address at Princeton University prior to his election arguing that 
“Today in American government there is too little coordination between our foreign policy 
goals—to the extent anyone has thought of them—and our defense budget and defense 
posture.”35  He criticized the Nixon-Kissinger style of détente, saying it had been “oversold 
for political profit.”36  The unhealed wounds of Vietnam deeply influenced Carter’s appraisal 
of American foreign policy.  His “essential foreign policy philosophy” was that “the era of 
American interventionism is or should be over” and that “future military 
commitment/involvement in the internal affairs of another country will be carefully 
avoided.”37  Carter planned to use his NSC as the agent of these changes. 
    Carter intended to alter the previous National Security Council structure which, under the 
control of Henry A. Kissinger, had dominated policy formulation for the previous eight 
years.38  Nixon’s and Ford’s NSC consisted of the President, Vice-President, Secretary of 
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the CIA, Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   Kissinger, as 
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Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, served as the primary director of the 
policy formulation branch of the NSC.  The Kissinger NSC structure, in the words of senior 
defense analyst Lawrence Korb, consisted of an “elaborate network of interagency bodies 
that supported the Council.”39  Kissinger’s NSC structure contained eight subcommittees and 
formed ad-hoc “interdepartmental groups” when a particular issue required coordination 
between the subcommittees.40  The result was a complicated and excessively cumbersome 
process. 
    In addition, the complicated process proved to be overly reliant on Kissinger himself, who 
at one point chaired seven out of the eight subcommittees.  No policy recommendation or 
study could reach the president without Kissinger’s personal approval.  If he was out of the 
country or otherwise engaged, the NSC process simply ground to a halt.  Kissinger’s 
viewpoints always governed.41 
    President Carter objected to the over-reliance of the NSC on a single strong personality.  
He criticized Kissinger and his policies, referring to them as “Lone Ranger” diplomacy that 
tarnished America’s image.42  Before his inauguration, and after selecting Polish-born 
scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski to be his National Security Advisor, Carter met with his cabinet 
at St. Simon Island in Georgia to plan a new structure for his NSC.  Brzezinski initially 
proposed a slightly modified version of the Kissinger model, with different advisors chairing 
each committee so as to eliminate the influence of a single person.  Carter rejected the 
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proposal out of hand, telling Brzezinski, “Too many committees.  I want a simple, cleaner 
structure.”43 
    Brzezinski vastly simplified the NSC structure and Carter approved it in Presidential 
Directive 2 the day he took office.  PD-2 reduced the core membership of the NSC to only 
the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.  Other advisors, 
including the Chairman of the JCS, attended NSC meetings only as Carter or Brzezinski saw 
fit.  The directive reduced the number of NSC committees to two:  the Policy Review 
Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC).44  According to the 
directive, the members of the PRC could establish ad-hoc “interdepartmental groups” to deal 
with certain issues, but, unlike the Kissinger structure, this would be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
    The PRC served as the primary vehicle for developing the administration’s national 
security policy.  Carter personally selected the chairman of this committee based on the issue 
at hand.  This gave the president more control of the policy making process, since he could 
appoint an individual whose views were consistent with his own on any particular issue.  
Early in his administration Carter most often chose Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to chair 
the PRC, probably because Vance’s foreign policy outlook closely mirrored his own.45 
    The SCC, always under the chairmanship of Brzezinski, dealt primarily with the 
implementation of presidential decisions and sensitive national security issues.  The SCC 
strongly influenced the NSC system.  Even though PD-2 made no mention of an SCC role in 
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policy making, Brzezinski himself admitted that he “used the SCC to try to shape our policy 
toward the Persian Gulf, on European security issues, on strategic matters, as well as in our 
response to Soviet aggression.”46 
    Although simple in design and effective in preventing a single person from becoming 
dominant, the Carter-Brzezinski NSC structure proved problematic.  Vance and Brzezinski 
held fundamentally different world-views centered on the U.S.-Soviet relationship:  Vance 
espoused an optimistic view of future cooperation with the Soviet Union, while Brzezinski 
kept a pragmatic outlook, expecting a more adversarial relationship with the U.S.S.R.  With 
each of these men chairing part of the NSC, and with each controlling a major element of the 
policy making machine, the products and advice reaching the president often contained 
diametrically opposed views.47  Additionally, Brzezinski’s hand-picked NSC staff itself 
became a microcosm of the larger NSC-State Department conflict.  William Odom, 
Brzezinski’s military assistant, felt that Vice President Mondale “insinuated a significant 
number of people into Brzezinski’s staff” who had more liberal leanings, including David 
Aaron.48  Brzezinski accepted this varied composition of the NSC, calling it “creative 
tension.”  Others mocked it as “creative destruction.”49  The conflict inherent in the NSC 
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process resulted in official policy that seemed, in the words of one veteran policy analyst, 
“contradictory, vacillating, and fragmented.”50 
    Carter’s new NSC structure also set the stage for civil-military tension.  Unlike the Ford-
Nixon NSC, the uniformed military representative, the Chairman of the JCS, attended only 
designated meetings.  In one instance, General George Brown arrived at the White House and 
attempted to enter one of the first NSC meetings, but a Secret Service Agent stopped him at 
the door to the Oval Office.  “I’m the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I’m invited to this 
meeting,” he stated.  The agent gave his instructed reply, “You’re not on the list.”  He then 
escorted the general from the premises.51  Beyond physically restricting military access to the 
inner workings of the NSC, Carter also rescinded NSAM-55 which had called for “direct and 
unfiltered” JCS advice to the president.52  Harold Brown followed suit at the Pentagon, 
developing a “single coordinated Defense position” on many matters where the JCS had in 
the past provided independent input directly to the president.  The JCS felt that such a 
“wholly synthesized OSD-JCS perspective” was not realistic or desirable in every instance.53  
Despite military objections, Carter had made it clear that he wanted his military advice to be 
passed to him through the Secretary of Defense. 
    In addition to restructuring the NSC system and limiting military input into the policy 
making process, Carter also immediately moved to make changes to U.S. foreign policy.  
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Brzezinski felt that the White House should focus on three major objectives.  First, he felt 
that America should increase its “ideological impact on the world.”  Second, he wanted to 
improve the nation’s “strategic position” in the world.  Finally, he desired to “restore 
America’s appeal to the Third World.”54  Many of Carter’s early presidential directives 
reflected these goals.  PD-5 boldly declared that the American government’s new aim “will 
be to promote a progressive transformation of South African society.”55  PD-6 directed that 
“we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba.”56  PD-9 placed “a 
strictly controlled and limited” intelligence gathering capability on the Army Special 
Operations Field office in West Berlin compared to Nixon’s more permissive NSDM 355.57  
Carter formulated each of these directives by the end of March 1977, less than two months 
after he had taken office. 
    The JCS had many problems with the way the new administration went about making 
these early policy changes and found that Harold Brown was less than supportive of their 
concerns.  On May 3, 1977 the JCS sent a memorandum to Brown complaining that the NSC 
was “tabling” important information in order to gain consensus during their meetings.  
Brown refused to forward the memo to Brzezinski.58  When General George Brown was 
invited to attend NSC meetings, he complained that he was often given little information 
beforehand to prepare and sometimes meetings were cancelled without informing him.  
Brown’s aide indicated that, in the first year of the administration, 60 percent of the material 
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that the NSC sent to the CJCS arrived less than twenty-four hours before the meeting.  This 
was less than half of the time needed for the Chairman to read the material, formulate his 
opinions, and contribute to the meeting.59  Since Harold Brown refused to address the JCS 
grievances to the NSC, General Brown’s assistant contemplated sending a memo directly to 
Brzezinski.  His indictment of NSC efforts to integrate the CJSC proved harsh: 
Your 48 hour guidance has apparently become a target rather than an intended 
minimum.  Frequently we do not see the agenda and the final revised papers 
to be addressed until a few hours before meeting time.  Gen. Brown and I are 
unable to prepare as well as we would like for these important sessions.60 
 
Indeed, it appeared that civil-military friction typified the early policy making process of the 
Carter administration.  Unlike the budget, when it came to policy, Harold Brown seemed to 
side more with the White House than with the JCS.  Civil-military interaction surrounding in 
the policy making process was thus even more contentious than that surrounding the defense 
budget in the first year of Carter’s term. 
Limited Global Commitments and Military Dissent:  PD-12, The Withdrawal from 
Korea, and the Singlaub Affair 
 
    The first major civil-military conflict over defense policy was Carter’s decision to 
withdraw American troops from South Korea.  Carter had promised such during his run for 
office, a huge change given the fact that the American military had been stationed there since 
the mid-1940s.61  He made good on his promise when he signed PD-12 on May 5, 1977.62 
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    The president’s decision was not cavalier.  As in his involvement in the defense budget in 
1977, Carter played a strong personal role in the decision to pull American forces out of 
Korea.  Still under the pall of Vietnam, the president wanted no chance of American troops 
getting involved in another ground war in Asia during his term.  Prior to election, Carter had 
read a Brookings Institution report which indicated that American troops could be withdrawn 
from Korea to save money without endangering U.S. interests.63  Carter agreed and adopted 
it as part of his foreign policy platform, arguing in his Princeton Address that “many of our 
troops in Asia are there based on outmoded and anachronistic policies no longer in force.”64 
Immediately upon taking office, Carter instructed Cyrus Vance to undertake a comprehensive 
review of U.S. policy toward Korea and determine if the troop withdrawals were feasible.65 
    Vance’s study produced PD-12.  The directive ordered that the 2nd Infantry Division be 
withdrawn from Korea one brigade at a time, with the first brigade out by the end of 1978 
and the second by July 1980, with Carter deciding the schedule for the rest of the forces “at a 
later date.” 66  Part of the calculation involved the South Korean government’s problematic 
human rights record.  Yet, PD-12 also pointed to another less recognized part of Carter’s 
policies:  a strategy of limited global commitment that placed the primary focus on Western 
Europe, the Middle East, and Japan.67  The strong emphasis in PD-12 on ensuring 
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understanding and communication with Japan further attested to this strategy of limited 
global commitments.  Carter viewed Japan as America’s most important ally in the Far East.  
Since South Korea rated only of secondary importance, it did not warrant a large contingent 
of ground troops, relying on less manpower intensive American air power to stop a North 
Korean invasion. 
    Military opposition explained the uncertain phrasing of the withdrawal plan.  Carter 
discussed it at a meeting with the JCS before his inauguration.  When asked if the U.S. could 
remove the 2nd Infantry Division, General Bernard Rogers, the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
replied, “Yes, if we make improvements in the South Korean capability.”  David Jones, Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force, felt Carter did not listen to the “if” enough and, in his words, “it 
caused a lot of problems later.”68  When the NSC discussed withdrawal with the DoD, the 
JCS were shocked to find that their part in the study was only to decide the pace of troop 
withdrawals.69  Carter had heard the Chiefs in person but dismissed their concerns.  Given 
the three choices, the JCS recommended the slowest, most gradual reduction of troops, 
informing their civilian superiors that their support for the administration policy was 
contingent upon guarantees that the United States remaining “a Pacific power.”70  Carter and 
Brown agreed to the JCS position, with a prominent line in the FY79 Annual Defense Report 
reading that “the planned withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Division from South Korea in no 
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way” changed the commitment of the U.S. to being a power in the Western Pacific.71  With a 
compromise reached, George Brown testified in support of the decision before Congress, 
although he disputed the administration contention that troop withdrawals would save 
money.72  The Chiefs thus came to the grudging decision to support the president’s Korea 
policy, but they demanded concessions for doing so. 
    Though the JCS compromised on the Korea troop withdrawals, the generals in command 
in Korea felt betrayed by their superiors at the Pentagon.  General John Vessey, commander 
of U.S. forces in Korea, as well as his deputy, Army LTG John J. Burns, and his Chief of 
Staff, Army Major General John Singlaub, publicly opposed Carter’s withdrawal plan.  All 
felt that the announced pullout could spark another war on the peninsula.  As one staff officer 
said of the president’s decision:  “I don’t know anybody who is not staggered by it.”73  When 
Washington Post Far East correspondent John Saar attributed Singlaub by name as saying 
Carter’s plan would lead to war, the president recalled the general to Washington, ordering 
him to report to the Secretary of Defense.  Singlaub strongly objected to reporting directly to 
Secretary Brown rather than his “military chain of command.”74  When allowed to report to 
Bernard Rogers instead, Singlaub found little support.  He later indicated that he felt betrayed 
because the Army Chief of Staff “had made no effort to defend me” and had “manipulated 
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plausible perception to cover himself” from any blame in the incident.75  Vessey, on the other 
hand, strongly supported Singlaub.76  The split between the JCS, with their qualified support 
for the policy, and commanders in the Korea, with their open opposition to it, was complete. 
    Carter’s White House, on the other hand, planned to use General Singlaub as an example 
to the entire military.  Carter did not immediately decide to relieve Singlaub.  Hamilton 
Jordan wrote to Carter that the “Singlaub incident” was “an opportunity for you to firmly 
establish the position of your administration on the question of civilian control over the 
military establishment.”77  Jordan argued, “it is important for the military establishment to 
understand that when they challenge your decisions and judgments, they do so at the risk of 
their own careers.”78  The president’s chief advisor counseled that doing nothing to Singlaub 
meant that “the point that you have an opportunity to make with the military establishment 
would be lost,” but that an outright firing of the general risked “making a martyr out of him.”  
Jordan therefore recommended the middle ground of reassigning Singlaub to a minor job in 
the Pentagon.79  The president opted instead for the harshest option, calling Singlaub to the 
White House and personally firing him.80  The president later justified his decision, stating 
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that Singlaub had committed “a very serious breach” of the military command system.81  
Indeed, at first it seemed that the treatment of General Singlaub had sent a powerful message 
to the military. 
    Unfortunately for the administration, Carter’s bold move to use the “Singlaub incident” to 
assert civilian authority and to send a message to the military backfired.  Conservative 
columnists blasted Carter’s treatment of the general.  One criticized the president’s 
“muzzling” of senior military officers throughout his administration, calling it “an arrogant 
act, a waste of lives” and accused Carter of using Singlaub like a “political football.”82   
Potential Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan took advantage of the crisis in 
civil-military relations, saying that Carter’s actions were “disgraceful” and demonstrated 
“petulance.”83  Singlaub’s friends leaked reports to the press that the general was “stunned” 
by Carter’s actions and felt he was being pressed to retire by both Carter and Harold 
Brown.84  As the fallout from the situation worsened, Thomas B. Ross, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, released a press statement that “Carter’s disciplining 
of Singlaub for publicly criticizing a presidential decision is not to be interpreted as a 
grounds for military men not to talk.”85  Originating as a means to send a message to the 
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“military establishment,” the administration’s handling of the “Singlaub incident” began to 
develop into a political fiasco. 
    Rather than standing tough during the politically costly effort to demonstrate civilian 
supremacy over the military, Carter chose to try to defuse the situation.  Hamilton Jordan 
suggested that Carter provide Singlaub with a prominent and challenging assignment, 
otherwise “the option of being a conservative hero might be more appealing to him than 
continued service in the Army.”86  Carter approved of the idea, writing his reply on the 
memo:  “I agree, have Harold expedite.”87  Harold Brown subsequently offered Singlaub 
what was considered a “prized staff position” as the chief of staff of FORSCOM, the largest 
command in the Army.  Iron majors at the Pentagon beamed with approval, and the Army 
information chief, BG Robert Solomon, issued a statement saying that Singlaub’s assignment 
was a “very, very significant job.”88  Unlike his mentor Harry Truman, Carter buckled when 
confronted with a direct challenge to his defense policies, and Singlaub and the uniformed 
military were the victors. 
    Carter’s Korea policy became more troubled as military dissent fused with congressional 
opposition to the withdrawal plan, creating even more political problems for the 
administration.  Singlaub testified at the behest of Congress, where he informed the House 
Armed Services Committee that intelligence reports used by Carter and his advisors 
underestimated North Korean strength by up to 30 percent.89  Both George Brown and 
Bernard Rogers admitted in subsequent testimony that the JCS had in fact not supported the 
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president’s plan.90  The generals’ testimony revealed that Carter’s NSC planning process had 
often lacked military advice.  In response, members of the committee and several senators 
from both parties declared a “frontal assault” on Carter’s Korea policy.91 
    Despite the military-congressional resistance, Carter continued his plans for the Korea 
troop withdrawals into the second half of his administration.  The military-congressional 
alliance continued to strengthen, however, and Carter indefinitely postponed the withdrawals 
on July 20, 1979.92  The administration never fully executed PD-12, and the 2nd Infantry 
Division remained in Korea, except for one brigade that was withdrawn.  Military opposition 
to the administration’s plan undermined Carter’s efforts to limit American military 
commitments in the Far East and weakened civilian authority over the military in his 
administration. 
Immanent Logic?:  PD-13, Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and the B-1 Bomber 
Cancellation 
 
    PD-13 “Conventional Arms Transfer Policy” proved to be another Presidential Directive 
that helped shape foreign policy, defense policy, and civil-military relations early in the 
Carter Administration.  Indicative of Carter’s early idealism, this directive furthered his 
commitment to improving America’s moral leadership in the world.  The underlying premise 
of the PD was that the transfer of U.S. weapons to other countries would be an “exceptional 
foreign policy implement” rather than a business-as-usual method of bolstering American 
security interests abroad.93  Carter’s NSC staff even pressured the DoD to remove Air Force 
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LTG Howard M. Fish, the Pentagon arms-sales director, because he was associated with the 
expansion of arms exports during the Ford administration.94 
    The directive remained consistent with Carter’s desire to limit U.S. military commitment 
to areas of vital interest.  PD-13 defined these, including Western Europe and Japan, by 
exempting them from the arms-sale constraints.  The administration also dodged the 
politically charged issue of limiting arms sales to Israel by stating that the U.S. would “honor 
its historic responsibilities regarding Israel’s security.”95  Such wording appeased pro-Israeli 
sentiment in Congress, but at the same time kept open the door for future U.S. leadership in 
the Middle East peace process.  The statement that the United States would not become the 
“first supplier” to introduce new weapons into a region appeared to be an overture toward 
further détente with the U.S.S.R. 
    Although consistent with Carter and Vance’s early optimism for better relations with the 
Soviets, Carter’s military and civilian advisors did not support PD-13, feeling it risked a loss 
of American influence in Latin America, while at the same time encouraging Soviet-Cuban 
incursions into Africa.  George Brown testified before Congress that encouraging nation 
building at the expense of weapons sales was unwise in Latin America.  Indeed, the Soviet 
Union sold weapons to Peru and Ecuador, perhaps because of the reduced availability of U.S. 
supplied weapons to fight their insurgencies.  “I think it is not in the interest of the United 
States,” said Brown, “I do not like to see that influence in Latin America.”96  Harold Brown 
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also admitted that the policy did not make much sense because the dearth of U.S. supplied 
weapons simply forced former allies to turn toward the Eastern Bloc for support.97 
    The Pentagon’s opposition transformed PD-13 into more a statement of ideals than an 
actively implemented policy.  For example, in the first real test of PD-13, the sale of ten 
AWACS aircraft to Iran, the Pentagon advocated the sale and the Department of State 
opposed it.  The president, convinced by Harold Brown, the JCS, and more hawkish 
members of the NSC, overruled State and authorized the sale of seven of the aircraft.98  This 
pattern continued through much of the administration.  A congressional study commissioned 
to investigate the impact of the policy determined that arms sales actually continued “on a 
rather routine basis.”  The study condemned the policy as creating “high expectations” and 
then becoming “a victim of its own rhetoric.”99  Testimony by defense intellectuals 
confirmed that the American defense industry and the Pentagon both opposed the policy as 
unnecessarily weakening U.S. influence abroad.100 
    Examined in concert with PD-12, published only the week prior, PD-13 demonstrated 
several trends in the early Carter Administration NSC policy formulation process.  First, the 
military saw that resistance to Carter’s policies paid off.  The Korea withdrawals seemed 
unlikely to take place, Singlaub was rewarded as well as reprimanded, and many arms 
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transfers continued to circumvent the intent of PD-13.  Second, a rift was hardening between 
the Pentagon and the White House on defense policy.  Finally, the administration could not 
advance its defense policy agenda with Congress, in large part due to the impression that 
advice from senior military officers was being ignored.  These facts hovered in the 
background while a series of unpopular political choices were looming for the 
administration. 
    The first was the B-1 bomber program.  For many years a manned bomber had anchored 
the nation’s strategic “triad” of nuclear weapons.  As the B-52 bomber aged, it seemed 
increasingly unable to deliver nuclear weapons through Soviet airspace.  The Air Force 
proposed a new bomber that could penetrate Soviet air defenses and deliver nuclear payloads 
into the 1990s.  Built to fly at low-levels and supersonic speeds, the B-1 would evade radar 
detection and carry twice as many nuclear weapons as the B-52.101 
    Whether or not to mass produce the B-1 bomber had been debated since the late 1960s.  
North American Rockwell won the contract to begin developing the bomber on June 5, 1970.  
At the Air Force’s full request for 240 aircraft, the contract would exceed $10 billion dollars, 
making it the largest weapons procurement program in history.102  In part because of the cost, 
Congress and several presidents hesitated to make, in Jimmy Carter’s words, a “final and 
binding judgment on the matter.”103 
    The debate came to a head in the election year of 1976.  A huge Rockwell lobbying effort, 
emphasizing the four prototypes already built, placed tremendous pressure on Congress to 
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fund the entire fleet.  The impending presidential election gave many in Congress an easy 
way out of the dilemma:  they would let the next president decide the fate of the bomber.104  
Thus, the decision fell to Carter.  Despite his campaign promises to cancel the bomber, Carter 
vowed to “reassess all the factors before making a final judgment.”105   
    Many in the Pentagon, especially senior Air Force officers, did not trust the president since 
his previous policy decisions had been quite consistent with his campaign promises.106  The 
Air Force viewed the B-1 bomber as its single most important project.  In 1976 Hearings on 
Military Posture before Congress, LTG Alton D. Slay, Deputy Chief of Staff for Research 
and Development, testified that the augmentation of the nation’s bomber force was 
“essential.”107  The B-1 would replace aging B-52s and thus maintain the strategic “triad.”  
The new bomber would double the payload of the B-52 in a smaller package and allow the 
plane to operate from many more airbases because of its short take-off capability and, most 
importantly, be able to penetrate Soviet airspace.108  Slay concluded that the B-1 served a 
flexible role that would “support national objectives across the full scale of conflict.”109  The 
Air Force testified clearly that the B-1 was vital to both the service’s future and the nation’s 
security. 
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    Yet compelling contrary arguments existed.  Though the B-52s could no longer effectively 
penetrate the Soviet air defense system, it was unlikely that B-1s could do much better.110  In 
fact, Soviet air defenses were adapting to engage aircraft with the attack profile of the B-1 
and could probably do so with a high rate of success.111  Opponents used such facts to argue 
against the B-1, especially given its $100 million cost per plane.112 
    Although Carter eventually rejected the idea of the B-1 bomber as necessary to maintain 
the triad, he did not dismiss the Air Force’s contention that the B-52s could no longer 
adequately penetrate Soviet airspace.  The president saw air-launched cruise missiles as the 
solution.113  The current fleet of B-52s, he argued, could be modified at relatively little cost 
to launch the cruise missiles, and the long range of the missile would allow the B-52s to 
remain well outside of the range of Soviet air defenses.  Hundreds of these cruise missiles 
could be produced for the price of each B-1.  “A swarm of cruise missiles,” he believed, 
“once launched could not be intercepted short of their multiple targets.  Even a fairly large 
attrition rate would leave a large number to conclude a successful mission.”114  Carter also 
spoke hopefully of new “stealth” technology under development at the time that would 
render planes virtually invisible to radar.115  Based upon all of this information, the president 
and Secretary of State Vance agreed that they should cancel the B-1 and continue with the 
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development of cruise missiles and the stealth program.116  Although Carter articulated these 
views after he had announced his decision, his conduct leading up to that point left many, 
including most of his military advisors, guessing as to which way he would finally decide. 
    Carter addressed the B-1 at several White House press conferences.  In an early one, on 
January 27, 1977, a reporter questioned his plans to drop the project.  Carter replied 
tentatively, indicating that just that morning he had discussed it with members of the 
National Security Council.  “I will have to know more about its capability, its cost, what we 
have in the way of other weapons systems” before deciding, he said.117 
    The President spoke of the B-1 again less than one month later during a February 23, 1977 
press conference.  When ABC News reporter Ann Compton posed a series of questions to 
Carter regarding his campaign promises, including the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, Carter 
emphasized that he had “cut $200 million for the B-1 program in the budget just submitted to 
the Congress.”118  He went on to say that he had “serious questions about whether or not the 
B-1 should be in the future the center of our airborne defense capability.”119  In less than a 
month, Carter appeared to have changed his position significantly.   
    Not only had Carter seemingly undergone a change of position, but he also kept his 
thoughts on the matter secret, consulting very few individuals and keeping people guessing 
until the very end.  In another press conference on June 13, two weeks before he announced 
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his final decision, Carter emphasized that he had “not made a decision” but would do so 
before the end of the month.120 
    The announcement came at a White House press conference on June 30, 1977.  In a brief 
statement before taking any questions, he said that he had decided on cancellation.  
Characterizing the decision as “one of the most difficult . . . since I’ve been in office,” Carter 
assured the press that Secretary of Defense Brown agreed.121  The president reflected in his 
memoirs: “Logic finally prevailed . . . I have no doubt that it was the correct decision, 
supported by the Secretary of Defense, key military leaders, and a majority of Congress.”122  
But, in fact, Carter’s decision lacked that support, and the manner in which he made the 
decision maximized civil-military distrust and anger. Although the decision to cancel the B-1 
had considerable logic, the lack of consultation with the Pentagon further damaged his 
relationship with senior military officers and Congress. 
    Carter’s decision made newspaper headlines the next day, largely because it came so 
suddenly and so unexpectedly.  The New York Times called it a “surprise move,” while the 
Washington Post echoed “a closely guarded decision that surprised B-1 proponents and 
opponents alike.”123  To some it seemed that Carter had intentionally manufactured the 
drama.  Washington Post columnist Haynes Johnson thought that “Everyone in Washington 
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knew, it seemed, that Carter was going ahead with the B-1 bomber.”124  Carter even left his 
audience on the edge of their seat at the final announcement, beginning with a long preamble 
explaining how difficult the decision had been and how much he had thought about it.         
    Regardless of whether or not Carter intentionally created a shocker for Washington, the 
decision certainly had that effect.  Only a half dozen people knew what the president’s 
decision was going to be twelve hours before he made it.125  Three weeks earlier, Carter met 
with two anti-B-1 Democratic congressmen for approximately forty minutes and both 
emerged from the meeting dejected, announcing that the president was “leaning very 
definitely toward building it.”126  Even Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), a strong proponent 
of the B-1 stated, after consulting with Carter a few days before his decision, that he was 
“becoming convinced that we can’t live without the B-1.”127  Carter’s decision certainly 
surprised Congress.  Senator Robert Dornan (R-CA), a vocal B-1 proponent, went so far as to 
say that he felt “deceived” by Carter’s sudden announcement.128 
    In the last press conference before he made the decision, Carter had indicated that it was 
time to “perhaps on my own and perhaps in a lonely way” to make the final judgment.129  
Apparently, that was what Carter did.  His close confidant Peter Bourne admitted that Carter 
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matter-of-factly broke the news to him while the two were playing tennis.130  He consulted 
and informed very few people and made the choice for discontinuation largely on his own.  It 
shocked military leaders.  According to newspaper reports, Carter’s decision came “as a 
complete surprise to SAC” which believed that, while full production of 244 bombers might 
not be possible, at least 140 B-1s might be approved.131  Never before had a president killed 
such a large weapons program so close to production.132  The Air Force had already chosen 
its new plane and thought that the only question remaining was how long it would be before 
Congress approved mass production.133  Now it appeared that the entire program was dead, 
and it had been killed by a single, unexpected presidential decree. 
    Signs of increased civil-military tension became obvious only one day after the decision.  
From his headquarters at Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska, SAC commander General 
Russell Dougherty told reporters that “his personal views and conclusions on the desirability 
of the B-1 were well known” but added that, “in view of the official policy of the United 
States administration,” neither he nor his command had any further comment on the 
matter.134  Dougherty added that he would “await official guidance flowing from the 
President’s decision through military command channels.”135  Other Air Force officers were 
less reserved.  Newspaper reports indicated that “one common reaction among officers in the 
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Air Force” was that Carter’s rejection of the B-1 compromised America’s greatest advantage 
against the threat of the Soviet Union.136  Some officers were quoted as saying that they 
“could not understand how the B-1 could be rejected” when the current manned bombers 
employed by the Air Force were “clearly inferior.”137  In Geneva, a senior Air Force Colonel 
working on the U.S. SALT II negotiating team was so incensed upon hearing the news of the 
cancellation that he quit the delegation and asked to be retired immediately.138  Retired Major 
General George Keegan, Jr., former chief of Air Force intelligence, wrote an op-ed piece in 
the New York Times blasting Carter’s decision as opting for the “ignoble military 
unpreparedness of the 1930s.”139  In a question and answer session with ROTC cadets at 
Georgia Tech, the recently retired General Singlaub called the decision “not in the best 
interests of the security of the United States.”140  The consensus of opinion in uniformed 
ranks outside of the Pentagon was that the president had not adequately considered the 
defense needs of the nation, and many officers voiced dissent publicly. 
    Just as had been the case with Korea, the B-1 decision drew some negative reaction from 
the JCS, but not nearly as much as from the field commanders.  The JCS felt Carter’s 
decision was made with little attempt to compromise or build consensus.  He had rejected 
their advice that B-1 production continue with reduced funding, as well as the idea that the 
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bomber be used as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union for arms reduction.141  Chairman 
George Brown broke with the administration and testified before Congress that the bomber 
should be kept in production.142  In the end, however, both Air Force generals on the JCS, 
and most of the members of the JCS staff, supported the president’s policy and did not 
attempt to overturn it beyond offering their disagreement to Congress.143 
    In the Pentagon, the most significant result stemming from the president’s manner of 
making his policy decision was an undercutting of his own Secretary of Defense.  Staff 
officers began to question Secretary Brown’s leadership during the B-1 debate because of the 
confusion concerning which way the president would ultimately decide.  While some felt the 
decision was reminiscent of the “systems approach” promoted during the McNamara regime 
and was an archetypical example of how professional military advice could be ignored by 
civilians, this unfavorable outlook was probably not a majority view.144  Central to the 
controversy surrounding Brown’s leadership was the opinion of the JCS that Brown was 
personally in favor of the B-1 but unwilling to convey this to the president.  Air Force Chief 
of Staff David Jones confirmed this idea when he stated that the Secretary of Defense “was 
careful not to reveal his position, but deep down I knew he would like to continue the 
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program.”145  Press reports similarly indicated that Brown was in favor of continuing with the 
B-1, but was overruled by the “security analysis staff” of the NSC, headed by Victor 
Utgoff.146  Brown was thus seen by many of his subordinates in the Pentagon as either 
unwilling to speak up to his boss or too weak to protect the interests of his own organization. 
    In the midst of this civil-military conflict a potential revolt was staved off by General 
Jones’ professional behavior.  Jones came under heavy fire from his Air Force colleagues 
who expected him to resign in protest over the decision and who even accused him being a 
“traitor” to his service when he refused.147  Jones referred to these vocal critics of the 
decision as “iron majors” and “zealots” and admitted later that he never considered 
resignation.148  Instead, Jones assented to the norms of civilian control:  “It seems to me that 
it is very presumptuous that somebody in the military can set themselves up on a pedestal, 
that they have the answer to the country.”149  “We have a leader elected by the American 
people,” Jones said, “and during his campaign he said he was going to stop the B-1.  And the 
American people voted for him.  Who am I to step above that?”150 
    Despite Jones’ professional behavior, Carter’s solitary method of making the policy 
decision on the B-1 hurt civil-military relations in his administration.  The lack of 
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consultation with the Chiefs and failure to keep Harold Brown in the decision making 
process further soured the relationship between Carter and his military advisors.  A quotation 
from a retired Air Force officer captured the frustration that many uniformed Air Force 
personnel felt: “Carter’s decision on the B-1 was just a disaster for him.  It really made him a 
lame duck with us long before his other decisions made him a lame duck with the American 
people.”151 
    Further evidence about the extent of the civil-military conflict came later in an Air Force 
Times editorial.  Carter’s decision regarding the B-1, the Air Force Times reported, “reached 
far beyond the bounds of a single weapon system” and in fact  could make “a major shift in 
air strategy” inevitable.152  Defiantly, the paper announced that the question of the B-1 was 
not “laid to rest.” Those “now elated over the President’s action probably will be unsatisfied 
a year from now,” the editor predicted.  The article closed with a warning that the B-1 debate 
was not really about a bomber, but instead about “the exact price of security and whether the 
nation can and will pay for it.”153 
    Indeed, the controversy did not die for some time.  On the same day that Carter announced 
cancellation, the House of Representatives passed by a 333-54 vote a defense appropriations 
bill which included funds for the B-1.  Earlier that same week the House defeated a bill by a 
vote of 243 to 178 that would have cut $1.5 billion from the project.154  Once again, Carter’s 
refusal to build a consensus for his decision showed. 
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    The B-1 controversy further strengthened the alliance of the military with more 
conservative members of Congress, particularly congressmen with constituencies that would 
suffer from the B-1 cancellation.  They realized that they could court a shunned and 
frustrated Air Force for support.  Only one day after the announcement of Carter’s decision, 
Senator Goldwater read aloud a letter from SAC’s General Dougherty, written in 1976, in 
which Dougherty strongly supported the B-1 and asked for Goldwater’s help in getting the 
final production run pushed through Congress.155  In the end, this combined lobbying of 
Congress and the military fell only three votes short of overturning Carter.156  Already 
developing because of the battle over the defense budget, the military-congressional alliance 
hardened with the cancellation of the B-1. 
Potential for Compromise:  The Panama Canal 
 
    Despite the civil-military conflict created over the B-1, the JCS demonstrated willingness 
to compromise and strongly supported a very unpopular administration policy—surrendering 
U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal.  While historian Steven Rearden argued that JCS 
support for the Panama Canal treaties was “weak,” this judgment is incorrect.157  In fact, the 
Chiefs faced considerable criticism yet never wavered in their backing of the decision. 
    The status of the Canal had been in question since the administration of Lyndon Johnson.  
In 1964, violent anti-U.S. riots shook Panama, forcing Johnson to consider a new treaty with 
the government of Panama, then under the leadership of President Roberto Chiari.  In 1968, 
General Omar Torrijos seized control of the Panamanian government in a coup, nullifying all 
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previous negotiations.  The Nixon administration picked up where Johnson had left off, 
attempting to create a new treaty which would alleviate the animosity in Panama over the 
fact that their nation was cut in two by a sovereign piece of U.S. territory.  Gerald Ford’s 
administration came close to finalizing negotiations with Panama on a new treaty, but the 
struggling president abandoned the efforts as the 1976 election approached and it seemed that 
the “Panama issue” would do more harm than good.158  During the campaign, Carter 
promised that he would re-negotiate a new treaty, preferably one that would “share 
sovereignty and control” of the Canal.159 
    The renegotiation and ratification of the Panama Canal treaty became the primary foreign 
and defense policy issue that Carter tackled in his first year in office.  After his election, 
Carter’s advisors discussed the issue of the Canal and several possible “inconsistencies” in 
the president’s pre-election promises.  They determined that anything close to the “status 
quo” would lead to permanent “Third World hostility” and the “probability of sabotage.”160  
Accordingly, on the first full day of the administration, the president directed that the NSC 
make the Panama Canal its first order of business.161  One of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s reports 
to Carter emphasized the importance of gaining ratification of a new Panama Canal treaty: 
There is no question in my mind that how we handle this issue poses the most 
important strategic decision you will be making this year insofar as your 
foreign policy is concerned.   Success in ratification of the Treaty will clear 
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the way for SALT, Comprehensive Test Ban, and a host of other issues that 
we all hope will be the landmarks of your Administration.  Failure, on the 
other hand, will severely undermine your ability to negotiate them 
successfully, since there will be concern on the part of other governments that 
you cannot deliver the Congress.162 
 
    Indeed the stakes were high, and the strategic importance of the Canal meant that the 
Pentagon must support any treaty.  Hamilton Jordan told the president to “worry about the 
Defense Department.”  Given the nature of the conflict over the Korea withdrawals and the 
B-1, the president’s closest aide recalled the anxiety:  “We had to get the people in the 
Pentagon to see the need for the treaty.  There were some that didn’t.  You’ve got to ride herd 
over those people.”163  The Carter White House recognized the importance of Pentagon and 
JCS support for a Panama Canal treaty, but was apprehensive about support for it due to the 
existing civil-military tensions. 
     With the Panama Canal, unlike the B-1 bomber, Carter conducted his policy making and 
decision making process in a much more open manner.  The president met personally with 
General Brown almost bi-weekly as both countries drew close to an acceptable treaty.164  For 
the entire JCS, the Panama Canal treaty appeared quite regularly on their agenda during this 
time period.165  LTG Tom Dolvin served as a JCS military representative on the negotiating 
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team and was involved during every step of the process.166  As they debated the issue and 
helped formulate the administration position, the JCS “decided what was important was the 
use of the Canal and not the ownership.”167  The Pentagon’s FY79 Annual DoD Report, 
formulated during this time period, reflected JCS views almost exactly, saying that 
“guaranteed use, not sovereignty, is all that we seek.”168  In a meeting between Carter, 
Secretary Brown, the JCS, and Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher, the military 
chiefs assured the president of their “full support” for the Panama Canal Treaty.169  The 
unified assent of both the top civilian and top military official in the Pentagon came to be the 
“Brown and Brown formula” in Washington lingo.170  In large part due to the close contact 
between the President and the Pentagon during the policy making process, Harold Brown had 
almost no problem getting the JCS to accept the terms of the Canal treaty as it was finally 
negotiated.171   
    The administration cooperated much more with Congress than it had on previous policy 
decisions.  Carter, anticipating the tough battle that would come with ratification, invited the 
input of over seventy members of the Senate on disputed points while the treaty was still 
under negotiation.  The administration also mobilized support among prominent private 
individuals and organizations who in turn lobbied Congress.172  As a result, several senators 
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who later fought the administration on defense issues actually supported it on the Panama 
Canal Treaty.173  Not only was the administration’s civil-military interaction better, but its 
executive-legislative interaction was in fact never closer on any other issue than it had been 
on the Panama Canal treaty. 
    Also unlike previous defense decisions, the theater CINC expressed his support for the 
administration.  General Dennis P. McAuliffe, SOUTHCOM commander, offered supportive 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Like the JCS, he contended that 
the U.S. needed only free operation, not direct control, over the Canal.174 He hosted briefings 
for groups of prominent Congressmen on-site at the Canal Zone to help support the need for 
the treaty.175  In letters to Senator Strom Thurmond, who opposed the treaty, McAuliffe 
assured the senator that, given the treaty, the U.S. could still protect its interests.176  Carter 
later selected General McAuliffe to be the first administrator of the Canal Zone formed as a 
result of the ratified treaty.177  The administration’s approach to policy making in the case of 
the Panama Canal had brought not only the JCS into the fold, but also the CINC. 
    Despite the support of the JCS and the CINC, many retired military officers still strongly 
opposed the treaty.178  One was John Singlaub:  “giving the Canal to an unpredictable 
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Panamanian government might mean that one day we would have to fight to have access to 
it.” He then accused the Carter administration of being “hell bent on turning the Canal over 
to a government headed by murderous thugs.”179  Four former CNOs, including George 
Brown’s predecessor Admiral Thomas Moorer, wrote the president urging him not to 
relinquish U.S. sovereignty of the canal.180  A retired Navy captain warned in a New York 
Times op-ed that the treaty imperiled U.S. Naval transit “during an international crisis.”181  
The American Legion disseminated thousands of flyers “staunchly against any proposal that 
will surrender or subordinate American rights.”182  General Brown was accused of supporting 
the treaty as an “act of loyalty to the President,” even though it was not in the best interest of 
the nation.183  Others accused the JCS of being “intimidated” or supporting the treaty in order 
to protect their careers.184  As the charges grew more accusatory, it seemed that the retired 
military lobby posed a real threat to the ratification of the treaty. 
    In response, the JCS took the offensive against the charges of the retired military.  In a 
press conference on August 12, 1977, David Jones, speaking for the JCS, endorsed the treaty 
and promised, “Mr. President, we will do what we can to help its ratification.”185  Later that 
month, George Brown, in what was termed “a highly unusual, if not unprecedented step,” 
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called a meeting of retired generals and admirals to justify his support of the JCS treaties.186  
Marine Commandant Louis Wilson braved a crowd of hostile members of the American 
Legion and spoke in favor of the treaty.187  Later, when Jones got word that the Air Force 
Association was about to pass a resolution condemning the treaty at a meeting in 
Washington, he stormed out of his office, saying that he was going to “get this straightened 
out.” The Air Force Chief went to the meeting and made sure the resolution failed.188 
    Later comments also rebutted the charge that Carter or his civilian leaders coerced support 
for the treaty.  General Brown’s special assistant remembered that the chairman’s 
“convictions were such that he did believe the Panama Canal Treaty was the proper thing,” 
not “just because the Commander-in-Chief said this is what we are going to do.”189  Marine 
Commandant Wilson believed:  “it was a good idea for us to sign this treaty.  I have no 
regrets in regards to my position on the treaties.”190 The director of the Joint Staff was 
unequivocal: “It was a unanimous JCS position.  There were no dissenters, and there were no 
minority opinions.”191  David Jones, perhaps the most ardent supporter of the treaty on the 
JCS, said, “To my dying day I will say that the Panama Canal Treaty was clearly in the best 
interests of the United States.”192  The Panama Canal showed that civil-military relations in 
the Carter administration were not all conflict.  In fact, civil-military cooperation inside the 
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Pentagon increased even if Panama was the exception to broader civil-military relations in 
Carter’s first two years. 
Big on Abstractions, Short on Specifics:  PD-17, PD-18, and the Neutron Bomb Debacle 
 
    PD-17, “Reorganization of the Intelligence Community,” also demonstrated greater unity 
within the Pentagon but led to much Pentagon conflict with the White House.  This 
significant directive gave substantially more power to the Director of Central intelligence, 
Admiral Stansfield Turner.  Turner was the highest ranking midshipman in Carter’s class at 
Annapolis.  Some at the Pentagon felt Carter had offered him the post of CIA director 
because the new president, who had ranked near the middle of his Naval Academy class, 
“took delight” in having Stan Turner now working for him.193  More likely, Carter chose 
Turner because the Admiral was a maverick whose self-professed “unconventional ideas” 
often unnerved his colleagues.194  Turner was also an outsider in the intelligence community.  
Just prior to Carter taking office, three investigative commissions had issued stinging rebukes 
of past American intelligence gathering practices.  Carter wanted to right these wrongs and 
change the manner in which the intelligence community operated.  Turner, having no 
institutional bias and a demonstrated willingness to instigate change, was just the person to 
make the required adjustments.195 
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    During his first meeting with the president, Turner requested greater authority for the 
Director of Central Intelligence.196  The admiral viewed competition between the CIA and 
the “large and clever military bureaucracy” of the Pentagon as a “dangerous hindrance” to 
U.S. intelligence capability.197  He recounted many instances in which he felt that the 
Pentagon intentionally misrepresented Soviet strength in order to try to gain congressional 
approval for expensive weapons systems, such as the MX missile.198  As the Director of 
Central Intelligence, Turner was by law supposed to exercise some oversight of the Pentagon 
intelligence apparatus, but Pentagon intelligence chiefs proved uncooperative and at times 
almost insubordinate.  In the first meeting between the CIA and Pentagon intelligence chiefs, 
for example, the Chief of Army Intelligence disparagingly referred to Turner as the “titular” 
head of the intelligence community.199  Given this animosity and lack of cooperation between 
the CIA and the Pentagon, Turner wanted greater authority. 
    Carter agreed with most of Turner’s bold reform proposals and delivered his promise in 
the form of PD-17, which empowered Turner with “full tasking responsibility and authority 
for translating PRC [Policy Review Committee of the NCS]-validated national intelligence 
requirements into specific intelligence collection objectives.”200  Previously this tasking had 
been split between the CIA and intelligence staff in the Pentagon.  The directive also granted 
Turner much greater budget authority which had traditionally rested with the Pentagon.  
Harold Brown strenuously objected to Turner’s and Carter’s ideas about centralizing the 
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intelligence community.201  Another Pentagon official showed more reserve, stating that as 
long as Turner “doesn’t try to force it all the way to the wall, we can live with it.”202  The 
head of the CIA confirmed these views in his memoirs, indicating that the Pentagon had 
offered “stubborn opposition” to his plans for reform.203  In the end, the reorganization of the 
intelligence community was a victory for the CIA over the Pentagon. 
    Turner’s reform efforts had further long-term implications for the administration’s civil-
military relations.  Like Carter and Harold Brown, Turner was a firm advocate for leveraging 
technology.  Early in his tenure he urged a focus away from human-gathered intelligence to 
imagery obtained from satellites and signal intelligence gained from listening posts.204 
    The new Director of Central Intelligence claimed that as soon as he entered the building at 
Langley, he had a feeling that excessive personnel burdened the CIA’s abilities.  “Too many 
old timers were hanging on,” he recalled.205  To correct these weaknesses, Turner decided in 
August of 1977 to reduce the CIA’s personnel.  On October 31, 1977 hundreds of impersonal 
letters went out to CIA employees, dismissing them from federal service, some just a few 
years from retirement.  The media quickly dubbed the event the “Halloween Massacre.”  
Since most of the cuts came from the clandestine branch of the CIA, critics charged that 
Turner had “emasculated” the nation’s spying capability.206  Though the head of the CIA 
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fiercely defended his decision, and the impact of the “Halloween Massacre” was grossly 
inflated in the media, the event did worsen civil-military relations within the administration.  
Following Turner’s reductions in the human intelligence gathering capability of the CIA, a 
series of intelligence failures later rocked the administration.  First, the CIA failed 
completely to provide warning of the fall of the shah in Iran.  Second, a brigade of Russian 
troops in Cuba, left over from the era of the Cuban Missile Crisis, was “rediscovered,” 
having been “lost” because of faulty CIA reports, causing the administration to over-react.  
As Chapter V will demonstrate, these two events created significant civil-military tension in 
the second half of Carter’s term. 
    Carter’s next directive, PD-18 “U.S. National Strategy” proved to be a long-awaited and 
controversial one.  PD-18 evolved from PRM-10, a comprehensive overview of the nation’s 
national security strategy that Carter had commissioned soon after taking office.207  Although 
every president since World War II had conducted such a policy review upon taking office, 
the PRM-10 studies were, in the opinion of JCS historian Steven Rearden, “some of the most 
laborious ever conducted.”  PRM-10 involved more than a dozen interagency groups as well 
as several independent “think tanks” and consultants.208  The JCS wanted to play a leading 
role in the PRM-10 study, hoping to influence PD-18, recognized as the administration’s 
“grand strategy.”209 
    Civil-military conflict characterized the PRM-10/PD-18 policy-making process almost 
from the outset.  Many in the Pentagon viewed the call for the study negatively given 
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Carter’s early meetings with the JCS in which he had inquired about drastically reducing the 
number of U.S. nuclear weapons.  It appeared that with his requests for PRM-10, Carter 
wanted to, in the words of one senior defense correspondent, “dig into questions of nuclear 
targeting and operation plans, rather than leave these matters to the Pentagon.”210 
    Similar to previous defense policy making efforts, the administration largely excluded the 
JCS from the PRM-10 studies.  George Brown expressed his concern about this exclusion in 
a private memo to the Secretary of Defense.  “The nature of the PRM-10/PD-18 follow on 
studies require the full participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all phases of the study 
effort,” the general began, “In the past, the Joint Staff has worked closely with the OSD staff 
in the development of studies relating to national defense.”211  General Brown complained 
that the JCS had been asked to provide informal comments on minor aspects of the study, but 
as yet had “no opportunities to comment on the Hard Target Kill Capabilities, Future of the 
Triad, or Targeting Policy studies.”212  He recommended that a representative from the JCS 
be included in a new subcommittee that would reexamine some of the important issues 
associated with the study.213  The general concluded, “I am concerned that the lack of early 
military participation in formulating these tasks may be detrimental to the quality of these 
important studies of military forces and planning.”214 
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    Along with objections to the crafting of PD-18, many in the military criticized the 
directive’s view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  Vaguely worded, PD-18 vacillated in its 
conclusions.  Describing the U.S.-Soviet relationship as “characterized by both competition 
and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict as well as the opportunity for stabilizing,” 
it seemed only to be a compromising generalization to cover the different foreign policy 
outlooks of Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski.215  Many also disagreed with what they viewed as 
an overly optimistic appraisal of the U.S. strength vis-à-vis the Soviets.216  Given their views 
of the disparity between defense spending in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the JCS simply did not 
share in the outlook espoused in PD-18 that the United States was surpassing a Soviet Union 
on the downslide. 
    Many within the Pentagon also cited a lack of reconciliation between means and ends 
within the directive.  The only link between the defense budget and defense policy was a 
reiteration of the NATO pledge that all members of the alliance should increase defense 
spending by 3 percent per year.217  The administration later experienced divisive conflict 
even over this point, with the Pentagon arguing that the 3 percent increase applied to the 
entire defense budget, while the Office of the Management of the Budget argued that the 
increase should only apply to the small portion of the defense budget directly supporting 
NATO.218  The remaining guidance on how the U.S. should pursue its national strategy 
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seemed amorphous and generalized.  According to one veteran Pentagon official, PD-18 was 
“big on abstractions and short on specifics.”219 
    If PD-18 was the administration’s first attempt at articulating a grand strategy, it seemed to 
confirm and emphasize all of the previous trends associated with the administration’s defense 
policy formulation process.  The result of months of intensive study, the final directive 
appeared unable to resolve differences of opinion and annunciate a consensus.  The JCS were 
again largely excluded from policy making, angering the Chiefs.  PD-18 also highlighted the 
increasing conflict taking place inside the administration between the more hard-line NSC 
under Brzezinski and the more conciliatory Department of State under Vance.  Harold Brown 
remained in an awkward position, seemingly unable to advance the DoD perspective.  
Providing no resolution of this conflict or reconciliation these competing viewpoints, PD-18 
instead degenerated into vague generalizations. 
    While PD-18 clearly showed the division, conflict, and sometimes confusion within the 
Carter administration’s policies, the document also reflected a degree of pragmatism.  The 
section on “Global Contingencies” alluded to one of the major contributions of the Carter 
years toward American military power-projection:  The development of the Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF).220  The final “Additional Studies” section of the directive called 
for several studies, most importantly a “targeting review” which became PD-59, a much 
more refined defense strategy.221 
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    A centerpiece of the PD-18 “grand strategy” was the U.S. commitment to the NATO 
alliance, clearly defined as one of the country’s vital commitments.  Carter’s views on NATO 
alliance were well known to the military before he took office.  He had stated in his address 
at Princeton University that, “Our NATO strategy is incorrectly premised on the theory of a 
long, World War II ground war.  The better thinking is that any conventional war will rather 
be of short duration.”222  In his first meeting with the JCS, he had indicated that he planned to 
force NATO allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense.223  This disturbed 
both General Brown and high ranking NATO officers.224  Traditionally, the American 
strategy had been to defend Western Europe as far forward as possible in the event of Soviet 
aggression, perhaps even taking the offensive into Eastern Europe.225  It seemed that Carter at 
a minimum planned to change this strategy and perhaps planned to abandon it altogether. 
    Consistent with PD-18’s NATO focus, Carter moved quickly to change U.S. policy toward 
Western Europe.  A month after entering office, the NSC issued PRM-9 calling for a 
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comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S. policy toward Europe and NATO.226  As part of the 
study, Harold Brown appointed Robert Komer as his special assistant for NATO affairs.   
    Komer, a self-professed believer in the systems analysis approach, reported directly to the 
SECDEF.  He shared Brown’s view that the NATO alliance should be the primary focus of 
U.S. defense policy.227  Komer examined closely the military contingency plans for war in 
Europe.  Never tactful, his conclusion was acerbic:  the Army’s plans, in particular, were 
“moronic” and “inane.”228  Komer, agreeing with Carter’s assessments, convinced Brown 
that the “long war” theory that the military was preparing for in Europe was incorrect.  He 
argued instead that war reserve stocks of ammunition should be dramatically cut and that the 
82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions should be removed from the list of ready reinforcements to 
Europe in order to save money.229  Army Chief Meyer strongly opposed Komer’s ideas, 
leading to much tension between the two.230  Marine Commandant Wilson described 
Komer’s interests in NATO as faddish and “parochial.”231  The Chiefs had again been cut out 
of the policy making process on an important defense matter and voiced their objections. 
    The biggest conflict between the Pentagon and White House occurred over the president’s 
decision against deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW).  Also known as a 
“neutron bomb,” an ERW was designed to provide minimal blast damage and residual 
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radiation while maximizing radiation at the moment of detonation in order to kill large 
numbers of soldiers in armored vehicles.232  The military saw ERW as an advantage, 
particularly where the U.S. might be fighting on an allied nation’s soil and facing massive 
armored attacks.  The low blast damage, lack of long-term radiation effects, and armor-
stopping potential of ERW seemed ideal.233  Ultimately, Carter’s preemptory veto of ERW 
without consultation further undermined his standing with the military. 
    ERW had been under secret development since well before Carter took office, and the U.S. 
had consulted NATO allies beginning in 1974.  Carter opted to continue the negotiations and 
development of the weapons, with Brzezinski describing NATO leaders as “cautiously 
affirmative” on the prospect of deployment on European soil.234  Then, in early June of 1977 
a Washington Post reporter researching the budget of the Department of Energy found an 
overlooked item that should have been classified—funding for an “enhanced radiation” 
weapon.235  The front page story that a “neutron killer warhead” was “buried” in the Energy 
Department budget shook the administration, forcing it to take a political stand on a 
previously secret program. 
    The political fallout from the Singlaub incident only two weeks prior had just begun to 
dissipate, so the administration chose to tread carefully in the ERW controversy.  Carter 
issued public statements defending the weapon and ordered a Pentagon study of the issue to 
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be completed by August 15, 1977.236  On August 11, Harold Brown recommended that the 
program be continued.237  The administration began a series of close consultations with 
NATO allies, discussing various options for the politically unpopular weapons.  Meetings 
between September and October of 1977 generated no consensus, but recommended that the 
U.S. either produce and deploy ERW or force concessions from the Soviets for not doing 
so.238  German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was particularly reluctant to have the weapons 
placed on his own soil, but was equally wary of the fact that the Soviets were deploying their 
new 1,500 kiloton intermediate ranged ballistic missile, the SS-20.239  Unable to gain 
anything other than tenuous support from NATO allies, the president requested further 
options. 
   The NSC gradually assumed the dominant role in the ERW process, eclipsing that of the 
Pentagon.  Brzezinski and the NSC offered the president another option:  produce the 
weapon, but limit deployment based on Soviet concessions to the Mutually Balanced Force 
Reduction (MFBR) treaties, a pending series of agreements that aimed to reduce NATO and 
Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe.240  Brzezinski pointed out that this option was 
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acceptable to Helmut Schmidt, who felt that the weapon could be used as a “credible 
bargaining counter.”  In this way the “tank killing” potential of the ERW could be realized 
without ever having to use the weapon—by demanding that the Soviets withdraw over 1,700 
tanks in exchange for the U.S. not deploying the weapons that could neutralize those same 
tanks.241  When the suggestion was forwarded to the Pentagon, both military and civilian 
officials strongly objected to the plan.  They argued that the NSC proposal was “inadequately 
studied” and “should not be considered a valid option.”242 
    Harold Brown was so concerned that he wrote privately to the president strongly opposing 
the linkage of ERW with the MBFR treaty.  He proposed instead that the administration 
should “state that we will not deploy ER weapons (to Europe or anywhere else) so long as 
the U.S.S.R. does not deploy the SS-X-20.”243  Brown listed a litany of reasons why the 
“ERW for SS-20” proposal was superior, concluding that his proposal provided NATO allies 
“a politically viable way to support the deployment if the Soviets reject the offer.”244  Upon 
hearing of Brown’s proposal, the NSC staff aggressively attacked it as “a bad principle of 
single trades of items that are not logically connected.”245  The NSC also argued that nothing 
would stop the Soviets from deploying the SS-20 and that Harold Brown probably knew this 
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when he suggest the course of action.246  Indeed, the NSC had probably seen through the true 
intention of the Secretary of Defense, betrayed by Harold Brown’s own admission that the 
Soviets had already built bases for the SS-20.  Unwilling to suggest a course of action which 
he knew Carter would reject (full production and deployment of ERW), Brown had instead 
offered another alternative that, if carried out, would eventually necessitate full production 
and deployment of ERW.  The NSC intervention into the ERW policy making process had 
forced the Secretary of Defense to take the “backdoor” to getting his way. 
    An NSC meeting on November 16, 1977 debated the issue more fully with the military in 
direct attendance for the first time.  The consensus was that the U.S. should produce the 
weapons, but on deploying the weapons into the field the attendees were split.  General 
George Brown and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger strongly pressed for full deployment, 
while Harold Brown still pressed his “SS-20 linkage” proposal.247  Brzezinski sided with 
Harold Brown, saying that he “pushed very hard” for adoption of that course of action.248  
When Brzezinski presented the alternatives to the president, Carter agreed to linking ERW 
deployment with a Soviet willingness to forego SS-20 deployment, writing in on his response 
that he hoped in the future this might “prohibit production of all nuclear weapons.”249  In its 
limited participation in the ERW policy making process, the military had thus been 
overruled. 
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    While the military had been consulted but their input rejected, Congress was almost 
completely left out of the loop on ERW.  As the ERW policy process was underway in late 
1977, Senator Stennis asked that the administration provide, by the end of 1978, a detailed 
report on its plans for ERW.  One day before the deadline, on December 30, 1978, the OSD 
staff responded by submitting a twelve sentence reply that answered none of the specific 
questions contained in the congressional inquiry.  Since this was the extent of executive-
legislative consultation on the issue during a two year period, it is easy to see how the 
administration’s response drew condemnation from Senator Sam Nunn.250 
    Without the consent of the military or Congress, the NSC, civilians in DoD, and Carter 
finally had come to a course of action on ERW by early 1978.  Realizing that Germany 
would be the only European nation willing and able to accept ERWs, the administration 
crafted a letter to Helmut Schmidt suggesting that Germany accept the deployment of ERW 
based on “SS-20 linkage” and a two-year gap between U.S. production and deployment of 
the weapon.  A meeting with NATO was arranged for March 28, 1978 to seal the final 
elements of the agreement. 251 
    Just as the meeting with NATO was about to commence, Carter opted for the policy 
decision process that he had used during the B-1 bomber incident—a solitary, lonely 
decision.  He ordered all departments to delay until they had consulted him personally.  At a 
morning briefing just two days before the planned NATO summit, Carter said he did not 
want to go through with the deal.  He told his advisors, “I wish I had never heard of this 
weapon,” that he could not bear to be remembered as the president who “introduced bombs 
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that kill people but leave buildings intact,” and that it “ran counter to his goals of nuclear 
disarmament.”252  On April 7, 1978 the president announced indefinite deferment of ERW 
with the message that he was doing so in the hope that the U.S.S.R. would demonstrate 
“restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting the 
security of the United States and Western Europe.”253  Brezhnev issued a terse statement in 
response:  “We resolutely reject any attempt by the United States to impose unacceptable 
terms on the Soviet Union.”254  The Soviets continued full deployment of the SS-20, some 
models with three MIRVs each, fielding almost 200 new warheads by the end of the year.255 
    Having been largely omitted from the decision, the military reacted unfavorably.  David 
Jones, generally the most supportive of Carter’s Chief’s, recalled feeling that the issue “was 
not handled well.”256  Regarding the international implications of the German Chancellor 
deciding to accept Carter’s tentative offer, Jones correctly indicated the U.S. had “left 
Helmut Schmidt out on a limb” and then “sawed it off on him.”257  LTG Edward Rowny, 
serving on the negotiating team in Geneva for SALT II, said that Carter had “surrendered 
neutron weapons and received nothing in return.”258  John Singlaub heavily criticized the 
decision on the conservative lecture circuit.259  Even though Carter admitted later that his 
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own handling of ERW had been a mistake, it did not change the fact that he had exacerbated 
civil-military relations in 1978.260 
Prepared for the Worst?:  PD-32, the Horn of Africa Crisis, and PD-41 “Civil Defense” 
 
    While PD-12 and PD-18 had defined Japan and Western Europe as areas of vital interest, 
Africa was not defined as such a vital area.  This did not meet with the views of the Joint 
Staff, who in late 1976 pointed to the “conspicuous growth” of Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese 
influence on the continent.  To military planners, communist involvement in African affairs 
“posed a serious threat to U.S. interests.”261 
    Through the first two years of the administration, the defense policies of the Carter 
administration had done little to address this perceived threat to American interests in Africa.  
In PD-30 on February 17, 1978 the administration articulated a “Human Rights” policy:  The 
U.S. would support foreign governments not on their anti-communist stance but primarily 
upon their treatment of their own citizens.262  While the Pentagon registered no explicit 
objections to PD-30, many in the military rejected the statements of Andrew Young, the 
administration’s ambassador to the U.N., that the Cuban presence in Africa was actually 
good and had introduced “a certain stability and order” and was “essentially opposing 
racism.”  Young declared, “I don’t believe Cuba is in Africa because it was ordered there by 
the Russians.  I believe Cuba is in Africa because it has a shared sense of colonial 
oppression.”  The U.N. Ambassador’s assurance that Americans need not fear “a few 
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Communists, or even a few thousand Communists” working in Africa could not have meshed 
well with the perspective of the Pentagon, which viewed this presence a serious threat.263 
    U.S. defense policy regarding Africa met one of its first major challenges in what came to 
be known as the “Horn of Africa Crisis.”  A series of tumultuous events shook the area in the 
summer of 1978.  Somalia, traditionally supported by Moscow, made overtures toward the 
West, while its neighbor, Ethiopia, increasingly accepted Soviet and Cuban aid.  A long-
standing border dispute between the two nations broke into open warfare and the two 
superpowers seemed obligated to take sides.264  Carter initially agreed to provide “defensive” 
arms to Somalia, but when that country gained the upper hand in the dispute, he quickly 
withdrew the aid.  The Soviets increasingly poured in advisors and the Cubans even sent 
combat units to fight on the Ethiopian side.265  Further inflaming tensions, the Soviet Union 
helped a communist coup in South Yemen across the Arabian Sea from Somalia.266  
Additionally, the Soviets had shown strong concern about any foreign presence in the Indian 
Ocean, demanding the “elimination” of American bases in the area, including Diego 
Garcia.267  Brzezinski believed that these events “posed a potentially grave threat to our 
position in the Middle East.”268 
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    Perhaps learning from previous experiences, the administration sought early input from the 
uniformed military during the Horn of Africa Crisis.  One of the first NSC meetings included 
both General Brown and his aide, LTG William Y. Smith.269  When the Chairmanship of the 
JCS changed in June of 1978, David Jones continued to attend the NSC meetings about the 
region.270  Although Brzezinski pressed very hard for a strong U.S. response, including 
deploying a carrier battle group into the Arabian Sea, both Harold Brown and the JCS were 
“skeptical” over these moves, advocating a more diplomatic course.  Brzezinski was enraged, 
noting in his journal that both Harold Brown and the JCS seemed “badly bitten by the 
Vietnam bug” and consequently were “fearful of taking the kind of action which is 
necessary.”271  In part due to fuller participation in the policy making process, the Pentagon 
presented a unified front and substantively contributed to a resolution of the crisis. 
    The resulting directive, PD-32, proposed that the U.S. government support a local solution 
to the conflict through the Organization of African states.  The directive ordered a restriction 
on transfers of arms to the region and promised U.S. willingness to “offset Soviet threats or 
actions.”  The document did not approve the deployment of the aircraft carrier to the region, 
but indicated “willingness to consider moving a carrier closer to the area.”  Unlike many 
previous decisions, the directive contained a plan for how the administration would consult 
closely with congressional leaders.272 
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    Brzezinski believed that the weak response proposed by PD-32 represented a critical 
turning point in the administration’s relationship with the Soviets.273  David Jones differed.  
When asked to comment on Brzezinski’s thesis and the Horn of Africa Crisis, Jones scoffed.  
“I don’t recall it at all.  It wasn’t an important issue in my mind.”  Clearly the Pentagon view 
had won out over that of the National Security Advisor in the case of PD-32. 
    PD-41, “U.S. Civil Defense Policy,” published in 1978, also reflected the increasing 
weight that the Pentagon was beginning to have on some policies.  Pressure from the 
Pentagon, especially Secretary of Defense Brown, to examine how the U.S. could minimize 
damage from a nuclear exchange with the U.S.S.R. spurred the directive.274  Department of 
Defense studies had for some time suggested that a civil defense program might have 
potential, but Carter remained unconvinced despite Harold Brown’s advocacy.275  In 
authorizing PD-41 Carter emphasized the importance of civil defense and re-energized 
government efforts toward examining how the nation might survive a protracted war with 
large scale use of nuclear weapons.  This turn toward analyzing potential conflicts with the 
Soviet Union illustrated the more pragmatic policies that typified the second half of the 
administration. 
    PD-41 emphasized the value of civil defense preparation in the “perception” of the nuclear 
balance of power.  Civil defense preparation could prevent the U.S. from being “coerced in a 
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time of crisis.”  It recognized the “continuing U.S. reliance on strategic offensive nuclear 
forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence.”276 
    The Pentagon and uniformed military were pleased with the policy articulated in PD-41.  
William Odom, the military aide to Brzezinski, was certainly very satisfied with PD-41.  He, 
along with NSC aide Samuel Huntington, worked extensively to bring civil defense to both 
Carter and Brzezinski’s attention.  These men recognized the significance and evolutionary 
nature of PD-41 and praised Carter’s decision to implement it.277  Press interpretation billed 
the passage of the directive as a victory for the Pentagon over the State Department and arms 
control advocates within the administration.278 
    While the military may have applauded PD-41, many of Carter’s civilian advisors did not.  
Odom recalled that Leslie Gelb and Lynne Davis, two more liberal minded members of 
Carter’s administration, strongly objected to PD-41.279 Before the president assumed office 
Barry Blechman and Stuart Eizenstat had counseled against spending on civil-defense.280  
Paul Warnke, who had recently resigned as Carter’s head of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, was also highly critical of the effort.281  Vance’s State Department 
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was also said to have fought against the allocation of resources for civil defense.282  In some 
ways, the drafting of this directive began to show the final splits in the administration that 
would lead to an NSC policy formulation process dominated by the hard-line predilections of 
Brzezinski and culminate in the resignation of Secretary of State Vance. 
Building and Refining a Grand Strategy:  Civil-Military Relations and Defense Policy, 
1977-1978 
 
    PD-41 ended the first phase in civil-military relations surrounding defense policy in the 
Carter administration.  In the first two years of the administration, Carter chose to exclude 
the JCS from his official policy making process as part of his revision of the NSC system.  
He listened at times to the Chiefs in person, but when it came to policy making he wanted 
their views filtered through Harold Brown.  Carter’s NSC process, while intended to create 
dissenting views, often kept the Pentagon out of the process.  This led not only to the 
beginning of the oft-discussed Vance-Brzezinski split, but also to the perception among 
members of the military that the JCS was being “muzzled.”  A secondary consequence was 
tension between the JCS and Harold Brown, whom the Chiefs viewed as ineffective in 
advancing Pentagon policy preferences.  Finally, as the Chiefs adapted to Carter’s policy 
making process, they proved willing to compromise and support the administration, with the 
Korea withdrawals being a case of weak, qualified support and the Panama Canal treaties 
demonstrating strong support.  Despite willingness to compromise and work with the 
administration, many members of the military outside the JCS and Joint Staff opposed 
Carter’s policies.  Korea was the worst case of dissent with the theater CINC breaking openly 
with the administration.  Even in the case of strongest support—the Panama Canal treaties, 
where both the JCS and the CINC supported the policy—the administration still suffered a 
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litany of dissent from prominent members of the retired military.  In effect, civil-military 
conflict dominated the first two years of the Carter administration. 
    The sources of this conflict were many.  The early exclusion of the JCS from the policy 
making process was certainly a major source of frustration.  In policies where the JCS were 
steadily consulted, such as the Panama Canal Treaties and the Horn of Africa Crisis, the 
tension eased.  Carter’s own proclivity for making surprise decisions at the last minute 
without consulting advisors or Congress also maximized civil-military conflict.  The B-1 
bomber cancellation was perhaps the best example of this, but the last-minute unilateral 
ERW deferral and the rather sudden issuance of PD-12 on Korea also created needless anger.  
Finally, the Carter administration continued the post-World War II willingness to politicize 
the role of the JCS on many matters related to defense policy.  While Carter generally failed 
to heed the advice of his military advisors in his first two years in office, he and members of 
his cabinet recognized the critical need for their support of his policies.  This created civil-
military tension during the Korea incident, the B-1 bomber cancellation, and also during the 
Panama Canal treaties.  Each of these factors explains why civil-military conflict 
predominated the defense policy making process in Carter’s first two years of office. 
    Carter recognized the growing civil-military discord and called a meeting with the Chiefs 
in late 1977.  The president asked the Chiefs if they were “participating to the extent” that 
they believed “appropriate in the decisions being made” within the administration.  While the 
Chiefs responded “generally in the affirmative,” they suggested it might be helpful if all of 
them, not just the Chairman, were able to become more involved with the NSC.  Carter 
yielded to their request and directed that Brzezinski would meet once a month with JCS.  
Additionally, Carter cleared the Chairman or the Acting Chairman and his assistant to attend 
 164 
all NSC meetings.283  This decision helped to alleviate some of the tension caused by the 
initial exclusion and filtering of military advice.  The reduction in tension and increase in 
JCS participation were shown in the events surrounding PD-32 and PD-41. 
    Civil-military relations surrounding the policy making process in the Carter administration 
would not experience an abrupt change with the passage of PD-41 and the arrival of 1979, 
but in several ways the relationship changed in the second two years of the administration.  
Several crises placed the civil-military relationship under an even greater strain.  Revolutions 
in Nicaragua and Iran, a coup in Korea, the discovery of a brigade of Russian troops in Cuba, 
the taking of the American hostages in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all 
required close civil-military consultation.  Yet, the relationship managed to remain functional 
through the turmoil.  Nonetheless, in the last two years of Carter’s term the defense policy 
process was to be taxed to its limit—and in a state of virtual chaos. 
    Despite the civil-military conflict surrounding defense policy and budgets in the first two 
years of Carter’s term, there was still potential for compromise on many issues.  Harold 
Brown had built a working relationship with two sets of Chiefs by 1979.  David Jones, taking 
over as Chairman in 1978, supported Brown and Carter on many important issues, setting 
aside service interests to do so.  The military-congressional alliance pushed Carter toward 
raising defense budgets and fought him on certain policy issues such as Korea troop 
withdrawals, but had been willing to support him on the critical but controversial Panama 
Canal treaties.  By the start of 1979, civil-military relations in the Carter years were by no 
means doomed to perpetual conflict.  In the last two years of his administration there would 
be much compromise in this area—but ultimately, especially in the realm of defense budgets, 
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it was going to be the uncompromising Jimmy Carter who would have to accept most of the 
compromises with the military-congressional alliance. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
COMPROMISE:  THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 
1979-1981 
 
Interlude: Room 2337, Rayburn House Office Building, May 29, 1980, 9:00 a.m.1 
 
    Representative Samuel Stratton, sitting beneath a huge painting of the Iwo Jima flag 
raising, had just lowered his gavel, bringing to order a special congressional hearing.  As 
chairman of the investigations subcommittee, Sam Stratton held a key position within the 
larger House Armed Services Committee.  In past congressional testimony, he had often 
questioned the Carter administration’s defense policies and had suggested that uniformed 
military advice was being ignored.  Although Stratton was a Democrat and one of the most 
senior members of the committee, Jimmy Carter and his staff had never asked his advice, 
invited him to dinner at the White House, or even spoken to him by phone.2  Like his friend 
Melvin Price, who was also a member of the subcommittee, Stratton had serious doubts 
about the adequacy of the Carter Administration’s defense budgets and felt that Congress had 
been given scant attention in the defense policy making process in the last four years. 
    Preparing to testify before the subcommittee were the highest ranking military officers in 
the nation.  At their center sat Air Force General David Jones, the longest serving member of 
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the JCS and now its chairman.  General Lew Allen represented the Air Force and General 
Edward Meyer spoke for the Army.  Admiral Hayward was out of the country at the time and 
was therefore represented by Admiral James Watkins, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
The Commandant of the Marine Corps had recently been made a full member of the JCS 
through legislation, so the newly appointed General Robert Barrow also sat before the 
congressional panel.  Each of the Chiefs was prepared to answer questions relating to the 
Carter Administration’s Fiscal Year 1981 Defense Budget.  Each one of them was also 
prepared to be put on the spot.  Given the animosity that existed between the House Armed 
Services Committee and the president, the Chiefs certainly expected a pointed series of 
questions.  As always when testifying before Congress, these military men would have to 
balance their support for stated administration policies with being truthful about their own 
professional opinions. 
    Notably absent from the hearings were any of the Joint Chiefs’ civilian counterparts.  
Neither Harold Brown nor any of the Service Secretaries had been called to testify at this 
special hearing.  Actually, they had been specifically excluded from the roll call.  Past 
hearings of this particular subcommittee had sought to discover if uniformed military leaders 
were actually being consulted by the administration, but it had been almost a full year since 
the subcommittee had last discussed these matters.  Now the issue was front and center once 
again.  This particular hearing was called due to what Chairman Stratton termed an “almost 
unprecedented development.”3  Only a few weeks earlier both the President and the Secretary 
of Defense had each written letters to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
asking that increases in defense spending proposed by the House Armed Services Committee 
be struck down.  Secretary Brown’s letter in particular was a point of great contention, for it 
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accused the House Armed Services Committee of “jeopardizing” the military capability of 
the United States by pursuing its own course and making additions to the defense budget.4  
The absence of Pentagon civilians at this hearing was designed to insure that the military 
leaders would be completely candid when questioned about these letters and their role in 
formulating them. 
    As Congressman Stratton brought the meeting to order, he leaned forward in his chair, 
spoke into his microphone, and outlined the reason for the hearing.  Stratton stated for the 
record the fact that the JCS advisory role to the President was codified in written law.  He 
then made it clear that he and most of the members of his committee felt that uniformed 
military advice was being ignored.  This, said the senior congressman, “seemed to us a very 
unfortunate situation since, if you are going to have advisors but consistently don’t take their 
advice, something is radically wrong and needs changing.”5  Stratton scanned the faces of the 
JCS, who sat in a row opposite him in the room at a large desk beneath an oil portrait of two 
young girls waiting for their POW father to return from Hanoi.  The differences between the 
emotional faces in the painting and the stoic expressions of the JCS could not be more stark.  
If these professionals agreed with Stratton’s statements then it was not outwardly apparent, 
but the veteran congressman was undeterred.  He was all too familiar with the Beltway 
etiquette.  He would have to ask these military men very specific questions to get them to 
reveal their disagreements with the commander-in-chief and the Secretary of Defense.  And  
Stratton and his Committee knew exactly what to ask. 
    Stratton began with Jones.  He asked if Secretary Brown had consulted him before sending 
the letter to Congress requesting reduced defense expenditures.  General Jones, wanting to 
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deflect possible criticism of his civilian superior, stated that it was “common procedure” for 
the Secretary of Defense to submit such letters to Congress.  No skilled politician would 
accept such an answer.  “I would prefer if you would just answer the question, General,” 
Stratton shot back.  General Jones admitted that he had not seen the letter until shortly after it 
was sent to Congress.  Stratton sensed victory, but wanted to clarify the issue even more for 
the record:  “Secretary Brown did not consult you—is that right?”  General Jones paused 
momentarily, trying to decide if there was any way to soften his response.  “He did not on 
this letter,” the general finally replied.6  Given the treatment afforded to him by the president 
and his staff, Stratton felt obligated to slam his point home in even more dramatic fashion: 
So on a matter which would appear to be of grave significance . . . Secretary 
Brown did not consult you before he advised Senator Stennis that the funds 
added by the House could seriously jeopardize our national defense?7 
 
“He did not,” General Jones conceded.8  The Chairman was immensely pleased.  He had 
known Jones would be the most difficult member of the JCS to question because in the past 
the Air Force general had, in hours of cross-examination, supported the administration’s 
decision to cancel the B-1 bomber.9  Now, in just a short series of questions, Stratton felt he 
had clearly demonstrated the civil-military discord between the President, his Secretary of 
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. 
    Still not wanting to let the point rest, Stratton questioned each of the members of the JCS 
in turn about both Secretary Brown’s and the president’s letters to Senator Stennis.  Each of 
them testified that they had not been consulted on the content of the letters.  Two of them, 
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Meyer and Barrow, were not even aware of their existence until reading about them in the 
newspaper some days later.10  This placed at least two of the service chiefs in the same 
situation as all members of the House Armed Services Committee, since Harold Brown and 
President Carter had informed none of them as to the letters which they had sent to 
Congress.11  As the five Chiefs finished their testimony, Stratton wondered aloud how “on a 
matter so vital to our national security and one where a sovereign House of Congress was 
being challenged by the Secretary of Defense on a professional military matter,” he himself 
would not have at least been informed of the administration’s intentions.12  It seemed that 
Carter and his civilian advisors had attempted their own variant of the end-run on Congress 
with the veiled goal of curbing rises in defense spending. 
    Having established the lack of military consultation surrounding the two letters, Stratton 
unleashed the other members of his committee to question the Chiefs’ personal opinions 
about various modifications and omissions from the defense budget.  Two cancelled 
programs received particular attention:  The B-1 bomber and the AV-8B Harrier II.  Under 
intense questioning, General Jones, in somewhat of a backtrack from his FY78 defense 
budget testimony, stated that he regretted the cancellation of the B-1 bomber and hoped that 
it would be considered again for procurement as a cruise-missile carrier.13  General Barrow 
classified the AV-8B, which had been rejected by Harold Brown as too costly, as the 
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Marine’s “number one aviation priority.”14  One of the most vocal critics of the proposed 
Carter budget was the Chief of Staff of the Army.  General Meyer testified that he currently 
felt that there was “a tremendous shortfall in our ability to modernize the Army,” and that the 
present budget did not allow his service to meet “the challenge of the eighties.”  He went on 
to cite grave recruiting shortfalls and bluntly stated that the Army had become “hollow.”15  
Under continued questioning from the committee members, each of the Chiefs admitted that 
they felt the defense budget was inadequate without the additions proposed by the Armed 
Services Committees in Congress.  Many of the Chiefs cited the recent Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as proof of the need to bolster the nation’s military posture.16  From the 
questioning, the JCS unanimously agreed that the additions and modifications to the defense 
budget proposed by Congress were essential to guarantee the future security of the nation. 
    Given the unanimity among the Chiefs, some members of Congress found it shocking that 
military end-runs to Congress had not been more prevalent and intense over the last four 
years.  To address this issue, Sam Stratton called on Marjorie Holt (R-MD), a member of 
both the Armed Services and Budget Committees.  She opened by lamenting that she was the 
only one fighting for the defense portion of the budget on the Budget Committee, 
traditionally more liberal than the Armed Services Committee, and that she had little support 
from the military’s congressional liaison office.  This, she argued, was in stark contrast to the 
Nixon and Ford administrations, when liaison officers were “swarming all over the place 
providing information.”  Looking directly at Jones, she declared that there was little hope of 
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passing a higher defense budget “simply because we are not getting any assistance from you 
at all.”17  “You know the situation better than anybody,” she implored to the stoic uniformed 
men sitting before her:  “You’re the men who are going to have to go out there and lay 
yourselves on the line.”  “Ma’am,” General Jones interjected, “We’ve tried to be helpful this 
morning, in sharing our concerns.”  Congresswoman Holt was not so easily deterred.  “We 
appreciate it very much,” she conceded, but reiterated that in her mind the matter was “very 
serious.”  She alluded to many allies in the Senate who felt that the defense budget should 
increase.  “I think it’s time that all of us wake up,” she concluded forcefully.18  Sam Stratton 
leaned forward, passing his gaze over each member of the JCS.  “I think Mrs. Holt has put 
her finger on what is the most frustrating thing to all of us.”  He challenged the JCS on their 
relative silence on the defense budget prior to this morning, asking each member of the JCS 
if they had been instructed to lobby against increases in the defense budget.  Each Chief 
denied it.19   
    The panel was clearly suggesting that the military end-runs over the last four years had 
been relatively minor compared to what they might have been given the circumstances.  “I 
just can’t see why every other agency in the Federal Government is free to lobby,” Holt 
broke in, “the food stamp people are here in full force . . . [yet] the Defense Department is 
under such constraints to tell us, to tell publicly, what we need.”  Opening a new line of 
questioning, she pressed the Chairman of the JCS for answers, “Where does the president get 
his military advice?  Who makes the decisions, OMB?” 20  General Jones was noticeably 
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flustered by Congresswoman Holt’s blunt questioning, and one of the more senior members 
of the panel, Robin Beard (R-TN) attempted to interrupt Holt.  She brushed him off: “Wait a 
minute.  Let me finish.  On the military budget from whom does President Carter take his 
advice?  General Jones?” “He gets it from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the Secretary of 
Defense and the National Security Council,” Jones replied.  She quickly retorted, “And he 
doesn’t pay any attention to it at all, from what you said this morning.”  The general paused a 
moment to reflect on an appropriate moderating counter to this last line of questioning.  “Our 
record is mixed,” he replied.  General Jones then went on at some length to describe how 
Carter had over time added to the defense budget and listened increasingly to the advice of 
the JCS.  He emphasized the loyalty that the JCS had for their commander-in-chief, and the 
fact that it would be wrong for the military to lobby against any executive decision.  “That 
would destroy the discipline in the military if we can make choices as to whom we obey,” 
Jones concluded.  Congresswoman Holt felt obligated to soften her harsh tone.  “I certainly 
commend you gentlemen, and I didn’t mean to imply that you should have a lot of people 
swarming around,” she acknowledged, “I don’t mean to belittle your efforts or not to 
recognize the constraints you’re under; but somehow we’ve got to get the message out, and 
I’m really very concerned.”21  Most of the committee nodded in agreement, and all seemed 
impressed by the loyalty and professionalism of the Joint Chiefs. 
    Stratton smiled and prepared to end the hearing with a sort of grand finale.  He turned to 
fellow committee member Robin Beard next to him and nodded.  Beard took the floor and 
first addressed Congresswoman Holt.  “I identify with your frustration, and I know you are 
searching for answers from these gentlemen,” he said, gesturing to the JCS, “but there’s no 
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way these individuals can give you the answer.” With emotion creeping into his voice, Beard 
lambasted the administration’s entire defense policy: “I think the fact of the matter is the 
defense of this country is caught up in this cheap shot, irresponsible politics.”22  He then 
launched into a verbal assault on the last three plus years of defense policy decisions: 
We talk about some of the battles we’ve won or some of the battles we’ve 
lost.  I don’t think the President is listening to you as much as he should.  We 
look at the shipbuilding program. . . . We look at the nuclear carrier when the 
President used one of his few vetoes during his tour.  We look at the neutron 
bomb; we look at the AV-8B, which the Marine Corps has begged for and 
pleaded for and sacrificed for; we look at the B-1 bomber. . . . With all of 
these things, the changes have been because political polls show that maybe 
it’s more popular.  I think the straw that breaks the camel’s back is a letter 
from the Secretary of Defense and a letter from the President which read like 
third-grade readers.  It’s an insult.  These letters are an insult to the Congress; 
they’re an insult to the military leadership; and they’re an insult to the 
American people.  These letters are absolutely, totally insane.23 
 
The committee room remained silent as Congressman Beard concluded his remarks.  The 
Carter administration, in his mind, was “caught up in campaign politics” and the defense of 
this country was “paying the price.”24 
    As he adjourned the committee at 10:40 a.m., Sam Stratton felt quite pleased.  The JCS 
had remained as loyal and professional as he expected, but with his system of pointed 
questioning he had been able to reveal fully the two-faced nature of Jimmy Carter’s promises 
to increase defense spending in the last two years of his presidency.   The media would soon 
get hold of the incident and widely report that the JCS had broken with the administration 
over the adequacy of the defense budget.25  Carter had throughout his term snubbed Congress 
                                                 
22
 Ibid.  
 
23
 Ibid., 24-25.  
 
24
 Ibid., 25.  
 
25
 George C. Wilson, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Break with Carter on Budget Planning for Defense Needs," 
Washington Post, May 30, 1980, A1, A16; Martin Tolchin, "House Rejects Budget Compromise as Foes of 
 175 
in the defense budgeting and policy making process.  The president, thought Stratton, would 
now reap what he had sowed.  The military-congressional alliance had reached one of the 
highest points in the four years of the administration, and Stratton, along with allies like Sam 
Nunn and Ernest Hollings in the Senate, were about to unleash a flood of peacetime defense 
spending. 
    In many ways this particular hearing exemplified four years of civil-military relations 
surrounding the defense budget in the Carter Administration.  First, although Jimmy Carter 
would become less personally involved in the third and fourth iterations of his 
administration’s defense budget, he and his staff still chafed at Congress altering his defense 
spending priorities.  This rejection of the traditional role of Congress in formulating the 
defense budget led to continued ineptitude within the administration when dealing with the 
Armed Services Committees and often resulted in Harold Brown being caught in the middle 
during his testimony before Congress.  Ultimately, Carter’s condescending attitude toward 
key pro-defense congressmen and senators cemented a firm military-congressional alliance 
and hardened a bi-partisan consensus within the Congress that his administration was not 
doing enough in the realm of national security.  Second, the JCS, under the leadership and 
example of General Jones, would remain loyal and professional throughout Carter’s term.  
Although end-runs would certainly take place, they did not occur to the extent that one would 
expect given Carter’s weak standing with Congress.  Finally, as this hearing vividly 
demonstrated, Harold Brown would find himself caught in the middle between a bi-
partisanly pro-military Congress and a president unwilling and unable to negotiate important 
issues related to the defense budget.  This strained the relationship between civilians and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Military Outlay Prevail," New York Times, May 30, 1980, A1; Richard Halloran, "Joint Chiefs Dissent on 
Carter-Brown Military Budget," New York Times, May 30, 1980, D14. 
 176 
military within the Pentagon and exacerbated animosity between the Pentagon and the White 
House. 
    When reflecting upon his tenure as Harold Brown’s special assistant, John Kester recalled 
that with regard to the defense budget “there was a great concern to have the chiefs sign on 
and say the funding was there—that the budget was adequate for the next year,” but as he 
was leaving his post in 1981 Kester admitted that, “there came a time when the chiefs refused 
to do that.”26  The hearing before Sam Stratton’s Investigations Subcommittee had revealed 
this dissent, but such a civil-military break had not occurred overnight.  The culmination of 
the events that took place in May 1980 can be traced back to the early stages of the 
formulation of the previous defense budget. 
Bold Promises:  Rhetoric and the Need for Higher Defense Spending in FY80 
 
    As the time approached to prepare the FY80 defense budget, the Carter administration 
clearly held a position of weakness relative to that of the military-congressional alliance.  
Victory in the veto of the FY79 defense appropriations bill had come at a high cost to the 
administration’s relationship with pro-defense senators and congressmen.  Carter would soon 
need these same lawmakers’ votes when it would come time to present the SALT II treaty for 
ratification.  With public opinion polls showing an increased desire for higher defense 
spending, many high ranking officers at the Pentagon saw the opportunity as ripe to lobby 
openly.  Bolstering the military’s position, Douglas Heinl, a pro-military political scientist, 
published in early 1979 a prominent op-ed in the Washington Post decrying the Soviet threat 
and calling for increased defense spending as an “insurance premium” for the nation.27  Air 
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Force Chief Lew Allen followed up a little more than a month later with a public speech to 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce describing the Soviet threat as greater than any 
threat in the nation’s history.28  Senator Stennis (D-MS) remarked as he began hearings on 
the FY1980 budget that the “balance between ourselves and the Soviets should be a matter of 
concern to all Americans.”29  The rhetoric of the Soviet threat and the need for increased 
defense spending in FY80 had made an early appearance in 1979. 
    Not only was the rhetoric of the Soviet threat increasing on the eve of the SALT II debate 
and the FY80 defense budget preparation, but the economy also proved to be a major issue 
on which the military-congressional alliance capitalized.  While Carter had repeatedly stated 
that he would decrease the budget deficit for the nation in FY80, ruinous inflation and a 
sagging economy forced him to reconsider his promise.  Two distinguished chief economic 
advisors to former presidents, including Alan Greenspan, agreed that a recession year made 
President Carter’s goal of holding the budget deficit for FY80 to $30 billion “unrealistic.”30  
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) concurred that the economic situation was detrimental to 
paring defense spending, publicly stating that a balanced budget amendment would 
“endanger national defense.”31 The Pentagon followed suit, releasing reports that the military 
was 27 percent over budget on its fuel costs.  Additionally the military would require $890 
million more than was allocated in the FY79 budget in order to pay its operating costs for 
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that year.  $470 million was required just to hold even with inflation, and another $490 
million was needed for “deferred DoD property maintenance, equipment repair, and unit 
training.” Still unfunded would be $250 million for recruiting and $200 million for ship and 
aircraft overhaul, plus over $400 million for increased utility usage.  General Jones publicly 
stated that these items badly needed funding and were of the “highest priority.”32  The 
Pentagon clearly planned to milk the current political and economic situation in order to get 
the most defense dollars possible. 
    Following Carter’s veto of the FY79 defense bill in August of 1978, Congress had been 
unable to agree on what items should replace the money allocated for the rejected Nimitz 
class carrier.  The House Armed Services Committee therefore made the relatively rare 
concession that any replacement items could be considered in a supplemental defense request 
for FY79.33  Taking advantage of this offer, the Pentagon sought to place their 
“unprogrammed” cost overruns into a $2.7 billion supplement for the FY79 defense budget.  
JCS Historian Stephen Rearden has termed the submission of this FY79 supplement to the 
defense bill as “the first sign of a crack in the administration’s budget policy,” and truly it 
was a crack into which the Pentagon chose to drive a wedge.34  High ranking military officers 
and many civilians in the Pentagon realized that Carter’s desire to smooth congressional 
relations in advance of SALT II were too important for him to risk fighting another FY79-
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style veto.  By taking full advantage of the FY79 Supplemental, the Pentagon recognized the 
opportunity to gain more funding with comparatively little risk. 
    Although the FY79 Supplemental seemed an attractive option for the administration to 
increase defense expenditures, it met with significant congressional scrutiny.  Such defense 
supplementals had been rare, and passage would require a waiver from the Rules Committee 
of Congress.35  Additionally, because the need for the supplemental had arisen due to 
Carter’s veto, many in Congress did not intend to give him an easy pass in modifying his 
plan for defense spending.  Yet, early in January of 1979, the Pentagon drafted plans, with 
Carter’s approval, to submit the supplemental authorization for the FY79 defense budget.  
Such an immediate and active discussion of the submitting of a FY79 supplemental defense 
spending bill shocked even Senator John Stennis (D-MI), chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, who indicated that he would object to the supplement on the grounds it 
was not a military emergency and was not needed until FY80.36 Likewise, Joseph Addabbo 
(D-NY), the new chairman of the House Budget Committee, initially felt that the supplement 
should be rejected on similar grounds.37  Likewise, House Appropriations Committee 
Chairman Robert Giaimo (D-CT), generally favorable toward defense spending, questioned 
the need for the supplemental, asking why the additions could not wait a few extra months to 
be considered with the FY80 Defense Budget.38  This posed a dilemma for Carter, and 
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revealed why he had made such a strong effort to pass the FY79 supplement.  If his 
administration had in fact disregarded the supplement and instead rolled the increase into the 
FY80 defense budget submission, then there would have been an almost unprecedented 21 
percent increase in the yearly budget, something completely irreconcilable with Carter’s bold 
promises to trim the federal budget deficit and economize in defense spending.39  As the 
rumors of defense spending increases, and the efforts to conceal them, spread at the start of 
the second half of his administration, critics declared that the president was “going big on 
defense but trying to have his cake and eat it too.”40 
    The FY79 defense supplement was not the only veiled effort to bolster defense spending.  
As his plan to add to his FY79 allocation drew increasing fire, Harold Brown suggested an 
additional course of action which Carter chose to employ.  Due to the internal situation in 
Iran, a large amount of American weaponry scheduled to be purchased by that nation had 
been cancelled.  Since much of the equipment was for the Iranian Navy, the U.S. Navy began 
planning to acquire these systems for itself—in Secretary Claytor’s words, “as soon as the 
troubles in Iran started.”41  On February 27, 1979, the president asked Congress to allow the 
Pentagon to buy fifty-five F16 fighters, two Kidd class destroyers, and over six hundred 
missiles originally slated to be purchased by Iran prior to the fall of the Shah.  In contrast to 
previous defense spending decisions, Carter followed Harold Brown’s recommendation with 
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very little modification.42  Eventually, these items were attached to the FY79 supplement as 
an amendment which raised the total by an additional $545 million.43  Once word of the 
maneuver was leaked to the press, columnist Jack Anderson referred to it as an unabashed 
“bail out” for defense contractors and argued that most of the equipment was “obsolete or 
unnecessary.”  He dubbed Carter’s defense spending addition the “Great Iranian Fire Sale,” a 
name which quickly gained common usage on Capitol Hill.44 
    Getting the FY79 Supplemental with the additional items purchased from Iran through 
Congress would prove to be much harder than Carter expected.  Senator Stennis stated at the 
opening of hearings on the bill that the “burden of proof” was on the Department of Defense 
to show why the requested programs should be funded in FY79 rather than FY80.45  At first 
Congress called only William Perry, Undersecretary for Research and Development, and W. 
Graham Claytor, Secretary of the Navy, to testify regarding the supplemental on March 7, 
1979.46  In his prepared statement, Perry explained that approximately one-third of the 
supplemental dealt with compensation for “unprogrammed” cost overruns, while the 
remainder would provide for additional program changes.  The largest portion of program 
changes would be the Pentagon acquisition of weapons systems formerly slated for Iran.  The 
total amended supplement would come to just over $4.4 billion, and since the president had 
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seen fit to veto the previous year’s defense bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee was 
not about to let such a large supplement pass without debate.47 
    The desire of many lawmakers to assert their role in the defense budget process was clear 
by the manner in which the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned DoD witnesses.  
Graham Claytor made a strong case for procuring two of the naval vessels previously slated 
for Iran, by explaining how badly the Navy needed these vessels and how much of a bargain 
it would be for taxpayers.  He even went so far as to suggest phrasing language in the 
supplemental so as to pave the way for purchasing two additional destroyers bound for Iran 
that he was certain would also be rejected by the new government in Tehran.  Stennis, 
considered to be one of the strongest supporters of the Navy in the Senate, tempered his 
approval of the plan so as to appear only partially supportive.48  Many senators indicated 
dissatisfaction with the explanations provided by the first set of administration witnesses.  By 
first having called only William Perry and Claytor to testify, the Committee was then able to 
demand that Harold Brown himself appear to further explain the need for the FY79 
supplemental. 
    When Brown appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee,  Senator Cannon 
(D-NV), bluntly asked why Brown viewed the Congress as a “supermarket” for his 
seemingly whimsical choices regarding defense spending.49  Brown took a rather apologetic 
tone to the committee, stating that external events, such as the exile of the Shah and the 
canceling of the arms for Iran, required the administration to submit an amendment to the 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., 7. 
 
48
 Ibid., 82-83.  Senator Stennis has been termed “the father of America’s modern Navy” and had a Nimitz class 
aircraft carrier named in his honor.  See http://www.cvn74.navy.mil/aboutSenatorStennis.html (Accessed 
December 27, 2007) 
 
49
 Ibid., 216. 
 
 183 
supplemental.  Cannon did not initially accept Brown’s explanations.  Brown appeared 
frustrated with the continued questioning and at one point admitted: 
If I didn’t tell you about these things, I would be concealing pertinent 
information.  If we tried to amend the supplemental, you would rightly say 
that we didn’t know what we wanted.  Well, we do know now what we want, 
but I can see that the committee is not inclined to do it.50 
 
When Cannon continued to probe as to possible modifications, including buying an 
additional destroyer, Brown conceded, “I am not sitting on your side of the table.  If I were, I 
would look to find enough money to purchase one of the ships now.”51  Following Cannon’s 
aggressive questioning, the usually pro-Pentagon Sam Nunn (D-GA) joined in the cross-
examination, directing a barrage of technical questions about the acquired weapons systems 
at Brown.52  At several other points in the hearing, the Secretary of Defense used this “other 
side of the table” argument to imply that he would not personally object to congressional 
modifications of the defense budget.  At one point Senator Stennis felt compelled to interrupt 
another senator and ask Brown, “Are you speaking as a representative of the executive 
branch of the government?”  The Secretary of Defense then downplayed his statements, but 
concluded by saying that he did not “want to get involved in what is appropriately the 
committee’s responsibility.”53  Under the directed questioning, Harold Brown had remained 
loyal to the policies of his administration, but also tried to make it known that he fully 
appreciated Congress’ role in modifying the defense budget. 
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    As Carter and his administration pushed the supplemental defense authorization, they also 
attempted to repair some of the damage done to their relationship with pro-defense 
Congressmen over the FY79 appropriations veto.  Given the fallout experienced with HASC 
Chairman Melvin Price, the administration desperately wanted to keep up cordial relations 
with SASC Chairman Stennis.54  By keeping the influential senator on their side, the 
administration would certainly find it much easier to move ahead with their modified plans 
for defense spending, as well as their hope for ratification of the upcoming SALT II treaty 
with the U.S.S.R.  If the House Armed Services Committee was a lost cause, the Senate 
Armed Services committee appeared much more open for future good relations with the 
administration, including making Stennis an ally.  The Mississippi Democrat had personally 
supported another nuclear carrier, yet had sided with the president and voted against it 
following the veto.55 By touting increased defense spending and seeking more input from 
Stennis, Carter and his White House appeared to have found a method to reduce the 
effectiveness of the military-congressional alliance on Capitol Hill while at the same time 
paving the way for future ratification of SALT II. 
    Unfortunately for President Carter, the same ineptitude that had plagued his congressional 
liaison staff in his first two years continued, with grave consequences for his effort to limit 
the increases in defense spending.  First, Carter’s congressional liaison staff angered civilians 
and military in the Pentagon with their stance on the refurbishment of the aircraft carrier 
U.S.S. Saratoga.  The supplemental defense appropriations for FY79 provided for the Service 
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Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the conventionally-powered carrier.  Harold Brown and 
Graham Claytor had conducted extensive cost-benefit analysis, in cooperation with the Navy, 
and determined that the overhaul of the aging ship should take place in Newport News, 
Virginia.  Claytor had even gone so far as to submit the Pentagon findings to Congress in 
writing.  But a late afternoon phone call to the Pentagon from the White House caught Brown 
and his staff off guard.56  Vice-President Walter Mondale contacted the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense at the Pentagon and demanded that the Saratoga be refurbished in the Philadelphia 
Naval Yard in order to help fulfill a campaign promise to create more jobs for the city’s 
sagging economy.  A young Colin Powell, the military aide to Charles Duncan, recalled the 
moment when Harold Brown informed the Secretary of the Navy of the changes that he 
would have to make to his upcoming Congressional testimony.  Claytor fumed, at first 
refusing to testify differently than the report he had submitted which recommended 
refurbishment at Newport News.57  When the day of reckoning came, however, Claytor 
relented, falling in line with the White House policy and standing up under rigorous cross 
examination as to why his testimony was inconsistent with his written report.58  The only 
military witness on the matter, Admiral Thomas Hayward, frankly stated what the studies 
had actually shown:  that Newport News was in fact more cost efficient for the overhaul than 
Philadelphia.59  In the end, Claytor’s testimony convincingly supported the refurbishment at 
Philadelphia Naval Yard, and the Senate Armed Services Committee agreed to the change.60  
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Although the vice-president had gotten his way, the White House had again made enemies in 
the Pentagon. 
    Following the Saratoga incident, the administration botched a second issue related to the 
inclusion of the “Iranian Fire Sale” naval vessels.  Sensing that they could draw closer to 
their desired strength of six-hundred ships, the Department of the Navy informed Harold 
Brown that they needed not just two, but all four of the Kidd-class destroyers originally 
slated for the Shah of Iran.  The Secretary of Defense agreed.  Brown, aware of Carter’s 
efforts to gain Stennis as an ally, and shrewdly hoping to ease the passage of the supplement 
through the Senate, promised the senator that all four of the destroyers would be built in 
southern ports.  As with the prior plan for the Saratoga, both civilians and military in the 
Pentagon fully supported Brown’s plan and felt it a wise tribute to Senator Stennis’ past 
support.61  Yet, Carter’s White House staff had different ideas.  Without consulting Stennis 
or the Pentagon, the administration’s congressional liaison allied with Senator Donald Riegle 
(D-MI), who offered an amendment striking two of the four ships.  Shocked at what he 
considered a political betrayal, Stennis strenuously objected, citing letters from Harold 
Brown, W. Graham Claytor, and various naval officers arguing that all four destroyers were 
needed immediately.  He also brought up the fact that the four destroyers would bring needed 
jobs into southern naval yards.62  Riegle countered that he was in possession of documents 
from the administration showing that only two destroyers should be purchased with the FY79 
supplemental, with the other two being part of the FY80 budget.  According to Riegle, John 
White, the Deputy Head of OMB, had told him that this was the “definitive” administration 
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position. “This is a repudiation of everything that everybody has told me!” Stennis shouted 
on the floor of the Senate, prior to storming out of the debate.63 The administration’s efforts 
to conceal its defense spending plans backfired, and the chance to make an ally of Senator 
Stennis met a similar fate. 
    Although ultimately a failure, the efforts to draw closer to Stennis proved unusual because 
the administration made few such efforts with other important congressmen and senators.  A 
glaring example was the administration’s treatment of Samuel Stratton (D-NY).  Stratton 
held a key position on the House Armed Services Committee.  In congressional testimony he 
had often questioned the administration’s defense policies and suggested that uniformed 
military advice was being ignored.  Though he was one of the most senior members of the 
committee, Stratton noted that the president and his staff never asked his advice, invited him 
to dinner at the White House, or even spoken to him by phone.64  Perhaps the Carter White 
House did not want to invest time in cultivating relationships outside the Senate, where 
ratification of SALT II would not be an issue.  Alternatively, Carter may have felt that the 
conflict with Melvin Price had ruined relations with the House Armed Services Committee.  
Whatever the reasoning, for many important members of Congress the message was clear.  
Senator “Scoop” Jackson may have summed up the prevailing attitude when he told the 
press, in regard to the Carter administration’s relationship with Congress on defense, “I’ve 
been around here a few years, and I’ve never seen such an amateurish operation.”65   
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    Despite the botched handling by the administration, the FY79 Defense Supplemental 
passed both houses of Congress by May of 1979, in large part due to the testimony of Jones 
and Secretary of the Navy Claytor.  Jones testified that although he was not an alarmist and 
would not “normally use words like crisis and emergency,” he did feel that these terms 
clearly applied to the need for the additional defense funds.66  If Congress did not pass the 
supplemental, he argued, the United States would be “signaling to the rest of the world a 
perpetuation of slips, cuts, and reductions.”67  Claytor stated that “a great deal of waste would 
be incurred” if the supplemental was further delayed and that the veto of the carrier in the 
FY79 bill had created a clear national emergency “if there ever was an emergency.”68  By 
supporting the administration’s “emergency” criteria and by appealing to the Congress’ sense 
of fiscal responsibility, these two men helped President Carter to save face and in the process 
ensured the passage of the FY79 Defense Supplemental. 
    The Carter administration’s clumsy efforts to conceal defense spending increases, coupled 
with the administration’s inability to make political bargains that could advance the 
president’s cause, proved to be yet another factor in cementing a bi-partisan military-
congressional alliance against Carter and his White House.  The ultimate result was noted 
later by Harold Brown:  Congress, in the last two years of the administration, tried 
increasingly to “micromanage defense.”69  With the all-important SALT II on the table for 
ratification, key senators and congressmen found the means by which to force the president’s 
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hand.  This process of what Brown termed congressional “micromanagement,” having started 
with the FY79 supplemental, continued for the Carter administration into the FY80 defense 
budget proposal. 
Less Bang for More Bucks:  Crafting of the FY80 Defense Budget 
    In a January 1979 preliminary look at the proposed spending plan for FY80, one 
Washington Post columnist described it as a “Frankenstein’s monster for the Carter 
administration” which would clamp “a no-growth appropriations and spending rein on 
domestic departments and agencies” while being “downright openhanded with the 
Pentagon.”70  Jimmy Carter and his White House had made their attempt to re-prioritize and 
economize defense spending and failed in FY78 and FY79.  The next two years they would 
lack the political clout to carry on the battle.  The crack in the administration’s budget policy 
would be broken wide-open by not only events such as the fall of Iran, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the taking of American hostages, but also by the sustained efforts of the 
military-congressional alliance.  Jimmy Carter found himself in January of 1979 already 
having to compromise on his plans for economical defense spending. 
    In marked contrast to his first two years of defense budgetary planning, Carter began to 
talk in terms of a long-term upward trend in military spending almost from the outset.  In a 
February 1979 speech to graduates of Georgia Tech University, he emphasized this need for 
military preparedness and increased defense spending.71  This speech has often been cited as 
evidence of Carter’s decision to adopt a more hard-line defense policy in his second two 
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years of office.  What has seldom been emphasized is how his administration’s efforts to 
increase defense spending were veiled and in some ways rather deceptive.  In reality, Carter 
and his White House did not want to publicize the failure of their efforts to re-prioritize and 
cut defense spending, a failure which would lead to much higher defense budgets and 
therefore a failure to implement his campaign promises.   
    While Carter’s rhetoric seemed to indicate that he wanted increased defense spending, his 
actions behind the scenes in the Beltway through most of 1978 and even 1979 indicated that 
this rhetoric was at best half-hearted.  Carter, despite his defeats at holding down the defense 
budgets and emphasizing readiness in FY78 and FY79, still planned to resist continued calls 
for higher defense budgets.  Carter’s efforts to counter this pressure were manifest during the 
FY80 budget process which began in mid-1978. 
    According to Harold Brown’s new process, each service had to submit its budget for FY80 
in July 1978.  Although not knowing the full outcome of the FY79 process, since Carter’s 
veto would not come until August of that year, the service submissions contained a great deal 
of strategic maneuvering.  In his annual Consolidated Guidance (CG), Brown ordered each 
Service to follow the “spirit of ZBB” and submit three different budget proposals termed the 
“basic, decremented, or enhanced” options.  The top line envisioned a total Pentagon budget 
of $138.4 billion, a three percent real increase from FY79.  The decremented and enhanced 
proposals called for allocations plus or minus five percent from the basic proposal.72  Thus, 
the Secretary of Defense was sanctioning military planners and their service chiefs to plan for 
a possible 8 percent real increase in the defense budget. 
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    Carter, upon reviewing the initial submission of the FY80 defense budget, consulted his 
White House Staff.  David Aaron, filling in for Brzezinski as National Security Advisor, 
examined the budget submission and put his reaction in the NSC weekly report to the 
president.  Aaron indicated that each of the three submitted proposals reflected “a good deal 
of ‘goldwatching’ by the services, especially the Air Force,” in other words structuring of the 
budget in such a way that special programs require net additions.  Many critical programs, 
including the MX missile, Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, Air-Launched 
Cruise Missile, and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile had been either left out of the 
budgets or placed in a lesser state of development.73  The reasoning behind it was particularly 
shrewd.  Given the political situation, the Pentagon knew that Congress would fight to add 
the important programs back into the budget without making hard decisions about what other 
programs cut.  The result, correctly pointed out to the president, would be that the entire 
defense budget would have to increase once it left Congress.  In Aaron’s opinion this gave 
Harold Brown “a difficult problem.”  Admitting that Carter’s target defense budget had been 
$135.4 billion (only .6 percent real growth), Brown would therefore have to remove over $3 
billion from the total while adding back in all of the expensive “goldwatched” programs.74  
The result of all of this, predicted Aaron, would be “tough infighting that is likely to spill out 
into the public view—with a possible adverse effect on the image we want to create in 
Defense for SALT.”75 
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    Thus, even before the battle over the FY79 defense veto of August 1978 began, the 
Pentagon had already started a battle over the upcoming FY80 budget.  Brown bypassed the 
President’s “target” level for the defense budget, since even his “basic” proposal exceeded 
the president’s guidance by $3 billion.  To meet the intent of the commander-in-chief, the 
only truly acceptable option would therefore have been the “decremented” proposal and this 
would not have been very palatable for the administration given its long-term goal of SALT 
ratification.  Two weeks after reading Aaron’s memo, perhaps seeing what the long term 
trend would be, Carter vetoed the FY79 appropriations bill.  While ultimately he would win 
that battle, the price of victory would be inability to challenge effectively the pre-planned 
surge in defense spending templated for FY80. 
    Thus, the JCS began a strong push for increasing the FY80 defense budget.  In a memo to 
Brown, they expressed extreme concern for the state of the military balance with the Soviets, 
characterizing the danger of not increasing defense spending in FY80 as “skating on thin ice 
with the ice getting thinner.”76  The debate over defense spending spilled across the river and 
into the offices on Pennsylvania Avenue.  By early November of 1978 the press was 
reporting a schism in the administration.  Apparently, the president’s special committee had 
reached only a broad consensus on the platform of “3 percent increase” without really doing 
any detailed calculations.  Brown and the Pentagon took the position that the 3 percent 
increase would naturally apply to the entire defense budget.77  Key members of the White 
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House Staff, however, argued that, since the purpose of the increase was to honor the pledge 
made to NATO, only items in the defense budget directly supporting NATO and Western 
Europe could qualify for the 3 percent increase.78  This would result in a total defense budget 
of $135 billion, a modest increase of 1 percent overall, and a number much closer to the 
president’s original “target” budget—but almost $5 billion below the Pentagon request.79  
The same Pentagon-White House animosity that had plagued the previous two years 
reappeared. 
    By December of 1978 the split reached the press.  Most of Carter’s domestic advisors, led 
by Stuart Eizenstat, opposed applying the 3 percent to the entire defense budget.  Unlike 
previous budget battles, however, the president’s Special Assistants Hamilton Jordan and 
Jerry Rafshoon sided with the Pentagon, arguing that the increase should apply across the 
board due to recent public opinion polls supporting higher defense spending.80  This advice, 
coupled with the fact that Bert Lance, the Head of OMB, was under investigation for illegal 
activity that eventually drove him from office, gave Carter a moment of pause.81  The 
divisions within the administration gave the Pentagon hope that the president actually align 
himself with the Pentagon rather than his White House Staff.  Anonymous press reports 
indicated that “defense officials” were “particularly gratified at White House efforts to raise 
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the budget,” and for a while it seemed that the president might finally compromise with the 
Pentagon.82    
    At the beginning of 1979, however, events prevented that.  OMB gave the president an 
alternative that was too tempting to pass up.  At the same time, political events in Congress 
gave a glimmer of hope that Carter could forge new relationships that could weaken the 
hardening military-congressional alliance.  If so, there was hope that Jimmy Carter could in 
fact limit defense spending in FY80 and thwart some of the Pentagon’s previous plans. 
    OMB provided Carter in early 1979 with a plan that could potentially allow the president 
to economize greatly in defense spending in FY80.  OMB argued that Carter should force the 
military to get its 3 percent increase in outlays by drawing on left-over appropriations.83  
These amounted to billions of unspent dollars allocated toward the completion of future 
contracts.  Technically, though this money was already allocated to fund the completion of 
current projects, no law prohibited it from being “borrowed” in order to meet FY80 defense 
costs.  Doing this, argued OMB, could hold the Pentagon even with inflation and not require 
any “real” increase in the defense budget at all.84  Followed correctly, this proposal carried 
much less political risk than trying to argue that the 3 percent increase applied only to NATO 
items in the budget.  The potential to yield substantial fiscal savings was real. 
    A significant change in the House gave Carter hope that he might be able to press forward 
with the OMB course of action.  Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) had recently taken over the 
chairmanship of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee from the longtime Pentagon 
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supporter George Mahon (D-TX).85  Addabbo openly expressed strong interest in following 
Carter’s proposed plan of forcing the Pentagon to draw on unspent appropriations, saying 
that he wanted “to give the Pentagon every weapon it needs, and I believe that we can cut its 
budget by several billion dollars and still accomplish that.”86  Along with the change in 
chairmanship on the House Appropriations Committee, many senior members, including pro-
Pentagon Bob Sikes (D-FL) and Jack Flynt (D-GA), had retired and been replaced by more 
critical members such as Jack Murtha (D-PA) and Norm Dicks (D-WA).  With these 
departures, the committee lost over one-hundred years of experience.87 Along with the 
changes on the Appropriations Committee, Robert Giaimo (D-CT), the chairman of the 
House Budget Committee, publicly stated that if the House did not reject higher defense 
spending then it would be impossible to curb inflation.88  As in the case of the Appropriations 
Committee, the House Budget Committee saw an increase in new members who would not 
be as sympathetic to the Pentagon as their predecessors.89  Thus, it seemed that political 
events now favored Carter siding with OMB in the upcoming budget debate. 
    The Pentagon quickly responded to the president’s new plan, seeking to counter it both in 
the press and with the use of the end-run to several senators.  The Pentagon leaked a report 
that key defense officials believed that the president could be swayed from his course of 
action by an important “political point:”  conservative senators, key to the ratification of 
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SALT II, would chafe against the proposed OMB plan and “suspect Carter of playing 
numbers games with the defense budget, and interpret this as a sign of weakness.”90  At the 
same time that they were threatening the future of SALT in the press, the Pentagon was busy 
consulting key allies in Congress.  Both civilians and military leaders in the Pentagon viewed 
the president’s OMB-inspired course of action unacceptable and were not about to watch 
their plans for the increase in the FY80 budget unravel. 
    The sustained pressure of the military through late 1978 appeared to pay off by early 1979.  
Carter thus began talking to the press about increased defense spending in early 1979 not 
only because of the fight over the FY79 veto, but also because of the pressure of the military-
congressional alliance on the FY80 budget.  Following the president’s speech at Georgia 
Tech in February of 1979, press secretary Jody Powell even released a statement saying that 
the president intended to reach across party lines and draw in Republican senators and 
congressmen to support his plans for increasing defense spending.91  Clearly, Jimmy Carter 
recognized the need to boost defense spending in FY80, but at the same time hoped to 
contain the budget to a level that he would find acceptable. 
Not Just 5 Percent, But at Least 5 Percent:  Congress’ Push to Influence the Defense 
Budget Process 
 
    The president and his White House Staff recognized that the new OMB proposal, coupled 
with the change in power in the House Armed Services Committee, gave them a new chance 
to push their own prerogatives for defense spending.  Although they probably realized that 
the OMB proposal was too drastic to make it through both houses of Congress, its existence 
made Carter’s “3 percent plan” seem all the more generous.  Given this fact, the 
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administration began a public-relations offensive, hoping to counter an ongoing 
congressional debate as to whether to increase defense spending even more.  The 
administration published a talking points memo that emphasized that the “The President’s 
1980 defense program was carefully balanced” and provided for “essential defense needs as 
it was submitted to the Congress last spring,” arguing  that “since that time . . . a number of 
significant and unnecessary changes to that budget have been made.  We want the level we 
originally asked for—and we don’t want a nuclear carrier.”92  Ignoring the previous advice of 
Melvin Price, the president was making it clear to Congress that, again in FY80, it should be 
the junior partner in determining defense-spending priorities. 
    Military planners in the Pentagon, unable to miss the parallels to the FY79 veto fight, 
sought to end-run specific programs that had been cut by the administration.  Of all the 
services, however, only the Navy had reason to be displeased with the FY80 budget as 
proposed by the Carter administration.  The Army was allowed to keep in development the 
XM-1 tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and the Blackhawk helicopter.93  The Air 
Force gained significant funds, getting a 43 percent increase in its overall budget and 
additional allocations for the Minuteman III ICBM and full production of the Air-Launched 
Cruise Missile.94  The Navy and Marines ended up getting, in the opinion of several 
anonymously quoted officers, “far less money and far fewer ships” than they had wanted.95  
General Louis Wilson, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was particularly angry with the 
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administration’s decision to cancel the planned upgrade to the Harrier jump-jet.96  By early 
1979, press releases cited naval and marine officers as saying Carter’s decision on the Harrier 
was “clouding the future of naval aviation.”97  Similarly, although both Harold Brown and 
the CNO recommended that Carter keep his FY79 promise to fund a 90,000-ton conventional 
carrier, the president rejected this idea and instead told Brown to settle for a 60,000-ton mid-
size carrier.98  The Navy was clearly facing the greatest budget cuts in FY80; but, like FY79, 
that service would not be the only one politicking on the Hill to increase Jimmy Carter’s 
budget. 
    In public statements Harold Brown’s defense of the budget might have been stronger, but 
the Pentagon did have reasons to be optimistic.  The Secretary of Defense called the 
proposed budget “acceptable militarily” but said he would have “grave concerns about the 
future balance” with the Soviets should any cuts be applied.99  Nonetheless, the budget was 
termed a “muted triumph” for Brown and the Pentagon, since the level of spending was still 
opposed by many domestic advisors in the White House.100  Overall, the final submission 
topped out at $142 billion, which provided a 3.5 percent real increase from the last fiscal 
year.101   
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    Despite Harold Brown’s qualified support of the defense budget and despite the substantial 
gain of a 3.5 percent real increase in spending, many in the Pentagon sensed the opportunity 
ripe for pressing ahead with even higher defense appropriations.  SALT II was on the table 
for future ratification and the Pentagon knew that the president would not want to seem soft 
on defense to conservative senators from both parties who would determine the outcome.  
Just as importantly, the Pentagon was well aware of the political damage the FY79 veto 
battle had done to Carter’s relations with important members of the Armed Services 
Committees.  Likewise, the administration’s continued difficulties in courting Senator 
Stennis as an ally showed that it was not adapting very well to forging strong alliances in 
Congress.  Given all of these facts, General Wilson, when reflecting in 1979 on the cuts to 
the Navy in the upcoming budget, was very confident that “his allies in Congress” would 
restore funding to his Service.102 
    The initial congressional reaction to Carter’s proposed budget was negative.  Criticism 
first came from the more liberal wing of Carter’s own party.  Given the sagging state of the 
American economy, the 3 percent rise in defense spending was seen as being particularly 
contentious.  Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, 
commented that, if the state of the economy did not improve, then “all bets were off” 
regarding Carter’s proposed plans.103  Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), hopeful of 
unseating Carter for the Democratic nomination in 1980, charged that the White House had 
“juggled figures” in the defense budget in order to conceal a 4 percent real-increase.104  Press 
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columnists soon joined in the criticism, even going so far as to attack Harold Brown’s 
defense of the budget, stating that “only in the rarified atmosphere of Pentagon spending can 
a $10 billion net increase be described as very austere.”105 Major newspapers pointed out that 
the 3 percent rise in defense was the largest increase in any single category in the budget.106  
Other journalists echoed the call, with one describing Carter’s entire FY80 budget as being 
“a grapefruit diet budget” in the “non-defense area,” with the overall design being “austerity 
for civilians, liberality for defense.”107  Herblock summarized such critiques in a political 
cartoon which depicted Carter serving scoops of “excessive pensions,” “cost overruns,” 
“weapons duplications,” “surplus military brass,” and “unneeded bases” to an obese general 
with the explanation “he’s on a special diet.”  A civilian couple sat nearby in shock, deciding 
what to order off of the “austerity menu.”108  Political columnist Edward Walsh was correct 
in noting that, even in early 1979, “liberal criticism” of the president’s defense budget was 
mounting.109 
    The attack from the left weakened the president even further against the military-
congressional alliance.  Carter was forced into increasingly pro-defense rhetoric.  He 
repeatedly labeled his submission “lean and austere” but consistent with a “compassionate 
society.”110  In answer to Senator Kennedy, Carter said, “I have not robbed the poor or the 
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deprived or the social programs in order to provide for defense.”111  He had “no apology to 
make for a strong, adequate defense,” while still claiming to have kept his campaign promise 
of $5 to $7 billion in savings.112  By having to fight the left-wing of his party, Carter 
advantaged the Pentagon.  Defense contractors took delight in the new turn of events, 
recognizing that the “new” Jimmy Carter would mean much higher profits.  James M. Beggs, 
executive vice-president of General Dynamics, then the nation’s largest defense contractor, 
felt confident that “The year 1980 looks as good as last year and maybe even better,” with 
many big-ticket weapons systems in position to be accelerated into full scale production.113  
In the minds of many, the president had been converted to a “big spender” on defense.114   
    Although Carter’s position was bleak, it was not entirely hopeless, for some in Congress 
vowed not to let increased defense spending pass so easily.115  From the pulpit of the House 
Appropriations Committee, Joseph Addabbo (D-NY) continued to complain about the 
backlog of appropriated funds at the Pentagon.  Two new members of that same committee, 
John Murtha (D-PA) and Norman Dicks (D-WA) were also shaping up to be, in the appraisal 
of senior correspondent George Wilson, “less predictable than the old lions” whom they 
replaced.116  Harold Brown found himself having to devote considerable time and testimony 
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to defending claims that the Pentagon could not make better use of these unobligated 
balances.117  While talk of reducing the defense budget was debated in the House, Senator 
Alan Cranston (D-CA), the Senate Majority Whip, challenged the president by calling for a 
massive $5.2 billion cut in the defense budget, including the rejection of the FY79 
supplemental bill.118  Robert Dole (R-KS), in a move that was called “surprisingly 
unpartisan,” questioned in a private letter to Carter whether additional defense dollars could 
be wisely spent.119  Even some “civilian executives” in the Pentagon admitted that it was 
unclear how added billions in the defense budget could be wisely used.120  By April of 1979 
the House Committee on the Budget was preparing to hand Carter what the press termed a 
“political hot potato” in terms of a reduced budget for defense spending.121 As the bill went 
through debate, the House Committee on the Budget, over the objections of its Chairman 
Robert N. Giaimo (D-CT), proposed significant cuts in defense in order to pare the deficit.122  
Finally, in early June, in what was termed “a significant change of mood,” the House Budget 
Committee proposed a defense budget that was $1.3 billion less than the Carter proposal.123 
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    The administration did nothing publicly to challenge these defense cuts because in fact the 
situation was working out as hoped.  The president would now be able to see defense 
spending limited without having to take the responsibility.  The fact that the Budget 
Committee’s actions appeared to be a “political hot potato” was all the better.  Many in 
Congress, however, were aware of the administration’s intentions and began a behind-the-
scenes effort to counter the president’s renewed hope for less defense spending. 
    Four powerful, conservative-minded senators served as the nucleus of the military-
congressional alliance during the FY80 budget debate.  At the center of the group of senators 
was Sam Nunn (D-GA).  Relatively junior, Nunn was clearly a moderate Democrat who 
would be an important vote to secure in the upcoming SALT II ratification.  “Scoop” Jackson 
(D-WA) was one of the most senior and influential senators and had gained much notoriety 
as a quintessential “Cold Warrior.”  Ernest Hollings (D-SC) was a veteran of World War II 
and a long-serving member of the senate. John Tower (R-TX), joined these Democrats as the 
ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.  Together, these four 
senators formed a strong alliance with the Pentagon’s lobby and sought to reverse the Carter 
Administration’s trend toward economizing defense spending. 
    Nunn began the offensive in July 1979, and, in a “stroke that may have redrawn the battle 
lines in the SALT II debate,” said that the Carter administration could gain his vote for the 
treaty by committing itself to substantially increased defense spending.  He requested $7 
billion on top of what was already slated for defense.  In the opinion of journalists, Nunn’s 
actions not only enhanced the possibility of SALT II being ratified, but also established the 
junior senator as “a principle spokesman for the large number of moderate senators who 
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seem increasingly willing to accept SALT II” given larger defense budgets.124  While the 
press’ characterization of Nunn’s leadership in the Senate was certainly accurate, it neglected 
to mention that Nunn had also placed himself as the de-facto leader of the military-
congressional alliance during the Carter Administration. 
    By early August, Nunn gathered key senatorial allies and formally submitted his position 
to Carter.  In a letter dated August 2, 1979, Nunn, Jackson, and Tower wrote the president 
objecting to any cuts in the defense budget and emphasizing the “crucial” need for additional 
funds for “weapons, ships, equipment, and research and development,” opposing the 
president’s priorities.125  Anonymous sources within the Pentagon, when asked how the 
military might spend extra money, cited “a hell of a lot of areas” including resurrecting the 
cancelled B-1 bomber.126  The Pentagon now had supreme confidence that the president 
could no longer impose his prerogatives on military spending.  Indeed, the president did face 
what many saw as a “no win” situation:  he would either have to bend on his priorities or risk 
alienating powerful senators that he would need to pass SALT. 
    Carter resisted.  He met with Harold Brown and the JCS on September 10, 1979.  The 
president stated his desire to press for a 3 percent increase but wanted to “go no further to 
meet Nunn’s demands.”127  Meanwhile, the battle taking place in the House over reducing the 
defense budget bolstered Carter’s hopes for being able to curtail Nunn’s dramatic requests. 
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    Nunn and Hollings also refused to relent on this issue and kept up the pressure.  Angered 
at Carter’s veiled efforts to moderate the defense budget increase, they accused the 
administration of being “two-faced on defense spending.”  They blasted the White House for 
“gently criticizing the Budget Committee’s defense cuts” while leaving Nunn and Hollings 
the impression that the administration was simultaneously leading the fight behind the scenes 
to curtail defense spending.128  The military-congressional alliance made it clear that it 
strongly resisted concealing Carter’s spending increases and hiding behind the ongoing 
debate in the Budget Committees. 
    Given the efforts of Nunn and his allies, Carter clarified his position on defense spending 
for FY80.  He sent personal letters to key senators pledging to support a 3 percent increase in 
real growth and stating that such an increase was in fact “necessary for our continuing effort 
to reverse the adverse trends in our overall military balance” relative to the Soviet Union.129  
He stated firmly that he supported 3 percent growth in the defense budget, but that “with 
respect to the 5 percent real growth . . . I cannot support those figures at this time.”130  Carter 
attempted to emphasize that the FY81 and FY82 budgets would have even higher growth, 
and that he was seeking to work with allies like Hollings to “reverse the ten-year trend during 
which every Congress has cut the amounts requested by the President.”131  Recipients of the 
letter included Senators Sam Nunn, John Stennis, John Tower, Robert Byrd, Howard Baker, 
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Bob Packwood, and Pete Dominici.  In addition to the letter, Harold Brown also assured each 
of the Senators in personal communications that the administration would press for a 3 
percent increase in FY80, FY81, and FY82.132  Carter and his White House had thus been 
forced into putting their plans for the defense budget into the public forum and opted for a 
long-term “three, three, and three” plan. 
    With Carter’s plan for defense fully articulated, Nunn and the military-congressional 
alliance again went on the offensive.  They agreed to table any massive increase in the FY80 
budget; but, in regard to the “three, three, and three” plan, Senator Hollings bluntly informed 
Harold Brown, “We’re going for three, five, and five.”133  Led by Nunn’s coalition, the 
Senate, in what was termed a “dramatic though symbolic demonstration of a new mood of 
toughness,” voted 55 to 42 for the “three, five, and five” plan for increasing defense spending 
in FY80, FY81, and FY82.  Although several key Senators including John Stennis, Gary 
Hart, and Ed Muskie voted against the resolution, the thirteen vote majority demonstrated the 
power and cohesiveness of the military-congressional alliance.  In a public moment of 
grandstanding following the vote, Nunn openly challenged the administration by citing the 
need for more defense expenditures because the only country currently “running in the arms 
race” was the Soviet Union.134  Likewise, Senator Hollings followed up the vote by 
lambasting the administration for failing to back even the three percent rise for FY80.135  The 
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message to Jimmy Carter and his White House was clear:  spend more on defense or 
endanger SALT II. 
    Following this symbolic vote, the administration cracked; its senate allies lacked sufficient 
numbers.  Nunn and Hollings were too strong.  After the vote, Brown publicly stated that the 
“door was open” to boost defense spending even more in FY81 and 82, alluding to possible 
acquiescence to the three, five, and five plan.136  By the end of the September 1979, Congress 
agreed to compromise on the defense budget.  The defense budget for FY80 was set at 
$129.9 billion, less than the $130.6 billion requested by the Senate but more than the House 
request of $128.6 billion.137  But, while the total amount may have been a compromise, the 
specific items in the budget were not.  Congress again overruled many of Carter’s proposals, 
most noticeably by putting the nuclear carrier back in the budget for a second time.  This 
time Carter made no effort to combat the re-prioritization.138  The military-congressional 
alliance had gained significant momentum, and now Carter’s hopes for limiting defense 
spending in FY81 were nearly dead. 
Foreshadowing the Flood:  Building the FY81 Defense Budget 
 
    Events conspired to end Carter’s efforts to limit defense spending for FY81.  First, the 
1980 election forced Carter to consider acceding to the mounting public support for higher 
defense spending.  Second, the continued downturn in the economy amply justified 
supplemental appropriations to offset increasing costs due to inflation, thus further increasing 
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the budget.  Finally, the JCS made it clear during testimony on the FY80 budget that it would 
support the president’s defense budget only if offered substantive increases in FY81.  Thus, 
Carter’s final defense budget foreshadowed the flood of the Reagan years. 
    The specter of the 1980 election strongly influenced Carter to acquiesce to the military-
congressional alliance’s call for higher defense spending.  Despite the strong media attention, 
pundits noted that “no loud cry of alarm, not from the hawks, not from the doves, not from 
Capitol Hill and not even from the campaign trail” had emerged in response.139  Conversely, 
public opinion polls now suggested that over 60 percent of Americans wanted an increase in 
defense spending, with only 9 percent favoring a decrease.140  Ben J. Wattenburg, head of the 
Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a congressional lobby group, correctly noted that “The 
shift in public opinion on defense spending is greater than on any other issue in the 
1970s.”141  Indeed, House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) concluded that, in the light of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failure of the April 1980 rescue mission for the 
hostages in Iran, a “wave of patriotism” was calling for higher defense spending.142  Facing 
re-election, Carter and his political advisors realized that continuing to support defense 
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spending increases only half-heartedly would not only further undermine the administration’s 
standing with Congress, but also with the public. 
    Carter’s Republican opponents exploited defense in the upcoming 1980 presidential 
election.  Gerald Ford began an offensive early in the year, detailing how Carter had cut the 
Ford/Rumsfeld plans for spending by an average of $9.5 billion per year.143  At a White 
House breakfast for Republican legislators, Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) and his colleagues 
called plans for defense spending “very inadequate and totally unrealistic.”144  Texas 
Governor Bill Clemens called the president a “God damn liar” for saying that the American 
military was stronger than ever.145  Finally, Ronald Reagan, the Republican front-runner, 
made defense spending a cornerstone of his campaign.  Carter could ignore these challenges 
from the right only at his own peril. 
    In response to these challenges and the polls, Carter moved early in the FY81 budget 
process to signal support for the Nunn-Hollings idea of increasing defense spending beyond 
3 percent per year.   The president announced late in 1979, soon after the compromise deal in 
Congress over the level of the FY80 defense budget, that his administration would commit to 
“a further real increase in defense spending” for FY81 in order to counteract what he saw as 
concerning “trends” in the U.S.-Soviet balance.146  Such promises, in the words of one senior 
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Washington correspondent, made it clear that Carter planned to “carry a much more pro-
military banner into the 1980 presidential campaign than he did four years ago.”147 
    Along with political reasons justifying higher defense spending, the economic woes of the 
late1970s, including massive inflation and skyrocketing oil prices, also provided the 
Pentagon reason to demand more funds.  Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs were 
among the highest ever.  When reflecting on the period in his May 1979 Oral History, Marine 
commandant Louis Wilson lamented 10 percent inflation, as well as the oil shortages brought 
on by the previous OPEC embargo and the fall of Iran, and complained that he and the 
Marines would be “drilling with broomsticks” if more money was not allocated in the next 
fiscal year.148  Similarly, the cost of fuel and maintenance cut the Air Force’s FY80 flight 
training hours, in the words of the Chief of Staff, “well below our desired requirement for 
readiness,” while at the same time forcing withdrawal from several planned NATO exercises 
that year.149  Military pay was also shaping up to be a major issue in FY81, with all members 
of the JCS complaining openly about the level of pay and its effect on the retention of junior 
officers and senior NCOs.150  Congress took this into account and debated raising military 
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pay.151  Given all these deficiencies brought about by the ailing economy, the Pentagon had 
ample arguments when asking for more money from Congress. 
    The final, and perhaps most compelling, factor in pushing the Carter administration toward 
higher defense spending in the FY81 was the military’s testimony during the FY80 budget 
hearings.  Whereas the FY79 testimony from both military and civilians in the Pentagon had 
offered qualified support for that year’s budget, the testimony in FY80 followed a different 
pattern.  This time Harold Brown found himself almost alone as a defender of the defense 
budget, primarily due to Carter’s efforts during that year to limit spending while still talking 
about increasing it.  Brown, attempting to mediate between Carter and an increasingly hostile 
Congress, failed to maintain qualified support for the budget within the Pentagon as he had in 
previous years.  Military testimony in FY80 was therefore much less supportive than it had 
been in FY79; at the same time, Secretary Brown found himself increasingly under attack 
from various elements in Congress which were trying to raise defense spending. 
    CJCS David Jones illustrated the reduced level of military support for the FY80 budget.  
Having gone out on a limb in FY78 by defending Carter’s cancellation of the B-1 bomber, 
Jones was considered by many in Congress to be a defender of the administration’s budgets 
even in hard times.  He offered little support in FY80, however, and instead provided what he 
himself termed a “sobering assessment” of the defense program.152  His opening statement 
began “another year has gone by and we continue with the adverse trends,” adding that he 
felt obligated to express “serious concern” about the situation.153  To the House 
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Appropriations Committee Jones seemed even more resolute, stating “Our programs for more 
than a decade have been characterized by the words ‘slip, cut, and cancel,’” warning of a 
“disappearing cushion of time” to increase defense expenditures.154  Indeed, Senator Harry 
Byrd (D-VA) was quite correct when he concluded that General Jones’ testimony during the 
FY80 defense budget hearings had been “not a very reassuring statement” for most 
Americans.155 
    While certainly pessimistic, Jones’ views were rather temperate compared to those coming 
from the Services.  Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson bluntly stated that “our strategic 
modernization program is not keeping pace with the Soviet Union,” and called the FY80 
budget “as lean as we can make it” with “funds . . . sufficient but only just so.”156  Air Force 
Chief Lew Allen testified that the budget was “austere” and only covered the “most needed” 
costs.157  Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander admitted that the FY80 proposal 
provided a budget for his Service that was “adequate—but only adequate.”158  Bernard 
Rogers, the Chief of Staff of the Army, was the most optimistic about the budget when he 
called plans for the Army’s modernization “prudent, supportable, and balanced.”159  He 
termed the Army budget “adequate” but admitted under questioning that it did not “satisfy all 
of our requirements” and that it would “not provide us as a nation the means to insure that we 
                                                 
154
 HAPC, FY80 Defense Appropriations Hearings, 362.  
 
155
 SASC, FY80 Defense Authorization Hearings, 40.  
 
156
 For “not keeping pace” see HASC, FY80 Defense Authorization Hearings, 688.  For “as lean as we can make 
it” and “sufficient but only just so” see HCOB, FY80 Defense Budget Overview, 427, 430. 
 
157
 SAPC, FY80 Defense Appropriations Hearings, 607.  
 
158
 HASC, FY80 Defense Authorization Hearings, 1017.  
 
159
 United States Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and HR 1872 (HR 
4040) and HR 2575 (S429), Part 1, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 960.  Hereafter cited as HASC, Hearings on 
Military Posture, HR1872, and HR2575. 
 
 213 
have a mobilization manpower base that is adequate for a major contingency.”160  The 
outgoing SACEUR, General Alexander Haig, told Congress that any cuts in the FY80 budget 
would be a “disaster.”161  Congressman Sam Stratton (D-NY), in criticizing the FY80 
defense budget, went out of his way to summarize that the testimony of the Air Force and 
Army did not “suggest a very reassuring picture of our capabilities as a military power.”162 
    If the Army and Air Force testimony was not reassuring, that from the Navy was even 
more dire.  W. Graham Claytor, perhaps under fire for his open dissent from Carter during 
the FY79 budget process, testified that he did “fully endorse the President’s budget” but 
warned “that there is no room for any further cut in our Navy budget if we are to maintain 
even our present status in the years ahead.”163  He attempted to deflect criticism from the 
administration by arguing that the long-term nature of naval budgets would mean most 
problems would be left for his successors “10 years or more from now,” although in his last 
round of testimony to Congress he dropped the time frame to five years.164  Admiral 
Hayward’s testimony was even less supportive.  The admiral cited Claytor’s own testimony 
from 1978 to describe the FY79 budget as “low” and then warned Congress, “we now have 
two data points, 1979 and 1980, which portend a significant and predictable decline in the 
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U.S. naval force levels in the years ahead.”165  In his appearance before the House Budget 
Committee, Hayward used some of his most harsh language, saying that he had “very serious 
concern” about the future and that any cuts in the naval budget could lead to a “rapid and 
probably irreversible decline in our ability to prevail at sea.”166  He openly supported a new 
nuclear carrier for the FY80 budget, despite Carter’s specific resistance to its inclusion.167  
The Marine Corps also joined in opposition to many specific elements in the budget, with 
Commandant Louis Wilson complaining that his O&M budget had been cut without any 
consultation from his civilian superiors and agreeing with the assessment that removal of the 
AV-8B Harrier II from the budget “seriously hurt the Marines.”168  “I think that is absolutely 
irresponsible and I am very disturbed to hear that,” Congressman Robin Beard (R-TN), a 
former marine, replied in response; “I would hope that this committee would see fit in their 
wisdom to take some form of corrective action on this.”169  Indeed, in FY80 Congress 
substantially modified Carter’s proposed naval budget by including both a nuclear carrier and 
the cancelled AV-8B.  When asked jokingly by Robin Beard if he would fight Congress over 
these modifications, Secretary Claytor replied, “I cannot recall I have fought this committee 
on anything.”170  The Navy’s testimony in FY80 clearly emboldened Congress to modify 
Carter’s final budget submission for that year. 
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    Carter’s veiled efforts to limit defense spending in FY80 also placed the Secretary of 
Defense in a very awkward position.  When members of the House Armed Services 
Committee questioned what the administration saw as the level of threat from the Soviets, 
Brown replied that while the current situation was “acceptable militarily,” he had “grave 
concerns about the future balance if trends continue,” and that it would be mistake to “panic 
the American public in order to get through what needs to be gotten through.”171  Such 
equivocation, as well as Brown’s almost apologetic tone in some of the hearings, made it 
clear that the Secretary of Defense saw himself caught in the middle of a political quagmire.  
At times, Brown clearly showed his frustration and anger.172  In front of the House 
Appropriations Committee, he faced criticism from one congressman that Carter’s actions, 
including the FY79 veto, set “a dangerous precedent” in terms of White House interference 
in the defense budget process because of a complete lack of any “Congressional cooperation 
or involvement before the fact.”173  Brown agreed somewhat, noting that “Congress . . . has 
to exercise its own independent judgment” and admitted that communication between the 
Legislative Branch and the executive was “not quite so sharp a correspondence as I would 
sometimes like.”174  Liberal critics who saw Carter’s defense budget as too high also 
questioned Brown aggressively.  Thus, the Secretary of Defense found himself devoting 
considerable time to arguing that the highly criticized unobligated balances held by the 
Pentagon actually represented “good management,” while at the same time making efforts to 
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point out that increases in defense outlays were still very low relative to other federal 
government programs.175  When questioned on the administration’s specific intentions for 
FY81, Brown demurred, stating that the administration remained committed “to a long-term 
real-growth target of three percent.”176  Under scrutiny from both liberal and conservative 
elements within Congress, Harold Brown negotiated a difficult path through his testimony in 
FY80 because Carter’s own position on defense spending was unclear. 
    All of these various events pushed Carter further toward higher defense spending for 
FY81.  Within the Pentagon the overall pattern of civil-military cooperation had continued, 
with the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs generally offering unified tepid support and 
even opposition to the president’s defense budget.  Harold Brown, however, was finding his 
position as mediator between Congress and Jimmy Carter increasingly difficult.  Carter’s 
concealed and ill-coordinated efforts to limit defense spending in FY80 had failed, and the 
chief cost was that his own Secretary of Defense’s standing with Congress suffered greatly.  
With his political position weakening and the military-congressional alliance growing 
stronger, Carter and his White House could see that any pitched battle against higher defense 
spending in FY81 would be futile. 
A Hollow Force: The Military-Congressional Response to the Final Carter Defense 
Budget 
 
    The process of compiling the FY81 defense budget began in October 1979 and reflected 
the difficulties that the Carter administration faced at that time.177  The shah had fled Iran, 
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Khomeini had come to power, and later Iranian “students” had seized the American embassy 
and taken hostages in November of that year.178  After the administration developed its FY81 
defense budget, another world event called into question if the 5 percent increase was even 
adequate:  the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.  Although the level of 
the FY81 budget had already been set, Carter suffered under renewed criticism for an 
inadequate defense budget.  Trying to deflect the charge of naïveté being surprised into 
action by Soviet aggression, Carter mounted a public relations campaign to show his 
commitment to higher defense spending.179  “In November of last year—well before the 
Soviet invasion—I presented to Congress the broad outlines of my plans for defense 
spending in the 1981 budget,”180 read one statement from the president, with the further 
claim that: 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made everyone more aware than ever of 
the importance of a strong defense capability.  But since we had begun the 
process of strengthening our military forces several years ago, last month’s 
events did not require a 180 degree turn in our defense policy or our military 
budget.181 
 
The White House media liaison distributed to Congress a statement entitled “National 
Defense—The Budget and the Record,”  arguing that Congress was the real culprit in 
lowering defense spending from 1968 to 1976, but that Carter had made a concerted effort to 
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raise defense expenditures through all of its defense budgets.182  The administration naturally 
pressed Harold Brown into service to sell the idea.  In his FY81 Annual Report, Brown stated 
“the Carter administration has concluded that the defense program must be substantially 
increased over the next five years and that we must begin the effort now.”183  He testified that 
the FY81 budget would provide a “steady, significant, sustained increase,” something 
necessary because “in the last couple of years the American public has become increasingly 
aware” of the Soviet threat.184  Based on the unified rhetoric of the importance of higher 
defense spending within the administration, one of the president’s closest aides resorted to 
hyperbole when he proclaimed that Carter’s FY81 defense budget marked “the end of the 
Vietnam complex” in America.185  All of this rhetoric aimed to refute the likely argument of 
the military-congressional alliance that the FY81 budget would not be enough given recent 
events in Afghanistan. 
     The response of the military-congressional alliance to Carter’s charges that he and his 
administration had been primarily responsible for the increase in defense spending in FY81 
proved to be swift and heated.  First, Harold Brown faced the wrath of Melvin Price, Sam 
Stratton, Robin Beard, and most of the House Armed Services Committee.  Second, Senators 
Sam Nunn, John Tower, and Ernest Hollings offered a calmer, but very challenging cross-
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examination of other Pentagon officials.  Finally, the JCS expressed public disdain for 
Carter’s false public relations campaign, withholding support for the FY81 defense budget 
despite its 5 percent increase.  These responses taken together meant that the absolute 
minimum in defense increases would be 5 percent for FY81, while at the same time 
highlighting the Carter administration’s prior lack of commitment to defense spending in the 
crucial 1980 election year. 
    Price, the long-standing chair of the House Armed Services Committee, mounted the first 
assault against Carter’s claim that his administration had always been tough on defense 
related issues.  Following Price’s caustic letter to the president regarding the FY79 veto, 
Harold Brown had expected to face rigorous cross examination from the chairman during the 
FY80 budget proceedings.  Brown got a reprieve in FY80, however, when Price required 
hospitalization for an infected toe when the Secretary of Defense testified.186  He would get 
no such clemency for the FY81 budget hearings.  Price opened by setting the record straight:  
“I would remind the Secretary, and through him, the executive branch, that some of us have 
been trying for some years” to change public perceptions regarding the need for higher 
defense spending “but have received only mixed support from the executive branch.”187  He 
then reminded Brown of the letters which he had sent to the president criticizing the 
administration’s defense spending policies and asking support for important weapons 
systems.  While admitting that he had the “utmost respect for the present Secretary of 
Defense,” Price felt extremely frustrated that “some executive branch officials, including 
some in the Department of Defense at the time” had gone “out of their way to disparage this 
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committee in their comments to support the veto” in FY79.188  In an effort to heal some of 
the past ill-will between them, as well as to let Carter know that he had the opportunity to 
change his relationship with Congress regarding defense spending, Price snidely stated:   
I would say to the Secretary, therefore, that we are prepared to work with you 
to improve our defense capabilities.  But I hope that you will carry the mes-
sage back to those whose wisdom has not always proved infallible in the past 
that we expect to be treated as a respected partner in the decision process.189 
 
The chairman ended his formal statement by re-emphasizing the importance of increasing 
defense expenditures and concluded that, “If the effort had begun sooner, it would not have 
been so great.”190  Thus, Price repudiated Carter’s claims of leadership in pushing for higher 
defense spending, but at the same time signaled the administration that he was willing to 
work together on the FY81 budget if he was not treated as a second-rate partner. 
    Other congressmen strongly agreed with Price’s statement and felt compelled to offer their 
own critique of Carter’s stance toward defense spending.  Stratton lauded the chairman’s 
statement: “I would recommend that we engrave it on the front podium of the committee 
structure.”191  Bob Wilson (R-CA) agreed; he was “more comfortable in knowing that our 
President has most recently re-evaluated his arithmetic and evidently discovered what we 
have known about the Soviet Union for a long, long time.”192  Statements such as these made 
it clear that Congress, particularly the House Armed Services Committee, had pre-dated 
Carter’s rather recent calls for more money in national defense. 
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    Despite the restrained tone of the traditionally vocal Price and Stratton, many other 
members of the committee in both parties took great offense at Carter’s claims and attacked 
the Secretary of Defense.  Robin Beard led the assault, saying that he felt “nauseated” by 
Harold Brown’s implication that Jimmy Carter was responsible for bringing about higher 
defense spending, calling such claims the “ultimate hypocrisy.”  He blasted the FY81 budget 
as not doing nearly enough and putting the United States in a position of outright 
“inferiority” relative to the Soviets.  In a heated exchange, Beard also accused the head of the 
Pentagon of being blatantly partisan and political rather than taking into account the true 
defense needs of America.193  Paul Trible (R-VA) followed his fellow Republican and 
bluntly argued that “Soviet tanks are rolling today in large measure because the President has 
permitted our national defense and our intelligence capabilities to decline so markedly.”194  
Robert Daniel, Jr. (R-WV) said that, despite the budget’s 5 percent increase, all Americans 
“stand on a bridge on fire at one end and it is smoldering at the other.”195  And in one of the 
harshest critiques by the opposition party, Charles Dougherty (R-PA) mocked Harold 
Brown’s characterization of the budget:  “I find the word ‘adequate’ totally inadequate.”196  
From the other side of the isle, Charles Bennett (D-FL) accused Brown of presenting a 
“horrendous situation” in his FY81 annual report and called the 5 percent increase but a 
“fraction” of what “most Americans feel should be done this current year.”197  Perhaps being 
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a bit melodramatic, Bob Stump (D-AZ) worried, “If we do not get a little more concerned, 
there may not be any of us around in the late 1980s to worry about it.”198  Further, in a 
stinging rebuke from his own party, Charles Wilson (D-CA) termed Carter’s FY81 defense 
budget “unrealistic” because it had been developed before the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.199   
    The Senate Armed Services committee also questioned Harold Brown rigorously.  The 
committee began showing that bi-partisan support for the fact that the FY81 defense budget 
was not just another “business-as-usual” submission.  Chairman Stennis opened by saying 
that “in many ways this is a crucial year for our defense planning:  some hard decisions need 
to be made. . . .”200  While he acknowledged that the budget did contain a large real increase 
from the previous year, he openly acknowledged that “we may need more money for hard 
military capabilities.”201  Following Stennis, John Tower, the ranking minority member of 
the committee, set the tone for the hearings by stating that “the actions taken this year in 
defense legislation will determine what history will surely record as the most important 
national security decisions of the postwar period.”202  The choice, he put simply, was “a 
disastrous period of decline” or “a solid foundation of credible military strength” and that 
“what is needed is dramatic action and urgent rearmament on a scale unparalleled in our 
modern history.”203  The leaders of both parties on the Senate Armed Services Committee 
                                                 
198
 Ibid., 437.  
 
199
 Ibid., 688. 
 
200
 SASC, FY81 Defense Authorization Hearings, 6.  
 
201
 Ibid.  
 
202
 Ibid.  
 
203
 Ibid., 6-7.  
 223 
thus put this budget on the record in dramatic tone for the Secretary of Defense, the Carter 
administration, and the American public to hear. 
    The questioning by the Senate Armed Services Committee proved to be more partisan than 
that in the House, with many Republicans expressing great displeasure with Carter’s overall 
stance on defense.  Prior to preliminary hearings on the FY81 defense budget, former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy William Clements held a news 
conference to attack Carter’s proposed increases in defense spending as totally inadequate 
and, not wanting to understate their position, indicated that a 20 percent real increase could 
be in order.204  Perhaps bolstered by these claims and by the heightened sense of urgency on 
the hearings, Senator Roger Jepsen (R-IA) summarized his views on the budget by saying, 
“The bottom line is our United States of America is in the process of getting caught with its 
trousers around its ankles.”205  Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) claimed not to see “any 
real addressing of the decline in the military balance” in the FY81 budget and asked Harold 
Brown, “When are we going to get started?”  When Brown responded that the buildup had 
started when Carter entered office, Humphrey replied that, “My view is that we are not doing 
nearly enough.”206  With Senators Stennis and Tower having set the stage for the importance 
of the FY81 budget, many conservatives had taken the opportunity to disparage the 
president’s defense policies. 
    The affair in the senate was not purely partisan, however, since Sam Nunn (D-GA) stepped 
forward as the leader of the military-congressional alliance to press Harold Brown with 
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several challenging questions.  Nunn supported the budget in general, since it contained the 5 
percent increase, and so opened his time on the floor by stating for the record that the FY81 
defense budget would be “the first budget that moves us out of . . . the period of strategic 
neglect.”207  In preliminary hearings held on the FY81 budget in December, he had 
questioned Brown attempting to expose a linkage between the increases in defense 
expenditures and Carter’s desire to have SALT II ratified in the Senate.  Although Brown 
stated that the 5 percent increase “was not put together to sell SALT,” he did feel that 
negotiating from a position of strength would be very important.  “I applaud your initiative,” 
Nunn commended, but added “we’re not going to have a SALT II treaty up here every 
year.”208 In Brown’s second appearance before the committee, Nunn asked Brown if Carter 
was the man primarily responsible for delaying the rise in defense spending.  When the 
Secretary of Defense argued that the administration had attempted to increase defense 
spending since 1977, Nunn asked what had happened, then, to make the jump to 5 percent 
necessary?  Brown in response cited many instances of Soviet aggression around the world, 
including the invasion of Afghanistan.209  Thus, Nunn forced Harold Brown to admit that the 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan warranted additional defense expenditure, furthering a 
major argument of the military-congressional alliance that emerged in the FY81 defense 
budget hearings. 
    The military in particular capitalized on the invasion of Afghanistan as a reason for 
demanding higher expenditures.  General Jones testified that in his mind the FY81 budget 
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was adequate when it was put together in November of 1979, but that the Soviet invasion in 
December required the administration “to take another look.”210  General Allen indicated a 
“commonality of views” with Hans Mark, the new Secretary of the Air Force, when he said 
that he supported the FY81 budget but felt that the invasion of Afghanistan clearly justified 
additional money being spent for defense.211  The new Secretary of the Navy Edward 
Hidalgo said that his attitude toward the budget was “one of reserve, and guarded optimism” 
but that it left “many issues unanswered for future resolution” due to increased potential for 
Soviet aggression.212  Admiral Hayward’s testimony was far more grim, the CNO stating that 
he felt the Navy was “stretched thinner today than at any time since the late 1940s,” that the 
Navy was covering a three ocean commitment with a one and one-half ocean fleet, and that 
world events such as Iran and Afghanistan should cause Congress to “once again assess how 
much naval insurance this nation should have,” concluding that he was “keenly concerned” 
about the monetary allocation for the Navy in FY81.213  When testifying before his allies on 
the House Armed Services Committee, Marine Commandant Robert Barrow appealed for 
their aid, saying that the budget for the marines needed to be increased “and I look to this 
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committee to help make this happen.”  In other testimony he claimed that “the need of the 
Marine Corps has never been greater.”214  Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander admitted 
that the budget was “a lesser real growth than we had hoped for” and General Meyer testified 
that, because the budget was put together before Afghanistan, “I personally believe that the 
Army’s portion of the budget is inadequate in several areas.”215  When asked directly if he as 
a professional soldier was satisfied with the budget, the Chief of Staff of the Army replied, 
“No.  I am not satisfied with it.”216  Each of the Services had in some way indicated that they 
felt defense budget was inadequate because it was created prior to the Afghanistan invasion, 
thus implying that some form of supplemental appropriations would be needed in the future.  
All of the FY81 civilian and military testimony from the Pentagon, save for that of Harold 
Brown himself, had strongly indicted Carter’s claims that he was getting tougher on defense 
in his last year in office. 
    Except for the public testimony, the Pentagon’s dissent regarding Carter’s FY81 defense 
budget did not involve end-runs, perhaps because they were not needed.  As an example, 
William Dickinson (R-AL), the second ranking minority member of the House Armed 
Services Committee, said that he approached the FY81 defense budget “with more 
frustration, I believe, than I have experienced ever” because of the difficulties in securing 
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military support for end-runs on the president’s plans.217  Likewise, Congressman Floyd 
Spence (R-SC) lamented that he felt that he often had to fight much of the Department of 
Defense to get any increases in the military budget.  “Last year we passed a nuclear carrier 
with one hundred votes more than we did the year before when the president vetoed it,” he 
stated, “we have to give the Navy something that they do not officially ask for.  That is the 
position we are in.”218  Marjorie Holt (R-MD) also spoke of the frustration she experienced 
as a member of the budget committee due to what she felt was a lack of military support for 
her desire to increase defense spending.  She decried the fact that all other cabinet-level 
agencies openly lobbied for more money on Capitol Hill while the Pentagon remained stoic 
and inactive.219  Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) correctly indicated that the JCS were 
“responsible” and “not backdooring their commander-in-chief.”220  Even Harold Brown 
publicly conceded that the JCS’s actions were “within the rules” and that he suffered no 
“heartburn” because of their straightforward and honest testimony.221  If the Pentagon did in 
fact conduct behind-the-scenes lobbying during this time period, it remained unseen and 
unrecorded and certainly failed to impress many important members of Congress. 
    This relative lack of behind-the-scenes Pentagon lobbying as well as several other factors 
provided Carter some hope that he might be able to limit increases in defense spending to the 
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agreed upon 5 percent.  The issue of unobligated Pentagon balances remained a major issue 
during FY81 testimony, with House Budget Chairman Joseph Addabbo aggressively 
questioning many civilian Pentagon officials concerning the disposition of these funds and 
whether the defense budget was really a “true priority” budget at all.222  Senator Jake Garn 
(R-UT) went so far to say that, from his perspective on the U.S. economy as a member of the 
Banking Committee, there would probably have to be a “net decrease” in defense spending 
through FY81.223  Additionally, Carter’s likely Republican opponents in 1980—Howard 
Baker, George Bush, or Ronald Reagan—had already expressed support for Carter’s plan to 
increase defense by 5 percent.224 These uncertainties encouraged Carter to hold fast to the 5 
percent increase in FY81 and bide his time before seeing if he would need to go any further.  
Given this policy, Harold Brown, when questioned closely as to whether additional funds 
would be needed in FY81 because of Iran and Afghanistan, replied that “we want to see 
whether Congress is willing to support what we have proposed” before going any further.225 
    Given the glimmers of hope for keeping the 5 percent increase in place, Carter and his 
loyal Secretary of Defense embarked on their own lobbying effort, sending a series of letters 
to key senators and congressmen asking them to limit defense spending.  When the House 
Budget Committee proposed a bi-partisan Holt-Gramm amendment to boost the defense 
share of the federal budget, Carter wrote to House Speaker Tip O’Neill saying that he was 
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“strongly opposed” to the measure and asking the speaker to defeat this amendment since it 
provided “far more defense spending than is needed or advisable.”226  As the JCS testified 
before Congress regarding the inadequacies of military pay, Carter sent a harshly worded 
memo to Brown, telling the head of the Pentagon to get the military leaders in-line on the pay 
raise issue because “a coach would never denigrate his team members by constantly 
criticizing them.”227  After his testimony to Congress about the “hollow force,” Army 
Secretary Clifford Alexander ordered Shy Meyer to retract his statements.  Meyer refused, 
stating “I took my oath to the Constitution, not to the president or this administration.”  
Alexander backed down and Meyer’s damaging comments remained on the record.228  In a 
press conference to a group of prominent editors, Carter stated that his military budget was 
“adequate” and “approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.”229  In a 
final, bold move to counter a huge $6.2 billion addition to the defense budget proposed by 
the House Armed Services Committee, both Carter and Brown wrote letters to Senate Armed 
Services Committee Chairman Stennis asking him to scrap the proposed increases because 
they posed a “danger” to national security.230 Carter and Brown wanted almost the entire $6.2 
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billion dollars cut and naval shipbuilding increases under consideration curbed.231  Thus, 
Carter made it clear that he wanted to hold defense increases to the minimum 5 percent level 
and that the only time in which he valued the role of Congress in the defense budget process 
was when it would support his own views. 
    It was Carter’s continued resistance to congressional modifications of his FY81 defense 
budget that defeated any possible accommodation with the military-congressional alliance.  
When Price and Stratton heard of the letter objecting to House additions to the budget, they 
revived their Investigations Subcommittee, calling on the JCS to testify without their civilian 
counterparts, threatening to subpoena them if necessary.232   The special hearings, detailed at 
the opening of this chapter, clearly demonstrated that Carter not only ignored the advice of 
his military advisors regarding the budget, but also resisted Congress’ efforts to modify the 
defense budget at almost every step.  Senate leaders also stepped forward to assail Carter’s 
last-minute efforts to derail further defense increases.  Ernest Hollings accused the president 
of the “height of hypocrisy” and “outrageous and deplorable conduct” for running a public-
relations campaign saying that he was primarily responsible for defense increases while at 
the same time trying to defeat higher defense spending sought by Congress.233  Hollings 
continued pressure on Carter in public speeches, dismissing a Republican call to consider 
reducing defense spending and calling for the president to “hurry up and catch up” with the 
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will of the American people for a stronger national defense.234  William Cohen (R-ME) 
called the president’s positions on defense “totally confusing” and akin to a “maze of 
mirrors,” and Sam Nunn detailed to the press how Carter had changed his position on defense 
increases at least four different times.235  Jimmy Carter’s final attempt at economy backfired 
amid bi-partisan disapproval from Congress. 
    Ultimately, Carter and Brown’s stalling efforts only delayed the inevitable increases in 
defense spending that came later in FY81 and erased the final hope for the administration to 
cooperate with Congress on the defense budget.  Throughout testimony in FY81, both 
civilian and military members of the Pentagon had called for additional money in the budget, 
due to both operations and maintenance shortages (O&M) as well as the need to counter 
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.  An $800 million supplemental for the FY80 budget made 
an effort to address the O&M shortages.236  A later addition to that supplemental allocated 
additional funding for the burgeoning Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and increased naval 
forces to cover the Indian Ocean due to the events in Iran and Afghanistan.237  By testimony 
in March of 1980, Harold Brown acknowledged under pressure that with regard to 
supplemental defense budget submissions, “we will almost certainly have them in 1981 as 
well.”238  Indeed, Carter eventually submitted two separate supplementals for the FY81 
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budget.239  Thus, seen as an unusual event in FY79, supplementals had become the norm for 
Carter’s administration in the last two years of his term. 
    Even as Carter added his supplementals, the military-congressional alliance, emboldened, 
pressed for even more increases in defense as the 1980 election drew closer.  Both the House 
and the Senate passed defense bills that exceeded Carter’s desires by $5 to $6 billion.240  
Although later reduced, even the lowest budget bills were over $2 billion more than Carter 
had requested, with the inclusion of an 11 percent pay raise for the military and increases in 
military benefits.241 
    In a last effort to reach some level of consensus on defense spending, Nunn and other 
senators met Carter at the White House in October 1980 in a gathering that illustrated the 
ultimate victory of the military-congressional alliance.  Nunn spoke as leader of the group: 
Mr. President, you have only one of two choices:  either you support us in our 
efforts to raise the defense budget sufficiently to meet the needs you say are 
necessary for this country, or you should go before the country and admit that 
you do not intend to fund even the minimal defense needs you say are vital to 
protect our interests.242 
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Carter remained silent for several seconds, staring at the group.  Then he stammered, “Sam, 
you don’t understand.  It’s not my fault.  It’s the Republicans’ fault.”  Nunn cut his fellow 
Georgia Democrat off.  “Mr. President, you don’t seem to understand,” the senator said with 
conviction, “if we go to war, we’re not going to war with the Republicans.”243  Presented 
with the overwhelming force of the military-congressional alliance led by Nunn, this meeting 
confirmed that Jimmy Carter was unable to stem the tide on increasing defense expenditures. 
    Before the lame-duck session of Congress came to a close in December of 1980, the 
Senate voted 73 to 1 for a record $161 billion budget for defense--$6.2 billion more than the 
outgoing president had sought.  The one dissenting vote was from a Republican.244  It was the 
first time in thirteen years that Congress had approved a defense budget higher than the 
president had submitted.245    Eventually gaining approval for the $6.2 billion increase, some 
civilians and military within the Pentagon lobbied Carter to accept an $8 billion increase for 
FY81.  As one of his last acts in office, Carter refused.  The military-congressional alliance 
hardly raised a voice in protest.  They knew that Ronald Reagan would now enter office and 
raise defense spending even more.246  The Pentagon was satisfied that it was well on its way 
toward remedying what General Meyer had termed the “hollow” force structure that had 
plagued it through the 1970s.     
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A Military-Congressional Alliance:  The Overall Pattern of Civil-Military Relations 
Surrounding the Defense Budget in the Carter Years 
 
    Civil-military relations through the four years of Carter’s term fit a pattern.  First, military 
and civilian DoD officials within the Pentagon worked together well for the most part, while 
the Pentagon as a whole fought with the Carter White House on budgets.  Second, Jimmy 
Carter and his staff proved incapable, and apparently unwilling, to work with Congress to 
develop a consensus on military budgets, thus inviting conflict.  The president wanted to re-
prioritize military regardless of how important members of Congress viewed the matter.  
Finally, the patterns of civil-military cooperation and conflict within the Carter 
administration would lead to a strong alliance between a bi-partisan coalition of pro-defense 
congressmen and senators and an increasingly complicit Pentagon.  Harold Brown, always 
loyal to the president, found himself squeezed by this contentious relationship and at the 
brunt of growing criticism from an increasingly hostile Congress.  The overall trend when 
looking at civil-military relations surrounding the Carter defense budgets from FY78 to FY81 
can thus best be described as a strengthening military-congressional alliance overtaking a 
weakening, yet stubborn, chief executive and his Secretary of Defense.  
    The primary reason for the increasing cooperation between the military and civilian 
elements of the Pentagon, and the Pentagon’s contentious relationship with the White House, 
was Carter’s heavy personal involvement in the first two iterations of the defense budget.  
Although Carter’s direct involvement lessened in his last two years in office, his 
micromanaging style had set the tone up front and soured his relationship even with the 
civilians whom he had appointed to run the Pentagon.  Carter also proved both unwilling, due 
to his own belief that he knew best about defense spending, and unable, due to the ineptitude 
of his White House staff, to work with key members of Congress on his defense budgets.  
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The result was a series of combative exchanges between the legislative and executive 
branches over the defense budget, with the veto of the FY79 defense bill being one of the 
most intense periods of the conflict and Carter’s concealed attempts to limit defense spending 
through the FY80 and FY81 budgets being a natural continuation of the conflict by a 
politically-weakened president.  Many members of Congress, angered by Carter’s lack of 
acknowledgement of their role in setting defense spending priorities, became increasingly 
hostile and sought to ally with forces inside the Pentagon to raise defense expenditures and 
acquire more sophisticated weapons systems.  Already frustrated by their contentious 
relationship with the White House, many inside the Pentagon felt more than willing to enter 
into such an alliance.  Harold Brown, always loyal to his boss, remained outside the alliance 
and often paid the price during his testimony to Congress.  These various factors explain why 
civil-military relations surrounding the defense budgets of FY78-FY81 created a military-
congressional alliance. 
    One important trend in civil-military relations on budget issues in the Carter administration 
was its increasing politicization.  The FY78 and FY79 budgets were strongly colored by 
Carter’s campaign promise to cut defense spending by $5 to $7 billion.  As the 1980 election 
approached and it appeared that public perceptions of defense spending had changed, Carter 
recognized that his plans for economizing defense spending would be very difficult to carry 
out through FY80 and FY81.  He maneuvered fiercely to limit defense spending while at the 
same time touting his own national defense record, usually enlisting Harold Brown in the 
effort.  When criticized by the left for spending too much on defense, he asked the 
Commerce Department to pay for military sealift so that he could take that share out of the 
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Pentagon budget.247  When criticized by the right for not doing enough, Carter ordered 
Brown to hold a news conference revealing “stealth” technology under development.248  
These were just a few of the political decisions that left Congress and political pundits 
wondering where the president really stood on defense.249  By forcing Harold Brown to 
justify these spending gyrations, Carter not only left his Pentagon chief open to attack, but 
also increasingly politicized him.  Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird recognized 
this and felt compelled to write an op-ed blasting Brown for lending “the essential non-
partisan quality of his office to political distortions.”250  While certainly Laird’s comments 
had their own partisan bent, the fact remained that from 1977 to 1981 the politics of the 
defense budget increasingly moved to center stage within the Carter administration, placing 
great pressure on Harold Brown. 
    Carter was by no means the first president to politicize the defense budget process through 
his term, and likewise Carter’s term was not the first time that some within the Pentagon 
recognized that the defense budget could be used for political gain.  The Navy initially 
proved to be one of the most effective Services in this regard, using a series of press leaks to 
make it seem that Carter’s FY78 and FY79 defense budgets were dismantling an already 
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crumbling service.  In FY80 and FY81, the Army under General Meyer mastered this tactic.  
In the critical month of October prior to the 1980 election, for example, three separate 
classified memoranda were leaked to the press detailing the decrepit state of the Army and 
Carter and Brown’s unwillingness to fund the needed remedies.251  The military therefore 
clearly knew how to use the defense budget to weaken Carter politically and gain future 
concessions even if it meant intervening to a degree in the 1980 election. 
    The overall level of military lobbying and the frequency of congressional end-runs 
throughout the four years of Carter’s remain difficult to gauge.  If any pattern appeared, it 
seemed to be that military lobbying and end-runs remained more muted than one might 
expect.  Carter had grown considerably weaker politically over this time period, and the 
military-congressional alliance had grown stronger.  The military thus would find end-runs 
more tempting due to the decreased chances of being punished for such behavior by a 
weakened commander-in-chief.  Yet, the congressional testimony during this time period 
does not seem to indicate that the military followed this pattern of behavior.  Instead, many 
members of congress increasingly expressed frustration that the JCS and Pentagon seemed 
not to lobby to overturn the president’s decisions despite his weakness.  Thus, although there 
certainly were end-runs and behind-the-scenes lobbying taking place, the JCS under the 
leadership of General David Jones remained loyal, preferring to offer honest testimony when 
questioned rather than resorting to back-door channels with Congress to overturn the 
president’s decisions. 
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    One reason that the JCS and others within the Pentagon may have felt less need to use 
back channels was the seemingly unshakable commitment of many key congressional leaders 
to several important weapons systems that were eventually purchased.  When Carter lost the 
1980 election and Republicans gained control of the Senate, John Tower correctly predicted 
even higher defense spending and the accelerated development of many costly weapons 
systems.252  The military-congressional alliance that had been forged during Carter’s term 
indeed helped Tower keep his promise and delivered impressive dividends for all of the 
Services.  For the Army, the M-1 tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Apache helicopter, and 
Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) all survived to become superb combat systems.  
The Air Force continued with the MX ballistic missile and even the “cancelled” B-1.253  
Despite being debated for hours in Carter’s first meeting on the defense budget, the Navy and 
Marines’ CH-53E helicopter gained continued budgetary support.  The Navy’s intensive 
lobbing efforts also ensured that the F/A-18 fighter and “Aegis” cruiser survived to enter 
service.  Carter did not think the Navy needed a fifth nuclear-powered supercarrier, but 
Reagan and Congress clearly disagreed; a fifth through tenth were eventually 
commissioned—with the eighth being named in honor of Senator John Stennis, who often 
supported the Navy over Carter, and the tenth being christened the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan.254  
Carter’s budgets, heavily modified by Congress, hardly crippled long-term American military 
superiority. 
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    Although heavy presidential involvement and a lack of respect for congressional authority 
characterized civil-military relations surrounding defense budgets in Carter’s administration, 
a rather different pattern emerged when considering relations involving other defense and 
foreign policy issues in Carter’s administration.  While Carter had at times micromanaged 
Harold Brown and the Department of Defense, he avoided doing so with Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and the State Department or with Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security 
Advisor and his staff.  The great latitude given to these men contributed to a confused and 
chaotic policy making process, especially in the final two years of Carter’s administration.  
While Carter downplayed the role of Congress in the defense budgetary process, he similarly 
minimized the formal role of the JCS in his defense and foreign policy making.  The result, 
especially in the last two years of Carter’s term, was a tense civil-military relationship that 
became further strained by a series of chaotic events.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
CHAOS:  DEFENSE POLICY AND PLANNING IN THE CARTER 
ADMINISTRATION, 1979-1981 
 
Interlude: The White House Situation Room, November 13, 1980, 3:00 p.m.1 
 
    Zbigniew Brzezinski glanced quickly around the White House Situation Room.  He 
contemplated how much the faces and circumstances had changed since he had begun his 
term as National Security Advisor nearly four years earlier.  Sitting opposite was Secretary of 
State Edmund Muskie who had replaced Cyrus Vance in April of 1979 after Vance resigned 
over the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran.  Muskie was the only “principal” member 
from any of the departments present at the meeting.  The rebellious and newly promoted 
Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Claytor represented the DoD.  Frank Carlucci, a 
veteran beltway insider and Deputy Director of the CIA, represented that organization in lieu 
of Admiral Stansfield Turner.  Even the JCS had sent an acting Chairman to this meeting, as 
General Edward Meyer stood in for General David Jones.  Brzezinski’s assistant David 
Aaron provided some continuity, having served since the start of the administration.  On 
balance, however, the National Security Advisor could not help but notice how different the 
individuals at this meeting were from those at the early gatherings of the SCC. 
    Perhaps one major reason for the changes, as well as the presence of so many deputies, 
was Jimmy Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan only a few days earlier.  Reagan had repudiated 
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most of Carter’s defense policies.  Many felt that the Carter “lame duck” period was going to 
be very uneventful.  Criticized for being associated with the outgoing administration’s 
rejected policies, Harold Brown, Stansfield Turner, and David Jones apparently preferred to 
pass on more responsibility onto their deputies at this juncture. 
     While the administration’s days were numbered, these men still tried to bring order out of 
chaos in the realm of defense policy.  The last two years of the administration had been 
plagued by a series of defense debacles and continuing civil-military tension.  Efforts to 
bring meaningful reform to the Pentagon failed; the president’s Korea troop withdrawal 
policy was finally defeated; and a revolution in Iran toppled the Shah and spawned an 
fundamentalist Islamic government.  Soon after the “fall” of Iran, the American embassy was 
seized and the occupants taken hostage.  A military operation to free the hostages failed 
miserably, and it was unclear when the Americans, now held for more than a year, would 
ever come home.  While these tumultuous events took place overseas, only a few hundred 
miles south of the American border a revolution swept a leftist government to power in 
Nicaragua.  The administration had tried to distance itself from the events taking place in 
Central America, but even as the administration’s term came to a close, a major incident 
seemed imminent. 
    Brzezinski cleared his throat as he took charge, stating that the meeting would have a 
three-fold purpose.  First, recent intelligence indicated that a counter-coup against the leftist 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua might be coming, something that the group needed to 
decide whether to support if it was likely.  Second, President Carter wanted a series of 
diplomatic demarches prepared that could be directed to Havana and Moscow warning them 
to stay out of the internal events taking place within Nicaragua should a coup begin.  Finally, 
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Carter wanted the group to examine possible military options which could deter or respond to 
Cuban efforts to stop the potential coup. This group of advisors would present their 
recommendations to the president in about one hour.2 
    “The key issue here,” Brzezinski emphasized forcefully, “is armed involvement on the part 
of Cuba.”3  He felt strongly that the U.S. must prevent any Cuban troop deployments into 
Nicaragua.  He had recommended to the president that military contingencies be prepared, 
and Carter had agreed that this should be a major focus of the meeting that day.4 
    Brzezinski then turned to Frank Carlucci, seeking an intelligence update.  “How does the 
CIA assess the state of events in Nicaragua right now?” he queried.  The Deputy CIA 
director labeled the situation as “deteriorating rapidly,” and with the Marxists losing power in 
the government, a right wing counter-coup was “very plausible.”  “In summary,” Carlucci 
concluded, “the additional reporting has lent credence to a coup, and enhanced the chances of 
success.”5 
    The National Security Advisor leaned forward in his chair, his interest visibly piqued by 
the opportunity to deal communism a setback in the Western hemisphere.  “What are the 
prospects of Cuban involvement to stop this coup?” he asked in a low voice.  “I would expect 
the Cubans to intervene,” Carlucci replied, adding, “but only if they didn’t expect us to be 
involved.”  The Sandinistas had established a military agreement with Cuba soon after 
coming to power.  Fidel Castro would certainly adhere to this agreement and send some sort 
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of military assistance unless the United States prevented it.6  Having been accused of 
“losing” Nicaragua to communist expansion, Brzezinski sought a chance to redeem the 
Carter administration’s record. 
    The eager look on Brzezinski’s face alarmed Secretary of State Muskie.  The veteran 
politician, renowned for his work in the Senate, was far less confrontational than the National 
Security Advisor.  Muskie spoke up, indicating that the coup was much more complicated 
and not quite as straightforward as Brzezinski might like it.  Up to three independent groups 
were then plotting a coup, none even knowing about the existence of the other.  “These three 
groups share a common goal—to replace the Marxist leadership with a more democratic 
system,” Muskie interjected, “however, the prospects of any of these groups succeeding is 
slim.”7  The Secretary of State even went so far as to suggest that the administration send a 
message to the conspirators making it clear that the United States would not under any 
circumstances support their efforts.8  Muskie was not eager to risk another foreign policy 
setback while the administration was just about to leave office.  The Secretary of State 
wanted to play it safe. 
    Undeterred, Brzezinski moved the meeting on to the next point of order:  the wording of 
the diplomatic demarche prepared by the State Department.  “These drafts look fine in 
general, but the conclusion on these demarches is weak,” he complained: “it should be made 
clear to Cuba that the United States will not tolerate any foreign involvement in the internal 
affairs of Nicaragua.”  In an October speech President Carter had firmly stated that he would 
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not permit troops from Cuba to move “in any offensive action against any neighboring 
countries.”  To Brzezinski, the demarches needed explicit reference to this forceful 
presidential statement of policy.  Instead, the draft denied any American role in the coup and 
objected to any Cuban troop movement except those made out of “reasonable self-defense.”  
Brzezinski felt that Castro would take advantage of the “self-defense” clause to intervene in 
Nicaragua.9  The National Security advisor therefore wanted the demarche reworded to 
reflect a more forceful U.S. position against Cuban intervention.  “That seems rather strong 
to me,” Muskie interjected nervously, “perhaps we should just allude to the president’s 
statement rather than explicitly reference it.”10 
    Brushing off the Secretary of State again, Brzezinski moved that the demarche be 
reworded to be more forceful.  “Do you all agree to this change?” the National Security 
Advisor quickly asked.  Muskie sat silently, looking as all other members of the meeting 
nodded their heads.  With Brzezinski’s cold stare still leveled at him, Muskie lowered his 
eyes and gestured with his hand, indicating his reluctant approval.  “Good,” Brzezinski 
beamed, and sent an assistant outside the room to retype the demarche immediately.11 
    “Let us talk military contingencies,” the National Security Advisor said as he turned to 
Graham Claytor.  The Deputy Secretary of Defense noted that the aircraft carrier U.S.S. 
Forrestal was in the area and that the 82nd Airborne Division was also ready, but neither had 
been alerted.  “How soon could we put troops onto the ground in Nicaragua?” Brzezinski 
eagerly questioned.  General Meyer responded that the entire 82nd Airborne could land in 
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seven to ten days, with the lead battalion being on the ground within 24 hours, provided that 
the Army was put on alert.  “Certainly we’ll put the Army on alert upon the delivery of the 
demarche,” Brzezinski concluded, preparing to move onto the next topic.12 
    Claytor and Meyer exchanged glances at the table.  This was not the first time they had 
witnessed the National Security Advisor’s hawkishness dominate the NSC meetings in the 
second half of the administration.  Even for these military men, Brzezinski’s tone at times 
seemed overly aggressive, his solutions too simplistic. 
    Claytor and Meyer both returned to the conversation, pointing out the logistical and 
political problems in deploying troops into Nicaragua.  Both emphasized the difficulty 
assembling the required number of aircraft to deliver the troops and supplies.  A training 
exercise in Egypt had absorbed many of the Air Force’s critical transport aircraft.13  Meyer 
emphasized that putting troops and aircraft on alert would be necessary to estimate how long 
the deployment might take.  “There’s no quiet way to put troops on alert,” the general warned 
Brzezinski, “Everyone would know about it.”14  The administration had experienced the 
problems of alerts leaking to the press, and now General Meyer appeared to be warning that 
it could happen again.  Brzezinski became visibly agitated at the fact that the DoD and the 
uniformed military seemed to be dubious about aggressive action. 
    “We have to be ready to conduct an airlift,” Brzezinski declared, “General Meyer, why 
don’t you use the Egyptian airlift exercise as a cover to re-divert the aircraft back to the 
United States and at the same time put troops on alert.”  Meyer nodded, indicating that this 
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“might be difficult” but that he could look into it.15  Thinking that he had spurred the defense 
establishment into assenting to some kind of action, Brzezinski pushed his views even further 
on the NSC, completely overwhelming the silent Secretary of State. 
    In addition to airlifting troops, Brzezinski also wanted the Forrestal to interdict any 
military flights coming out of Cuba, preventing the communist island from quashing the 
right-wing coup in Nicaragua.  Meyer indicated that Admiral Hayward, the CNO, was 
“confident” that the Forrestal could perform this mission.  However, the general cautioned 
that orders to interdict another country’s aircraft over international waters risked a major 
incident, including the accidental destruction of a civilian airliner.16 
    Brzezinski waved his hand in the air, stopping the general.  He was growing tired of 
caveats to his courses of action.  “If Cuban pilots disregard our signals, then we could take 
that as a presumption that they are engaged in sending troops or military material, and they 
should be shot down,” he declared.17  The room fell silent for a moment following the 
National Security Advisor’s guidance to use lethal force to stop Cuban intervention. 
    General Meyer was the first to break the silence, and he urged caution regarding the 
possible adverse incidents that could result from Brzezinski’s course of action.  “The rules of 
engagement would have to be developed providing very clear instructions for our pilots,” the 
general insisted.18  “Has any work been done on this?” Brzezinski quickly shot back.19  The 
military opposition to his plan clearly had the National Security Advisor flustered.  “We will 
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begin work on the rule of engagement immediately,” Meyer assured, “It will take the 
Forrestal twelve to fifteen hours to move into position where it could intercept the Cuban 
flights in any event.”20 
    “What?” Brzezinski questioned in a shocked tone, “I thought that the Forrestal was 
already in position!  The President had been informed that the Forrestal was in position some 
time ago!”21  “Well, we did not want to move it into position too soon because it might be a 
tip-off to the Cubans that we are aware of the possibility of a coup in Nicaragua,” General 
Meyer explained.22  Brzezinski visibly fumed in his chair.  “The Cubans could have a 
thousand troops in Nicaragua before we even get the Forrestal in place!” the National 
Security Advisor yelled in frustration.23  This was not the first time that the administration 
had experienced difficulty getting an aircraft carrier into position in a timely manner.  Nor 
was it the first time in the last two years when the military had made the decision about 
where a carrier battlegroup should be positioned.  Brzezinski recalled the fiasco associated 
with the Iranian Revolution when the JCS had moved the U.S.S. Constellation toward the 
Indian Ocean in response to the unrest in Iran.   Press reports of the movement surprised the 
White House which had not been informed.24  This time the JCS’s insubordination was 
different—the military had chosen not to deploy a carrier that the president wanted in 
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position.  “Explain to me now why we should not have the Forrestal sail immediately to a 
position where it can interdict these Cuban flights,” Brzezinski challenged.25 
    Since Brzezinski had rejected Meyer’s argument that the carrier move might precipitate a 
coup, the general tried another explanation.  “Sir,” Meyer responded haltingly, “the carrier is 
currently in a flight-training mode conducting a practice exercise, so we did not want to 
move it.  We can maneuver it to the important point within twelve hours if need be.”26 
    Brzezinski exploded in rage.  “General, I just don’t understand your answer.  To hell with 
the military exercise, we may actually need to use the Forrestal for combat!”27  “Sir, we felt 
that moving the carrier would tip our hands to the Cubans,” Meyer explained again, “and if 
the Cubans saw we would be involved it might precipitate the coup.”  David Aaron, 
Brzezinski’s longtime deputy on the NSC, suddenly jumped in, defending the general’s 
interpretation.28  Secretary Muskie then broke his long silence, concerned that American 
pilots might be “trigger-happy” and could shoot down planes with innocent civilians in 
them.29  Frank Carlucci brought up the fact that it would be very difficult for the CIA to 
determine what would actually be on the Cuban planes—SR-71 overflights would not help, 
there was little ability to get operatives on the ground to observe the airfields in Nicaragua, 
and the ability of the CIA to intercept radio signals from Cuba was incomplete at best.30 
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General Meyer felt relieved that he was now not the only one on the NSC bringing up 
problems with Brzezinski’s plans. 
    As the resistance to Brzezinski’s course of action mounted, the National Security Advisor 
reluctantly agreed that the issue required further study.  The problem could not be solved at 
this NSC meeting.  Brzezinski remained seated as the rest of the meeting participants filed 
out of the room.  With the Situation Room empty, the National Security Advisor realized that 
the last opportunity for the Carter Administration to deal a setback to world communist 
influence had probably slipped past. 
    This lame-duck administration NSC meeting regarding possible military intervention in 
Nicaragua served in many ways to replicate the course of civil-military relations in the 
second half of the Carter administration.  The JCS, largely excluded from the process of 
policy making in the first half of the administration, became increasingly involved in the last 
two years of Carter’s term.  The influence of the State Department, so prominent in the early 
years of Carter’s defense policy, waned in the second half of the administration.  With State 
increasingly marginalized, Zbigniew Brzezinski stepped forward to become more influential.  
Despite his hard-line predilections, the Pentagon did not blindly support the hawkish 
National Security Advisor.  As was clearly evident at this meeting, the Pentagon, especially 
the uniformed military, at times openly opposed his confrontational plans.  President Carter, 
though listening more to his defense advisors than before, was still ambivalent as to what 
course he should take on defense policy.  Perhaps the key difference between the first and 
second half of the administration in terms of civil-military relations was that a series of 
tumultuous world events created a more chaotic environment than in the first two years. 
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The Nature of the Building:  Pentagon Resistance to Defense Reorganization in the 
Carter Years 
 
    One point of civil-military conflict that had been constant since the start of the 
administration, but climaxed in its last two years, was the issue of Pentagon and JCS 
reorganization.  Like other policy decisions earlier in the administration, the JCS was 
involved only to a limited degree.  Carter’s first set of Joint Chiefs, however, had not been 
proponents of change.  With the selection of his second set, Carter finally gained a team 
willing to oversee substantial change in the Pentagon.  Ironically, the resistance from the first 
group convinced Harold Brown, and through him Carter, that no substantial change in the 
Pentagon could take place during the administration’s term. 
    Carter’s presidential campaign alleged Pentagon inefficiency and wastefulness and 
promised change.  Harold Brown used the momentum from the election to begin his reforms 
early.  In his first hearing before Congress, he complained that over two dozen separate 
elements of the DoD reported directly to the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy.  “I have 
concluded that this span of control is too broad to enable us to give adequate supervision to 
these functional elements of the Department,” Brown determined, and set about making 
reforms.31  Less than four months later, he proposed a “sweeping reorganization” which 
abolished one deputy secretary of defense position but created two undersecretary positions, 
thus creating an extra layer of civilian control.32  These early reforms concentrated primarily 
on the civilian realms of the Pentagon—the higher-level secretary positions. 
    Brown’s next changes, launched later in 1977, more directly affected the military and 
spawned military opposition.  The Secretary began in July of 1977 by proposing massive cuts 
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in Pentagon staffs.  All of the services were to experience a portion of these cuts.  Brown’s 
plan eliminated more than four thousand civilian and military positions—a reduction of 
between 20 and 25 percent for most staffs.33  The military resisted the efforts, first appealing 
the cuts down to 2,900 personnel, then transferring, only on paper, these individuals to 
organizations outside of Washington.  These units in turn detached the personnel back to the 
Pentagon.  The end result was that Brown’s staff reforms physically removed only sixty 
people from the building.  The Army and Navy then requested additional personnel for their 
depleted staffs, leading one reporter to comment, “Nowhere does the fixation with 
bureaucratic organization look sillier than at the Pentagon.”34  Brown’s staff reorganization 
was therefore deemed almost a complete failure by the end of 1978. 
    The most controversial set of early reforms, which carried on through the entire 
administration, were the changes that Brown proposed to the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS).35  Central to these reforms was developing comprehensive 
“Consolidated Guidance” (CG).  This document, the brainchild of Undersecretary for Policy 
Stanley Resor, integrated both strategic and fiscal guidance for the administration and relied 
on earlier input from the Secretary of Defense and the president.36  The introduction of 
Consolidated Guidance was thus a prominent assertion of civilian, especially presidential, 
authority on defense policy making procedures. 
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    When the Secretary of Defense provided the first draft of the administration’s 
Consolidated Guidance to the Chiefs for comment, their appraisal was uniformly negative.  
They criticized both the strategic and fiscal sections of the document.  The vehemence with 
which the uniformed military resisted this intrusion of civilians into a heretofore military-
dominated realm was evident in the comments on the draft.  “There is no section which 
coherently pulls overall policy and military strategy and guidance together,” was a major 
criticism.37  The JCS also felt that the Soviet threat was “portrayed inconsistently.”38  In the 
most stinging criticism, the JCS deemed that “the Draft CG contains overly specific, 
restrictive guidance which inhibits the JCS/CINCs in their planning.”39  General Wilson, as 
he was leaving his post as Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated that he felt the CG had 
“no future” and was “useless.”40  Commenting on the fiscal portion of the guidance, the JCS 
lobbied for a long term 5 percent increase in defense spending, which they felt could be 
“easily” passed by the Congress if the administration proposed it.41  This recommendation, 
“one of their few unanimous views” in the words of Harold Brown, was seen by the JCS as 
“solving their most severe problems and as making the difference between a low-risk and a 
high-risk defense capability.”42  “They may even be right on both scores,” Brown told Carter, 
in a rather dismissive view of the JCS position.  Apparently a copy of the memo reached 
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General Brown, whose marginal notations indicated that he was annoyed with the Secretary’s 
dismissal of his advice.43 
    As Harold Brown pursued these ambitious reforms, Carter ordered him to study 
improvements in three more major areas in the Pentagon:  defense management structure, 
defense resource management, and the national military command structure.  Brown selected 
veterans from the McNamara Pentagon to lead each of the study groups.44  The military had 
little input in determining its future structure—Brown outsourced the entire project to 
civilians familiar with defense policy making. 
    The first study group, termed the Ignatius Study group after its head Paul Ignatius, 
examined defense management structure inside the Pentagon.  Its main recommendation was 
a call for closer direct coordination between the Chairman of the JCS and the newly 
established undersecretary of defense for policy.45  Harold Brown had recently appointed 
former Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor to the undersecretary position.  One of Resor’s 
primary functions was to control service programs which had previously been the 
responsibility of the military service staffs.46  The new undersecretary for policy was 
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considered the third-ranking official in the Pentagon and had been given an even greater 
authority by the findings of the Ignatius Group.47 
    The uniformed military in the Pentagon resisted the Ignatius recommendations just as they 
had the other efforts to assert more civilian control of defense policy.  By March of 1979, 
within only nine months of taking his position, Resor resigned his post in frustration.  
Insiders posited various reasons for the sudden departure, but the level of civil-military 
conflict at the time seems a likely explanation.  One senior defense official seemed to support 
this, indicating that within the Pentagon it was “the nature of the building” to block any 
modernization or change.48  John Kester, Harold Brown’s special assistant, agreed, lamenting 
that the organization of DoD was created by “historical accident and bureaucratic 
stonewalling,” and that little meaningful change was likely in the near future.49  The press 
termed Resor’s resignation “an embarrassment for the Carter administration, which, like 
previous ones, has accurately diagnosed the Pentagon disease, but failed to impose a cure.”50 
    The second study group, the Steadman group, studied the national military command 
structure and its recommendations made it the most famous of the three.  Press reports 
anxiously anticipated a major reorganization of the Pentagon and JCS when the study was 
first commissioned.51  Somewhat anti-climatically, the Steadman report, presented in July of 
1978, recommended no changes.  It did, however, criticize the military Joint Staff system 
within the Pentagon as being too dominated by individual Service perspectives.  The group 
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argued that under the existing system it was “difficult for the JCS to produce persuasively 
argued joint papers which transcend Service positions.”52  The report also said that the 
Chief’s obligations to their Services as well as to the administration reduced JCS advice to 
the “lowest common level of assent.”53  To solve this and other problems, the group 
recommended providing the Chairman of the JCS greater authority, as well as a greater role 
for CINCs, as opposed to the Services, in resource allocation decisions.54  The hope was that 
a stronger CJCS and more CINC involvement would reduce inter-service squabbling.  
Pentagon correspondent Bernard Weinraub judged that the report indicated that the Chiefs 
had been playing a “limited role in defense policy” and were “due for a major overhaul.”55 
    The Steadman report’s optimistic press did not coincide with reaction in the Pentagon.  
Although the Chiefs implemented limited internal reforms to comply with the findings, as a 
whole they rejected any need for substantive change.56  Even the newly appointed Chairman 
of the JCS, David Jones, who later became a strong advocate of organizational changes, was 
quick to defend the status quo.  “The fundamental organizational structure is sound . . . there 
is no present need for dramatic change,” he asserted in his official response to the Steadman 
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report.57  Likewise, the Army only partially agreed with the findings, specifically opposing 
more power for the CINCs and the Joint Staff.58 
    The last group to complete its project, headed by Donald Rice, focused on the issue of 
defense resource management within the Pentagon.  Reporting in the spring of 1979, the Rice 
report argued modestly for an increased role for the Chairman of the JCS and the Joint Staff 
in the resource allocation process.59  Brown responded by creating a “Resource Planning 
Board” consisting of the Secretary of Defense and his service secretaries, to integrate the 
separate budget submissions of each Service and resolved major issues between them.  
Brown made the Chairman an ex-officio member of this board, suggesting a preference for 
uniformed military advice filtered through the Chairman rather than the JCS as a body.60 
    Civilians dominated each of these studies and civilian control pervaded the reforms 
proposed during the first and second half of the Carter administration.  Brown chose 
knowledgeable, defense savvy civilians to conduct the important studies and, although the 
Chiefs certainly provided input, they resisted changes.  The degree to which civilians 
independently formulated answers to the studies was unusual.  As an example, Army official 
historians studying the reaction of the uniformed military determined that: 
Previously, the Army chief of staff and vice chief of staff played major roles 
in defining the Army position.  The existing evidence . . . suggests that neither 
General Rogers, nor the vice chief of staff, General Walker T. Kerwin, was 
much involved.  Secretary of the Army Alexander played a much more 
important role than they.61 
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    While the early efforts to reform the policy making process in the Pentagon had certainly 
created civil-military tension, it also caused friction between civilians in the Pentagon and the 
White House which consistently believed the Pentagon to be inefficient, wasteful, and in 
need of reform.  The president even went so far as to direct Harold Brown to develop a 
physical training program for officers assigned to the Pentagon because Carter felt that many 
of those in uniform were too fat.62  This micro-management—as was the case with 
budgeting—caused significant Pentagon-White House tension at times.  On physical fitness, 
Harold Brown concluded, “I think he paid too much attention to that sort of thing.”63  When 
speaking of Carter’s three directed studies, Brown characterized them as “overly 
ambitious.”64  John Kester had an even stronger opinion on the matter.  Brown’s special 
assistant blasted the directed studies as a waste of time and effort and indicated that he fought 
them every step of the way.65  Veteran official “Doc” Cooke also noted this White House-
Pentagon tension, indicating that “left to his own devices” Harold Brown probably would not 
have conducted these reorganization studies.66  Though Brown, Kester, and the 
administration’s team at OSD had their own plans to change they way of doing business in 
the Pentagon, Carter’s demands for further studies pushed the impetus for reform almost too 
far even for reformers. 
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    Ironically, the one major reform to the structure of the JCS during the Carter years—the 
elevation of the Marine Corps Commandant to full membership in the JCS—came about not 
as a result of any of the studies but through military insubordination.  The issue came to a 
head in late 1978 when all other members of the JCS left Washington, but General Louis 
Wilson, the USMC commandant, remained behind.  For that period of time the Chairmanship 
of the JCS had to pass to the three-star Deputy Chief of Staff of for Plans and Operations 
because, by law, the USMC commandant was not a full member of the Joint Staff while the 
three-star general was.  David Jones apologized to Wilson for the situation.  “Fine.  Thank 
you very much,” Wilson replied, “I’ll take it from here.”67  From that point on the Marine 
Commandant decided to make himself a full-member of the JCS—regardless of what his 
civilian superiors or military peers might think or the law might state. 
    As a former Congressional Liaison Officer, Wilson had the contacts in Congress to carry 
out his plan.  “No one knew what I was doing,” including Harold Brown or the other Chiefs, 
the general recalled later, “I had kept this very quiet.  I did tell—not ask—the Secretary of 
the Navy that day before what I was doing and requested his confidence.”68  Getting Graham 
Claytor’s assurances of secrecy, the Marine General proceeded to call upon his friend Bob 
Wilson (R-CA), the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee.  
Congressman Wilson shrewdly suggested that the Marine Commandant speak to Senator 
Stennis about putting a clause in the FY79 defense bill making the commandant a full 
member of the JCS.  If Stennis would agree and get it through the Senate, then Bob Wilson 
could get it through the House.  When General Wilson approached Stennis, the influential 
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Mississippi Democrat proved to be “enthusiastic” about the idea.  The provision for the 
Marine Commandant being a full member of the JCS was thus included in the FY79 defense 
appropriations bill.69 
    The passage of the bill making the Commandant a full member of the JCS “came as quite 
a blow in the halls of the Pentagon,” Wilson remembered.  Harold Brown was “appalled that 
something that was this important had gone through without any discussion whatsoever” and 
knew that Wilson was responsible.  General Jones called Wilson, indicating that he was 
“quite surprised” and “sorry” that the commandant had not even informed him of his 
intentions.  Wilson openly challenged the Chairman:  “Stand up and be counted.  If you don’t 
want the Commandant as a full member of the JCS, I suggest that you call Senator Stennis 
and tell him so.”  Jones backed down.  Even when Carter vetoed the FY79 defense bill, 
Stennis inserted the provision into the modified defense budget, which Carter could not hope 
to veto.  When the modified bill passed, the Marine Commandant thus became a full member 
of the JCS.  Harold Brown, perhaps having encountered enough military end-runs for one 
fiscal year, congratulated Wilson on his achievement.70  The most significant change in the 
JCS thus derived not from one of Carter’s civilian staff studies, but from an end-run to 
Congress. 
    The failure of the administration to reform the Pentagon stood in stark contrast to Wilson’s 
coup.  Because of uniformed military resistance to the civilian-dominated staff studies and 
the administration’s weak political standing as it entered its second-half, most major reform 
efforts fizzled.  Back in 1977, Harold Brown and his OSD staff had been able to make 
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meaningful changes to the PPBS system—the Consolidated Guidance being the most 
important and lasting one in the realm of defense policy making.  By early 1979, however, 
when the Carter-directed studies finished, the reform movement had lost most of its 
momentum. 
    Change was going nowhere without support from the top.  Both David Jones and Harold 
Brown became vocal proponents of substantial changes to the JCS which eventually led to 
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  But in Carter’s administration, 
Jones felt powerless to press any sort of meaningful reform.  Brzezinski’s military assistant 
Colonel William Odom remembered meeting with the chairman during the latter half of the 
Carter term.  The general bemoaned his lack of authority.  “You’ve got to understand, I don’t 
have clout,” Jones had lamented.  “I felt sorry for him,” Odom recalled.71  Similarly, Harold 
Brown decided to rest on the laurels of his early reforms.  Responding to the findings of the 
three directed studies, Brown argued that the DoD “works well . . . and that sufficient 
changes occurred in the Department prior to the commencement of the formal reorganization 
studies, and the Administration should take credit for these changes.”72  In his memoirs he 
proposed “radical” changes to the Pentagon, very similar to the Goldwater-Nichols 
reorganization, arguing that advice coming from the JCS as a body was not useful.73  When 
asking the rhetorical question, “Why did he not propose these changes while in office?” 
Brown responded, “The answer is simple:  Ripeness is all.”74  He felt it best to make these 
suggestions after leaving office and leave the actual reforms to a subsequent administration.  
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Had the Carter administration continued for a second term, he and David Jones might have 
been willing to push these reforms.75  But there was going to be no second term—and no 
substantive reform of the Pentagon until Goldwater-Nichols under Reagan’s administration. 
Korea on the Brink:  PRM-45, Revising the Decision Nobody Liked and Saving an Ally 
 
    The withdrawal of troops from Korea was another issue which provoked military 
resistance in Carter’s term.  It, too, culminated in the second half of the administration.  
Again military resistance forced the president to back down, demonstrating the power of the 
military-congressional alliance. 
    Carter had continued to push troop withdrawal despite the Singlaub fiasco and other 
military resistance.  The first increment of six thousand soldiers was supposed to leave by 
December of 1978, but only half that number actually left the country because of military 
resistance, General Singlaub’s testimony, and congressional hesitation to fund needed 
equipment for South Korean forces.76  Bernard Rogers, in testimony before the Congress, 
admitted that “the Army’s intelligence and security command has focused upon the North 
Korean capability in recent months to an extent we had never done before” but made it clear 
that the only options the military was considering was the policy dictated by PD-12.77  Carter 
wrote to Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Speaker Tip O’Neill, confirming his plans for 
continuing the withdrawals.  The president acknowledged, however, that “should 
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circumstances affecting the balance change significantly, we will assess these changes in 
close consultation with Congress,” and, if need be, alter the schedule.78 
    In late 1978, a new intelligence report from the Army indicated that North Korean military 
strength was 25 percent greater than previously thought.79  The report was quickly leaked to 
the Army Times, generating widespread suspicion that this was another thinly veiled effort to 
oppose the president’s policy. 80  According to General Rogers, however, there was little 
unanimity among the intelligence community on the estimates of the North Korean 
strength.81  Stansfield Turner believed that some intelligence analysts had attempted to pass 
off an inflated estimate of North Korean strength in 1977.82  Despite the lack of confirmation, 
the vastly increased estimates of North Korean strength continued to circulate throughout 
Washington.  The White House issued PRM-45 in response, calling for a review to “assess 
the effect of recent developments on the military balance on the Korean peninsula.”83 
    Congress soon took a strong interest in the matter, joining the military in opposition to 
Carter’s policy.  After viewing the intelligence report, Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and John 
Glenn (D-OH) met with Cyrus Vance and requested that the administration further delay any 
troop withdrawals.84  Sam Stratton and the House Armed Services Committee in particular 
focused upon the intelligence reports as a reason to veto the president’s policy.  When 
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testifying on the matter before the committee, Bernard Rogers attempted to walk the line 
between supporting the administration and justifying the JCS opposition to the plan.  
Although stating that he felt the withdrawals could continue, the official JCS position was to 
wait for a full evaluation of the intelligence reports by the Joint Staff.  Stratton rejected the 
general’s efforts at loyalty, accusing him of “playing with words” and mounting a “filibuster” 
of a congressional inquiry.  “You mean to say as a Chief of Staff you don’t want to have to 
evaluate the intelligence yourself; you want to let some major or some colonel do it; is that 
it?” the feisty New York Democrat demanded.85  The congressional offensive against 
Carter’s withdrawal policy was in full swing. 
    The combined opposition at the outset of the second half of Carter’s term stalled the 
withdrawal decision even further.  Although Carter continued to pursue it as late as October 
1979, his requests focused only on small numbers of support troops.86  By the start of 1980, 
Harold Brown testified that no combat troops would be removed from the peninsula; only a 
few hundred support personnel would turn over duty to the South Koreans.87  The focus on 
reducing military sales to South Korea due to its poor human-rights record also folded under 
the pressure.  Carter authorized the transfer of sixty-eight F-5 aircraft to South Korea, 
explicitly contradicting his own policy in PD-13.88  Later that same month, Harold Brown 
announced that American security commitments to South Korea would not be used as 
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leverage to try to bring about human rights changes in the country.89  Later that year, in 
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Brown announced that any further 
removal of troops had been deferred until 1981, after Carter’s first term, another victory for 
the military-congressional opposition.90 
    One other policy issue relating to Korea arose during the second half of Carter’s term.  On 
October 26, 1979 an assassin gunned down South Korean President Park Chung-hee.91  Less 
than two months later, a military junta took control of the nation in a bloodless coup, 
imposed martial law, and proceeded to rule through a civilian figurehead president.92  By 
May of 1980, unrest in the country had reached unprecedented levels as citizens protested 
against the military government, culminating in what became known as the “Kwangju 
Tragedy,” where South Korean Army units attacked demonstrators in a rebellious city, 
killing hundreds.93  At the same time, the North Korean Army was increasing its readiness 
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and even infiltrated two elite agents into the South.94  
Ambivalent as to whether to support the military government, the Carter administration now 
faced the possibility of seeing the government of one of its East Asian allies toppled and the 
outbreak of a second Korean War. 
    General John A. Wickham, Jr., the new CINC in Korea, enjoyed cordial relations with 
many of the administration’s Far East officials, including Richard Holbrooke and Michael 
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Armacost.95  The general was impressed with their mastery of East Asian affairs and their 
understanding of events taking place in Korea.96  By and large, Wickham supported the 
administration’s emphasis on human rights and liberalization of South Korean society.97  
This good relationship within the administration became critical to Wickham later, for the 
general also became embroiled in a Singlaub-like civil-military confrontation with Carter’s 
White House. 
    Wickham had to walk a fine line between supporting administration policy and supporting 
military rule in Korea.  After the military coup, he understood that a military junta “was a 
complete reversal of everything President Carter had tried to accomplish.”  The general, 
however, recommended what he termed a “hands-off response” for Washington because he 
felt that “the era of America’s paternal influence over the ROK had passed” and that it was 
best to be pragmatic and deal with the junta.98  The administration largely accepted the 
Wickham’s judgment and recommendations, unlike the case with the previous CINC.99 
    Despite this cooperation, a media performance again created a near civil-military crisis 
between Carter and his commander in Korea.  As part of a public campaign to explain the 
American position toward the coup, Wickham agreed to a series of interviews.  The 
agreement with the reporters stated that Wickham should be not be quoted for attribution but 
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instead as a “senior military official.”100  The interview covered background surrounding the 
coup and dealt with nothing controversial until one of the reporters asked if the American 
government would support General Chun Doo-hwan, the coup leader, if he consolidated his 
power and became president.  Although understanding “it was not my place as a military 
official to announce U.S. government foreign policy,” Wickham answered the question 
anyway, speculating that the U.S. might indeed support Chun if he came to power 
legitimately, gained the support of the Korean people, and did not endanger the security of 
the peninsula.101  Realizing the value of the quote for a headline, the journalists, in a gross 
breach of professional ethics, released a taped transcript of their interview to a colleague 
from The New York Times who was not bound by the non-attribution agreement.  As a result, 
the entire tape became public.102  The government-controlled South Korean press enjoyed a 
field day with the report.  Wickham lamented the bias of Korean press coverage, which ran a 
non-stop blitz for days.  “The three conditions for support that I explicitly outlined in the 
interview were totally omitted, as were the criticisms of Chun’s repressive policies,” 
Wickham wrote in his memoirs, “The Korean media reported simply that Chun was a good 
guy and the United States would support him unconditionally.”103 
    Soon after the media blitz started, the American media joined the fray, casting Wickham as 
a second Singlaub.  The New York Times reported that Secretary of State Muskie was 
“startled” by Wickham’s comments.  Another state department official stated that the general 
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was out of line to grant such an interview in the first place.104  The Washington Post was 
quickly pointed out that the general’s comments differed from the administration’s policies, 
while the Los Angeles Times ran a headline that the general had spoken “out of turn.”105 
    The administration was furious.  Richard Holbrooke, trying to support Wickham, 
characterized the reaction as “dramatic.”  “Human rights activists went ballistic,” he later 
recalled, citing calls for the general to be “repudiated, or even replaced.”106  Carter was 
incensed.  The president recalled the general to Hawaii.  Wickham feared that he would be 
cashiered like Singlaub.  Speaking to Admiral Robert Long, the newly appointed commander 
of the Pacific Command, Wickham lamented, “This is no way to treat a military officer,” and 
contemplated resignation.107 
    Unlike the incident with Singlaub, however, allies within the administration flocked to 
Wickham’s side.  The general felt strongly that Admiral Robert Long, David Jones, Dick 
Holbrooke, Mike Armacost, and Harold Brown all defended him.108  Knowing that the media 
would interpret it as a sign of support for the military regime in Korea, Holbrooke pressed for 
Wickham’s immediate return to his command.  The administration acquiesced and returned 
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the general to Korea on the pretext of him overseeing a joint U.S.-ROK military exercise.109  
Carter and his White House aides had learned from the fallout of the Singlaub incident to 
avoid a clash with the military, keeping in mind the upcoming election in November.  In this 
case, giving the appearance of civil-military comity trumped making an example of a general 
who had publicly differed with administration policy. 
    In the end, Wickham credited the moderate response of the administration with a desire to 
protect national security.  General Chun later went on to hold democratic elections and 
consolidate power.  Although human rights continued to be an issue in South Korea, they 
became less so over time.  Civil-military relations clearly had shaped U.S. defense policy 
toward Korea.  In this case, the cooperation between the theater CINC, the Pentagon, and 
Washington led to a policy that many leaders felt may have saved a vital U.S. ally. 
All Fall Down:  The Iranian Revolution and the Loss of an Ally 
 
    While the Carter administration’s approach to Korea may have saved an ally, many argued 
that its approach to turbulent events in Iran in 1979 led to the U.S. losing an even more 
important ally.  Indeed, the “Fall of Iran,” is interpreted by many historians as one of the 
most disastrous events of Carter’s term.  Like so many previous policy matters related to U.S. 
national interests, civil-military relations shared a role in shaping administration behavior. 
    Iran was not seen initially as a likely location for any sort of significant foreign policy 
problems when Carter took office—not on the list for initial policy review, and no PRM or 
PD ever called for a U.S. examination of its posture toward Iran.  The nation’s leader, Shah 
Rezha Pelavhi, had been installed in a U.S.-backed coup in 1953.  The Shah had enjoyed 
unqualified support under the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy framework, military security 
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contracts and arms purchases dominating the relationship.  Navy Captain Gary Sick, the NSC 
officer responsible for Iran, felt that the Carter administration opted to continue this Nixon-
Kissinger policy toward Iran almost completely.110 
    One of the first tests of the relationship turned out to be a direct challenge to Carter’s arms 
sale policy, and the president chose to side with the Pentagon.  Early in the administration, 
the Shah requested ten high-technology AWACS planes built for the U.S. Air Force.  This 
was the first request which required direct approval by the president, given the new 
guidelines established by PD-13.  The State Department argued against the sale because these 
planes contained sensitive electronic equipment, the loss of which could harm U.S. national 
security.  OSD and the JCS, argued that the AWACS increased Iranian security from 
potential Soviet incursions and that the risk in transferring the sensitive equipment was thus 
outweighed by the benefits.  Carter ultimately agreed with the DoD and authorized the sale, 
despite opposition from Congress to the sharing of the technology.  The president, however, 
chose to limit the number to seven.111  Later, however, he chose, against the advice of OSD 
and the JCS, to bar the sale of F-18 aircraft to Iran.112  In so doing, Carter sent a clear signal 
to the Shah that the days of limitless arms sales from the U.S. were ending and a message to 
the Pentagon that he was still skeptical of their support for the continuation of heavy arms 
sales to Iran. 
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    Limiting the sale of weapons technology came at a time when Iran faced increasing civil 
turmoil.  Protests against the Shah’s repressive government reached significant levels in 
November of 1977, just as Carter assumed office.  The human rights policies of the Carter 
administration gave the Shah pause when considering how to deal with the increasing 
protests, mainly from the educated youth in Iran.113  The Shah wanted some liberalization 
within the strict structure of Iranian society, so long as it did not threaten his own position as 
a supreme ruler.  As the Shah came under increasing attack from dissidents, he requested tear 
gas from the U.S. for non-lethal riot control.  Patricia Derian, the first Assistant Secretary of 
State for Human Rights, blocked the transfer.  Pro-arms sale advocates within the 
administration, including the DoD, objected and eventually won the support of the 
president.114 Thus, even as the Shah’s regime headed toward crisis, Carter had shown a 
willingness to defer to the judgment of DoD and JCS over the advice from State. 
    Gary Sick, reflecting on events later, felt that the controversy distracted the administration 
from the seriousness of the turmoil inside Iran.115  Indeed, the president referred to Iran as an 
“island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world” during a visit to Tehran on New Year’s 
Day 1978.116  Nine months later this optimistic appraisal came crashing down as Iranian 
military units opened fire on protesters in the capital.117  The U.S. government, distracted at 
this point by both the ongoing SALT II negotiations and formulating the final agreements for 
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the Camp David Accords, began to give much closer attention to what increasingly appeared 
to be a revolutionary situation. 
    The new polices in the CIA implemented by Admiral Turner, and resisted by the DoD, had 
played a role in the U.S. being blindsided.  Sick called Iran “an intelligence disaster of the 
first order.”  He drafted a memo for Brzezinski, later signed by President Carter, which 
chastised Turner for providing inadequate intelligence on Iran and the entire Middle East.118  
Turner responded that there had been no way to tell how rapidly the Shah would fall.119  
Despite the denials, however, a congressional inquiry into the matter, published in January of 
1979, concluded that CIA intelligence reporting on Iran had indeed been weak.  It also 
became clearer that, as the Ayatollah Khomeini mounted the revolution from exile in France, 
hardly anyone in the U.S. government knew the man or his stances.120 
    As it became clear that the Shah would never regain power and that Khomeini might take 
over the government, civil-military disputes intensified.   The first clash came over the 
deploying the Pacific fleet’s aircraft carriers.  As Iran grew more unstable, the JCS ordered 
the U.S.S. Constellation to move from its homeport in the Philippines to Singapore, closer for 
quick deployment into the Indian Ocean.  The Chiefs had not sought presidential approval for 
such a movement because it was “precautionary” in nature.  Unfortunately, one sailor on the 
carrier breached security and informed his relatives in the United States of the change, and 
word subsequently leaked to the press.  The White House press spokesman denied the report 
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but later had to backtrack, embarrassing the administration as well as the military.121  
William Sullivan, the American Ambassador to Iran, protested the military deployment 
through State Department channels.  Carter, shaken by the military’s breach of operational 
security, sided with Sullivan and did not allow the carrier to proceed into the Indian 
Ocean.122  Then, as the Shah left Iran in control of a military government, it was soon 
replaced by a civilian government headed by opposition politician Shahpur Bakhtiar.123    
    The administration threw its full support behind the Bakhtiar government, urging other 
nations to do so as well.124  Ambassador Sullivan, as the senior State Department 
representative in Tehran, made it clear from the outset, however, that he had his own ideas 
about how events in Iran were going to play out and did not want any “interference” from 
Washington.  Cyrus Vance and the rest of the State Department felt inclined to accept the 
Ambassador’s insubordination and shielded him from criticism.125  Sullivan strongly opposed 
the Bakhtiar government, instead wanting the U.S. to deal directly with Khomeini.126  
Brzezinski, on the other hand, wanted the Iranian military to initiate a coup.127  The JCS 
sided with Brzezinski, arguing that the Iranian military would remain friendly to the U.S. and 
could suppress radical dissent within the country.  The JCS advised, however, that the Iranian 
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military might need help.  Harold Brown advocated a middle ground, proposing that a highly 
qualified military man should visit Iran and get a feel for the situation.128 
    Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan then selected Air Force General Robert 
“Dutch” Huyser, the deputy commander of NATO forces in Europe, to journey to Iran in 
order to gauge whether the Iranian military could support the new civilian government.  
Huyser was well qualified for his mission.  From 1975 to 1979 he had made numerous visits 
to the Middle East working with the Pentagon’s arms sales program.  He had met several 
times with the Shah and they shared a mutual respect.  The general’s mission was to fly to 
Tehran, urge Iranian military leaders to support to provisional Bakhtiar government, and 
reassure the Iranian military that the U.S. was behind them.129 
    The selection of Huyser stirred more civil-military tension centering on the theater CINC.  
Huyser’s superior, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) Alexander Haig, 
objected violently to his deputy being assigned the mission to Tehran.  “I opposed what 
became known as the Huyser mission because its objective was ambiguous and because it 
was preeminently a political and not a military task,” Haig later recalled.  Both Huyser and 
Haig felt that the Carter administration had displayed “feebleness” in responding to the 
situation in Iran.  Haig now feared that Huyser was going to be the fall guy for the failure in 
U.S.-Iranian relations.130  Another theater CINC had stepped forward to oppose the 
administration.   
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    The administration responded by circumventing Haig, keeping him out of the loop on 
almost all information concerning Iran.  David Jones spoke directly to Huyser, informing him 
that Carter had selected him personally to go to Iran.  Huyser, wanting to keep loyalty to his 
commander, requested that Jones inform Haig of the decision.  When Jones complied, Haig 
again exploded.131  The SACEUR had long opposed the Carter administration’s policies 
relating to the Middle East.  Earlier, Haig had met with Carter and recommended that the 
president lift an arms embargo on Turkey.  The president had dismissed the advice, telling 
Haig, “General, you don’t know what you’re talking about.”  Haig stood up, turned his back 
on the president, and walked out of the Oval Office.  Harold Brown, present at the meeting, 
chased down the general and castigated him on his lack of courtesy.132  Carter believed that 
he should have fired Haig for his constant opposition to administration policies, but Harold 
Brown talked the president out of it, averting a potential civil-military blowup but at the cost 
of retaining another CINC that was virtually in open revolt against his civilian superiors.133  
As a result, as the crisis in Iran came to a climax, the administration chose to keep its theater 
CINC in the dark. 
    Due to Haig’s opposition, Charles Duncan telephoned Huyser directly to implore him to 
take the mission.  Huyser hesitated, and contemplated resigning in protest over what he saw 
as support for a failing administration policy.  Ultimately, the general’s sense of duty 
prevailed, although he refused to take the mission until the Pentagon provided written 
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instructions detailing the purpose of his mission, which Duncan did.134  Cut out of the loop 
and knowing that his ability to influence policy was now almost completely gone, Haig 
submitted his retirement paperwork soon after Huyser’s mission concluded, but not until 
leaking the report that Huyser’s mission would actually hasten the downfall of the Shah.135  
Upon retirement, Harold Brown hailed Haig as “the complete professional through his 
distinctive military career,” a comment that symbolized the administration’s weakness in 
dealing head-on with inappropriate military opposition.136 
    Huyser’s mission in Iran brought about additional discord within the government.  
Immediately upon his arrival in Iran, Ambassador Sullivan handed Huyser a telegram from 
Cyrus Vance directing the general to ignore all previous orders.  To Huyser it was obvious 
that the State Department had one view of the situation and the DoD and the White House 
another.137  Ambassador Sullivan confirmed this when he told Huyser that he felt that the 
U.S. would do best to skip the Bakhtiar government and deal directly with Khomeini.  The 
ambassador also called the president “stupid” for not directly approaching the Ayatollah 
while he was exiled in France.138  To the general it was now clear that the ambassador openly 
opposed administration policy.  Huyser, however, had been sent to gain Iranian military 
support for the Bakhtiar government.  The tension between Sullivan and Huyser suggested 
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that the two most senior representatives from the U.S. in Iran were working at cross 
purposes. 
    The disagreement manifested itself most clearly in their appraisals of the Iranian military.  
As Huyser conducted his liaison mission with the leaders of the Iranian military, he came to 
believe that they were indeed loyal to, and capable of, supporting the Bakhtiar government.  
This appraisal differed fundamentally from that of Ambassador Sullivan, whose reports to 
Washington constantly portrayed the Iranian military as a “paper tiger,” incapable of helping 
the civilian government deal with the growing Iranian mobs.139  In Washington, the differing 
reports increased tensions between the White House and the State Department.  Vance, 
perhaps feeling that Carter’s support for Bakhtiar was misplaced, largely absented himself 
from official policy meetings on Iran, leaving the field mostly to Brzezinski, who teamed 
with Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger and cited Huyser’s optimistic reports as reason 
for the U.S. to support a coup.140  Carter rejected their ideas, responding with “icy 
repudiation.”141  The differing reports coming into Washington left the president unsure of 
whose advice he should follow. 
    Ultimately, Carter lost trust in the independent-minded Sullivan and relied on Huyser, who 
had the president’s ear as the crisis deepened and the Shah finally departed.142  The State 
Department responded by attempting to cut Huyser out of official communications, but 
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Harold Brown kept close contact with the general and relayed his views directly to Carter.143  
When Khomeini returned to Iran and the situation at last became too dangerous for the 
American general to remain, Carter ordered him to report to the White House immediately 
upon his return.  After a ten minute conference, in which Huyser frankly explained his 
differences with Sullivan, Carter emerged as “grimly angry” as one aide had ever seen him, 
outraged over the ambassador’s resistance to administration policies and the lack of 
cooperation shown to Huyser by the State Department.144 
    Ironically, in spite of the president’s trust, Huyser’s optimistic appraisal of the Iranian 
military proved less correct than Sullivan’s.  Soon after Khomeini’s return, forces intent on 
installing the Ayatollah in power assassinated or arrested several key Iranian generals.  Left 
without firm direction from its leaders, the Iranian military folded in a single day and the 
Bakhtiar government fell to a theocracy headed by Khomeini.145 
    Iran clearly strained civil-military relations in the Carter administration even though the 
president had placed greater trust in the military than he had in his own State Department.  
Cutting Haig out as theater CINC was only one factor.  The JCS was fully integrated into the 
decision-making cycle.  Huyser had provided vital and trusted input to the commander-in-
chief.146  The primary source of civil-military conflict was instead the perception among 
members of the military that the Carter administration’s response to events in Iran had been 
“feeble,” as Alexander Haig had characterized it. 
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    Other senior military besides Haig saw Carter’s action’s on Iran as weak.  Huyser agreed 
before and after his mission.  When Charles Duncan approached Huyser after his return to 
Washington and asked if he would be willing to return immediately to Iran and orchestrate a 
military coup, the general balked.  Huyser wondered why the administration had not 
suggested that he take such bold action when he was still in Iran before Khomeini had seized 
control.  Now the idea seemed a classic case of “too little, too late.”  Huyser eventually 
agreed to return to Iran, but only if Carter accepted four demands:  unlimited funding for the 
operation, a cadre of twelve handpicked U.S. generals to accompany Huyser, ten thousand 
U.S. troops deployed to Iran to support the coup, and the requirement that the administration 
rally undivided national support among the American people for the mission.  After 
presenting the demands, Huyser turned to Al Haig, who nodded in agreement.  “There was a 
rather long pause,” Huyser recalled in his memoirs, “so I answered the question for them”—
in the negative.147  “My trust and faith in the upper strata of our government was a real 
weakness on my part,” Huyser reflected some years later.  “My naiveté in assuming that, if I 
carried out the tasks assigned to me with the Iranian military, then the political wing of our 
government would march smartly along in lock-step, was a gross mistake.”148  Other military 
figures, USMC Commandant Louis Wilson among them, agreed, characterizing Carter’s lack 
of support for the Shah as tantamount to approval of the revolution.149  Most in the Pentagon 
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failed even to understand Huyser’s mission, believing that the general had been sent to 
prevent a coup rather than bolster the strength of the Iranian military.150 
    The view that Carter had been weak flowed in large part from the administration’s 
downplaying the crisis in the press, which seemed to conflict with strategic value that the 
Pentagon placed on Iran as a buffer to the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf.  The fears of 
Soviet aggression into Iran arose long before their invasion of Afghanistan.  Under a bilateral 
treaty dating to 1921, the Soviets had the right to send troops into Iran if a third power 
intervened in the area.  Iran had renounced the treaty, but the U.S.S.R. had refused to do 
so.151  At every step of the crisis, the Soviets attempted to befriend the revolutionary forces 
and played up the role of outside U.S. interference.152  The Pentagon became especially 
concerned about Soviet aggression when the Bakhtiar government announced it was 
withdrawing from CENTO, the anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East.153  The Carter 
administration, however, tried its best to downplay the strategic importance of Iran and the 
aggressive Soviet posture.  The president publicly dismissed the idea that Iran was critical to 
the security of the Middle East, said that he did not expect the Bakhtiar government to 
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survive indefinitely, stated that he would like to see long-term stability in the region, and 
asserted that the Russians felt the same way.154  When the Bakhtiar government fell to 
Khomeini, the shockwaves rippled across the region, Saudi Arabia becoming especially 
fearful that the U.S. would abandon it if a conflict began with the Soviet-supported nation of 
South Yemen.155  The administration responded to the crumbling confidence by sending 
Harold Brown on a whirlwind tour to reassure the shaken nations. In almost a complete 
repeal of PD-31, Brown was given wide latitude to sell arms to friendly nations throughout 
the region.156  Additionally, the Pentagon sent AWACS aircraft to the Saudis and created the 
5th Fleet to provide a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.157  Despite these late efforts to 
increase the U.S. presence, Carter’s lack of concern for Iran and the Shah led many to 
question his commitment to the region and one historian to conclude hyperbolically that 
“never previously in U.S. history had an administration acted so decisively or successfully to 
subvert a major strategic and political ally.”158   
    Although some in the military, as well as Congress, questioned Carter’s commitment to 
Iran, the administration did in fact view it as an important strategic ally.  Carter could not 
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dismiss Soviet support for the revolution; the fact remained that Iran could serve as a 
potential invasion route to Persian Gulf oil for the Russians.  Since the period after the 
revolution would be such a formative one for the U.S.-Iranian relationship, the administration 
opted to keep its embassy in Tehran in place despite an attack in February of 1979 in which a 
mob briefly held the staff hostage.159  This decision to keep a skeleton embassy staff on 
station despite the violence spoke to the importance which the administration placed on Iran.  
It also led to Carter’s greatest crisis when in November of 1979, the 444 day ordeal of the 
American hostages began.160 
    The conflicts over Iran symbolized the chaos in defense policy during the second half of 
the Carter years.  The theater CINC, in open opposition to the administration policy, was 
circumvented rather than relieved.  Carter from the outset of his second term gave military 
advice more credence, and Iran again showed this pattern.  The president continued to take 
advice from the JCS and trusted General Huyser more than he trusted his own ambassador in 
Iran.  The DoD and State Department worked against each other and Carter did not 
adjudicate.  The trust in a general and cooperation with the JCS, however, could not 
compensate for such schisms in the government.  With respect to Iran, the split developing 
between the NSC under Brzezinski and the State Department under Vance, intensified.  
Although the DoD increasingly unified and coordinated its actions with the NSC and White 
House, the State Department continued a course different from that of the official 
administration policy.  “Discipline within the U.S. government had been deplorable at almost 
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every level,” Gary Sick concluded in his memoir on Iran, “policy was constantly contradicted 
or undermined by leaks . . . and bureaucratic sniping.”161 
The Trouble Down South:  PRM-46, PD-52, the Nicaraguan Insurgency, and the Re-
crafting of American Policy in Central America 
 
    While Iran plunged into revolution, events in nearby Central America also forced a series 
of defense policy decisions on Carter in early 1979.  As an early goal the administration 
intended to emphasize and respect the diversity of the nations in Latin America.  According 
to the Annual Defense Department Report of 1979, most Latin American nations welcomed 
this approach, seeing in it a rejection of traditional U.S. paternalism and the beginning of a 
more mature, normal relationship.162  The Panama Canal treaty, which relinquished 
American sovereignty over the Canal Zone, confirmed this optimistic appraisal.  The climatic 
battle over ratification of the treaty had been intense, but the administration prevailed in no 
small part due to the staunch support of the JCS.  Indeed, as 1979 approached, it seemed that 
the administration had met many of its foreign policy goals in Latin America. 
    These successes, however, cost much military dissent.  Along with the controversies 
surrounding PD-13 and arms transfer policies, members of the uniformed military often 
opposed Carter’s policies in this region.  In late 1978, the Soviets supplied Cuba with several 
MiG-23 “Flogger” fighter-bombers which had the capability of striking the Panama Canal.  
General McAuliffe recommended that his Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) be put in 
charge of air defense of the canal.  He also requested that SOUTHCOM’s obsolete A-7 
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“Corsair II” aircraft be upgraded to the more modern F-4 “Phantom” in order to counter the 
enemy MiGs.  David E. McGiffert, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, overruled McAuliffe, indicating that such an upgrade of military technology 
might convey the impression that the U.S. was trying to intimidate Panama or other 
Caribbean states.163  When the Pentagon leaked reports that the new MiGs were capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons, Carter declared publicly that the Soviets had provided 
assurances that the planes posed no nuclear threat to America.164  The JCS strenuously 
protested a supposed disregard of Latin American security and, without support from 
civilians in OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), initiated a Joint Staff Study of security 
in the region.  When OSD offered to assist with the study, the Joint Staff refused their 
support.165  Others outside the Pentagon held a similar sentiment, noting that U.S. diplomats 
in Central America seemed to offer “a warm embrace for the left, a cold shoulder to the 
right.”166  JCS Historian Steven Rearden argued that these and other developments caused 
many uniformed military within the Pentagon to see Carter’s polices toward Latin America 
as “naïve and short-sighted.”167 
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    The military also objected to Carter’s human rights pressure on allied governments in 
Central America, which peaked under the direction of Patricia Derian, a Human Rights 
activist and the first assistant secretary for the function in the State Department.  Derian felt 
that economic and military aid should depend on a nation’s human rights record.  As part of 
this initiative, when the State Department sent annual offers of aid to Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Uruguay, and Argentina, Derian’s staff attached descriptions of each nation’s 
human rights abuses.  These governments exploded in response.  Each refused the aid offers 
and denounced Carter for interfering in their internal affairs.  Brazil even went so far as to 
abrogate its mutual defense treaty with the United States.168  Louis Wilson remembered that:  
“We are not welcome in Latin America,” and that he was unable after these incidents even to 
visit Venezuela and Chile.169  When he was invited to Brazil, it was as a personal friend of 
the Brazilian Marine commandant, not as an official guest.  Despite the human rights 
campaign, or perhaps because of it, the general felt that by 1979 there were serious problems 
in Latin America that did not “bode well for the future.”170 
    SOUTHCOM CINC McAuliffe testified that civil-military discord over Latin America 
increased perceptibly when compared to the relative cooperation manifest during the Panama 
Canal treaties.  In April of 1979, after viewing the Department of Defense Annual Report for 
1980, he wrote the JCS to express grave concern.  McAuliffe deemed the overall assessment 
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of Latin America “incomplete and, indeed, unbalanced from almost any perspective.”171  The 
general went on to offer a scathing critique:   
The assessment brings out that:  there are no threats in Latin America; Cuba is 
capable of stirring up problems, but to do so would only hurt itself; . . . the 
Panama Canal Treaties have created a new spirit of cooperation; Mexico is 
now a major new energy source; friendship and stability exist throughout the 
region.  What it does not take into account are most of the regional problems 
that are obvious even to the casual observer.172 
 
The CINC identified several other areas in which the FY80 guidance on Latin America 
proved utterly lacking, including Cuban involvement in terrorist activities, the imbalance in 
arms transfers, and the lack of attention to Brazil’s growing strength as a regional power.  “In 
sum,” he concluded, “I find this so-called regional analysis woefully deficient.”173  He 
recommended that the JCS “take steps to seek a broader, more balanced assessment for next 
year’s annual report,” which would correct the deficiencies in the current report so that 
Congress could use it as a valid guide.  He also wanted additional funding for SOUTHCOM 
in the FY80 and FY81 budgets.  “I sense it may take a major effort to achieve this,” he 
warned.174     
    Events in Nicaragua undoubtedly caused much military dissatisfaction with Carter’s Latin 
American policies.  For over forty-six years that country had been ruled by the Somoza 
family, which had bought, seized, and consolidated great wealth in this largest of countries in 
Central America.  So powerful was the family that in many ways Nicaragua came to 
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resemble, in the words of one writer, “less a sovereign nation than it did a huge, family-
owned conglomerate.”175  The country’s seven thousand man National Guard, which had 
originally been established in the 1930s by departing U.S. Marines, kept the family firmly in 
power.  By the 1970s, however, the National Guard had become increasingly corrupt, 
engaging in widespread graft and organized crime.  Despite the poverty that gripped the 
nation, a succession of three Somoza’s, all educated at West Point, had little difficulty in 
holding onto power within the nation—until political unrest began to erupt in the late 
1970s.176 
    By the time Carter took office, dissent within the country had grown significantly, and the 
new president was forced to re-evaluate U.S. policy toward the country.  Roman Catholic 
clergy preaching “liberation theology” as well as free-market businessmen equally criticized 
the harsh rule of Anastasio Somoza.  The regime responded harshly and declared martial law.  
In April of 1977, Carter bypassed Congress and suspended all military-aid to Nicaragua.  At 
various times leading up to 1979, Carter reinstated and then withdrew aid based on Somoza’s 
human rights record.177  Administration policy had almost been entirely developed into a 
dialogue between the State Department and the NSC.  The Pentagon, though participating in 
most of the deliberations, played only a minor role according to NSC member Robert Pastor, 
confirming Steven Rearden’s assessment that the JCS had been “frozen out” of the decision 
making process.178 
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    By 1979, the situation had reached a crisis level and Carter took steps to try to mediate it.  
The leftist resistance, known as the Sandinistas or FLSN, had coalesced a wide range of 
moderate anti-Somoza reformists and was now winning a guerrilla war against the National 
Guard.179 Military intelligence reports indicated that Cubans were involved in training the 
Sandinistas.180  Carter sponsored a fifteen-week effort by a three nation mediation team to try 
to negotiate a solution, but to no avail.  In February of 1979, his efforts to mediate the dispute 
having failed, Carter terminated all military aid to Nicaragua and withdrew the U.S. military 
advisory team.181 
    Carter’s Nicaragua policy came under attack from many in Congress which contained a 
powerful “Somoza Lobby.”  Representatives John Murphy (D-NY) and Charlie Wilson (D-
TX) even went so far as to journey to Nicaragua and sit with Somoza during a televised press 
conference in which the dictator defended his policies as anti-communist.  Wilson even 
threatened the administration with “rough treatment” on a required House Appropriations bill 
to finance to the transition of the Panama Canal if Carter continued with policies that would 
“turn the largest country in Central America over to the Communists.”182  When the president 
did not relent, Wilson and his allies lived up to the threat, forcing the administration to take 
action to ensure the passage of the bill.183  Congressional resistance to the president’s policies 
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led the New York Times editorial page to argue that “Somoza has outgunned and 
outmaneuvered his opponents.”184 
    In May 1979, in response to the military and congressional criticism, Carter directed a 
reassessment of U.S. policy toward Latin America.  Entitled PRM-46, the document 
reinforced the administrations’ human rights intentions, but also sought “the denial of the 
region to forces hostile to the U.S.”185  This time Carter gave greater weight to the advice of 
the uniformed military, especially General McAuliffe.  By June of 1979 it was becoming 
clear that Somoza could not hold onto power much longer.  McAuliffe sent General Jones’ 
assistant an assessment and recommendations concerning the situation.  The general foresaw 
a “bandwagon” forming to place a Sandinista “provisional junta” in charge of the country 
when Somoza departed.  “To say that I am concerned about this turn of events would be to 
grossly understate it,” McAuliffe went on, “to avoid what I believe may, in reality, be a 
Communist government in Nicaragua, and with visions of Iran and Vietnam, I wish to ask 
the JCS to consider supporting an alternative approach.”186  McAuliffe then outlined his 
resolution of the situation: an immediate ceasefire, the departure of Somoza, and the 
continued support of the National Guard.  The general saw the latter as the “key ingredient” 
in the mix in order to avoid a communist takeover, but acknowledged that leadership changes 
would be required at all levels of the Guard.187  McAuliffe asked that his recommendations 
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be forwarded to the JCS and, if the JCS would deem appropriate, the civilians at OSD.188  
The JCS and OSD apparently supported the CINCs recommendations fully and forwarded 
them to the White House.  Near the end of June, Carter ordered Secretary of State Vance to 
go before a special session of the Organization of American States (OAS) with a proposal 
which almost precisely matched McAuliffe’s recommendations to end the conflict in 
Nicaragua.189 
    Despite following the advice of his military advisors, Carter’s efforts failed.  The OAS 
rebuffed Vance’s pleas to commit troops and oversee a cease fire.  For the first time in its 
history, the OAS rejected an American proposal for intervention in a member state.190  Soon 
after, Somoza’s rule came to an end.  On July 17, 1979, a joint session of the Nicaraguan 
Congress accepted his resignation.  Two days later FLSN rebels entered the capital city of 
Managua.191  Within a week, the victorious Sandinista leadership flew to Cuba for personal 
congratulations from Fidel Castro.192  Assessing the significance of the events at the time, 
Marine Commandant Louis Wilson felt that Nicaragua was “gone.”193 When later asked in 
February of 1980 how he would assess the American position in Latin America, Wilson 
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called it “very bad.”194  The marine general then went further, explaining his true feelings on 
the administration’s policies in this region: 
I think the whole Caribbean is a hotbed of Communist-inspired insurgents 
brought about in large part by our willingness to put up with Castro’s 
exporting communism to that area and of course the President’s human rights 
program, which is a disaster. . . . I think the role of the Marine Corps is at an 
end.  I also think the role of the United States is at an end, unless we change 
our policy.  We are losing ground rapidly and in the whole of not only the 
Caribbean but all of Latin America.195 
 
If Wilson’s stinging indictment was at all representative, some in the military increasingly 
blamed Carter’s defense policies for the events in Latin America, even while the president 
increasingly accepted military advice. 
    The U.S. still supported Nicaragua even after the FLSN took control.  General McAuliffe 
urged in early August of 1979 that the U.S. supply non-lethal military items and 
humanitarian assistance to the struggling government as an effort to assure neighboring 
countries of American commitments.  He also asked, that if requested, aid be promptly 
dispatched to surrounding countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador.196  The 
administration again accepted military advice, requesting from Congress a $75 million dollar 
aid package in what was deemed “an effort to avoid Marxist, pro-Cuba rule” and to bolster 
the government of neighboring El Salvador.197  Yet, the situation seemed to worsen.  The 
Sandinistas moved increasingly toward the Soviet sphere.  They doubled the size of the 
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Nicaraguan Army, openly accepted Cuban advisors, and, along with Cuba, became the 
second country outside the Warsaw Pact to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
front of the United Nations.198  Less than a year later, in August of 1980, intelligence reports 
indicated that Cuba was providing massive arms shipments to the Sandinistas to support a 
conflict with neighboring El Salvador.  Evans and Novak decried that these developments 
forced Carter to “reconsider his courtship of the left in Central America.”199 
    If the events in Nicaragua forced Carter to reconsider his policy toward Central America, 
perhaps even more influential was the “discovery” of a Soviet army brigade in Cuba on 
August 31, 1979.  Although the brigade had been there since the time of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, it had been forgotten by the CIA.  Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, and David Jones all 
claimed that the unit posed “no threat” to America.  Satellite reconnaissance revealed, 
however, that the brigade was not just training Cubans but instead conducting “combat 
maneuvers” of its own.200   
    The administration’s handling of the incident quickly created a political crisis.  Wanting to 
keep Congress informed of the matter, a lower level official from the State Department 
briefed the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Church (D-ID), 
while the president, Harold Brown, and Brzezinski were all out of town for Labor Day.  
Church, running that year for re-election and defending himself against charges that he was a 
“dove,” proceeded to call a major press conference in which he took a bellicose posture and 
publicly stated that the SALT treaty should not be ratified while the Soviet brigade remained 
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in Cuba.201  Secretary of State Vance took a surprisingly hard-line view as well, issuing a 
statement that “the status quo is unacceptable.”202  With Carter supporting the view that the 
presence of the Soviet unit was unacceptable, and with the future of the SALT treaty now 
embroiled in the matter, the administration had virtually created its own crisis.203 
    Comments from retired military officers heightened the importance of the issue.  LTG 
Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, insisted that “something 
new” was going on with the Soviet unit in Cuba, and that many intelligence officials knew 
this but were being ignored.204  Columnist Jack Anderson claimed that he had access to 
classified information that the Soviet brigade had doubled to five thousand men and 
contained Soviet troops who had constructed nuclear reactors in East Germany.205  The most 
serious allegations came from General Singlaub, who claimed that the purpose of the Soviet 
unit was to guard nuclear missiles.  “I know there are nuclear missiles in Cuba.  The U.S. 
intelligence establishment knows there are nuclear missiles in Cuba.  And President Carter 
knows there are nuclear missiles in Cuba,” he boldly asserted.  Singlaub went on to compare 
the Soviet brigade incident to the Cuban Missile Crisis.206 
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    The administration fumbled attempts to solve the Soviet Brigade issue through diplomacy.  
Carter sent Vance to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on several 
occasions, but the Russian refused to make any concessions and accused the U.S. of creating 
a false crisis over a training unit that had been stationed in Cuba for over seventeen years.207  
Marshall Brement, the NSC specialist on the U.S.S.R., concluded that the Soviets would not 
back down on the issue; the best the administration could hope for was to back away from 
the problem and issue a “Carter Doctrine” that any Soviet troop movement from Cuba 
elsewhere in the Western hemisphere would be unacceptable.208  The president rejected the 
advice of the NSC.  Over the strong objections of Brzezinski, Carter convened a panel of 
retired officials from outside of the administration whom he dubbed “The Wise Men,” 
headed by Clark M. Clifford, from which he hoped to draw advice to end the impasse.209  In 
the end, Carter issued a statement that Soviet assurances that the brigade would not be used 
for combat was enough, that the issue was “certainly no reason for a return to the Cold War,” 
and that SALT II should not be tabled.210  Correspondent Don Oberdorfer judged that 
Carter’s response was “a tacit admission that three weeks of diplomacy had failed to bring 
about a negotiated settlement to the dispute.”211 
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    The Soviet Brigade incident caused chaos within Carter’s White House.  Hamilton Jordan 
and Jody Powell quipped to the press that the thirty-day process probably could have been 
handled in five days.212  Brzezinski felt rather differently.  He was so incensed by the 
president’s handling of the situation he actually contemplated resignation.213  Louis Wilson, 
dictating his oral history at the time, captured the attitude of many when he recorded that 
“this is a continuing series of problems that the president has had, in which he speaks and 
then has to back down.”214 
    While the event may not have unified Carter’s White House, it did demonstrate an 
increasing unity between the Pentagon and the NSC.  Brzezinski indicated that through the 
entire incident he had “collaborated very closely” with Harold Brown.  Brown and the JCS 
both believed that the primary focus of the incident should be the issue of Cuban 
involvement in Central America and Africa.215  The administration’s official response to the 
incident, codified in PD-52, reflected this Pentagon-NSC consensus.  The directive ordered 
that the new U.S. policy toward Cuba should attempt to “reduce and eventually remove 
Cuban military forces stationed abroad,” “undercut Cuba’s drive for Third World 
leadership,” and “inhibit the Soviet build-up of Cuba’s armed forces.”216  Indeed, the contrast 
between PD-6 and PD-52, both dealing with Cuba, was stark.  The administration had begun 
wanting to form a cooperative relationship with Cuba but, by October of 1979, had decided 
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that the relationship must be almost entirely adversarial.  The president also followed almost 
all of the JCS advice in terms of how to respond to the situation.217  On October 2, 1979, 
Carter established the Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force “to monitor and respond . . . to 
any attempted military encroachment in the region.”218  Unlike his decision in 1977 to cancel 
a planned naval exercise off of Guantanamo, Carter authorized Harold Brown to “conduct a 
number of show the flag exercises” including increased naval maneuvers in the Caribbean.219  
It certainly appeared that Carter opted to follow more closely Pentagon advice as he tried to 
resolve the Cuban crisis. 
    Along with PD-52 and the Cuban incident, the administration’s focus on Latin America 
became increasingly pragmatic as the conflict between Nicaragua and El Salvador 
intensified.  In November 1979, the press reported that Carter was willing to provide 
“significant” assistance to the rightist government in El Salvador.220  Gregory Treverton, a 
member of the NSC, confirmed that the administration also began covert operations inside 
Nicaragua to support the Salvadorians.221  When it appeared that a right-wing countercoup 
might be underway in Nicaragua, the administration reacted rather aggressively, sending 
letters of demarche to Moscow and Cuba warning them against intervention and ordering a 
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carrier battlegroup into the central Caribbean.222  Even when the right-wing junta in El 
Salvador murdered three nuns and a lay worker, the administration consented to an internal 
investigation of the events, supervised by the FBI and foreign observers.223  In that same 
meeting, the DoD recommended sending in fifty military advisors to help the Salvadorians.  
When Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher objected that this would seem like an 
“invasion,” Brzezinski overruled him and sided with DoD.224  It thus became an unofficial 
administration position to continue to supply limited military aid to the Salvadorians to assist 
in the struggle “against leftist guerillas.”225  Later, Carter continued to side with DoD 
regarding El Salvador, allowing the shipment of helicopters to combat the Sandinistas.226  
Given this evolution of events, Steven Rearden’s conclusion that “by the end of Carter’s 
presidency, U.S. policy in Latin America was beginning to approximate something closer to 
what the JCS believed it should be” was correct.227 
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A Grand Strategy Revised:  PD-59 and Pentagon Contingency Planning 
 
    PD-59 (“Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”) issued in July of 1980 marked the final 
maturation of the Carter administration’s policy making process and grand strategy.  This 
directive detailed Carter’s “countervailing strategy” of nuclear deterrence.  The document 
detailed “pre-planned options” for nuclear targeting against the Soviet Union and called for 
the president to be able to “pursue specific policy objectives” from “general guidelines 
established in advance.”228  Overall, it reached a level of specificity and pragmatism not seen 
in previous directives. 
    According to Brzezinski, PD-59 departed radically from all previous administrations and 
put Carter’s mark on deterrence.  Brzezinski argued that until PD-59, “American war 
planning postulated a brief, spasmic [sic], and apocalyptic conflict.”229  Carter’s strategy, by 
contrast, called for a deeper analysis of nuclear war, acknowledging that it might “last a few 
days at most” and involve less than complete destruction of both nations.  It targeted Soviet 
command, military, and industrial structures rather than primarily cities and industrial 
capacity.  The strategy called for a “look-shoot-look” capability to destroy Soviet mobile 
conventional and nuclear forces.230  It also sought to give the president more selection from a 
“menu” of nuclear options and more direct control over targeting.  Part of this involved the 
idea of limiting the possibility of a catastrophic nuclear escalation by informing the Kremlin 
of the targets of our nuclear weapons after their launch, so that the Soviets could judge the 
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appropriate level of retaliation against us.231  The specificity stood in stark contrast to the 
generalities and optimistic appraisals of PD-18 from early 1978. 
    The directive had both critics and supporters within the administration.  Although 
Brzezinski and Harold Brown both strongly supported it, some of those who had criticized 
PD-41 also vehemently opposed PD-59.232  Many disagreed strongly with the analytical tone 
of the directive, which implied that nuclear war could be controlled or even won.  Others 
took particular exception to one of the “pre-planned options,” which supposedly detailed an 
American nuclear preemptive strike against the U.S.S.R.233  Secretary of State Edmund 
Muskie also objected to PD-59, mainly because he had not even been informed of the change 
in U.S. strategy until after it was signed.234  PD-59 had thus completed the transition of the 
NSC policy making process from one dominated by Vance to one dominated by Brzezinski 
and Harold Brown. 
    Congressional reaction to the administration’s change in strategy proved guarded.  Both 
Brown and Muskie defended the change before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  
The directive had been leaked to the press and speculation ran rampant about the “first 
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strike” portion.235  Some congressmen feared that the heavily analytical nature of the studies 
leading up to PD-59 virtually made “launch under attack” a policy and might eventually 
place computers in charge of the use of nuclear weapons—particularly worrisome given the 
fact that a series of recent computer glitches had falsely indicated a Soviet nuclear attack.236  
Other congressmen questioned the “wafighting” potential of the directive and whether it 
made nuclear warfare more likely.237  Obviously, the administration had failed again to 
consult adequately with the legislative branch on a major change in defense policy. 
    PD-59 also revealed changing civil-military relationships inside the administration.  Like 
so many of the early studies conducted within the Pentagon, civilian defense analysts almost 
solely formulated the nuclear targeting options in PD-59.  Leon Sloss, a highly-regarded 
civilian consultant, developed many of the specific concepts in the directive.238  Sloss had 
gone out of his way to cooperate with military officers during the study, but the JCS greeted 
his leading role with skepticism.  Although the Chiefs did agree with the tone and overall 
concept of PD-59, they did not like how Sloss and his assistants had developed the targeting 
options.  The JCS, accustomed to being responsible for employment of weapons systems, 
thought some of the civilian-developed targeting options “overly ambitious” and offered only 
qualified support.239  Accordingly, while PD-59 engendered less public civil-military conflict 
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than previous directives, the military still manifested its discontent with what was viewed as 
civilian intrusion into previously military dominated realms. 
    Besides the nuclear targeting policy covered in PD-59, another related area in which 
civilians invaded traditionally military realms was in contingency planning, or the 
development of theater war plans.  Bob Komer, promoted to Resor’s vacated Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy position, took it upon himself to inject his office into contingency 
planning.  Komer felt that “the non-nuclear war planning process” within the Pentagon was 
weak and “without much imaginative consideration at CINC or JCS level.”240  “When the 
JCS briefs it is general,” Komer complained, “What are we going to do?  That is the province 
of the CINC, they say.  We had to relate defense programming better to contingency 
planning.”241  John Kester agreed, admitting that Joint Staff plans “often have dismayed 
outsiders who have had occasion to read them.”242  Jimmy Carter happened to be one of 
those “outsiders.” The president therefore remained personally involved in the overall 
revision of military contingency planning directed by Harold Brown and Komer.243  In 
response to the president’s concern, Brown issued, in June of 1980, the first annual policy 
guidance for contingency planning.  The Secretary of Defense directed Komer to review all 
military contingency plans.  Komer classified this as a “pioneering effort to give DoD’s 
civilians an insight into what the military are doing in the way of actual war planning.”244   
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    The military resisted this civilian intrusion.  Before Komer’s arrival, contingency plans 
had been denied to all civilians save for the SECDEF himself.245  Harold Brown called even 
David Jones’ attitude on further civilian involvement on planning “prickly” and remembered 
that other members of the JCS were even less cooperative.246  The JCS complained to Komer 
that too much civilian oversight in military planning risked highly classified war plans being 
compromised.  In response, Komer agreed that his own military aide, Air Force General Pick 
Boverie, should be intimately involved in the process to help safeguard classified 
information.247  Unable to keep the civilians from viewing the plans, the military at times 
clandestinely resisted the modification of their strategies by means of an “end-run” to 
Congress.  The most prominent case of this was the adoption of a naval “swing strategy” for 
the Pacific theater.  This strategy, adopted “against the better judgment” of the military, 
called for the majority of U.S. naval power in the Pacific to be transferred to the Atlantic in 
case of war with the Soviets.248  In response, CNO Admiral Hayward invited Senator Sam 
Nunn to Honolulu for a top-secret briefing.  Hayward, opposed to administration policy, 
proposed to Nunn his own war plan code-named “Sea Strike” which called for a six hundred 
ship navy to fight on both oceans against the U.S.S.R. simultaneously.249  In other instances, 
Harold Brown judged that the military services continued to play “substantial” roles through 
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the JCS in the realm of strategy and planning.250  Thus, the military successfully resisted on 
almost every front the Carter effort to increase civilian input in contingency planning.   
    Harold Brown recognized the challenges to civilian involvement in contingency planning, 
and thus felt that the administration’s efforts to gain control were mixed.  “The military, of 
course, are most jealous of their prerogatives in this area,” Brown reflected later, “They think 
the [civilian OSD] staff has no legal basis for being in these things” and that “they will be 
second guessed by a whole bunch of amateurs who have no right to do it.”251  The Secretary 
of Defense admitted that he had gone to “enormous lengths to organize the OSD to try to 
minimize the problem,” such as labeling Komer’s position undersecretary for policy when it 
really should have been “undersecretary for plans and operations.”252  He admitted that at 
times “Komer and some of his people were really allowed into the planning business as 
equals,” but that, in the end, “We never did get adequate control or influence over military 
plans and operations.”253  This may be why Senate Armed Services staffer James R. Locher 
felt that, prior to the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, “the absence of civilian review led to plans 
based on unrealistic assumptions, sharply limiting their utility.”254  The Carter administration 
had in fact attained civilian oversight of contingency planning well before Goldwater-
Nichols, but because of military resistance, with only limited impact. 
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Strategic Summary:  The Evolution of Defense and National Security Policy and Civil-
Military Relations, 1977-1981 
 
    The controversies surrounding Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Directives support most 
historiography:  that Carter’s policies evolved from the more idealistic to the more pragmatic.  
Yet, while many historians argue that it was foreign policy setbacks such as Iran and 
Afghanistan that led to these changes, these setbacks were not the only reasons for change.  
Civil-military relations also shaped the substance of the administration’s defense policies, 
making them conform more to Pentagon positions by the end of the administration.  
Although President Carter listened to his defense advisors and altered policies based on their 
input, his NSC policy formulation process initially excluded the uniformed military and 
engendered civil-military tension that lasted throughout his term.   
    Despite the conflict, the military clearly influenced policy increasingly in the Carter 
administration.  David Jones held a very positive view of the president, saying that “he 
learned quickly . . . and gained experience in office that helped him a great deal” and that 
“we [the JCS] were able to convince him to increase the growth percentage” of the defense 
budget.255  Lew Allen agreed, stating that the military point of view influenced Carter and 
that “his mind was changed by cold reality.”256  The president took advice from the JCS 
directly at times, but it did not always translate, even in the last stages of his term, into 
policy. Although military leaders welcomed the overall change in tone of Carter’s policies, 
they still, even during the final days of the Carter term, objected to specific elements of those 
polices and how the NSC developed them. 
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    All of this does not imply that Carter refused to listen to the military—on the contrary he 
actually listened to them frequently.  Carter allowed the JCS direct access to him—he 
admitted that they never requested a meeting with him that he did not grant within twenty-
four hours.257  David Jones, having served as Chairman of the JCS for both Carter and 
Reagan, agreed that the JCS could talk directly to Carter.  Indeed, Carter listened to Jones 
more than Reagan did.258  George Brown, Bernard Rogers, James Holloway III, and Louis 
Wilson all publicly attested that they had uninhibited access to the president and that they felt 
Carter listened to their advice.259  Claims that Carter “muzzled” the military—arising mostly 
from the Singlaub affair—were mistaken.260 
    The main complaint early in Carter’s term was lack of JCS representation in the NSC 
policy-making process.  Coming into office vowing to reform the Pentagon and end “Lone 
Ranger” diplomacy by the NSC and State Department, the administration initially made it 
clear to the Chiefs that they would no longer play the same role that they had during the 
Nixon-Kissinger years.  PD-2 and the repeal of NSAM-55 made this explicitly clear to the 
JCS, along with George Brown’s ejection from the White House when he tried to attend an 
early NSC meeting.  At first, Carter wanted to hear only from Harold Brown on defense 
policy.  Brown followed suit at the Pentagon with his efforts to craft a single DoD position 
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on many issues where the JCS had previously provided independent input.  This early 
exclusion of the uniformed military gradually gave way to a more open relationship in the 
second half of the administration when a JCS representative attended almost all NSC 
meetings.  Even so, most of the later defense policy studies, most notably PD-59, still 
represented significantly more civilian control in the policy-making process than had been 
the case at the start of Carter’s term.  The overall result of this increase in civilian control and 
lessening of military influence was civil-military friction. 
    Although Carter was arguably less personally involved in defense policy than he was in 
defense budgets, his manner of decision making also maximized civil-military discord.  
Carter often kept even his closest aides guessing as to how he might decide.  Notable 
examples of this were his sudden decision to cancel the B-1, his quick decision to withdraw 
troops from Korea, and his last minute scrapping of the neutron bomb.  These abrupt 
decisions poisoned relations with the uniformed military outside the Pentagon, especially the 
theater CINCs.  While the JCS might have seen these decisions coming, CINCs such as 
Vessey and Haig became increasingly frustrated and alienated from both the Pentagon and 
the administration.  These quick presidential decisions also exacerbated conflict with 
Congress.  When they were not sudden, he seemed to fall back on his engineering 
background and order voluminous studies.  This was certainly the case with Pentagon 
reform, the PRM-10/PD-18 studies, and the refinement of nuclear targeting.  This frustrated 
even some of his civilian appointees in the Pentagon, and the military exclusion from many 
of the studies provoked more anger.  Where Carter attempted explicitly to integrate military 
advice and congressional support, such as with the Panama Canal treaty and the Horn of 
Africa crisis, he minimized civil-military discord. 
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    The second half of Carter’s administration was particularly chaotic partly because of a rash 
of crises in 1979 and after.  Even as Carter and his NSC moved to integrate military advice 
more fully, his policy process came under intense strain.  The political turmoil in South 
Korea, the Fall of Iran, the “discovery” of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the taking of the 
American hostages, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all required extensive civil-
military consultation.  While there was more cooperation than might be expected given the 
ongoing fights over the defense budgets, the Carter administration still seemed to lurch from 
one crisis to the next, unable to recover its equilibrium or deal with the challenges in a 
sensible, effective manner.  This chaos particularly harmed the administration’s relations 
with the theater CINCs and with members of Congress, all of whom increasingly viewed the 
administration’s responses as weak or uncoordinated.  
    Secretary of Defense Brown limited civil-military conflict less in defense policy than he 
had in the defense budgets.  Many within the Pentagon recognized that Brown felt more 
comfortable with the details and scientific analysis associated with the budget than he did 
with broad policy matters.  “The problem is that Brown is not policy oriented, but program 
oriented,” said one anonymous DoD official, “He’s interested in weapons systems and 
hardware and the scientific end and, basically, cares very little about the policy side.”261  
Whereas many in the Pentagon believed that Brown fought hard for higher defense budgets, 
fewer felt that he represented the DoD well in the complex discussions formulating 
government policies in the Pentagon and White House. 
    Despite the early exclusion from policy making and the reduced effectiveness of Brown as 
a mediator, as a whole defense policy in the Carter administration over time came to more 
resemble the JCS desires.  This was certainly the case for policy issues relating to Korea, 
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Latin America, Africa, and with the RDF.  Theater CINCs, however, did not necessarily 
share in this view and tended to resist administration policy throughout the four years.  For 
this reason, Carter increasingly bypassed his CINCs on important matters, which culminated 
in the efforts to forestall the fall of the Shah in Iran.  Carter managed to replace the two most 
recalcitrant CINCs—Haig in Europe and Vessey in Korea—with officers with whom he had 
better relations:  Bernard Rogers and John Wickham.  This resolved some civil-military 
conflict; but, as a whole, theater CINCs did not share the JCS view that Carter learned from 
his experiences in office and improved in defense policy making. 
    Although the Pentagon and the NSC formed a natural alliance against the State 
Department during the second half of Carter’s term, the strength of this alliance had limits.  
While in general the Pentagon preferred Brzezinski’s positions to those of Vance and 
Muskie, the support remained equivocal at best.  Civil-military and Pentagon-White House 
conflict still flared even in the final stages of the policy-making process where Brzezinski 
had become virtually dominant, best illustrated by the military’s limited support for 
Brzezinski’s courses of action during the Horn of Africa, Iranian, and Nicaraguan crises.  
Despite the increasing influence of the more hawkish National Security Advisor, the 
Pentagon remained suspicious of and uncomfortable with the administration in general and 
the White House in particular to the end. 
    While civil-military conflict certainly dominated the defense policy-making process in the 
Carter years, it never erupted into a major incident or “blowup” which permanently poisoned 
the relationship.  The increasing willingness of the administration to include—and heed—
military advice over the four years tempered military dissent and resistance.  It was for these 
reasons that, despite the chaos of the last years of the Carter term, any sort of civil-military 
 308 
crisis was averted.  The critically important SALT II process taking place throughout the four 
years even demonstrated that the Carter and his uniformed military advisors could cooperate 
despite the friction and chaos.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
COOPERATION:  JCS SUPPORT FOR SALT II 
 
Introduction: White House Cabinet Room, December 19, 1978, 2:45 p.m.1 
 
    Jimmy Carter sat pensively at the head of the long rectangular table in the White House 
Cabinet Room, but he was not meeting with his cabinet.  In fact, it was not a meeting that he 
had called but was one that had been requested by his military advisors.  On his left sat the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, standing out in their medal and star bedecked uniforms.  General David 
Jones sat closest to Carter.  On the president’s right sat National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and his deputy David Aaron, along with their assistant Victor Utgoff.  Also 
present were Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his deputy Charles Duncan.  Since the 
subject of the meeting was SALT II and the 1980 defense budget, General George Seignious, 
the newly appointed head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ADCA), was also 
attending.  All of these men focused on the president, who after nearly two full years in 
office was showing signs of strain. 
    “Gentlemen,” the president began, “I intend to make a number of difficult decisions this 
week.”  Carter explained that he was deciding the final figures for the FY80 defense budget 
and the concluding details of the SALT II agreement with Russia.  Turning to the JCS, the 
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president asked them to elaborate on their concerns which had led the Chiefs to ask for this 
meeting.2   
    Carter had learned during his first years in office and understood the importance of good 
civil-military relations.  He knew that the JCS probably did not agree with all aspects of his 
defense budget or the pending SALT II treaty but that, as professional military men, they felt 
obligated to support their commander-in-chief.  He also recognized that they would have to 
provide frank and full testimony to Congress and that, if he failed to accommodate their 
concerns, then testimony might undermine the administration’s goals.  For this reason Carter 
had maintained a direct dialogue with the JCS.  While on matters of policy Carter expected to 
hear from Harold Brown, when it came to listening to the pulse of the uniformed military the 
president preferred at times to hear it directly.  In fact, in instances such as this where the JCS 
asked to meet with the president, Carter prided himself in granting such a meeting within 
twenty-four hours.3 
    Jones, sitting closest to Carter, began to speak for the Chiefs’ concerns.  “Mr. President, 
we have spent many hours in the last two days meeting on both SALT and the defense 
budget,” he began, gesturing to the other members of the JCS.  He explained that the JCS 
was especially concerned with the rising power of the Soviet Union and that many important 
issues were at stake in the next few days and weeks.  The Chiefs’ particularly feared the 
limitations on cruise missiles in the SALT agreement, the future of the MX missile program, 
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and the level of the FY80 defense budget.  “We understand the problems that you face, Mr. 
President, and we want to help,” the general said in closing.4 
    If anybody understood the principles of proper civil-military relations it was David Jones.  
He was a firm believer in supporting presidential policy even when he personally disagreed 
with it.  While he had excellent relations with many important members of Congress, he 
never used those contacts to undermine administration positions.  Jones firmly believed that 
the best way to influence defense policy was to work in a cooperative relationship with his 
boss Harold Brown and, at times, to provide direct advice to the president.  If Jones disagreed 
with an administration policy, then he frankly informed Harold Brown or the president.  He 
also worked to consolidate the views of the other members of the JCS, filtering out parochial 
service interests when possible, and presenting the issues in a forthright manner to his 
civilian superiors.  Jones had at many times been criticized as being a “political” or a 
“liberal” general because he supported his civilian superiors over his service.  While not 
overly concerned with these charges, Jones, like Jimmy Carter, was also showing the strain 
of a difficult two years.5 
    Jimmy Carter thanked Jones for his concern and said that he wanted to make a preliminary 
statement.  He began by pointing out that he had met more with the JCS than many of his 
predecessors and had tried to honor their suggestions.  He emphasized, however, that SALT 
was the centerpiece to his entire administration and was now in the final stages of twenty-two 
months of negotiations.  “I hope, gentlemen,” Carter implored, “that you can keep in mind 
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the challenges that I as the president face in having to balance the importance of our positions 
on the various outstanding issues with the potential for a breakdown in the entire agreement.”  
The president then zeroed in on the issue of cruise missile limitations, pressing hard to make 
the JCS understand that without the agreement on this issue the Soviets might refuse to sign 
the treaty.  On the issue of the continuation of the MX missile program, Carter assured, “I 
know of no defense systems that you are deeply committed to that SALT II would prevent.”6 
    Although Jones remained looking directly at the president, Carter noticed that the other 
members of the JCS were exchanging skeptical glances.  The president felt compelled to 
articulate his position in more detail in order to try to win the support of the Chiefs.  First, he 
pointed out that SALT II would not last indefinitely and felt that this perception was coloring 
the debate in the press and in Congress.  Even if all aspects of the treaty were not fully 
consistent with the views of the JCS, it did not mean that the U.S. would have to accept the 
terms of the treaty indefinitely.7  Second, the president agreed with the Russian insistence on 
limitations on all cruise missiles despite the JCS opposition to such limitations.  Carter 
pointed out that nuclear-tipped cruise missiles had to be counted in the allowable weapons 
totals for each side and, because of this, the Soviets correctly argued that it was nearly 
impossible to distinguish a nuclear-tipped cruise missile from a conventionally-armed one 
given the small size of the weapons.  Secretly, one side or the other might attach nuclear 
warheads to conventional cruise missiles and gain nuclear superiority.  The Russians 
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therefore demanded that all cruise missiles, conventional or not, be limited by the SALT II 
protocol.  Carter agreed.8 
    The Joint Chiefs, although generally willing to allow Jones to speak for their collective 
interests, were not always enthusiastic about it.  Service interests or personal opinions at 
times still emerged in these meetings, and the cruise missile issue was one such case.  The 
CNO, Admiral Thomas Hayward, felt Jones was weak on this issue and offered his own 
point of view.  “I am not going to introduce any new arguments here,” Hayward began, “but I 
think I speak for all of my colleagues when I say that I am concerned about the precedent that 
including conventional weapons in a strategic arms limitation treaty entails.”  The admiral 
was also very concerned that the U.S. delegation was going to agree to major limitations on 
the range of the cruise missiles.  “The future of the naval cruise missile systems would be 
overly constrained if their ranges were limited to only three hundred miles,” Hayward 
concluded.  General Louis Wilson, the USMC Commandant, interjected that allowing 
blanket limitations on cruise missiles was detrimental to the U.S. because American 
technology was already superior in this area.  He also pointed out that the JCS saw many 
problems of verification on the treaty from the Soviet side—for instance it was nearly 
impossible to tell if a Soviet SS-20 missile had two or three warheads, and the Backfire 
bomber might well have more range than the Soviets admitted, making it a true 
intercontinental bomber.  The Marine general felt that Carter and his SALT delegation were 
ignoring these verification issues while going too far to address the Soviet concerns about 
cruise missiles.9 
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    His position challenged, Carter fell back on his engineering background.  He expressed 
doubt that it would be cost effective ever to put a conventional warhead on a cruise missile.  
“At one million dollars apiece, we will want nukes on these valuable vehicles,” Carter 
concluded.  “I think your arguments about conventional versus nuclear cruise missiles are 
specious,” the president argued; “we aren’t giving up anything real by foregoing 
conventional cruise missiles on heavy bombers.”  Carter also stated that, if he went with the 
JCS course of exempting conventional cruise missiles from the limits, then SALT II 
opponents in Congress like as Scoop Jackson might attack the treaty as “unverifiable.”  “I 
hope that you all can accommodate me on this issue,” Carter requested, “I think that if we 
drop the distinction on cruise missiles then we will win our positions on all of the remaining 
SALT II positions.”10 
    Some members of the JCS were still not satisfied.  “Why are the Soviets being so 
intransigent on the cruise missile issue?” General Wilson demanded.  “Because they know 
that we have the advantage over them in cruise missiles, and we can deploy large numbers by 
1985,” Carter responded.  “This sounds like an argument to hang tough,” Admiral Hayward 
broke in; “their interest in this issue suggests we should push them to the wall.”  “A long-
range conventional cruise missile is simply a waste,” Carter replied, “The agreement does not 
cover other classes of cruise missiles such as ground and sea launched versions, so I think we 
lose nothing by agreeing to the Russian position.”  Army Chief Bernard Rogers then entered 
the fray, stating that he was “very upset” and feared that the U.S. was giving up too much by 
acceding to the Soviet demands.  “I understand your positions on these issues,” Carter 
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responded, “but I assure you that I have no intention of letting this treaty set any 
precedents.”11 
    General Jones stepped back in to consolidate the JCS position, recognizing that Carter was 
not going to retreat on the issue of cruise missiles.  The Chairman stated that the single most 
important issue was “to get started on building a survivable ICBM system” with the MX 
missile.  Carter gave his assurance that SALT II allowed this and that his administration 
would be able to get a costly mobile basing system approved by Congress.12 
    Carter then asked the JCS to think beyond SALT II toward SALT III which could even 
further reduce nuclear arms between the two countries.  He wanted “profound” cuts in the 
nuclear arsenal, and wanted the Chiefs to think about how they would do that if “they were in 
his shoes.”  Carter also stated confidently that he looked forward to further progress on the 
Mutually Balanced Force Reduction Treaty in Europe, hoping to scale back conventional 
forces for each side in Europe.  The president’s optimism for reducing future tensions with 
the Soviet Union met only half-hearted approval from the JCS.  Air Force Chief Lew Allen, a 
nuclear physicist, replied that it was very hard to project ten years into the future and see 
where each side’s strategic force balance might be.13  For these military men it was hard to 
share the president’s favorable outlook for relations between the two superpowers. 
    “I do not want you all to feel reticent about coming to me on important issues,” Carter 
said, as he prepared to adjourn the meeting, “I do not want to see you only when Harold 
Brown and you disagree.”  The president smiled broadly, looking at his Secretary of Defense, 
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who quickly glanced down at the table and remained silent.  “You are truly great Americans, 
and I have great respect and admiration for you all,” the president complimented. 
    David Jones nodded, but leaned forward to press the final issue for the meeting, the FY80 
defense budget.  “We certainly do not feel inhibited coming directly to you with problems or 
advice,” Jones began, “and we do want to think about SALT III even though it is difficult to 
do so.”  “We do, however, also want to talk about the defense budget,” the general pressed; 
“we feel that there are a great number of important defense programs left out.”14 
    President Carter pushed his chair away from the table.  “We’ll be lucky to hold the DoD 
budget at the level we set,” he said with a laugh.  “There is no way that you all can appreciate 
the problems that I am facing cutting back non-defense programs and budgets,” the president 
said as he stood up.15  The rest of the attendees stood as well, and Jimmy Carter turned his 
back and left the room.  The JCS exchanged uneasy glances, and David Jones looked across 
the table at Harold Brown who quickly busied himself putting his papers back into his 
briefcase.  Carter had made it clear that he saw no link between SALT II and higher defense 
spending.  The Chairman of the JCS had done his best to try to open dialogue on this issue, 
but had been rebuffed.  Jones wondered how this might play out, for clearly many in 
Congress did see the two issues as inextricably linked.  Jones would do his best to try to get 
the JCS to come to a position of support for the president’s policy, but in this case he knew a 
rough road lay ahead. 
    In several ways this meeting symbolized the ongoing saga of SALT II which influenced 
civil-military relations throughout the Carter years.  First, Jimmy Carter placed critical 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 7. 
 
15
 Ibid. 
 
 317 
importance on and viewed SALT II as the centerpiece of his administration.  It typified his 
ambitious goals for arms control and future nuclear disarmament.  Second, the JCS wanted to 
support Carter and his policies and were willing to compromise on many issues in order to do 
so, but they did not share the president’s optimism regarding future relations with the 
U.S.S.R.  Their prime concern was the Soviet military buildup; they felt that the U.S. must 
respond in kind.  For the JCS, increasing military spending was, paradoxically, vital to 
reducing nuclear arms.  Jimmy Carter consistently dismissed this linkage.  Finally, the 
meeting also demonstrated the lack of consideration for Congress’ role in the SALT II treaty.  
Carter, as with the defense budget, underestimated the power of the military-congressional 
alliance.  Although his Chiefs remained remarkably loyal on SALT II, the president’s 
resistance to more spending on defense weakened JCS support.  In the end, it was this 
congressional side of the alliance that blocked ratification of SALT II and brought about 
Carter’s greatest defeat. 
The Most Profound Disappointment:  The Centrality of SALT II to Civil-Military 
Relations in the Carter Years 
 
    Civil military relations in the Carter years cannot be fully understood without SALT II 
because it was the single most important civil-military interaction during Carter’s 
administration.  Unlike many crisis-oriented events, the extensive SALT II process lasted 
virtually throughout Carter’s term.  It was among the first issues covered in the preliminary 
talks which Carter had with the JCS.16  Carter’s initial “deep cuts” proposal in March of 
1977, although a failure, resulted in some of the most detailed studies of the nation’s strategic 
posture yet conducted.  Even while the controversial Panama Canal treaty was ongoing, 
Carter still engaged in substantial dialogue with the JCS about SALT.  Even major events 
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such as the plans for the Korea troop withdrawals and the revolution in Iran took place within 
the ongoing SALT II process.  SALT II was not officially withdrawn from consideration by 
the Senate until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—but even then SALT became 
inextricably linked with the administration’s final two defense budgets for FY80 and FY81.   
    The SALT process had occupied, in the minds of Carter’s advisors, “the central role in 
U.S. Soviet relations since the end of the Johnson administration.”17  Few, if any, advisors 
questioned the central role of nuclear arms in maintaining the balance between the U.S. and 
Soviets.  “No one can win a thermonuclear war,” stated an early policy memo from the 
Carter White House; “therefore, preventing it—by deterrence—remains overwhelmingly our 
most important strategic goal.”18  Strategic arms reductions for both sides remained the 
primary means by which the risk of a thermonuclear war could be averted while still 
maintaining deterrence.  The entire future of détente, in Carter’s mind, rested with 
negotiating continued arms reductions with the Soviets.   
    President Carter felt that it was critical to have JCS support for SALT II and dedicated 
much of his dialogue with them in efforts to secure their support.19  Strategic arms treaties 
had always been hotly contested issues between presidential administrations and Congress.  
Although some in Congress, most notably Les Aspin (D-WI), charged that the threat of 
Soviet nuclear superiority was greatly exaggerated, many others such as Senator Scoop 
Jackson (D-WA) insisted that the U.S. was being railroaded into a permanent position of 
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strategic inferiority.20  The support of the JCS in testimony to Congress was therefore crucial 
to any hopes for strategic arms reductions.  The JCS also viewed SALT II with similar 
importance.  The director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon confirmed that SALT II was one 
of the most significant and time-intensive events taking place in the Pentagon during Carter’s 
term.21 
    Finally, Jimmy Carter cared deeply and personally about SALT.  The new president truly 
wished to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.  SALT II would be just the 
first step along that path and his ambitious “minimum deterrence” and “deep cuts” proposals 
revealed his ultimate intentions.  Although Brezhnev rejected most of his ideas, Carter still 
wanted desperately to reach a nuclear-arms limiting accord with the Soviets.  The president 
focused extensive personal and political effort into crafting and seeking ratification for the 
treaty.  He was purported to be able to cite from memory chapter and verse of any of the 
nineteen articles of the treaty and the associated 300 page statements of understanding.22  He 
told the JCS that it was his “most cherished hope” to leave office having signed a strategic 
arms reduction treaty with the Soviets.23  In his memoir he listed the failure of his 
administration to gain ratification of SALT II as “the most profound disappointment” of his 
presidency.24  
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Deceptions and Backfires:  Reasons for JCS and Congressional Hesitation on Arms 
Control 
 
     Despite Jimmy Carter’s commitment to arms reduction and the SALT II treaty, the JCS 
and Congress were hesitant to rush into further arms control agreements with the Russians in 
view of what had transpired between the two countries in the past.  Arms control was 
integrally linked with each side’s defense expenditures.  A failure to negotiate arms control 
treaties required each side to spend more and more on costly nuclear weapons systems in 
order to maintain a strategic balance.  The U.S. had held the clear lead in the balance in 1964, 
with more modern nuclear delivery systems, but later that decade the expenditures for the 
war in Vietnam cost the U.S. significantly.  By 1976 many defense analysts argued that the 
Soviets had surpassed the U.S. in terms of military power, building more and better nuclear 
weapons, and were still continuing to out-produce the U.S. in conventional forces.  While 
magnitude of the Russian military buildup was certainly debatable, it was widely believed 
that the Soviets had more than doubled their defense outlays relative to the U.S. by 1976.25 
    By the 1970s the increase in Soviet military strength, combined with the price of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, had led the Nixon and Ford administrations to take the initiative on 
arms control with the Soviets.  By 1972, in the SALT I treaty, the U.S. and Soviets had 
agreed to two different types of arms control.  First, under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
treaty, each side was allowed only one site for these anti-ballistic missile installations.  
Second, the treaty known as the “Interim Agreement” limited the number of nuclear delivery 
systems for each side.  While the ABM treaty had generally been heralded as a success, the 
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Interim Agreement was criticized by many in Congress because it allowed the Soviets to 
field a greater number of land-based missiles.26 
    In response to the disagreements about SALT I, the Ford Administration negotiated the 
Vladivostok accords in 1974, which limited each side to 2,400 strategic launchers—ICBMs 
(Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles), SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles), or 
bombers—for nuclear weapons.  The only exception to how the sides could distribute their 
arsenals was that the number of land-based missiles could not go above the number from in 
1972 Interim Agreement.  This left the Soviets with a greater number of land-based missiles 
while allowing the U.S. to have many more strategic bombers.  The accords also restricted 
each side to 1,320 Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) weapons.  
These were considered particularly deadly because a MIRV missile carried several nuclear 
warheads capable of hitting different targets while still counting as only one delivery system 
under the agreements.  In the 1970s, the U.S. clearly appeared to have a more advanced 
program for MIRV missiles, so the rather high ceiling on these weapons was seen as 
advantageous to the Americans.27 
    Two major issues remained unresolved as a result of the Vladivostok accords.  First, the 
status of newest Soviet bomber, dubbed the “Backfire,” remained undecided.  The Soviets 
argued that the plane should not count as a strategic delivery platform because it lacked 
intercontinental range and its primary mission was support of the Russian navy.  The JCS 
argued that the plane was capable of carrying nuclear bombs and cruise missiles and if 
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refueled in the air could strike targets anywhere in the United States.28 Since most of the U.S. 
continental air-defense had been dismantled in the early 1970s, the JCS deemed any 
significant deployment of the Soviet bombers as disruptive to the strategic balance.29  The 
second issue was the status of cruise missiles according to the treaty.  Since the U.S was far 
ahead of the Soviets in terms of cruise missile technology, the Russians argued for heavy 
restrictions on cruise missiles, while the Americans fought for fewer restrictions.  The 
interim decision that missiles with a range over six-hundred kilometers should count toward 
the nation’s total number of strategic delivery kept open the controversy.  The Soviets felt 
that this must apply to cruise missiles while the U.S. argued that it only limited much larger 
(and yet undeveloped) air-launched ballistic missiles. The Chiefs vehemently opposed such a 
short-range limit for cruise missiles, deeming it totally advantageous to the Soviets.  Most 
American population centers were within six-hundred kilometers of the seaboard and 
therefore more vulnerable to sea and air attack by such short range missiles.30 
    Besides the controversy over SALT I and the Vladivostok accords, several other issues 
endangered JCS support for any further arms control measures.  First, the JCS pointed out 
was that Soviet MIRV technology was ahead of schedule and posed a grave threat to the U.S. 
strategic deterrent.  In 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger revealed that the 
Russians had deployed at least sixty new MIRV missiles ahead of schedule and that these 
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weapons demonstrated a “reasonable degree of accuracy” for attacking U.S. missile silos.31  
Such a capability from the massive Soviet ICBM force was extremely disconcerting.  At the 
end of the Ford Administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that “before 
the mid-1980s the Soviets could possibly have the capability, with a small fraction of their 
ICBMs, to destroy the bulk” of U.S. land-based missiles.32 
    The second major issue with arms control was the fact that Soviet technology in other 
areas appeared to be erasing the U.S. advantage.  This remained true throughout Carter’s 
term.  Initially, the director of the Pentagon Joint Staff revealed that Soviet ballistic missile 
submarines had begun patrolling as close as three-hundred miles off the American coast.  He 
warned that the Soviets also had the potential to develop “depressed trajectory” SLBMs that 
could quickly destroy B-52 bombers before they could leave their bases.  This, combined 
with the threat of MIRVs to U.S. land-based missiles, gave potential for two-thirds of the 
U.S. deterrent to be destroyed in a first strike.33  The Russians deployed new “third 
generation” ballistic missiles, and, in late 1977, Harold Brown publicly admitted that the 
Soviets were then in the process of deploying four new types of ICBMs.  These “fourth 
generation” missiles appeared “almost uniformly first class in terms of their accuracy and 
payload.”34  By 1979, the Soviets had developed and tested Anti-Satellite Weapons ahead of 
the U.S and, in the first six months of 1980, had deployed 200 to 300 more new missiles than 
the U.S. predicted was possible. There was also information that indicated that the Russians 
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had tested long-range cruise missiles. 35  Given these trends, David Jones clearly enunciated 
the concerns of the JCS when he stated that, “The span of time in which SALT I has been in 
force has been a period of rapid, unmistakable progress in the growth and capabilities of the 
Soviet strategic arsenal.”36 
    A final issue which clouded U.S.-Soviet arms control was the perception that the Soviets 
were already cheating on previous agreements.  A CIA report detailed extensive Soviet 
deception efforts during the SALT I negotiations.37  An example was the position of the 
Russian SS-19 missile in the ongoing arms negotiations.  The Soviets consistently refused to 
divulge the capabilities of the missiles, leaving the U.S. guess at those capabilities, and then 
refusing to confirm or deny the American estimates.38  The Russians also demanded the right 
to conceal telemetry information about all of their missiles in order to make it impossible for 
the U.S. to judge Soviet accuracy.39  Finally, in violation of the SALT I agreement, 
intelligence sources indicated that the Soviets were continuing to keep older ICBMs, rather 
than dismantle them as they phased in newer missiles.40  This perception of Soviet chicanery 
made the JCS and Congress dubious about arms control. 
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Unilateral Disarmament?:  The Genesis of Carter’s SALT II Proposal 
 
    As with most of his defense and foreign policy, Carter had begun to formulate his ideas 
concerning SALT II before he assumed office.  The assessments of Art Wood of the 
Brookings Institution had particular influence on Carter’s pre-presidential views.  Wood 
asserted that the capabilities of the Russian nuclear arsenal were grossly overstated by the 
Pentagon and that in fact none of their 2,400 missiles were truly MIRV capable.  He 
emphasized that force levels on both sides were so large as to constitute tremendous 
“overkill.”  According to Wood, even one-third of the U.S. strategic arsenal could destroy the 
entire Soviet Union’s industrial capacity.41  Carter seized upon this theme in his Princeton 
address, calling for “prompt action” to keep the Vladivostok accords from becoming a 
“charade” and vowed that his taking office was “the time for bold initiative . . . to offer an 
incentive to both sides to reduce the maddening arms race.”42  Jimmy Carter’s proposal to 
reduce the U.S. strategic arsenal to 200 missiles in his first meeting with the JCS reflected his 
belief in the “overkill” thesis. 
    Soon after his initial meeting with the JCS, Carter again called on the Chiefs as a body and 
arms control again featured prominently in the discussion.  General Brown emphasized the 
wariness of the JCS, stating that “the unfavorable trend between U.S. and Soviet strategic 
nuclear forces” was of “grave concern and will continue to worsen until the early 1980s” 
when new U.S. systems such as the B-1 bomber and MX missile would restore the balance.  
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Carter pressed the JCS for detailed information on the strategic balance, but remained firm in 
his desire to move boldly forward with a “deep cuts” proposal for the Soviets. 43   
    Upon taking office, Carter ambitiously called for talks with the Soviets within three 
months.  He stated that he saw the negotiations with the Soviets advancing in two stages:   
(1) “rapid ratification” of SALT II, the (2) a subsequent agreement which would result in a 
“much more substantive reduction in atomic weapons as the first step to complete 
elimination in the future.”  When questioned at a press conference as to the difficulties 
associated with the Backfire bomber and cruise missiles in the previous negotiations, Carter 
dismissed the problems:  “I would not let those two items stand in the way of some 
agreement.”44  By the start of February 1977, Carter appointed Walter Slocombe, one of his 
campaign advisors and a former member of the NSC, as the head of a DoD task force on 
strategic arms limitations.45  Clearly, Jimmy Carter intended to move full speed ahead on 
arms control. 
    Harold Brown sympathized with Carter’s ideas on rapid arms reductions and at the same 
time JCS concerns about moving too fast.  Before even becoming Secretary of Defense he 
had drafted a tentative proposal for SALT II.  Brown proposed reducing the Vladivostok 
accord weapons ceilings by 10 percent.  Additionally, he proposed trading half of the Soviet 
“heavy” ICBMs for an agreement to limit the range of the American Air Launched Cruise 
Missile (ALCM). The second half of the proposal was particularly contentious.  The JCS had 
long resisted any move to limit the range of the ALCM, but also viewed the Soviet heavy 
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ICBMs as the greatest threat to the strategic balance.46  These massive missiles were initially 
fitted to carry a huge 25-megaton nuclear warhead, but in the early 1970s the Soviets began 
refitting them to accommodate up to ten smaller yield MIRVs.  With the 308 heavy missiles 
in their arsenal allowed by treaty, by the 1980s the Soviets in theory could target each of 
America’s 1,054 ICBM silos with up to three warheads while only launching a fraction of 
their total missile force.47  Harold Brown was acutely aware of this impending threat and 
concentrated his initial plans for SALT II on reducing these heavy missiles. 
    Brown and the JCS also supported the development of a new generation of American 
ICBMs that would be significantly more accurate and less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.  
Dubbed the MX, this new missile was slated to replace the existing stock of Minuteman 
ICBMs, but was also extremely costly.48  The Ford administration had touted the MX, calling 
it the “heart of the ICBM modernization plan.”49  The mode of basing for the new missile 
remained undecided as Carter took office, and Harold Brown opted to slow down 
development of the missile in order to study the best method for deployment.50 
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    While Harold Brown remained sympathetic to JCS concerns, Carter and his White House 
staff remained much more skeptical.  In June of 1977, the president enthusiastically 
commented on the work of a junior NSC staffer which downplayed the Soviet nuclear 
buildup.51  A July 1977 paper from Brzezinski reported that the Joint Strategic Target 
Planning Staff felt that U.S. ICBM casualties would be “essentially zero losses under all 
Soviet attack conditions.”52  Later, Brzezinski indicated that a “panel of distinguished 
scientists” argued in November of 1977 that the current stock of U.S. Minutemen ICBMs 
would not be “significantly vulnerable” until the late 1980s.53  Carter apparently accepted 
these interpretations and, even as late as January of 1979, pressed Harold Brown to consider 
the “minimum deterrence” posture of reducing the U.S. arsenal to a few hundred weapons.  It 
was not until Harold Brown took a forceful stand on the issue that Carter abandoned his hope 
of “minimum deterrence.”54 
    Although abandoning the idea of minimum deterrence, Carter did not alter his idea of 
proposing significant arms reductions to the Russians early in his term.  Contrary to his 
historical portrayal as a hardliner, Brzezinski was actually in full agreement with Carter on 
this point, giving a remarkable degree of unity to this decision among the civilians in the 
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administration.55  The president appointed Paul Warnke to head the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and be the chief American negotiator for SALT II.  Many in the 
military, most vocally John Singlaub, felt that Warnke was a poor choice because he had 
advocated for many years what some considered to be unilateral American nuclear 
disarmament.56  The Senate narrowly confirmed Warnke to the positions, indicating that any 
negotiations reached under his watch would be even more intensely scrutinized than usual.57  
From early in Carter’s term it must have been obvious that administration civilians were 
firmly united in their desire to proceed quickly with negotiating deep cuts in nuclear arms. 
Damage Control:  General Rowny and the Role of the JCS in Early SALT Proposals 
 
    Given the civil-military distrust in the president’s first meeting with the JCS prior to his 
inauguration, George Brown procured an unauthorized copy of Harold Brown’s tentative 
SALT II proposal before the new administration even took office.  CJCS Brown handed the 
proposal over to Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, who was going to serve as the JCS 
representative to the SALT II negotiations.  Rowny looked over the proposal and reported 
back to the chairman that he found it “bold, reasonable, and fair” and a “major improvement” 
over the Vladivostok accords.  George Brown accepted Rowny’s judgment.58  The JCS thus 
tentatively endorsed Harold Brown’s plan even as the administration took office. 
    Congress also remained vigilant on the SALT II process from the outset.  During January 
1977 hearings on the FY78 defense budget, Senator John Tower warned Harold Brown that 
                                                 
55
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Memorandum to Stuart Eizenstat, Subject:  Suggested Speech for Governor Carter, 
September, 1976," Jimmy Carter Presidential Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues 
Office-Stuart Eizenstat, Box 17, Folder:  Foreign Policy, 9/76, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA. 
 
56
 Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 411. 
 
57
 Rowny, One to Tango, 100-101. 
 
58
 Ibid., 97. 
 
 330 
“public statements made by the new administration concerning SALT have appeared to some 
to be a little long on eagerness and a little short on caution.”59  Congress continued to be a 
key player throughout the SALT negotiations, but in a different way from the Panama Canal 
treaties. Whereas during the Panama Canal negotiations Carter and his congressional liaison 
staff had kept key Senators informed at all stages of the negotiating process, they did not 
follow the same approach with SALT II.  The result was that Congress increasingly pried 
into Carter’s handling of the process and tried to entice the JCS into open opposition to 
Carter’s policies.  This happened only over time, however, and for most of 1977 and 1978 
Congress remained relatively uninvolved and the Carter administration sought little advice or 
support from the legislature. 
    The civil-military accord over the initial agreements only went so far, however.  Rowny 
remained the primary JCS representative throughout the negotiation of SALT II.  Reflecting 
on the initial stages of policy development, the general remembered first noticing that arms 
control would take a different turn at an NSC meeting in February of 1977 where Cyrus 
Vance submitted two options for SALT II.  “None of us in the Pentagon had been consulted,” 
Rowny recalled.  As the meeting progressed, Rowny objected strongly to Vance’s proposals 
but was overruled.60 
    Carter was aware of the growing military opposition to his arms control plans.  A memo 
from Brzezinski in early March of 1977 indicated that the White House made a deliberate 
effort to separate Harold Brown from the JCS.  The National Security Advisor proposed 
three possible SALT II options, noting that on the first two Harold Brown and the JCS stood 
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firm on demanding that the Backfire bomber be included in the Soviet weapons count but 
that on the third option “only the JCS” insisted on “counting the Backfire in the aggregate.”61  
Carter thus realized early on that the Chiefs viewed the Backfire bomber as a significant 
issue and knew that they objected strongly to any course of action that would not address it. 
    Despite objections from Rowny and the JCS, Carter wanted to move boldly and quickly 
with his proposals to the Soviets.  By March of 1977 he decided, with pressure from 
Brzezinski and congressional advice only from Senator Scoop Jackson, to propose a limit of 
1,800 to 2,000 strategic systems for each side with a limit of 150 heavy missiles and limits on 
cruise missiles with a range in excess of 2,500 kilometers.  Backfire was not included in the 
deal pending Soviet assurances that its capabilities not be improved.  A second proposal, 
known as the “fallback,” was to put off the issue of cruise missiles and the Backfire until 
later.62  This first proposal mirrored almost exactly Harold Brown’s initial proposal for SALT 
II, so Carter did in fact heed the advice of his Secretary of Defense.  However, it was not 
Brown who led the negotiations with the Soviets.  Instead, Cyrus Vance spearheaded the 
effort, with Carter sending him twice before mid-September of 1977 to meet with Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko.63   
    The first meeting turned into a fiasco.  Rowny, reflecting later on the incident, wrote that 
he was “astonished” as Vance opened the negotiations by submitting the American 
“fallback” proposal as the first of two options.  Apparently, Vance had at the last minute 
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developed fears that the Soviets might find Harold Brown’s proposal too bold.  Gromyko 
responded offensively, frothing at the mouth and swearing in Russian as he lambasted both 
proposals as American ploys.  Vance sat through the entire tirade without responding, 
rejecting a passed note from Rowny urging him to respond to the attack.  “It was bad enough 
he served up our fallback position on a silver platter,” Rowny recalled.  “Now it appeared he 
was being verbally assaulted for presenting such a gift.”64  The Russians derailed Carter’s 
ideas for “deep cuts” by rejecting both offers.   
    In May of 1977 Vance and Gromyko met again and established a three-tier plan for 
concluding SALT II.  The first part of the plan stuck to Harold Brown’s 10 percent reduction 
from the Vladivostok ceilings.  The second tier proposed yet undecided limits on the 
Backfire bomber and the ALCM.  The third tier agreement was to be a joint statement of 
each country’s intent for an even more comprehensive SALT III agreement.  By September 
of 1977 the Carter administration had finalized this three-tier approach, effectively replacing 
the framework of the Vladivostok accords.65 
    The modified three-tier approach carried with it the potential for strong civil-military 
disagreement.  No definitive administration position had emerged on the issues of Soviet 
heavy missiles, restrictions on the ALCM, or including the Backfire bomber.  These issues, 
of primary importance to the JCS, seemed almost completely in the hands of the American 
negotiating team in Geneva—and Rowny reported that Vance had not taken a hard-line on 
any of them.  Beyond this, many of the civilians in the State Department and in the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency blamed Harold Brown for the failure of first stages of the 
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negotiations because of the ambitious nature of his proposal.  As a result, they kept “Brown’s 
boys,” including the JCS, out of the phases of the negotiations leading to the three-tier plan.66 
    The word that Vance was being weak on the U.S. SALT position had definitely made it 
back to Congress by late 1977.  In November, Brzezinski authored a memo to Carter stating 
that he was “concerned with the continuing attacks” on the administration’s SALT II 
position.  Senator Robert Byrd worried to Brzezinski that SALT was going to be a more 
difficult ratification contest than the Panama Canal treaty.  Brzezinski recommended that 
Carter begin a strong lobby effort during the time Congress was out of session, but that the 
president not meet with key leaders—particularly Scoop Jackson.  Although Carter had taken 
the senator’s initial advice on the SALT proposals, Jackson felt that Vance had given up too 
much too early at Geneva and was now opposing the treaty.  “Since we are not planning on 
changing our SALT position,” Brzezinski wrote, any meeting with the influential Jackson 
“would do no good.”67  
    Although the early stages of the SALT II negotiations involved little input from Congress 
and most of Rowny’s advice was rejected, Carter did keep in contact with the Chairman of 
the JCS. Carter met in early February and March with George Brown at the White House and 
twice in September as Cyrus Vance’s negotiations proceeded in Geneva.68  Carter was very 
concerned with an early NSC weekly report which indicated that the JCS leaked objections to 
his arms control process to the press, calling a meeting with General Brown the next day.69  
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Brzezinski acknowledged in his memoirs that he was impressed by Carter’s ability to 
“massage” the JCS and alleviate their tensions during the SALT process.70  While it cannot 
be confirmed from the record, Carter’s claim in his OSD oral history that “every item put 
forward in nuclear arms negotiations leading to SALT II was directly approved by the Joint 
Chiefs,” can hardly be judged disingenuous.71  The civil-military conflict over SALT resulted 
not so much from a lack of consultation between Carter and his military advisors, but rather 
from the manner in which the American negotiating team finished its business in Geneva. 
Endgame:  The Final Agreements Leading to SALT II 
 
    Negotiations in Geneva dragged on into 1978, much longer than Carter had hoped.  The 
administration became increasingly eager to produce a final treaty, especially once a very 
effective Soviet propaganda campaign began to circulate in the West through the Russian 
newspaper Pravda.72  In Rowny’s assessment, as the negotiations wore on the Russians 
interpreted American “flexibility and over eagerness as signs of weakness” and responded 
“with stiffer and more unreasonable demands that more often than not were met with 
acquiescence.”73   
    The issues of the Backfire bomber and the ALCM remained unresolved through 1978, and 
two other major issues also arose which greatly concerned the JCS.  First, the American 
negotiating team jettisoned demands for a reduction in Soviet heavy missiles, the cornerstone 
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of Harold Brown’s initial proposal.  The Soviets refused to accept the American 
classification system of heavy, medium, and light ICBMs and called for only two classes—
heavy and light.  This was very advantageous to the Soviets because America possessed 
nothing akin to the Russian heavy missiles and would therefore have to classify the medium 
weight MX as a “heavy” type ICBM.  In response to the Soviet stalling, Vance offered a 
“compromise” proposal that allowed the Soviets to keep all 308 of their heavy missiles.74 
The second major issue was that of encryption of missile telemetry information which the 
U.S. used to measure the accuracy and carrying capacity of Russian missiles.  The Soviets 
demanded the right to encrypt all information associated with their missile tests.  The JCS, 
through Rowny, lodged a strenuous objection to this, telling Vance that reading Russian 
missile telemetry was vital to national security.  Vance forwarded the issue to the NSC, 
which responded, in Rowny’s words with “a masterpiece of bureaucratic fence-straddling.”  
The NSC replied that the Russians could encrypt half of their missile telemetry, or five out of 
ten performance measures.  The Soviets consequently chose to disclose five measurements 
which the U.S. could already read by other means.  The remaining five, which the U.S. had 
no way to measure, could be encrypted.75 As the Carter team in Geneva negotiated away 
Harold Brown’s initial proposal, the Pentagon grew increasingly concerned with the results 
of the negotiations. 
    Harold Brown conveyed his concern to Carter in July of 1978.  In response, the NSC met 
with Brown and Charles Duncan, asking them how they felt a “more positive Congressional 
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climate for SALT” might be developed.  Brown in particular indicated that he “welcomed 
this initiative” and emphasized that he saw the “overall size” of the defense budget as being 
critically linked to the success of SALT.  Brown pleaded that it would be “extremely helpful” 
if Carter “could indicate at least privately” his preferences regarding the MX missile and 
other strategic weapons systems.  Such information, said the Secretary of Defense, would 
enable him to “better control the Defense bureaucracy and project a more orderly and 
systematic image to enhance confidence” at the Pentagon.76 
    Following an upsurge in Carter’s popularity after the Camp David Accords in September 
of 1978, the administration began a concerted public relations effort to gain conservative 
support for SALT II.  Carter replaced the liberal Paul Warnke with retired Army general 
George Seignious as the head of the ACDA in October of 1978.  Carter’s move was widely 
seen as an effort to gain conservative senators and military support for SALT II.77 
    With Seignious in the lead, Carter ordered a strong push to conclude the negotiations for 
SALT by November of 1978.  The negotiations lasted into December, with the Soviet 
delegation standing firm on demands that the Backfire bomber not be counted in weapons 
totals and that the U.S. restrict production of both conventional and nuclear cruise missiles.  
The U.S. delegation hoped to be home in time for Christmas and looked to broker some kind 
of deal on the matter.78  In response, Carter convened the JCS where David Jones broached 
the issue of higher defense budgets in FY80 and FY81 to offset agreeing to so many Soviet 
stipulations within SALT.  Carter, as indicated in the chapter opening, rebuffed this idea and 
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then took JCS deference as tacit support for agreeing to the Russian proposals.79  Soon after 
his meeting with the JCS, Carter issued a statement to the press that there remained some 
“minor but important issues” but that a SALT II treaty was to be concluded without delay.80  
The president assured listeners on television that the Russians had “negotiated in good faith” 
and that they had not “hardened” their position on the treaty.81 
    As the treaty was still being finalized, the administration opened a second major media 
campaign to gain support for SALT.  Brzezinski released reports that he felt that the treaty 
was important enough to be considered without the traditional détente “linkage” argument 
tying it to other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations.82  Carter promised that even if SALT was 
not ratified he was prepared to “willingly match” restraint offered by the Russians.83  Harold 
Brown loyally “took up the baton” to defend the administration position, speaking in support 
of the treaty in several forums and warning that a rejection would result in an “open 
invitation” for each side to conceal nuclear arms from the other.84  Jody Powell issued what 
reporters termed a “carefully deliberated statement” about a new Russian tactical nuclear 
missile which the administration claimed made arms control more urgent.85  The 
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administration also urged NATO countries to support the treaty publicly while the FY80 
defense budget hearings were underway.86  The Washington Post called the administration’s 
efforts to sell the yet to be finalized treaty indicative of “a very difficult time” with 
Congress.87 
    Despite the public relations blitz, Harold Brown’s fear of a congressional backlash to the 
events in Geneva was realistic.  Congress increasingly resisted the SALT process as it wore 
on in secrecy and Carter neglected to consult key senators and congressmen.  Charlie Wilson 
(D-TX) summarized congressional feelings best when he railed that the administration was 
“trying to sell the SALT treaty as if it was already a fact and that everything had been agreed 
to” when in fact many outstanding issues still remained.88   
    As the treaty neared completion in Vienna, Rowny informed the JCS that Cyrus Vance had 
made “too many concessions” and that SALT II would “undercut” national security.  He 
asked to resign from the negotiating team in Geneva and retire from the Army.  David Jones 
replied that the JCS agreed with Rowny’s assessment but that it would “prove embarrassing 
to the president” if the general left while the treaty was still being negotiated.  Jones asked 
Rowny to remain until the end, continue his “mission of damage limitation,” and quietly 
leave at the end if the treaty was still not satisfactory.  Rowny reluctantly agreed, informing 
the Secretary of State that if he did resign he would testify against the treaty before Congress 
if called to do so.89 
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    After a final round of negotiations, SALT II was scheduled to be signed on June 14, 1979.  
Rowny excused himself from the festivities and cabled his resignation to CJCS, saying he 
could not in good conscience support the treaty.  He was excused from going to Vienna for 
the signing with Carter and Brezhnev, but was informed eight hours after he sent his cable 
that his retirement date was going to be at the end of the month.  “It was Washington’s way 
of expressing displeasure,” Rowny recalled, “I was given two weeks to bring to a close a 
U.S. Army career of 38 years.”90  Shaken by Rowny’s rebuff, Carter ordered the JCS to 
report to the White House for what a presidential aide termed a “hand holding session” just 
before boarding his helicopter for Andrews Air Force Base.91 
    As Carter left Andrews for Vienna to sign the treaty, Scoop Jackson spoke to an audience 
of conservative democrats, likening Carter’s trip to Neville Chamberlain’s journey to 
Munich.  The president was so angered by the affront from his fellow Democrat that he 
refused to use an umbrella—one of the most remembered pieces of Chamberlain’s attire—
despite the pouring rain when he arrived in Vienna.92  Carter wanted not only to sign SALT, 
but also to engage Brezhnev on other matters.  The Soviet leader had other ideas, however, 
registering objections to restrictions on the production rates of the Backfire at the last minute.  
Carter responded by demanding that verbal Soviet agreements on the Backfire be codified in 
writing.  The Soviet Premier refused, but Carter held firm on this issue as it was of great 
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importance to the JCS.  Finally, Brezhnev agreed to provide the agreement in writing, and on 
the strength of that promise Carter signed the treaty on June 18, 1979.93 
Changes Unacceptable:  Carter Presents SALT II to the Senate 
 
    Rowny remembered wrongly in his memoirs that Jimmy Carter expected to “return 
triumphantly” from the signing of SALT and was shocked by the level of congressional 
opposition to the treaty.94  In fact, the FY80 Defense Budget testimony from early 1979 
demonstrated to the administration that SALT II was going to be a tough sell.  The military 
testimony during the FY80 defense budget was often redirected towards SALT.  Although 
not making many comments about the treaty itself, the military often responded to questions 
about SALT II by testifying that higher defense expenditures were necessary for FY80 and 
beyond. 
    David Jones’ opening testimony outlined the JCS position well.  When questioned by 
Senator Tower whether the SALT treaty as of January 1979 was equitable, Jones responded 
that the JCS had reserved “judgment . . . until there is a treaty in hand.”  He outlined three 
“conditions:” First, it must be fair and equitable; Second, it must allow the U.S. to pass 
technology to its allies; Third, it must provide “essential equivalence” between the U.S. and 
Russian strategic forces.95 
    Air Force Chief Lew Allen and Navy CNO Thomas Hayward expressed skepticism about 
SALT throughout their FY80 defense budget testimony.  Allen told Congresswoman 
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Marjorie Holt (R-MD) that limits being considered within the treaty would still allow the 
Russians to continue programs “that put our ICBMs in jeopardy” while not doing “enough in 
relieving the threat” and that there were still “serious matters” needing to be resolved.  He 
agreed that Soviet nuclear forces were postured to fight and win a nuclear war with the U.S.  
His skepticism of the treaty was so strong that Congressman Charles Wilson (D-CA), 
cautioned Allen that he might be “chastised” by his civilian superiors for his testimony.96  
Admiral Hayward was less skeptical, but indicated that he saw problems with the treaty and 
that he hoped the JCS position was going to be supported in the final rounds of the treaty 
negotiations.97  Even David Jones stated that the Backfire bomber, if its numbers were not 
constrained by the SALT treaty, could provide the Soviets with an equivalent megatonnage 
of 1,300 nuclear missiles and that JCS advice on restrictions for the bomber had been 
rejected.98  The lack of restrictions on the Backfire, Jones stated, necessitated greater defense 
procurement including additional F-15 fighters and E-3 AWACS aircraft.99  The JCS thus 
remained guarded in their opinions of the unfinished treaty in early 1979. 
    Harold Brown’s statements on SALT during the FY80 defense budget hearings generally 
agreed with the JCS.  He emphasized that SALT II would “not result in any reduction in 
resources that we allocate to strategic forces during the life of the treaty.”  He called for 
greater defense expenditures, but argued that the cost might be even greater without 
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ratification.100  “Even with SALT,” Brown stated, “we will need to and we will be permitted 
to expand our strategic nuclear efforts.”101  He assured the Senate that all of the planned U.S. 
strategic weapons were allowed under SALT II.102 
    Throughout the FY80 defense budget testimony, verification of SALT provisions were 
also a major issue.  Several congressmen questioned if the “loss” of Iran and the associated 
monitoring stations along the Russian border made the treaty “unverifiable.”103  Both Harold 
Brown and Stansfield Turner publicly acknowledged this problem.104 
    Finally, one of the most important and contentious provisions in the final SALT II treaty 
was Article XVIII which declared that each side could propose amendments.  This was a 
special provision inserted to assure Senate ratification.  These modifications had to be 
approved by both sides.  Amendments to certain controversial issues—such as the Backfire 
bomber and cruise missile portions of the treaty—were already being dubbed “killer 
amendments” because of the likelihood of Soviet rejection.105 
    The FY80 defense budget testimony, combined with the recognized potential for “killer 
amendments,” certainly warned Carter of controversy to come.  What became more 
surprising was the contrast between his earlier approach to the Panama Canal treaties and the 
manner in which he pursued ratification of this agreement.  While Carter had made extensive 
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efforts to consult key senators during the critical stages of the Panama Canal treaties, he 
made no such effort during the final stages of the SALT II negotiations.  He took personal 
offense at Congress not approving pro-forma his hard-negotiated treaty.  Even before the 
administration finished the treaty, twelve Republican senators held a press conference and 
demanded that the president address their concerns.106  “He acts as if we are calling him a liar 
just because we ask questions,” reported one.  Others agreed, saying that the president was 
treating the upcoming debate on SALT “like an anti-Carter plot.”107  For Jimmy Carter, given 
his emotional attachment to arms control, the effort to ratify SALT was the climactic battle in 
his war with Congress over defense policy and foreign relations. 
    Upon returning from Vienna, the president sent the treaty to the Senate with the message 
that any modification of the treaty was “unacceptable.”108  This bold stance also flew in the 
face of the long process of compromise and consultation that the president has pursued 
during the Panama negotiations.  As Carter made his defiant announcement to the Senate, 
some of the same senators who had allied with the military during the FY79 and FY80 
defense budget hearings began to line up against SALT. 
    The administration opened its formal defense of SALT II on July 9, 1979.  Harold Brown 
and Cyrus Vance adopted what the press termed a “bare bones” defense of SALT.  Both 
admitted that the treaty would not guarantee “essential equivalence” with the Soviets and that 
billions must still be spent on making new weapons, but that without the treaty the U.S. 
defense would become even more expensive.  Backing down from Carter’s hardline 
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presentation to the Senate, Vance urged no amendments to the treaty, but acceded that 
“President Carter will have to accept” whatever the Senate does.  Senators Howard Baker, Jr. 
(R-TN) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) grilled Brown about the superiority of the Soviets heavy 
ICBM force.  Brown responded emotionally with a “lecture on the arithmetic of nuclear 
strategy” indicating that the threat from the Soviet force would exist even without the new 
SS-18 missile.  Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), accused Vance of making too many 
concessions to the Soviets.  On the other side of the line, George McGovern (D-SD) 
confessed that he was on Carter’s side for the treaty and was bothered by too much talk of 
increasing defense spending.109 
    While at first the lines seemed fairly partisan, Howard Cannon (D-NV) also stepped 
forward to oppose the treaty.  Cannon cornered Harold Brown during the early hearings on 
the FY81 Defense Budget, lambasting the Secretary of Defense for supporting SALT in the 
face of continued Soviet “adventurism” in Iran and Afghanistan.  He also attacked the 
administration record on defense spending, saying that administration officials had not 
authorized any increases in FY79 and FY80 until Congress “held their feet to the fire.”110  
Soon other Democrats followed.  Joseph Biden (D-DE) and John Glenn (D-OH) questioned 
Brown extensively on the allowance of the Soviets to build new missiles under the 
agreement.111  Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) stated that even with SALT II he felt the 
U.S. would still have to spend billions more on building up its strategic arsenal.112  In the 
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lower chamber, Sam Stratton, Melvin Price, and most of the House Armed Services 
Committee attacked the treaty as lacking “any balance.”113       
   Scoop Jackson (D-WA) wanted to shape the debate in the Senate to his more defense-
conservative leanings.  Jackson pressed for the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold 
extensive debate on the SALT treaty during the FY81 defense budget process in order to 
influence the ratification fight.  Normally the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired 
by Frank Church (D-ID), would be at the center of any ratification debate.  Yet Jackson 
viewed Church and his committee as too “soft” on the Russians, fearing that the liberal 
George McGovern held too much sway over Church and Muskie, the other two key senators 
on the committee.  Jackson knew that involving the Armed Services Committee intensified 
an already heated debate.  He consulted with Chairman Stennis of the SASC and the two 
agreed that the more conservative committee should be the battlefield for SALT as well as 
the upcoming FY80 and FY81 defense budgets.114 
    The Armed Services Committee pursued the matter with a bipartisan vigor.  On July 23, 
1979, Harold Brown endured extensive questioning.   The Secretary admitted from the outset 
that his FY81 defense budget projections assumed that both sides adhered to the SALT II 
protocol.115  Scoop Jackson offered the most vocal criticism, declaring that SALT II was 
completely disadvantageous to the United States.  Barry Goldwater actually sided more with 
Brown, saying that he was reasonably confident from closed testimony that Soviet 
compliance could be verified.  Chairman Stennis was cordial to Brown throughout the 
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testimony.  Sam Nunn, whose vote was considered critical because of its influence on other 
conservative Democrats, asked hard questions but did not tip his hand one way or the 
other.116 
Selling SALT:  Trading Fewer Nuclear Arms for More Defense Dollars 
 
    Finally, during testimony on July 25, 1979, Nunn dropped a bombshell.  In what the press 
termed a “stroke that may have redrawn the battle lines in the SALT II debate,” Nunn 
declared that the Carter administration could gain his vote for the treaty by committing to 
increased defense spending.  The Senator boldly requested $7 billion on top of what was 
already slated for defense in FY80 and FY81.  Beltway insiders judged that Nunn’s promise 
was a “substantial boost to the treaty’s prospects.”  Nunn also established himself as the 
principle spokesman for the large number of moderate senators who were uncommitted on 
SALT II.117  Cyrus Vance accepted that there would have to be “substantial” increases in the 
FY81 defense budget.118 
    In large part due to Nunn’s qualified support and Vance’s acquiescence, by early August 
many in the Senate felt that SALT II stood a good chance of ratification if it was linked with 
higher defense spending.  “I smell ratification,” declared one longtime Senate staffer; “I 
wouldn’t have said that five or six weeks ago.”  According to press reports, high officials in 
the Carter administration felt “a sense of relief and some optimism.”119 
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    Vance’s statements and the reported sense of relief and optimism clashed sharply with 
Carter’s response to Nunn’s offer.  The president rebuffed Nunn, stating that he would never 
increase defense spending “just to get” votes for SALT II.  He stubbornly blamed Congress 
for cutting defense expenditures anyway, claiming that there was no mandate for any defense 
increases.120  Andrew Young, the administration’s Ambassador to the United Nations, echoed 
Carter’s position, saying that the president could “not afford” to increase defense spending at 
all given the tenuous state of the economy.121  The president and many of his more liberal 
advisors defied the military-congressional alliance. 
    Just as was the case with the Panama Canal Treaties, the conservative elements in 
Congress gained support from members of the retired military.  Early in 1979, over 170 
retired generals and admirals had sent the president a letter opposing SALT.122  Fresh from 
retirement, Alexander Haig testified that if he were a Senator he would “refuse to vote” on 
SALT II, but would not give his own opinion on the treaty.123  Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and 
Thomas Moorer also lined up in opposition.124  Moorer railed that SALT II proved that 
America had “the world’s worst negotiators.”125 
    The most influential retired officer opposing SALT II was Edward Rowny.  Although on 
the negotiating team for SALT for the administration, he fought to block ratification.  Rowny 
recognized that Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker had been largely shunned by the 
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administration, despite having been one of the few Republicans who supported SALT I and 
the Vladivostok Accords.  Also slighted were several moderate Democrats, including John 
Glenn (D-OH), whom Carter thought would fall in by party line when the chips were down.  
Recognizing this, Rowny showed his political savvy by outflanking the Carter administration 
and embarking upon a one-man mission to secure these senators’ opposition to SALT II.126 
    Rowny testified that SALT II failed to “meet minimally acceptable standards” and would 
“threaten [American] security for the years to come.”127  He attacked the administration, 
stating that the JCS alone were responsible for the treaty not being much worse and that a 
much better treaty was possible if the negotiating team had more closely followed military 
advice.128  He called the treaty against the national interest, inequitable, and unverifiable.  
According to the general, the Soviet promises regarding the Backfire bomber were 
“worthless” and the treaty, if ratified, would weaken NATO and undermine deterrence.129 
    Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze surprised many 
by weighing in with Rowny and strongly opposing SALT II.  Serving as a contemporary of 
Harold Brown in the LBJ Pentagon, Nitze’s opinion carried clout inside the Beltway.  He 
insisted that the Senate should add four amendments to the treaty in order to make it 
equitable and verifiable.130  Nitze’s dissent was very damaging because he had been a strong 
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supporter of Carter during his presidential campaign and was a close advisor to the president 
on arms control.131  The elder-statesman made an impassioned plea before the Senate Foreign 
Relations committee that ratification of SALT would “incapacitate our minds and wills for 
doing the things necessary to redress the strategic balance.”132  Rowny’s and Nitze’s 
testimony and lobbying seriously imperiled the treaty. 
    Civilians in the Carter administration responded.  Rowny maintained contact with a lawyer 
in the Pentagon, Harry A. Almond, who continued to feed the general information on the 
ongoing SALT deliberations.  When the contact between the two men became public, 
Almond’s supervisor, supported by Harold Brown, fired Almond the same day.  Almond was 
branded “an enemy of the president’s policy” and was told that it was “unconscionable” for 
him to have given any information to Rowny.  The backlash against Almond’s firing was 
swift, led by Nitze, who, along with the Dean of Yale’s Law School, wrote letters to the 
editor in the Washington Post likening Almond’s treatment to that of dissidents in Russia.133  
Although Almond was never re-instated, the fallout over his firing in the press—similar to 
the Singlaub incident—further weakened the administration’s influence. 
    Just as the administration was dealing with the fallout from the Almond controversy, a 
major obstacle to U.S.-Soviet relations occurred.  In September 1979, a Soviet “combat” 
brigade was revealed to be in Cuba.  Though the CIA had known of the unit since the end of 
the Cuban missile crisis, the intelligence reports had been overlooked and forgotten for many 
years.  Recent activity of the brigade revealed that it might have the capability not just to 
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train Cuban soldiers but also to conduct combat operations in the Western Hemisphere.  The 
revelation took place over Labor Day weekend in 1979 when most of the principle White 
House and State Department Staff members were on vacation.  When Frank Church (D-ID), 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, heard the report he immediately 
called his own press conference and demanded the removal of the Soviet brigade before 
SALT II be given any further consideration in the Senate.134 
     The administration scrambled to control the damage, but it was too late.  Carter and his 
advisors mulled the issue for weeks, calling in a council of “wise men” and treating the 
matter like the Cuban missile crisis.  At last, on October 1, 1979, the president spoke to the 
nation, stating that the brigade posed no threat and that the Soviets had given assurances that 
it would not be used in a combat role.  The speech appeared to soften some alarm in 
Congress, but for the most part it did little to change already hardening opinions on the 
treaty.  John Tower (R-TX) responded to the president’s address by stating that the treaty 
should not be considered for ratification unless the Soviets demonstrably changed their 
behavior on the world scene.135 
     A few days later, on October 5, 1979, the president bowed to Nunn’s requests and 
released a preview of the administration’s five year defense plan.  Although only accepting a 
reduced rate of growth (3 percent in FY80-81, and 5 percent in FY82 as opposed Nunn’s 
request for 3 percent in FY80 and 5 percent in years beyond), it was clear that Carter 
increased defense expenditures in order to gain approval for the faltering SALT treaty.136  As 
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the House Budget Committee examined the new defense plan, most members saw Carter’s 
proposal as being clearly linked to SALT, with little other justification for the proposed 
increase in defense spending.137  Years later, Harold Brown admitted that the increases in 
defense spending in the second half of the Carter years were to get approval for SALT II.138  
In this sense it appeared that Jimmy Carter purchased support for SALT II from the military-
congressional alliance.  The full story, however, was more complex. 
A Unified Front:  The JCS Support SALT II Ratification 
 
    The military-congressional alliance did not stand as firm on SALT II as it had on defense 
budgets.  When it came to SALT II, the Chiefs supported the administration despite intense 
pressure from conservatives in Congress to oppose it.  While the Chiefs dissented on the 
adequacy of defense budgets, once Carter decided to increase defense spending they offered 
their support for SALT.  JCS support was slow in coming and developed only after close 
contact between Harold Brown and Jimmy Carter himself.  Unanimous JCS support also 
required the selection of a new Marine Commandant because Louis Wilson refused to 
endorse the treaty until the end.  When the time for congressional testimony arrived, 
however, David Jones managed to pull all of the Chiefs in line with administration policy and 
get them to endorse the treaty.  The Chiefs’ testimony was frank and honest.  They were not 
enthused about the treaty but they endorsed it as being in the best interest of the nation—as 
being “modest but useful.” 
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    Carter lobbied the JCS arduously on SALT.  Jones testified to that, saying that the Chiefs 
were “fully consulted in all the negotiations” and “a full part of the process.”139  Even Louis 
Wilson admitted that it was the single most important event during his tenure as Marine 
Commandant and that he spent several hours each day dealing with SALT.140  On April 28, 
1979, as the SALT II negotiations neared an end, the JCS met.  Jones instructed each to cast 
his vote for or against SALT.  Jones, Hayward, Allen, and Bernard Rogers all voted in favor.  
Rogers’ affirmative vote surprised many, especially Wilson who was alone in refusing to 
endorse it.141  Apparently, the JCS decided to conceal Wilson’s dissent.  Wilson would retire 
before he had to testify on SALT, and since the other Chiefs supported it, as a body they 
drafted a memo to Carter pledging their support just prior to the president’s departure for 
Vienna.142 
    Before their testimony, Harold Brown predicted that the Chiefs would take “a constructive 
attitude” on SALT, but the issue was in doubt.  The Chiefs had consistently refused to make 
their views public, so there were rumors that they would dissent from the administration.143  
The JCS did have many differences with Secretary of State Vance on the treaty, and General 
Jones had worked hard to try to work through these and keep the other Chiefs in line.144  
LTG Ray Sitton, director of the Joint Staff at the time, reported that the JCS felt that several 
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of the provisions in SALT were not advantageous to the U.S.145  Jones privately classified the 
treaty as “fatally flawed” but “better than nothing.”146 
    Whatever their doubts, the JCS supported SALT in testimony to the Senate.  Jones began 
his statement to the Foreign Relations Committee by emphasizing that the JCS were in favor 
of even deeper cuts in strategic weapons than SALT II offered, but that the cuts provided by 
the treaty enhanced national security.147  He was frank about JCS concerns, including the 
lack of restriction on the Backfire and the numbers of Soviet heavy ICBMs.  In the end, 
however, he argued that the treaty was favorable to the U.S. because it allowed the continued 
development of the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, the MX, and a new Trident Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missile.  The JCS, he said, felt the treaty was “adequately verifiable.”148  
With Jones leading, the JCS endured many hours of detailed questioning from Senators.  At 
one point in the testimony Senator Jackson became frustrated with the Chief’s stoicism and 
tried to imply that the Chiefs were under orders not to oppose the treaty, which they all 
denied.149 
    The JCS testimony proved convincing.  When Edward Rowny testified in opposition to the 
treaty, many senators aggressively questioned why he would differ with the JCS in his 
opinion.  Jacob Javits (R-NY) asked Rowny point-blank if his opposition amounted to 
nothing more than second guessing the JCS.  The retired general admitted that this “struck a 
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nerve” and left him shaken in his response.150  Soon after retirement, Louis Wilson also 
testified at the behest of Sam Nunn, stating that he felt the treaty was not in the best interests 
of the nation.  He refused, however, some twenty-five other invitations to speak out against 
SALT, stating that as a retired member of the JCS he would not campaign against the 
treaty.151 
    In addition to the JCS, SAC Commander General Richard H. Ellis also supported SALT.  
“I would rather be Commander with SALT than without it,” he declared in special testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee.152  When Robin Beard (R-TN) attacked the 
general’s support of the treaty, implying that it was coerced, Ellis retorted that he based his 
answers on military, not political, considerations.  “From a military point of view it is 
desirable” for the treaty to be ratified, he insisted.153 
    The JCS, and even some civilians in the Pentagon, were explicit about their support for 
SALT being contingent on increased defense expenditures.  Jones stressed this point clearly, 
consistently speaking in terms of American “strategic inferiority” and the “deteriorating 
strategic balance.”154  He cautioned the Foreign Relations Committee that the Soviets had 
been out-investing the U.S. for more than ten years and that, even with SALT, the JCS was 
“unambiguous” on the need for greater defense expenditures.155  Air Force Secretary Hans 
Mark was the most vocal supporter of this position, emphasizing that the Russians were on 
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the verge of strategic superiority unless America made “the necessary investments to match 
their power.”156 
    The JCS testimony linked SALT II support not only with increased defense expenditures, 
but also with the deployment of the MX missile.  Carter and his White House had long 
opposed the MX, reducing funding for it in the original FY78 defense budget.157  Later the 
program was held up by acrimonious debates over how to base the missile.158  When it 
became clear that the JCS would only support SALT if it included the continued 
development of the MX, Carter agreed to the ultra-costly Mobile Protective Shelter (MPS) 
system of basing, despite being “nauseated” (as he remembered later) by having to do so.159  
General Allen then supported SALT strongly, but closely linked it with the MX in MPS, 
calling the missile “the highest priority and the most important need.”160  As a consequence, 
by the time the FY81 defense budget hearings arrived, Harold Brown declared that the 
administration commitment to MX in MPS was “very close to being irrevocable.”161 
    The supportive testimony by the Chiefs allowed the more liberal Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to recommend ratification of SALT II.  In a rather weak statement of support, the 
Committee concluded that “this Treaty is better for the United States at this point than no 
Treaty at all.”  The statement bowed to the more conservative forces at work with the 
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military-congressional alliance, however, noting “recognition” that “additional defense 
efforts by the United States will be necessary to preserve deterrence” was “one of the most 
important results of the SALT II debate.”162 
    Even with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Chiefs still 
supported the treaty.  When pressed by Sam Stratton, Lew Allen responded that “it is my 
personal judgment that this country is well advised to attempt to continue a policy that 
includes negotiations with the Soviets on strategic arms whenever that is possible to do.”  He 
conceded that he did not trust the Soviets, but that his support of the treaty was not based on 
trust, but on the belief that SALT was “a useful thing for the United States” and “a sound 
policy for the future.”163  When asked in January of 1980 about the SALT II treaty, if it had 
changed from “modest but useful,” Jones felt it was “not a favor to the Soviets.”  “I believe 
that the agreement is in their best interest and I believe it clearly is in our best interest,” he 
concluded.164  Ironically, the highest-ranking members of the military remained supportive of 
the treaty even as the Soviet’s aggressive actions spelled its ultimate doom in the Senate. 
“Modest But Useful?”:  What JCS Support of SALT II Meant 
 
    Conservative columnist George Will forecast the doom of SALT in August of 1979 while 
others were predicting its ratification.  His theory was that Carter would resist Nunn’s calls 
for increased defense expenditures.  “Carter cannot comply without further diminishing his 
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much-diminished authority,” he concluded.165  While Will’s reasoning behind the demise of 
SALT II was not entirely correct, his forecast for Carter’s behavior was remarkably accurate.  
As shown by the events surrounding the FY81 Defense Budget, Carter did indeed resist 
Nunn’s demands for as long as he could, fighting the increases at every turn. 
    Carter’s approach to treaty ratification, calling for no modifications, also backfired.  
Defying the president, the Senate recommended a reservation specifically allowing for the 
development of the MX missile.  Some senators also wanted an amendment stating that 
SALT II would be void after 1985 without Senate approval for extension.166  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee even promised that any ratification of the treaty must include a 
statement increasing defense spending to maintain “essential equivalence” with the Soviet 
Union.167 
    As the battle over defense expenditures raged on and Carter became increasingly 
intransigent, Scoop Jackson and the Senate Armed Services Committee declared that SALT 
was “not in the national security interests of the United States.”  General Rowny, reflecting 
on this moment in his memoirs, believed Jackson’s declaration made the treaty “effectively 
dead.”  Five days later the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan.  Carter, knowing that SALT 
would now never be ratified, withdrew the treaty from consideration by the Senate.168 
    In the end, Jimmy Carter’s inability to deal with Congress overshadowed JCS support for 
SALT II.  Contrary to what many in the Pentagon thought, JCS support was not assured—it  
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came only with much debate.169  In the words of the architect of the compromise, David 
Jones, the Chiefs “etched in marble the words ‘modest but useful.’  I tell you, it took a long 
time before we could come up with the agreed words.  Those were finally the words we 
could coalesce around as to our position on SALT II.”  “Overall,” the general recalled, “it 
didn’t accomplish a great deal.”170 
    One thing that SALT did accomplish was to give the military-congressional alliance its 
leverage to force Carter to increase defense expenditures and commit to costly weapons 
projects.  In fact, the president’s bid to reduce nuclear arms and even eradicate them from the 
face of the earth led to one of the biggest peacetime military buildups in the nation’s history.  
This was the supreme irony of SALT II and civil-military relations in the Carter years. 
    David Jones remained the main force behind the military leverage placed on Carter.  LTG 
Howard Fish, who served as the Pentagon Arms Sales Director during the first part of the 
Carter years, summarized the situation.  The President wanted SALT II ratified but the JCS 
had problems: 
Now what are you going to do if you are the CJCS? Take a hard stand that 
there are certain fundamental elements about it that were unacceptable and, 
therefore, that it should not be ratified and . . . lose effectiveness with the 
Commander-in-Chief or do you recognize that the ratification is inevitable and 
try to get as much out of it as you can?  And that’s exactly what he [Jones] 
did.  [Get the] MX, increase the budget.171 
 
While Jones understood many of the tenets of proper civil-military relations, he also knew 
how to get his way with his civilian masters and used SALT II as a means to do so. 
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    While Jones and the JCS used SALT II to force MX and higher defense budgets on Carter, 
the JCS for the most part followed proper military subordination.  Carter’s weakness with 
Congress, made him extremely vulnerable to end-runs—but these came mostly from the 
retired military.  Many key members of Congress, like Scoop Jackson, did all they could to 
encourage JCS opposition to SALT II.  Carter, already hobbled by the Singlaub incident, the 
Almond controversy, the fall of Iran, and the Soviet Brigade in Cuba could have done little to 
suppress JCS dissent to SALT.  Still, the JCS held firm in their support for the president and 
his treaty. 
    The compromise that the JCS made in their support of SALT II did not go unnoticed by 
Carter or his White House.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, reflecting on the JCS testimony, declared 
that the Chief’s support was “critical” to the early success of the treaty and advised the 
president, “You should take an early opportunity to express your appreciation to General 
Jones and the other Chiefs for their support.”172 
    Following the testimony on the Hill, Harold Brown stood with General Robert Barrow at 
the Marine Corps Ball on a rainy night.  A reporter overheard the Secretary of Defense 
approach the general.  “I must say,” Brown remarked, “that the Chiefs deserve a great deal of 
credit for their SALT testimony.  You said what you felt, you preserved your integrity and 
you didn’t let anybody shake you.”173  In many ways this small exchange captured the 
essence of the JCS relations with their civilian superiors and Congress not only with SALT, 
but throughout the Carter years. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CRISIS AND CONCLUSION: OPERATION EAGLE CLAW AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CARTER’S TERM 
     
Epilogue:  White House Situation Room, April 16, 1980, 6:30 p.m.1 
 
    Colonel Charles Beckwith sat nervously in his chair.  As the commander of the Army’s 
top-secret anti-terrorism unit known as the “Delta Force,” Beckwith was one of the most 
respected officers in the military.  Just a few hours earlier, General Jones had informed 
Beckwith that President Carter wanted a briefing from the field commander on the upcoming 
hostage rescue mission in Iran, code named Operation Eagle Claw.  Dressed in a sport coat 
and slacks, the career special operations officer felt even more awkward and unprepared.  So 
much secrecy surrounded the mission that all of the officers that night were dressed in 
civilian clothes so as not to make it seem that there was an unusual level of military presence 
at the White House. 
    Beckwith looked around the room at the others present for this critical meeting.  All of the 
highest ranking members of the administration were present.  The colonel stared with some 
disdain at Hamilton Jordan, dressed in Levis.  Jordan seemed too young and informal to be a 
White House Chief of Staff.  As those in the room began to file into their seats, Vice 
President Walter Mondale finally entered.  Beckwith gaped with disbelief at the Vice 
President’s attire—he was wearing sweatclothes and expensive running shoes.  The only 
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remaining seat was right next to Charlie Beckwith, and Mondale took it.2  The Delta Force 
commander could hardly have felt more out of place. 
    All in the room stood as Jimmy Carter entered.  “He looks good,” thought Beckwith to 
himself, noting that the president was wearing a blue blazer and grey slacks.  The president 
walked to the head of the Situation Room table and sat down.  General David Jones stood 
and began the briefing, introducing Army General James Vaught, who had been responsible 
for the inter-service training, coordination, and planning for the mission.3  The president 
listened intently as the general briefed the overall concept for the rescue attempt.  Beckwith 
was impressed by both Vaught’s mastery of the material and the president’s demeanor. 
    As Vaught reached the critical portion of the plan surrounding the infiltration into Tehran, 
Mondale elbowed Beckwith.  “What are those?” the vice president queried, pointing to a pair 
of plastic handcuffs sitting on the table in front of the colonel.  “Sir, those are ‘flex-cuffs.’  
We will use them to detain any Iranian prisoners my team captures,” Beckwith whispered.  
“Let me see them,” Mondale demanded.  Beckwith handed the plastic cuffs over.  To the 
colonel’s astonishment, Mondale began playing with them.  The intermittent sound of the 
vice president loosening and tightening the zip-ties on the cuffs sounded throughout the 
remainder of the briefing.4 
    As Vaught finished, he introduced Colonel Beckwith.  “Mr. President,” Hamilton Jordan 
interceded, “Colonel Beckwith is from your neck of the woods—he is a Georgian from 
Schley County.”  Carter beamed in approval, “That is right next to Plains, we must have been 
neighbors, Colonel.”  Beckwith smiled and nodded.  He felt more comfortable now as he rose 
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and began briefing his portion of the mission—securing the embassy compound in Tehran 
and rescuing the hostages.  Beckwith spoke informally but in great detail, looking directly at 
the president.  He explained the Delta Force plan down to the position and types of 
machineguns that would be covering the assault.  Carter listened silently but intently 
throughout the entire brief.5 
    Beckwith finished and asked for any questions.  “How many casualties do you see here?” 
the president asked.  General Vaught intervened before Beckwith could answer.  “Mr. 
President, we don’t honestly have an answer for you.  Perhaps six or seven Delta men might 
be wounded.  Two or three hostages might be injured.”  The president nodded and looked 
Colonel Beckwith in the eye.  Despite his superior’s reply, Beckwith did not feel it was as 
candid an answer as Carter wanted, so he spoke up.  “Mr. President, my men are trained to 
kill anyone carrying a weapon.  Odds are that when we assault, one of those hostages will 
overpower a guard and get hold of a weapon.  And my men will kill him by mistake, sir.  We 
have to count on that happening.”  “I understand.  And I accept it,” Carter replied.6 
    Warren Christopher, the acting Secretary of State, raised his hand and asked a simple 
question:  “What will happen to the Iranians guarding the embassy?”  “Mr. Christopher, it is 
our intent to take the guards out,” Beckwith quickly answered.  “Take them out?  You mean 
you will shoot them once in the shoulder or something?”  Christopher questioned again, 
confusion and worry filling his voice.  “No sir, we’re going to shoot each of them twice—
right between the eyes,” the colonel said sternly, “we’re going to kill any of the guards who 
put up resistance.”  “You can do that?  In a dark room with hostages, running?” Christopher 
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stammered.  Hamilton Jordan broke in, “Colonel Beckwith, in your training exercises, did 
your men ever shoot a hostage target instead of a terrorist target?”  “Sir, Delta is playing in 
the Rose Bowl, not the Toilet Bowl,” Beckwith quipped.7 
    W. Graham Claytor, the veteran Deputy Secretary of Defense, broke in to stop the 
questioning.  “Gentlemen,” he began, “I’ve been down to Delta and seen these men train.  
They can do everything Colonel Beckwith says they can.  They are quite good shooters.”8  
The tension in the room subsided a bit, although Hamilton Jordan and Warren Christopher 
continued to exchange worried glances.  Christopher had been the only remaining member of 
the cabinet to object to the rescue and his doubts lingered on the eve of the operation.9  His 
boss, Cyrus Vance, had already resigned in protest over the matter. 
    Following Beckwith, Air Force General Phillip Gast stood and explained the air-
movement part of the operation.  It was complicated.  Six CH-53 helicopters were necessary 
to ferry the Delta Force and the hostages out of the embassy and to an airfield for evacuation.  
In case some helicopters were damaged, the JCS had recommended eight be sent.  These 
helicopters were to fly from an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, but they did not have the 
range to reach Tehran.  They would have to land at a location designated Desert One and be 
met by several C-130 aircraft carrying fuel.  After re-fueling, the helicopters would continue 
on to a hiding point outside of Tehran to wait for the rescue to begin.  Other aircraft, the 
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much larger C-141 transports, would evacuate the freed hostages and Delta operators from a 
nearby airfield secured by Army Rangers.10 
    Beckwith was still worried as General Gast spoke.  General Pustay, the assistant to David 
Jones, leaned over to Zbigniew Brzezinski during the brief and whispered, “We need to take 
a closer look at the helicopter part of this mission.”11 Beckwith agreed.  He knew Gast was a 
superb fighter pilot.  “But he’s a ‘jet jockey’,” thought Beckwith, “I should have left a few 
Delta Force men with him to ensure the helicopter pilots were properly trained.”12  Even 
more troubling than the complicated helicopter movement was tactical air cover for the 
mission.  Despite all of the planning and meetings leading up to this point, Charlie Beckwith 
did not really understand if American fighter planes were going to cover the operation and 
protect the transports as they left Iranian airspace.  Why go through the entire rescue only to 
be shot down by an Iranian pilot at the last minute? 
    Almost on cue, Jimmy Carter asked, “What about tactical air coverage for the operation?”  
General Gast demurred, stating that some things were still unresolved about this.  “No, it is 
resolved right now,” the president interjected, “there will be tactical air cover all the way out 
of Iran.”  Beckwith gave a sigh of relief.13 
    Stansfield Turner leaned forward in his chair.  “Mr. President, my agency now needs to 
know what your decision will be.  Should we pre-position our agents for this operation?”  
Jimmy Carter looked around the room at the generals and his cabinet.  “It is time for me to 
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summarize,” the president began, “I do not want to undertake this operation, but we have no 
other recourse.  There is not going to be just ‘pre-positioning’ forward.  We are going to do 
this operation.”  Beckwith’s stomach leapt, and he clenched his fist.  “I never thought Jimmy 
Carter had the guts to do it, but he does,” the colonel thought to himself.14 
    Jimmy Carter then continued, looking at General Jones.  “David, this is a military 
operation.  You will run it.  By law you will keep the Secretary of Defense informed and I’d 
appreciate if you do the same for me.”  The president then gestured to the rest of the room, “I 
don’t want anyone else involved, and I will not be involved from this point forward.  It is 
your show.”  Beckwith was proud to have a president who had decided as he just had done.15 
    Everyone in the room came to their feet as the president ended the meeting.  “Colonel 
Beckwith, I’d like to see you before you leave,” Jimmy Carter called.  The others left the 
room, and Carter approached the colonel in the silence.  “I want you to do two things for me, 
Colonel,” the president began, “First, assemble your team and explain to them that in the 
event this operation fails, it will be entirely my fault and responsibility, not theirs.  Second, I 
want you to bring back the body of any American who is killed as long as it does not 
jeopardize another life.”  Beckwith choked back emotion, but some crept into his voice as he 
responded, “Sir, I give you my word on both counts.”16 
A Tragic End:  Operation Eagle Claw and the Course of Civil-Military Relations in the 
Carter Years 
 
    Less than ten days later, on April 24, 1979, Colonel Beckwith was recommending to 
Jimmy Carter over the phone that Operation Eagle Claw be aborted.  Only six helicopters had 
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arrived at Desert One.  While there, another had developed a hydraulic leak and was unable 
to fly.  With only five helicopters Beckwith judged he could not complete the mission—six 
was the minimum number allowed when planning the rescue.  Carter acceded to the ground 
commander and concurred that the operation be aborted.  Several minutes later, General 
Jones called to inform the commander-in-chief that a helicopter and a refueling plane had 
collided while leaving Desert One and seven American servicemen had been killed.17  The 
operation was a total and embarrassing failure for the nation and the president.  
    In the last pages of his memoir, Jimmy Carter recounts taking great pride in receiving a 
plaque with a quote from Thomas Jefferson:  “I have the consolation to reflect that during the 
period of my administration not a drop of the blood of a single citizen was shed by the sword 
of war.”18  While the plaque may be true in word for Carter, his reaction to the tribute is also 
telling.  Jimmy Carter wanted peace.  Yet, unlike many presidents, Jimmy Carter did send 
American troops to fight in a foreign country.  He did authorize an operation that resulted in 
the deaths of seven soldiers.  The bloody failure of the hostage rescue mission may very well 
have crippled an already weakened administration.  In this way Operation Eagle Claw was a 
tragic end to the only use of military force during the Carter years. 
    Based on the civil-military discussions surrounding Operation Eagle Claw, one would 
hardly have predicted such a tragic outcome.  The mood of the White House meeting on 
April 14, 1979 and Charlie Beckwith’s reaction to the president clearly demonstrated accord 
between the president and the military on this operation.  Unlike the conflict surrounding 
defense budgets and some decisions on defense policy, it cannot be said that Jimmy Carter’s 
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micromanagement led to civil-military discord.  Tutored by Brzezinski that John F. 
Kennedy’s “interference with military planning” in the Bay of Pigs invasion led to failure, 
Carter vowed to be completely hands off when it came to executing the hostage rescue in 
Iran.19  Harold Brown stayed out as well, calling it “a military operation with military 
decisions.”20  A post-action investigation into Eagle Claw directed by former CNO James 
Holloway termed Carter’s leadership a “textbook case of the proper relationship between a 
commander-in-chief and his military subordinates.”21  The president and his civilian advisors 
stayed out of the military’s affairs.  Unfortunately, the military returned the favor by failing 
their commander-in-chief miserably with a plan that had only marginal chances for success.22 
    Somewhat hypocritically, some members of the JCS decried Carter’s handling of the 
hostage situation despite endorsing his policies.  In his oral history, Marine Commandant 
Louis Wilson referred to Carter’s initial approach to freeing the hostages through 
negotiations as “an appalling lack of fortitude on the part of this administration.”23  
Conservatives charged that Carter’s decision to launch the rescue was for “political reasons” 
and a desperate attempt by “a president with deep political problems.”  Some of these same 
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critics accused Harold Brown and the JCS of going along as “good soldiers” merely trying to 
help their crippled commander-in-chief.24  In fact, while Carter had preferred to take a 
diplomatic path to resolving the situation, he did consider the use of force from the earliest 
points of the crisis and the JCS concurred with his assessment.  The president did, however, 
agree with military advice to increase military presence in the Persian Gulf and to use the 
threat of retaliation to deter Iran from conducting “espionage” trials of the diplomats.25  Even 
Wilson was forced to admit that calls to “send in the Marines” to rescue the hostages were 
“not realistic at all.  There’s no way we could have gone in to seize the hostages.”26 
    Carter’s relationship with Congress soured even further as a result of the failed rescue 
mission.  Although he did have Cyrus Vance give almost daily briefs on the state of the 
hostages to key congressional leaders, the president refused to consult key senators on the 
rescue plan, despite meeting privately with Majority Leader Robert Byrd on the eve of the 
operation.27  Some accused Carter of violating the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and 
bypassing the legal role of Congress in deploying troops in foreign countries.28 
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    Following the failure of the mission, recriminations surfaced that Carter’s “micro-
management” had been overly constrictive to military planners and was a major reason for 
the failure.  David Jones later had to defend the president of these charges, calling them a 
“bum rap.”29  Despite all of the evidence to the contrary, some could just not believe that a 
president who went line by line through the annual defense budget would give the military 
free reign in planning and executing a complicated rescue operation.   
    In some ways, Colonel Beckwith’s reaction to the final briefing on Operation Eagle Claw 
typified the evolution of the relationship between the president, his military advisors, and the 
civilians in the Pentagon.  A newly promoted colonel, Beckwith was not far removed from 
some of the “iron majors” who stood at the edges of the room during Carter’s initial meeting 
with the JCS.  Like them, he was skeptical of the new Democratic president.  His doubts 
were confirmed by many of the decisions Carter had made while in office—he did not think 
that Jimmy Carter had the “guts” to go ahead with the rescue.  Once he had close contact 
with Carter, however, his opinion changed.  He admired the president’s intelligence, 
dedication, and willingness to listen to and trust his military advisors.  Yet problems 
remained.  Beckwith still viewed many of those in the Carter administration—such as Walter 
Mondale, Warren Christopher, and Hamilton Jordan—with disdain.  The sparring between 
these more liberal advisors and Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor highlighted the 
Pentagon-White House tension that had began with and continued during the course of the 
administration.  No key members of Congress were called into the final briefings for the 
rescue, creating executive-legislative conflict later.  In all of these ways, Operation Eagle 
Claw symbolized civil-military relations in the Carter years. 
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Protecting the National Interest:  The Carter Doctrine, PD 62, PD 63, the Rapid 
Deployment Force, and the Military Legacy of the Carter Years 
 
    Although the failure of the rescue attempt often dominated critiques of Carter’s defense 
and foreign policy, Carter actually left a much more enduring legacy for the future use of 
military force.  Two final Presidential Directives, put into effect just before Carter left office, 
articulated this legacy which gave increased importance to the Middle East in American 
defense policy and created a force rapidly able to project power into this region.  Both the 
Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Force were the most salient parts of this effort to 
protect the national interest abroad. 
    The development of the Carter Doctrine and the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) provoked 
less military resistance than some of the administration’s early efforts to change defense 
policy and military contingency planning.  The military generally supported both the 
increased emphasis placed on the Middle East and the development of a quickly deployable 
force to intervene in that area.  Both the military and Congress, however, disputed the means 
which the administration provided to reach its desired ends with the Carter Doctrine and 
RDF.  Despite less military resistance, the Carter administration still implemented two of its 
final and most far reaching defense policy decisions amid much civil-military tension. 
    The ideas behind the Carter Doctrine and the RDF grew slowly in the administration.  The 
concept of the RDF had been discussed since the early days of the PRM-10 studies which 
were the comprehensive studies undertaken on national defense soon after Carter took office.  
As early as January 1979 the administration talked publicly of creating a force capable of 
responding to worldwide crises.30  Given the turmoil caused by Cuban and Russian 
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surrogates in Central America and Africa, Harold Brown argued in February of 1979 that the 
U.S. must “find a way” to help allied countries combat this threat.  As part of the effort 
Brown traveled to the Middle East, taking along with him the new Pentagon Arms Sales 
Chief, LTG Ernest Graves.  At the same time, reports indicated that the JCS was equally 
concerned about these developments and was conducting several staff studies on how to 
better combat these surrogate forces.31  Initial work on the concept of an RDF pointed at the 
Middle East. 
    In June, Brown directed the JCS to review the Unified Command Plan and assess 
capabilities to defend U.S. interests in the Middle East, spawning the studies that led to the 
RDF.  Brown put Army Chief of Staff, Edward “Shy” Meyer, in charge of the effort.32  The 
development of the RDF was marked by significant difficulties in the areas of logistics, 
service conflicts, timing, politics, and civil-military relations. 
    The logistical problems and inter-service rivalry that plagued the RDF spawned in large 
part from Carter’s efforts to restrain defense spending.  General Meyer, working on the plans 
for the RDF, openly decried a lack of airlift for the force, and others in the Pentagon 
supported him, calling for a new, long-range transport aircraft.  With the administration’s 
efforts to cut defense spending, each service worried that sustaining the RDF might pull 
away needed resources from future procurement.33  The Navy in particular was described as 
being “cool” toward the entire concept because of a fear that building the required cargo 
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ships for the force would take away money from an already strained shipbuilding budget.34  
Manpower shortages also proved to be significant for the military, and Carter went so far as 
to ask Congress for authorization to call up one hundred thousand reservists in order to 
buttress the RDF in case of emergency.35  All of these logistical and inter-service challenges 
placed a great strain on the ongoing efforts to construct the RDF. 
    The pressure to make the final revisions in the administration’s grand strategy and the 
RDF came on December 27, 1979 when the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan.  Soon after, 
in his January 1980 State of the Union Address, the president finally accepted his advisors 
recommendations and articulated what became known as the “Carter Doctrine,” namely: 
Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.  It will be 
repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force.36 
 
The president fully articulated this idea in his last two directives, PD-62 and PD-63, the final 
installments in the administration’s “grand strategy.”  Both demonstrated increased military 
influence in the policy making process.  PD-62 stated that greater military readiness was 
required “given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. 
interests.”  PD-62 replaced PD-18, which had identified NATO as the primary U.S. security 
interest, by naming the RDF as the “highest priority” for the next Five Year Defense Plan.37  
PD-63 placed military measures ahead of diplomacy in dealing with confrontations in the 
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Persian Gulf region—in both order and emphasis within the directive.38  These final 
directives demonstrated not only the importance that the administration placed on the RDF, 
but also how much the policies within the administration had changed. 
    The Pentagon clearly took the opportunity that the Afghanistan conflict and Carter’s 
change of policy provided to call for not only increased defense expenditures, but also an 
even greater bolstering of the RDF.  “In Afghanistan we have a new kind of signal,” Harold 
Brown declared in testimony before Congress, “The Soviets are willing to use their own 
military power outside the Soviet Bloc countries for the first time since World War II.”39  
The military testimonials were certainly along the same lines.  When asked if he felt anything 
would stop the Soviets from continuing south into the oilfields of Iran and to the Indian 
Ocean, Louis Wilson replied, “Not a thing.  I think it is inevitable that the United States will 
lose.”40  Lew Allen cited the move as proof that the Soviets were confident that they 
possessed a “relative military balance” with the United States and that it would force the U.S. 
to re-examine its defense posture.41 
    In fact, the Pentagon did hastily re-examine its defense posture which contributed even 
more to the controversy surrounding he RDF.  A practice mobilization exercise conducted in 
October of 1978, entitled “Nifty Nugget,” had shown significant problems with the capability 
of the military to mobilize and move substantial forces to Europe quickly.  In the words of a 
Washington Post report, the exercise made it clear that “existing mobilization plans were a 
hodgepodge of old and unconnected presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations, and 
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procedures.”42  Immediately after Afghanistan, the JCS directed the CINCs and services to 
submit proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan by mid-February in order to 
determine how to better support mobilization of the RDF and project American power into 
the Middle East.43  The resulting study on how to better support mobilization led to 
significant disputes among the services and between Harold Brown and the JCS.  Brown 
initially assigned operational control of the RDF to U.S. Readiness Command.  Several 
members of the JCS, especially the CNO and Marine Commandant, objected because they 
felt U.S. Readiness Command, based in Atlanta, was not suited to control a deploying force 
as far away as the Middle East.  In response, Brown agreed to assign operational control of 
the RDF to European Command once the forces deployed.  U.S. Readiness Command 
remained responsible for mobilizing and equipping the RDF.  The JCS also adopted a 
“compromise” position between all of the services regarding the Unified Command Plan—
they supported no changes to the plan itself, but the commander of the RDF would be 
designated as CINC of a “special region” within the Middle East should he deploy his 
force.44  Former Secretary of Defense, and recently resigned Energy Secretary, James 
Schlesinger, attacked the compromise and ad-hoc nature of the RDF, arguing that it was 
fatally weakened by poor command arrangements and inter-service bickering.45  Responding 
to the criticism, the Pentagon launched a hasty effort to bolster support for the RDF, but even 
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ranking military leaders felt that the effort was “politically motivated and would not last 
through another Carter term.”46 
    Congress was critical of both the Carter Doctrine and the RDF as the tool to implement it, 
in part because of military testimony on the matter.  Newly instituted Marine Corps 
Commandant Robert Barrow, while agreeing with the administration’s change of strategy, 
testified before Congress that the RDF was “a very catchy title,” but judged its ability to 
quickly deploy was “more an objective than a reality.”47  LTG Paul X. Kelley, the decorated 
marine chosen to command the RDF, rejected the characterization of “a paper tiger,” 
proclaiming that he was “comfortable going to war tomorrow.”  Yet, he admitted to serious 
deficiencies in air and sealift.48  When asked in writing by Congress what one area of 
national defense should receive more military funding if available, the Chiefs replied it 
should be the RDF.49  Even when the administration had changed policy to be more in line 
with military advice, the uniformed military complained about the resources. 
    A similar pattern of civil-military interaction occurred over military registration for a draft, 
which some claimed would be necessary should the RDF be deployed.  Through 1979, the 
administration had opposed both registration and any revival of the draft.50  Since the 
transition to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, the armed forces had suffered serious 
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recruiting shortages.51  An Army recruiting scandal in 1979 provoked a critical Washington 
Post editorial which suggest that while the scandal was not “proof that the volunteer army 
doesn’t work . . . it certainly is a signal of trouble.”52  Robert Barrow was less guarded in his 
testimony before Congress, openly opposing administration policy and boasting that the 
Marine Corps maintained itself “in spite of the All-Volunteer Force and not because of it.”53  
Bernard Rogers lamented that “we should have brought the Selective Service out of deep 
standby sometime ago.”54  Senator Stennis called for a revival of the draft, calling the AVF 
“the weakest link” in the nation’s defense.55  Senator Sam Nunn published a scathing 
editorial in the Washington Post, arguing that registration was absolutely necessary and that 
the administration’s plans for mobilization were completely inadequate.  Nunn commented: 
If our nation remains at peace while we continue our reliance on the current 
unworkable scheme, we will simply look back on it as politically motivated 
nonfeasance.  If, however, we have a war or emergency mobilization during 
this period, those in the chain of command responsible for basing our nation’s 
security on this hoax and who know better but sit silently will be held 
accountable, by an enraged nation, for their gross negligence.56 
 
Congressional and military opposition to the administration policy in the case of the draft 
was united. 
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    The administration finally buckled to the continual congressional and military pressure 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  In July of 1980, Carter ordered four million 
men to register.57  Even then the Pentagon was only partially supportive, the Secretary of the 
Navy claiming that a restoration of the draft would not solve the loss of senior personnel 
facing the Navy.58  The JCS followed suit as well, warning Carter, even as he signed a 7 
percent pay raise for the military, that this would not “stem the exodus of essential people 
from the armed services.”59  Even in the twilight of his administration, while more fully 
accepting congressional and military advice, Carter only possessed limited support in 
national defense. 
Beyond the Carter Years:  What We Can Learn from the Civil-Military Interaction 
from 1977-1981 
  
    Dale Herspring’s ranking of the Carter administration as being somewhere in the middle of 
an invisible civil-military conflict/cooperation continuum is correct.  There have certainly 
been many administrations where the civil-military tension was much worse—Nixon and his 
deceitful relationship with the JCS; LBJ and his escalation strategy, and then micro-
management of the Vietnam air war; Clinton having to contain the damage of an open revolt 
over “gays in the military”—and administrations where the tension was relatively less—
Reagan, giving the military huge defense budget increases and George H.W. Bush giving the 
military overwhelming force to fight the First Gulf War.60  The Carter administration 
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contained both elements of both cooperation and conflict.  Yet, an in-depth examination of 
the Carter years also reveals how simplistic this characterization is because it ignores the 
incredibly complex and changing relationships between the president, his military and 
civilian advisors, and Congress. 
    Perhaps, at least for the Carter years, one should consider how much worse the relationship 
could have been.  As the opening chapter discussed, Jimmy Carter took office at a time when 
civil-military relations were especially strained following the Vietnam War.  He entered 
office as an outsider, totally alienating even his own party in Congress, and made it 
immediately clear to the JCS that he planned to cut the defense budget and reduce the 
nation’s nuclear stockpile massively, perhaps unilaterally.  As his first act in office he 
pardoned draft evaders from Vietnam.  His Secretary of Defense, a “whiz-kid” from the 
McNamara years, entered the Pentagon and immediately began to interfere in areas of 
defense policy previously controlled only by the military.  The initial policies from the NSC 
and White House called for good relations with Cuba, distanced American support for 
traditional friends in Central and South America, and ordered the withdrawal of all American 
ground forces from Korea.  Carter scrutinized every service’s budget, personally pouring 
through it line by line for two years.  His administration sought to cut military retirement pay 
and refused military bonuses.  When Congress modified his defense budget requests, the 
fight became so intense that it culminated in a nearly-overridden veto.  He killed two major 
programs at the last minute without consulting anyone—production of the Air Force’s 
crown-jewel B-1 bomber and the deployment the neutron bomb for the European theater.  He 
resisted calls to link increased defense spending with ratification of SALT II furiously—
defying both Congress and the advice of the JCS.  The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet 
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invasion of Afghanistan swept through the Middle East and the administration seemed unable 
to react.  When Carter did decide to use military force to try to resolve the hostage crisis, his 
attempt failed miserably.  Ronald Reagan exploited all of these conflicts to make Carter 
appear even softer on defense, heightening tensions as the 1980 election approached.  With 
all of this, civil-military relations in the Carter years could have been a total catastrophe—but 
they were not. 
    An important factor in limiting civil-military conflict was Jimmy Carter’s personal 
willingness to listen to the advice of his military leaders.  Even before he took office, the 
time that he spent in meetings and briefings signaled to the JCS that he took his role as 
commander-in-chief seriously and was willing to hear advice directly from military leaders.  
While his initial reorganization of the NSC system cut the JCS out of some areas where they 
had been more active participants under Nixon, over the course of the four years the 
involvement of the Chiefs in the policy making process increased.  He prided himself on his 
openness with the Chiefs, always seeing them within twenty-four hours of their asking for a 
meeting.  Both Admiral James Holloway and General Louis Wilson confirmed Carter’s 
openness, with the former making the claim that he did not “know of any president who has 
offered the chiefs of service greater opportunity to provide advice on military matters.”61  
Bernard Rogers termed the president’s willingness to meet directly with the Chiefs 
“unprecedented.”62  General Jones admitted that getting Carter to follow their advice “took a 
lot of work” and that “part of it was external,” but that overall the Chiefs’ “quiet, calm 
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manner helped in convincing him that the cutback in defense ought to stop.”  As Jones put it, 
“I felt that during the four years our influence increased considerably.”63  The Chiefs knew 
that even if their advice was not always being heeded it was at least being heard and 
considered by the president. 
    Despite the importance of Carter’s open communication with the JCS, this was far from a 
panacea for the difficulties involved with the civil-military relationship.  The president failed 
to engage Congress in defense policy and budgets, creating significant conflict and leaving 
himself vulnerable to end-runs.  The ritual of getting military advice from the JCS failed at 
certain times to assuage the concerns of theater CINCs.  More distant from Washington and 
surrounded by their own staffs the CINCs, felt less confident that Carter was taking military 
opinions into consideration.  The House and Senate Armed Services Committee began to 
have even greater doubts over time despite the fairly restrained testimony of the JCS during 
this time period. 
    Harold Brown also played an important role in facilitating the civil-military interaction of 
the Carter years.  Charles Stephenson is certainly correct in classifying Brown as a “team 
player.”64  In many ways he was a model Secretary of Defense.  Despite the stigma of 
association with McNamara’s Pentagon, Brown formed a good working relationship with the 
Chiefs and with most of the CINCs.  Introverted and analytical, he made an effort to be 
personable—for example, he was the only serving SECDEF to visit and talk with the 
personnel in the OSD Historical Office.65  Harold Brown was also unswervingly loyal to 
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Jimmy Carter.  He supported Carter publicly on many issues where he privately differed with 
the administration.  Brown understood the bureaucratic nature of the Pentagon and, despite 
his wishes for a massive overhaul of the advisory and command systems, he tempered his 
desires and settled for very modest changes. 
    Despite Harold Brown’s strengths, he also had weaknesses which increased tension 
between the Pentagon and the White House and between the administration and Congress.  
While he made a great effort to cooperate with and influence the JCS, he failed to do the 
same with key members of Congress.  He was often criticized and attacked, even by 
members of his own party, while testifying.  Brown did not react well to this, at times 
becoming emotional and refusing to build the political bridges necessary to advance the 
administration’s defense policies and budget priorities.  He was a master of the details of 
defense programs and budgeting, but at times lacked as much focus on larger issues of 
policy.  This led some in the Pentagon to describe him as “not policy-oriented, but program 
oriented” and as a SECDEF who “basically, cares very little about the policy side.”66  He 
never fully overcame his introverted nature.  Even as the administration left office, Colin 
Powell, having worked for John Kester in the Pentagon, still felt Brown “preferred paper to 
people.”  The young military aide “always had the impression that Brown would be just as 
happy if we slipped the paperwork under his door and left him alone to pore over it and work 
out his theorems.”67  Such views articulated the uniformed military’s fear that their defense 
policy interests were not being protected within the administration.  It also increased friction 
between the Pentagon and White House, where the more forceful leadership of Brzezinski 
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overshadowed Brown’s more quiet approach.  Finally, while Brown was completely loyal to 
the president, Jimmy Carter did not always return the favor.  In areas related to the budget, 
Carter’s micromanagement undercut Brown’s authority.  Harold Brown never effectively 
addressed this problem.  This led veteran Pentagon insider David Cooke to conclude that 
“Harold was the right secretary of defense, but for the wrong president.”68 
    The personalities of the JCS were also a major factor in determining the course of civil-
military relations in the Carter years.  George S. Brown, hobbled from the outset by his 
previous public relations gaffes, proved unwilling to offer much resistance to Carter or 
Harold Brown even though he strongly objected to decisions such as Korea troop 
withdrawals, the B-1 bomber cancellation, and the cutting of the defense budget.  He voiced 
his objections in private and with Congress and never fully gained the confidence of his 
civilian superiors who tended to leave him out of more decisions than they did with his 
successor.  Still, he strongly supported the administration on the Panama Canal treaty, 
offered qualified support for the Korea troop withdrawals during his congressional testimony, 
and reacted strongly against those who accused the JCS of being overly docile.69 
    David Jones, who replaced Brown, dominated the JCS by personality during the Carter 
years.  The president classified Jones as “the most extraordinary leader I have ever known,” 
and the praise was not misplaced.70  As both Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chairman of 
the JCS, Jones effectively managed the complicated web of politics and bureaucracy 
surrounding the Pentagon.  He gave direct advice to the president when necessary but 
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generally preferred to work through Harold Brown with whom he got along well.  He became 
well-integrated into the decision making process in the Carter administration.  Often the 
administration made decisions with which he disagreed, but he refused to end-run to 
Congress and remained frank and honest in his sworn testimony.  He exerted leadership over 
his fellow chiefs, best exemplified by his ability to garner unanimous JCS support for SALT. 
    The other members of the JCS also remained publicly loyal to the president but offered 
frank testimony before Congress.  At times they feuded fiercely with their civilian masters—
Bernard Rogers and Edward Meyer especially—but the conflicts rarely spilled out into the 
public light.  The CNOs tended to be more willing to end-run the administration on policy 
and budget issues, but despite Carter’s insistence on cutting the Navy budget most of these 
conflicts remained relatively low-key.  One must read Marine Commandant Louis Wilson’s 
private oral history in order to get a sense of how much he disapproved of some of the Carter 
administration’s policies—he simply refused to voice his objections in any forum other than 
testimony in front of Congress and was very restrained even then.  These Chiefs never 
derided the administration, but they also told Congress what they believed when it came to 
defense spending.  They simply did not think that Carter was spending enough on defense 
and they made that clear when asked during the later two years of his term. 
    Perhaps the greatest factor limiting civil-military tension was the active role that Congress 
played during the Carter administration, especially with regard to defense budgets.  The JCS 
and theater CINCs recognized that they had an appropriate forum to voice their dissent 
because they would be asked tough questions about policies and budgets during 
congressional hearings.  Sam Nunn, Scoop Jackson, Ernest Hollings, Melvin Price, Sam 
Stratton and others made it clear that, when it came to defense policy and budgets, they did 
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not intend to give their fellow Democrat a blank check.  Early on they attacked Harold 
Brown when there was even a hint that he might return to the ways of the McNamara 
Pentagon where military advice was ignored.  The military saw that there was serious and 
substantive debate taking place on defense budgets and policies and were willing, for the 
most part, to use appropriate forums to express their opinions.  This certainly reduced 
frustration for the uniformed military and deterred end-runs to Congress. 
    Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, truly embraced their constitutional 
role in providing for the common defense.  Many more defense-oriented congressmen and 
senators disagreed with Carter’s approach.  Of course the usual politics of defense spending 
prevailed—many congressmen opposed B-1 cancellation simply because it would cost their 
districts jobs, senators fought over where the new navy ships they were authorizing would be 
built, and defense industry lobbyists certainly purchased votes for their programs—and the 
administration took much unfair criticism in its laudable effort to economize national 
defense.  Yet, one must recognize the sincerity and seriousness that pervaded much of the 
dialogue taking place before Congress at this time.  The Pentagon and the administration 
were both asked very tough questions and many of these senators and congressmen were 
deeply committed to doing what they thought was right when it came to national defense.  
Longtime congressional staffer James Locher has noted the strikingly non-partisan nature of 
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and their willingness to debate many 
challenging issues associated with national defense during the period.71  A quotation from 
Senator Stennis, spoken in earnest as the chair of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 
summarized much of the conduct of Congress during these years:  “This is not a partisan 
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subcommittee.  We don’t have party lines on this subcommittee.  We argue about the 
majority and the minority, but we are not a party subcommittee.  We are looking at the 
defense of the nation.”72 
    Given the path that Congress took in modifying the defense budget, it could be said that a 
rant by Armed Services Committee member Robin Beard summarized their view of defense 
policy in the Carter years: 
Our definition of détente is different from their definition of détente.  So it 
does disturb me that while we embrace détente, we as a committee have been 
told that we have experienced superiority in nuclear strategic capabilities, that 
superiority has gone to equality, the equality has now gone to parity, the parity 
has been described as rough parity, and now we are talking about an im-
balance . . . So I would hope that this administration would now take a very, 
very frank look and start working with this committee and members of 
Congress in letting the American people know that there is a sacrifice to be 
made.73 
 
The same Congress that worked against Carter’s efforts to economize defense spending sided 
with Reagan in crafting a massive peacetime buildup.  The military, through its testimony 
and the occasional end-run, was more than willing to help in the effort.  Were it up to Jimmy 
Carter himself, the military buildup would never have taken place. 
The Politics of Military Appointments:  Carter and Brown’s Approach 
    From the outset of their administration, Jimmy Carter and Harold Brown made it clear that 
they did not see the JCS as political appointees.  Just as they took office there was strong 
pressure from some in the administration to remove George S. Brown as Chairman of the 
JCS because of his intemperate remarks at Duke University.  Vice President Mondale had 
even declared during the campaign that the general “shouldn’t be dogcatcher.”  Harold 
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Brown opposed Mondale, arguing that replacing the CJCS based on political considerations 
would “set a very bad precedent.”  His staunch defense of the general ensured that George S. 
Brown would serve out his second two-year term and kept the CJCS from becoming an 
overtly politicized position.74  
    Jimmy Carter and Harold Brown were able to replace almost all members of the JCS and 
took a somewhat unique approach to doing so.  In broad terms, they chose to replace the first 
set of Chiefs with officers more supportive of the administration’s defense priorities.  When 
General George Brown, stricken with cancer, stepped down in June 1978, Carter replaced 
him with David Jones who had been publicly supportive of many of the president’s 
decisions, including the B-1 bomber and the Panama Canal.  Lew Allen, considered a 
“surprise appointment” and a scientific expert like Harold Brown, replaced Jones as Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force.  He too proved to be supportive of Carter, stating that much of the 
military animus toward Carter was “misplaced because he had really changed his views a 
good deal.”75  When Harold Brown slated General John Vessey, who had spoken out publicly 
against Carter’s Korea withdrawal policy, to replace General Rogers as Army Chief, Carter 
stopped the move.  He instead brought in General Edward C. Meyer who had been scheduled 
to take command of the U.S. Army in Europe.76  When James Holloway, the CNO who had 
publicly lobbied for the nuclear supercarrier, retired from his post, Carter denied him the 
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traditional honorary visit to the White House.  Carter replaced him with Thomas Hayward, 
who worked hard to try to suppress open dissent in the Navy and as a result, according to 
press reports, became “rocked by criticism” for his “capitulation.”77 Carter clearly made 
deliberate choices as to which flag officers he placed in high offices. 
    Despite the political pressures and civil-military tension that Carter and Harold Brown 
generated, it would be inaccurate to say that they “purged” the JCS and appointed only “yes-
men” to replace the outgoing chiefs.  Carter and Brown succeeded in taking control of the 
military promotion system to the consternation of the JCS.  This power of promotion was 
largely concentrated in the office of John Kester, special assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense.  Yet, when interviewed for the position of Kester’s own military assistant, Colin 
Powell was impressed by the fact that “he was not looking for a yes-man.”78  Likewise, the 
same could be said for the selection officers of the JCS.  What Carter, Brown, and Kester 
sought were forward-looking officers willing and open to change in the defense 
establishment.  Their pattern of selection and officer management supports this contention.  
General Jones, selected as the new Chairman of the JCS, had not only supported Carter on 
the B-1 but, perhaps more importantly, described himself as a “creature of change and an 
advocate of change” willing to oversee and mediate Carter’s plans for the military.79  Rogers, 
leaving his post as Army Chief of Staff, was appointed SACEUR despite his serious clashes 
with Kester and Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander.  Based on the revisions in 
Carter’s defense policy, this move placed Rogers in a position where he would continue to 
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give strong input into the defense budgetary and planning process, for Brown had succeeded 
in greatly increasing this role for the CINCs.80  It would be difficult to classify Rogers as 
being completely deferential to civilian authority, yet he was considered at the time a “new 
breed” of intellectual officer willing and open to change.81  Similarly, his replacement, 
Meyer, was a very young appointee—a three-star at the time of his elevation to chief—who 
was, like Carter, a strong advocate of readiness and who had headed Carter’s efforts to create 
the Rapid Deployment Force.82  The same pattern emerged in the selection of the Air Force 
Chief of Staff.  While Brzezinski recommended General Robert Huyser to Carter based on 
the general’s popularity and his ability to “deliver the Air Force . . . on important arms 
control issues,” the president refused.83  He instead appointed the scientist with a PhD in 
nuclear physics, Lew Allen, who Brown had worked with before and who had done much 
research into pioneering space, missile, and “stealth” technology for the future.  Allen, 
considered “the most learned missile expert in JCS history,” would often argue toe to toe 
with fellow physicist Harold Brown—and Brown was the strongest advocate of Allen over 
Huyser.84  Admiral James Holloway consistently opposed the administration on shipbuilding 
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budgets and strongly opposed any reform of the Pentagon.85  The successor CNO, Thomas 
Hayward, represented the very aviation-carrier wing of the Navy Carter fought against during 
his budget battles.  Hayward was, however, considered a “maverick” and a technologist, 
open to Carter’s “total force” concept in the Navy.86  There is no evidence that Carter thought 
he would support smaller carriers.  The overall pattern, then, seemed to be one of Carter and 
Brown selecting officers willing to oversee substantial change and provide expert technical 
advice, rather than officers who would simply “go along.”  This second set of Chiefs 
reduced, but by no means eliminated, the resistance to stronger civilian control of defense 
policies and budgets. 
    A similar pattern emerged for the selection of most of Carter’s CINCs.  Despite his 
conflicts with several of them, Harold Brown convinced the president to work with most of 
them rather than try to relieve those who opposed administration policies.  Carter listed 
SACEUR Alexander Haig as one of two people he should have fired.  Indeed, Haig clashed 
strongly with the administration over many policy decisions, especially in regard to NATO 
and Iran.  Harold Brown talked Carter out of firing him and the general instead opted to retire 
later in his term.87  Vessey publicly opposed Carter’s Korea withdrawal policy but was later 
assigned as Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army in 1979.  SOUTHCOM CINC Dennis McAuliffe 
cooperated on the Panama Canal treaties but opposed the administration’s overall approach 
to Latin America.  Even so, Carter appointed the general as the first administrator of the 
Panama Canal Commission which took over operation of the Canal Zone following the 
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ratification of the treaty.88  None of these CINCs were pliable—each of them vocally resisted 
the administration at least one turn—yet the president and his SECDEF opted to try to work 
with them rather than risk a head-on civil-military confrontation. 
    Carter and Brown, to their credit, never retaliated against the JCS or theater CINCs for 
their sometimes dissenting testimony before Congress, nor did they limit their selection of 
chief’s and CINCs to “yes men.”  They were able to change out all four chiefs and several 
CINCs, and to the end the Chiefs remained willing to give frank advice and testimony.  The 
Chiefs respected their commander-in-chief’s approach and proved more willing to work with 
him and support SALT II, the cornerstone of his hopes for nuclear disarmament.   
    Although Carter’s relations with his military chiefs improved, his relations with the 
military as a whole remained troubled.  Most members of the military still viewed Carter’s 
budgets, despite their increase over time, as a “step backward” from what Ford had 
planned.89  Indeed, Carter’s first defense budget was a net real decrease of 3.5 percent from 
the Ford FY77 budget.90  Many less-senior members of the military, perhaps some of those 
aides attending Carter’s first meeting at Blair House with the JCS, never altered their 
negative opinion of Carter and his administration.  According to General Lew Allen, the 
attitudes of some of these younger officers toward the civilian leadership of the Carter 
administration bordered on “unacceptable insubordination.”91  These “iron majors” 
significantly affected civil-military relations since they populated the staffs that supported 
senior policy and decision makers.  Harold Brown was so conscious of the impact of these 
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“iron majors” that he chose to consult members of the JCS when they were alone.  Brown 
complained that, in the official meeting room for the JCS known as “The Tank,” there was 
“always one of the ‘iron majors’ watching to make sure” that the Generals “toed the line.”92  
General Jones described these officers as “zealots” and lamented that some of these officers 
“down below” always argued “that the Chief ought to resign, the country was going to hell, 
and the President doesn’t know what he is talking about.”93  Colin Powell, serving as an “iron 
major” at the time, confirmed these sentiments, saying that, “on the whole, the vibrations 
coming out of the Carter White House were not comforting to the military profession.”94     
Conflict, Cooperation, or Chaos?:  The Verdict On Carter’s Civil-Military Relations 
and How It Changes How We View His Presidency 
     
    An understanding of the civil-military interaction during the Carter years offers several 
critiques of the existing historiography of the Carter administration as a whole.  It has been 
an area too often overlooked when trying to explain why things happened the way that they 
did during this time period.  In many cases this study of civil-military relations validates 
existing conclusions, but in a few instances it definitely offers a new appraisal.  
   The course of civil-military relations in the Carter years is in keeping with the findings of 
the primary Carter historian Edwin C. Hargrove.  His evaluation of Jimmy Carter’s 
leadership style is stinging: 
Carter did not manage the seamless web of purpose, politics, and process 
smoothly.  His strategic leadership had a disjointed character in which discrete 
decisions jarred and jostled each other.  He fastened too much on particular 
decisions that had come before and that would follow.95 
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Hargrove believes Carter thought of himself as Wilsonian—moralistic in nature and inclined 
towards a factual analysis of problems.  Once Carter reached a decision, he was supremely 
confident that his decision was the correct one--a decision that was morally correct and for 
the “public good.”96  Part of the reasoning that created Carter’s decision-making process 
stemmed from the view that he took of himself as president.  Carter viewed himself as an 
“outsider”—a president who was divorced from politics as usual, a president who could bring 
morality back to politics.  For this reason he sought to personally create “comprehensive 
solutions” to problems without building coalitions behind those decisions.  Whenever 
possible he would leave politics out of his calculations.97  The result of this decision-making 
process, according to Hargrove, was that Carter tried to make too many decisions himself.98 
    Hargrove’s findings very well classify much of the interaction between the administration, 
the military, and Congress.  The decision to cancel the B-1 bomber project is perhaps the 
single best example that fits well with Hargrove’s assessment.  Based on solely on cost 
benefit analysis, Carter made a logical and correct choice regarding the B-1.  In fact, B-1 
project completion proved to be even more costly than expected, and the plane ended up 
having a very bad operational history. Each successive problem generated millions of extra 
dollars in program cost and the first B-1 bomber was not employed in combat until 
retaliatory strikes on Iraq in late 1998.99  Thus, Carter’s decision maximized the cost-
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effectiveness of our nation’s defense systems with his ideas of modernizing existing B-52s 
with “swarms” of cruise missiles at a reasonable cost of only $750,000 per aircraft.100  Yet, 
despite the logic and prudence of his decision, Carter’s surprise announcement generated 
needless frustration and anger.  Carter’s approach to the Korea troop withdrawals and the 
ERW cancellation took a very similar course.  In the end all of these last-minute decisions 
made without full consultation of Congress or advisors heightened discord, just as Hargrove 
finds in his overall analysis of the Carter presidency. 
    The findings of Richard Thornton in The Carter Years are not fully supported when doing 
deeper analysis into civil-military interaction within the administration.  Thornton’s work is 
the second of three volumes analyzing American strategy and foreign policy from 1968-
1988.  His thesis was that Carter entered office fully intending to carry forth the Nixon-
Kissinger policy of détente, but “a major Soviet strategic weapons breakthrough almost 
immediately forced its reconsideration.”  The result, according to Thornton, was a “heated 
debate over the viability of Kissinger’s strategy” which resulted in “strategic indecision and 
policy vacillation.”101  There are several problems with this interpretation. 
    First, the idea that a “major Soviet strategic weapons breakthrough” forced Carter and his 
advisors to reconsider their entire foreign policy is not borne out by the declassified 
documents and congressional testimony of this time period.  In November of 1977, 
Brzezinski advised Carter that the U.S. ICBM force would “not become significantly 
vulnerable until the late 1980s [emphasis in original].”102  Likewise, the Air Force confirmed 
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these findings, predicting that Minuteman missile losses would be “essentially zero” during 
any kind of Soviet attack.103  Harold Brown took office testifying to Congress that “there is 
no reason for immediate or grave alarm about our ability to deter major military actions by 
the Soviet Union.”104 Later testimony in early 1979 repeated these findings.105   
    Second, it does not seem that the Carter administration was as committed to continuing the 
approach of the Nixon-Kissinger framework as Thornton suggests.  Many of the early PDs 
coming from the Carter White House were significant and rapid changes of course.  Even the 
Carter administration overhaul of the NSC system was a massive departure from the past.  
While arms control remained a central part of both administrations’ approach to détente, 
Carter had radically different ideas—as his initial “deep cuts” and “minimum deterrence” 
proposals suggested.  The uniformed military were particularly apprehensive about many of 
these changes, particularly in the first two years.  Korea, Latin America, and Africa were all 
areas were the military objected to many of the new administration’s initiatives. 
    Finally, Carter’s foreign policy was not as vacillating or incoherent as Thornton suggests.  
Thornton is not alone in thinking this, however; Steven Rearden also states that the Carter 
administration lacked “any clear-cut, high-level consensus on the nature of the Soviet 
threat.”106  John Lewis Gaddis also reached a similar conclusion regarding Carter’s approach 
to containment.107  While this may seem the case at first, when examining the interaction 
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between Congress, the Pentagon, and the White House in the Carter years a more coherent 
picture emerges. 
    First, Carter largely adhered to the ideas espoused in his Princeton Address before he took 
office.  He believed that America had reached a limit of its power and could no longer use 
only its might to protect the free world.  He advocated shouldering American allies with 
greater responsibility for their own defense.  He wanted to withdraw American forces from 
the Far East and focus on development of the NATO alliance.  By pursuing this course, 
which would eventually include normalization of relations with China, Carter hoped to press 
the Soviets to accept deeper arms reductions than even the initial deep cuts proposal of 
SALT.  After a brokered settlement between Israel and Egypt in the Middle East, Carter 
expected that region to remain relatively stable.  The human rights campaign, combined with 
the return of the Panama Canal, would help American standing in the Third World while at 
the same time put pressure on the Russians to reform their own political system.108 
    Second, the there was a degree of consensus among high-level civilians in the Carter 
administration that the Soviet threat had been overblown in the past.  Carter and Vance did 
not really think of the relationship between the two nations as a “Cold War.”  Harold 
Brown’s rhetoric when taking office was so muted that some called it a “flute against [war] 
drums” and decried that the “Cassandra calls” about the Russian threat were ending.109  Even 
as late as June of 1979, Brown was “worried” about a Pentagon study which he felt 
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exaggerated the Soviet threat.110  Brzezinski was the most hardline advisor, but even he felt 
that the administration could cooperate with the Russians and avoid “excessive 
preoccupation with the U.S.-Soviet relationship.”111  The curtailment of defense spending 
dovetailed naturally from these views. 
    Finally, the administration’s changes in policy flowed not so much from vacillation as 
from recalibration of their initial opinions—and the interplay between Congress and the 
military had much to do with this.  There was no vacillation when it came to how much to 
spend on defense—Jimmy Carter consistently tried to hold the line, but the military-
congressional alliance forced his hand, using SALT II as leverage.  The military influenced 
Harold Brown when it came to defense spending, leading to a united Pentagon call for higher 
budgets.  In terms of overall foreign policy, Carter also made some conscious decisions to 
shift stances.  Several of his PDs called for reassessment of relations with Latin America and 
events in the Middle East encouraged a change of outlook for that area.  He changed his mind 
on Korea troop withdrawals after continued resistance from the military.  PD-59 overhauled 
nuclear war planning and took a detailed look at how to confront the Russians in a global 
conflict.  All of these changes resulted in large part due to the increasing weight that Carter 
gave to military advice and the fact that the political strength of the military-congressional 
alliance overpowered his ability to resist it. 
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    The analysis of civil-military relations in Carter’s term also calls into question the strength 
of the argument advanced by historian Gaddis Smith that the Vance-Brzezinski split was 
primarily responsible for Carter altering his foreign policy.112   This argument holds that 
during the first two years of his administration, Carter listened more to Vance, whose more 
liberal views dominated foreign policy.  Following the setbacks of Iran and Afghanistan, 
Brzezinski’s hard line gained increasing influence and, by 1980, almost entirely held sway 
with Carter.  The result was the transition to a militant Cold War foreign policy accompanied 
by a military buildup.  When looking at Carter’s relationship with his military advisors, the 
Pentagon, and Congress, however, this interpretation falls short.  It neglects the role of 
Congress in converting Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy and assigns too much agency to Carter 
himself in the process.  As much of the debates surrounding defense budgets and SALT II 
demonstrated, Jimmy Carter wanted to limit defense spending even as late as 1980.  It was 
the military-congressional alliance that forced his hand and precipitated the military buildup 
which Reagan later completed.  This larger political scene had at least as much influence on 
the president as his Secretary of State and his National Security Advisor. 
    Finally, even the most recent interpretation of Carter’s defense policy offered by Brian 
Auten is not entirely correct.  When looking only at the programs and levels of the 1977-
1980 defense budgets it does indeed seem that Carter and his advisors gradually precipitated 
a massive nuclear modernization and a conventional forces buildup.  When considering the 
interplay between the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House, however, the story is not so 
straightforward.  If Carter and his advisors truly recognized the Soviets as such a great threat, 
it is unclear why they would have fought so fiercely against proposed congressional defense-
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increases while publicly bolstering their image as strong on defense.  Auten is correct when 
he speaks of Carter’s conversion to a harder defense policy, but it was more of a forced 
conversion than it was a completely “self-correcting policy change.”113 
    The Carter years also provide some new interpretations for the existing stock of civil-
military relations literature.  In particular, the Carter presidency additional insight on three 
important issues: (1) partisanship among military officers, (2) the rise of the military as a 
special interest group in politics or the “politicization of the military,” and (3) control of the 
military through successful civilian influence in policy and warfighting. 
    The origins of the much discussed findings of Ole Holsti and Morris Janowitz concerning 
the increasingly Republican partisanship of the Army officer corps can be seen in the Carter 
years.114  A public opinion poll a few weeks before the 1980 election revealed that less than 
one percent of military officers supported Carter over Reagan.115  No doubt this had much to 
do with the chaotic foreign policy from 1977-1981 and the failure of Operation Eagle Claw.  
It would be unfounded, however, to place the blame for this officer partisanship on Carter.  
Holsti’s study does not chart prior to 1976, so more than likely this trend in officer 
identification with the Republican party was gradually taking place anyway.  Carter’s 
policies and conflict with the military may have hastened the shift, but little evidence exists 
                                                 
113
 Auten, Carter’s Conversion, 3.  Likewise, what Auten terms the innenpolitik model offered by David 
Skidmore.  See Skidmore, Changing Course, 55, 180.  Skidmore perhaps over-emphasizes the role of domestic 
politics in his model, especially the role of conservative political groups such as the Committee on Present 
Danger in forcing Carter to take a harder stance on the Soviets.  As shown by his stance on defense budgets, 
Carter was willing to carry the fight against the military-congressional alliance even into the 1980 campaign. 
 
114
 Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?” in International Security 23, no. 
3: 5-42; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier:  A Social and Political Portrait, 2nd ed. (New York: Free 
Press, 1971), lii, 391-392.; Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, 187. 
 
115
 Perry, Four Stars, 277. 
 
 399 
to support more than this.116  The battles over the military budget in FY1950 raged much 
hotter than FY1980.117  One must also note that the military-congressional alliance in the 
Carter years was more of an alliance between conservative Democrats and the Pentagon than 
it was between the uniformed military and the Republican opposition. 
    Samuel Huntington, Dale Herspring, Edward Kolodziej, and Adam Yarmolinsky have all 
spoken of the politicization of the military since World War II.118  Herspring especially has 
argued that the military has become its own special interest group on Capitol Hill.  Again, the 
Carter presidency provides qualified support for this conclusion.  As Huntington pointed out, 
“Congressional appropriation of more money than the Administration requests usually 
reflects a significant policy divergence between the Administration and Congress.”119  This 
was definitely the case during the Carter years—and the statements and letters of key 
members of Congress attest to this.  The Pentagon at times circumvented Carter, using end 
runs to alter his policies and expenditures.  Yet, as the testimony surrounding the FY80 and 
FY81 defense budgets revealed, many in Congress had hopes that the military would have 
done more to press their own interests.  On the critical SALT II treaty, the military 
compromised and risked offending the military-congressional alliance that it would have 
been so much in their interest to support.  Thus, in the Carter years the military acted like a 
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special interest group but at times was willing to do things against its own interest in order to 
limit civil-military discord and support their commander-in-chief.   
    Louis Smith and Elliot Cohen’s studies suggest a sustained role for civilians in defense 
policy making and warfighting.120  In many ways the Carter administration provided a very 
good example of how this can be done without creating excessive civil-military conflict.  The 
President took an active role in both defense budgets and policy but was willing to limit that 
direct control over the course of his term as he gained confidence with his subordinates.  The 
president also kept an open dialogue with his military advisors, making it clear that they 
could come directly to him on matters of great importance.  When it finally came to the use 
of military force with Operation Eagle Claw, Carter fully trusted his subordinates in the 
Pentagon to execute a plan after he gave them his specific guidance. 
    Harold Brown accepted this arrangement as Secretary of Defense.  He had many ideas 
about how to reform the Pentagon and how to change defense policy, but he was pragmatic 
about how much he was willing to try to accomplish.  When resistance from the military 
stiffened, Brown did not try to railroad reform through, nor did he cave in and backdoor his 
boss.  He increased civilian control within the Pentagon but did so gradually and with an 
even-hand. 
    Jimmy Carter, with his bold plans for world peace and nuclear disarmament, has by some 
been associated with the Reagan’s return to militancy in the Cold War.  If he had only his 
own way, however, this would not have been the case.  Carter envisioned a post-Cold War, 
multi-polar world before the Cold War was really over.  He saw the future but was limited by 
the constraints and reality of the present.  The military-congressional alliance that formed 
                                                 
120
 Cohen, Supreme Command, 206, 264; Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, 12. 
 
 401 
over the course of his four years led his administration to abandon its plans for reducing 
defense spending and limiting U.S. global commitments.  It was indeed a conversion-like 
odyssey for Jimmy Carter—but it was a forced conversion. 
    Civil-military relations during Carter’s administration improved over time. Carter’s term 
demonstrates how conflicts, cooperation, compromises, mistrust, and end-runs can all occur 
within an administration’s civil-military relationship, even at times simultaneously.  It also 
shows how even in times of virtual chaos this relationship can still function to provide for the 
national interest.  There is probably no model or formula that can capture all of the 
complicated interactions involved and predict or prevent civil-military discord.  In the end 
much of it comes down to personalities and professionalism.  Although many of the “iron 
majors” never overcame their disdain for Carter, the most experienced and professional 
officers in the military performed their duty and acceded to civilian control. 
        In the end, the thirty-ninth president found a naval vessel named in honor of him—the 
USS Jimmy Carter, the final Seawolf class nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in 
February 2005.  This may indicate that even the embittered Navy was willing to cede that the 
Carter years inflicted no permanent damage to the American civil-military relationship.121  
Then again, Senator John Stennis, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush all had the largest 
aircraft carriers ever built bear their namesakes.  So perhaps the Navy, after their successful 
end-runs, delivered a parting shot to Jimmy Carter—faint praise as a note of disdain—just for 
the sake of posterity.
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 Appendix 1 
The Annual Defense Budget Process 
    The annual defense budget is one of the most complicated processes within the federal 
government.  In his first appearance testifying as Secretary of the Navy, Edward Hidalgo 
admitted with understandable frustration that the defense budget process was “an endless 
labyrinth.”1  The following discussion is a brief overview of the process during the Carter 
years.  While the general pattern remains the same today, each presidential administration 
adjusts the defense budget timeline somewhat to fit into its overall planning cycle.  The 
Carter administration was no different in this regard and, upon taking office, began to 
institute changes in the defense budget drafting process.  As is often the case, different 
agencies and organizations fail to meet recommended budgetary timelines, thus altering the 
course of the defense budget drafting process.  Again, the Carter administration was no 
exception—struggling to meet timelines on its first two iterations of the budget as it 
attempted to implement its new systems.2  Significantly, the annual defense budget process is 
cyclical in nature and attention to the defense budget is constant—so, as soon as one year’s 
ends, work begins on the next. 
    According to improvements made during Robert S. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of 
Defense (1961-1968) which were known as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS), the annual defense budget process began roughly in March of a given year.  
The process then ended in February of the next year with the finalized budget submission to 
Congress.  In between this time, Congress modifies the budget through a series of 
committees: the House and Senate Budget Committees, the House and Senate Appropriations 
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Committees, and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.  These committees each 
have different functions and agendas based on their composition, but all seek input from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Service Secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense during open 
and closed testimony.  Based on their own discussions and the testimony before them, the 
various committees modify the budget and vote on it through Congress in a series of bills.  
Generally, by the end of March, the congressional stage is complete, Congress votes, and 
submits a defense authorization bill to the president for his signature.  The president can then 
either sign the bill into law or veto it. 
    During the Carter administration, the process began with the JCS submitting the Joint 
Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP).  The plan "outlined the threats which jeopardized the 
security of nation and recommended the military forces which the Chiefs believed were 
necessary to counter the threat."3  Taking into account the information in the JSOP, civilians 
in the administration then formulated guidance documents for the military.  In 1976, prior to 
Carter's first budget, these documents consisted of Defense Guidance (DG), Planning and 
Programming Guidance (PPG), and Fiscal Guidance (FG).  Carter and his Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown felt these three documents were cumbersome, redundant, and failed 
to integrate fully foreign policy into the defense budget process.  Therefore, Brown grouped 
these three separate documents into a single one known as Consolidated Guidance (CG).4  In 
the words of the JCS official historian, this was a "watershed event" which brought 
significant changes to the annual defense budget process.5 
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    Brown did not feel that starting the process in March for completion in February of the 
next year was adequate, so he requested the JSOP from the JCS in October and proposed 
several modifications to the PPBS.  Following the issuing of the JSOP, the Chairman of the 
JCS would then meet with the Secretary of Defense at the start of November to “suggest key 
features of the CG.”6  By the start of January, the draft CG would be sent to the JCS for 
review.  From this document, which in theory revealed how far the administration was 
willing to go in meeting the threats detailed in the original JSOP, the JCS would develop a 
document known as the JSOP II.  This document detailed how the JCS proposed to meet the 
threats to the nation based on the limited means of the administration laid out in the draft CG.  
The JSOP II would then be returned to the Secretary of Defense with only a one week 
suspense for completion.7 
    After reviewing the JCS comments for almost two weeks, Harold Brown would meet with 
the JCS in the third week of February to discuss their comments.  The Office of the Secretary 
of Defense staff would then revise the CG based upon this discussion, and the revised draft 
CG would be sent to President Carter for his signature at the end of the month.  In the first 
week of March, the president would then meet with Secretary of Defense Brown and the JCS 
to discuss the CG and make his recommendations, from which the final draft of the CG 
would be prepared by the third week in March.  Each service would then submit a 
Programming Objectives Memorandum (POM), a rough draft of how the service planned to 
meet the CG and a tentative list of its costs associated with doing so--again with only a one 
week suspense.  Through a process of meetings and negotiations, with periodic status reports 
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sent to the president, the OSD and JSC would work together to determine which programs 
would receive funding.  By the start of August, each service would then meet individually 
with the Secretary of Defense to "reclama" (appeal) any cuts which they strongly opposed.  
After decision on all of the reclamas, the individual services would then submit their budgets 
by the end of September, when they would then be compiled into the Department of Defense 
budget for approval by the president and his Office of the Management of the Budget staff.8  
The process of the administration developing its own defense budget was then essentially 
complete. 
    The changes proposed by Secretary Brown, although resisted by the military and 
Congress, were eventually implemented with minor modifications.9  The JCS finally adapted 
by making several important changes in their own Joint Strategic Planning System that 
would make the overall process more efficient.  In the judgment of the official JCS historian 
the reforms during the Carter Administration “clearly enhanced the utility of the Joint 
Strategic Planning System.”10  Thus, in some ways, the legacy of Carter and Brown’s 
changes to the annual defense budget process carry on to the present day.   
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Appendix 2 
Civil-Military Timeline of the Carter Years 
Pre-Presidential 
12 Dec 74:  Carter announced candidacy 
28 Jan 75:  Carter’s advisors met with Brookings Institution on defense strategy and budget 
08 Feb 75:  Carter’s “Princeton Address” Drafted 
17-20 Feb 76:  SASC Hearings on FY77 Defense Budget, Air Force argued for critical need 
of the B-1 
16 May 76:  Carter’s interview with Bill Moyers promised Korea troop withdrawals 
14 Jul 76: Carter nominated as Democratic presidential candidate 
13 Sep 76:  Carter’s U.S. News and World Report interview dismissed possibility of war in 
the Pacific theater 
02 Nov 76: Jimmy Carter elected president 
05 Dec 76:  St. Simon Meetings, agreement to reorganize the NSC 
10 Dec 76:  First Meeting with JCS and President-Elect Carter (Ch. 1 Opening Vignette) 
 
1977 
 
January 1977 
05 Jan 77:  First tentative NSC meeting setting primary goals as Panama and Middle East 
11 Jan 77:  Nomination Hearings of Brown and Duncan with SASC 
13 Jan 77:  JCS Meeting with Carter (9 hours 15 minutes).  Carter suggests idea of 
“minimum deterrence” again 
20 Jan 77:  Carter’s Inauguration 
20 Jan 77:  PD-1 Establishment of PRM/PDs, PD-2 NSC System changed the structure of the 
Nixon-Kissinger NSC to the Carter-Brzezinski system as agreed at St. Simon 
21 Jan 77:  PRM-1 Panama, PRM-3 Middle East, PRM-4 South Africa-Rhodesia, PRM-5 
Cyprus/Aegean, PRM-6 MFBR called for significant changes from the Nixon-
Kissinger foreign policy approach.  Carter issued Presidential Pardon for Draft 
Evaders from Vietnam 
24 Jan 77:  PRM-2 SALT set forward ideas for significant movement toward a SALT II 
ratification, followed by a much more significant SALT III 
25 Jan 77:  Secretary Brown and CJCS Brown presented unmodified FY78 Defense Budget 
to SASC in their first joint appearance before Congress 
26 Jan 77:  PRM-12 Arms Transfer Policy Review, PRM-13 Korea (Initiated studies on 
Korea troop withdrawal), PRM-14 Philippine Bases, PRM-17 Latin America Review 
further outlined Carter’s plan for limited global commitments 
27 Jan 77:  Bert Lance and Harold Brown met with Carter regarding FY78 Defense Budget 
31 Jan 77:  “Marathon” Meeting with Carter, OSD, OMB, CJSC on the FY78 Defense 
Budget (Ch. 2 Opening Vignette) 
 
February 1977 
18 Feb 77:  PRM-10 Military Overview initiated a massive review of U.S. military strategy 
from which the JCS later claimed to be largely excluded 
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23 Feb 77:  Carter held firm to promise of $5-7 billion in defense cuts at press conference 
24 Feb 77:  SECDEF Brown and CJSC Brown re-submitted FY78 Budget to SASC with cuts 
of only $2-3 billion. 
 
March 1977 
01 Mar 77:  President Carter visited the Pentagon and was questioned on his pardoning of 
Draft Evaders by an Air Force Sergeant, but cited the need for the nation to “move 
on” from the Vietnam War 
05 Mar 77:  “Ask President Carter” on CBS, Carter denied Vietnam Veterans Bonus 
09 Mar 77:  PD-5 Southern Africa (Called for promotion of change in South Africa) 
15 Mar 77:  PD-6 Cuba (Called for normalization of relations with Cuba) 
17 Mar 77:  PRM-21 Horn of Africa initiated studies on how to address Cuban and Soviet 
incursion into this region. 
30 Mar 77:  First SALT II proposals rejected by USSR 
 
April 1977 
05 Apr 77:  PRM-24 China Policy initiated studies on Normalization with China 
 
May 1977 
03 May 77:  JCS complained to SECDEF that the NSC was tabling information to gain 
consensus, but SECDEF Brown declined to forward the memo to Brzezinksi 
05 May 77:  PD-12 U.S. Policy in Korea initiated troop withdrawals from Korea 
13 May 77:  PD-13 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy stated that the U.S. would not be the 
first nation to introduce new arms into a region.  This later brought significant 
objection from the JCS and the SOUTHCOM CINC. 
19 May 77:  John Saar article cited MG Singlaub as saying Carter’s troop withdrawal policy 
will lead to war in Korea 
21 May 77:  Carter fired MG Singlaub as Korea Chief of Staff 
28 May 77:  Singlaub awarded Chief of Staff position with FORSCOM 
 
June 1977 
06 Jun 77:  Walter Pincus’ article exposed existence of ERW 
10 Jun 77:  PD-14 Disposition of NSAM and NSDMs (Major Policy Continuity/Changes) 
(Rescinded NSAM 55 “Relationship of the JCS to the President in Cold War 
Operations” which called for “direct and unfiltered” JCS advice to the president) 
15 Jun 77:  SECDEF Brown took exception to many of the PRM-10 findings in a letter to 
Carter, supporting JCS concerns 
24 Jun 77:  NSC Weekly #18 on U.S.-Soviet Tensions predicted a general “warming” of 
U.S.-Soviet relations 
30 Jun 77:  Carter announced B-1 cancellation in a surprise decision 
 
 
July 1977 
14 Jul 77:  HCOB hearing on 5 year defense plan for the administration 
22 Jul 77:  NSC Weekly Report #22 reports Minuteman missile losses expected “zero” under 
all Soviet attack conditions 
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August 1977 
04 Aug 77:  PD-17 Reorganization of Intel Community initiated many of Stansfield Turner’s 
reforms within the CIA and DIA, Department of Energy established 
11 Aug 77:  Harold Brown recommended continuation of ERW program to the president 
12 Aug 77:  JCS publicly endorsed Panama Canal Treaty 
23 Aug 77:  Meeting between CJCS Brown and Carter on Panama Canal 
24 Aug 77:  PD-18 U.S. National Strategy outlined the administration’s “grand strategy” but 
was criticized as being “big on abstractions and short on specifics,” especially in 
regard to the Soviet threat 
 
September 1977 
07 Sep 77:  Panama Canal Treaty signed by Carter and Torijos, CJCS Brown went to the 
White House for breakfast upon the president’s return 
08 Sep 77:  SECDEF Brown missed deadline for submission of FY78 defense guidance 
09 Sep 77:  PD-20 U.S. SALT Position clarifies the “three-tier” approach dominated by the 
State Department, moving away from Harold Brown’s initial proposal that was 
supported by the JCS 
20 Sep 77:  Carter directed SECDEF Brown to study DoD organization 
21 Sep 77:  Bert Lance resigned as head of OMB amid a personal financial scandal 
22 Sep 77:  JCS reported concern with no delivery of defense guidance for FY78 
27 Sep 77:  Compromise with Gromyko on SALT II, CJCS testified before Congress on 
Panama Canal, supporting the treaty 
29 Sep 77:  Carter meeting again questioned role of ICBMs in the triad, calling for minimum 
deterrence.  Following this Harold Brown told the president that continuing to pursue 
minimum deterrence created “fundamental risk” for American security 
30 Sep 77:  PRM-32 Civil Defense initiated studies on civil defense in America in case of 
nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R. 
 
October 1977 
26 Oct 77:  SECDEF Brown proposed changes to the PPBS to the JCS, generating resistance 
from the military-congressional alliance 
28 Oct 77:  Carter calls for more NSC supervision of defense budgets and defense policy in 
NSC Weekly #34 
31 Oct 77:  “Halloween Massacre” at the CIA fired many espionage agents 
 
November 1977 
01 Nov 77:  Services, CJCS met with SECDEF to suggest key features of CG 
11 Nov 77:  NSC Weekly Report #36 reports Minuteman may not be vulnerable until late 
1980s, possibly negating the need for the MX missile 
 
1978 
 
January 1978 
03 Jan 78:  SECDEF reviewed the first draft of CG, sent to the JCS for comments 
09 Jan 78:  CJSC Brown strongly criticized first draft of the CG 
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10 Jan 78:  OSD revised CG, comments sent to JCS and services 
17 Jan 78:  JCS, services reviewed CG, sent comments and JSOP II to SECDEF 
20 Jan 78:  Carter submitted FY79 Budget to Congress, Melvin Price requested explanation 
on Brown’s proposed changes to the PPBS, saying that Brown’s proposed changes 
would leave out uniformed military advice until it was too late to consider 
February 1978 
01 Feb 78:  JCS complained of lack of notice and preparation for important NSC meetings 
14 Feb 78:  SECDEF reviewed second set of JCS comments on CG 
15 Feb 78:  CJCS Brown again heavily criticized CG in memo to SECDEF 
17 Feb 78:  PD-30 Human Rights defined an important aspect of Carter’s foreign policy 
21 Feb 78:  SECDEF Brown and Charles Duncan met with all services on CG, Congressional 
Testimony began for the FY79 Defense Budget 
24 Feb 78:  PD-32 Horn of Africa followed most of the JCS recommendations of how to 
respond to the war between Somalia and Ethiopia 
28 Feb 78:  OSD Staff revised CG, draft sent to President Carter for his comments 
 
March 1978 
07 Mar 78:  President reviewed CG, met with SECDEF and CJCS to hear their views 
10 Mar 78:  Memo from Brown to Carter asserting the JCS feeling that a 5 percent defense 
increase could be “easily” passed by Congress 
16 Mar 78:  Senate ratified 1st Panama Treaty 
28 Mar 78:  Services prepared POMs for the FY80-81 Budget Cycle 
 
April 1978 
7 Apr 78:  Carter unilaterally deferred ERW in another surprise decision 
11 Apr 78:  NSC Meeting on Korea withdrawal (Ch. 3 Opening Vignette) 
15 Apr 78:  Carter sided with OMB in debate over final FY79 budget totals 
18 Apr 78:  Senate ratified 2nd Panama Treaty 
 
May 1978 
10 May 78:  JCS lunch at White House with the JCS re: Consolidated Guidance 
23 May 78: PRM-36 Cubans and Russians in Africa called for more detailed studies of 
Soviet and Cuban “adventurism” in Africa 
 
June 1978 
07 Jun 78:  Carter’s speech at Annapolis on “conflict or confrontation” is criticized as being a 
stapled-together draft of Vance and Brzezinski’s opposing views on foreign policy 
30 Jun 78:  JCS Chairman changed to from Gen. Brown (USAF) to Gen. Jones (USAF), 
Adm. Tom Hayward as CNO, Gen. Lew Allen, Chief of the Air Force 
 
July 1978 
19 Jul 78:  OSD Staff drafted FY80-81 POMs, SECDEF sent to services 
25 Jul 78:  Services reviewed FY80-81 POMs and sent requests back to SECDEF 
28 Jul 78:  Service requests reflected “goldwatching” according to NSC Weekly Report #68 
31 July 78:  Steadman Report published, criticized quality of JCS advice 
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August 1978 
07 Aug 78:  FY80-81 service reclama meetings with SECDEF and CJCS 
17 Aug 78:  Carter vetoed FY79 Defense Budget 
18 Aug 78:  President met with SECDEF, CJCS regarding the veto 
31 Aug 78:  Letter from Melvin Price blasted Carter on his veto and defense spending 
 
September 1978 
01 Sep 78:  Services prepared and submitted Defense Budgets for FY80-81 
04 Sep 78:  Camp David Conference began 
07 Sep 78:  Jaleh Square Massacre in Iran signals beginning of the fall of the Shah 
17 Sep 78:  Camp David Accords signed 
29 Sep 78:  PD-41 Civil Defense called for much greater investment in civil-defense efforts 
to respond to potential nuclear attacks, Final Defense Budgets for FY80-81 from 
services sent to SECDEF 
 
October 1978 
18 Oct 78:  U.S. announced decision to produce neutron weapons components despite 
Carter’s earlier unilateral deferral 
 
November 1978 
21 Nov 78:  Preliminary CG Drafted for FY81-82 
 
December 1978 
15 Dec 78:  U.S. normalized relations with China 
19 Dec 78:  Meeting between JCS and Carter regarding SALT II where Carter refused to 
acknowledge any link between SALT ratification and increased defense spending 
(Ch. 6 Opening Vignette) 
20 Dec 78:  Paul Warnke resigned as head of the ACDA 
 
1979 
January 1979 
01 Jan 79:  General Seignious appointed as head of the ACDA 
05 Jan 79:  General Huyser arrived in Iran 
12 Jan 79:  Letter from 170 retired generals and admirals sent to Carter opposing SALT II 
16 Jan 79:  Shah fled Iran 
22 Jan 79:  PRM-45 U.S. Policy Toward Korea ordered re-evaluation of troop withdrawals in 
light of intelligence reports of greater North Korean military strength 
25 Jan 79:  FY80 Annual DoD Report Published, Testimony on FY80 Defense Budget began 
 
February 1979 
1 Feb 79:  Khomeini returned to Iran 
2 Feb 79:  General Huyser left Iran, meets with the president upon his return 
7 Feb 79:  Hearings on FY79 Supplemental Defense Request began 
9 Feb 79:  U.S. severed ties with Somoza regime in Nicaragua due to human rights violations 
9-19 Feb 79:  Harold Brown’s Middle East arms selling trip to assure allies in that region 
11 Feb 79:  Iranian government toppled by massive uprisings 
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14 Feb 79:  U.S. Embassy staff briefly held hostage, then released by Iranian “students” 
20 Feb 79:  Carter’s Georgia Tech Speech emphasizes military preparedness and higher 
defense budgets 
 
March 1979 
01 Mar 79:  Carter added “Iranian Fire Sale” material to FY79 supplemental 
07 Mar 79:  3rd FY79 Supplemental Hearing before SASC (Iranian Fire Sale Testimony) 
11 Mar 79:  Stanley Resor resigned as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, cited a lack of 
support for reform within the Pentagon 
28 Mar 79:  Three Mile Island Incident 
 
April 1979 
Early April 79:  SECDEF Brown created Defense Resource Board IAW Rice study 
recommendations 
23 Apr 79:  Gen. McAuliffe, SOUTHCOM CINC, criticized FY80 defense guidance 
 
May 1979 
04 May 79:  PRM-46 U.S. Policy Toward Central America called for a re-evaluation of U.S. 
policy toward Latin American countries in light of Cuban support for insurgencies 
Late May 79:  FY79 Defense Supplemental passed Congress 
 
June 1979 
18 Jun 79:  Carter signed SALT II with Brezhnev in Vienna 
22 Jun 79:  SECDEF Brown ordered JCS to review entire command arrangement for the 
Middle East, but the JCS eventually rejected any need for reform in the Unified 
Command Plan and instead called for additional resources for the RDF 
 
July 1979 
03 Jul 79:  Camp David Meetings on state of the administration, all cabinet members 
submitted resignations and Carter decided which to accept or reject 
15 Jul 79:  Carter’s “Malaise” Speech 
17 Jul 79:  Carter Announced Cabinet and Staff Changes including firing James Schlesinger 
as Secretary of Energy 
19 Jul 79:  Somoza fled Nicaragua, Sandinistas assumed power 
20 Jul 79:  Carter announced suspension of U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea 
26 Jul 79:  Senator Nunn publicly linked ratification of SALT II to higher defense spending 
in FY80 and FY81 
 
August 1979 
02 Aug 79:  Senators Nunn, Tower, and Jackson sent letter to Carter calling for the “3-5-5” 
plan for increasing defense spending 
15 Aug 79:  Andrew Young resigned as UN Ambassador 
31 Aug 79:  Soviet BDE “discovered” in Cuba 
 
September 1979 
07 Sep 79:  Carter approved mobile basing system for the MX missile 
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10 Sep 79:  Carter met with SECDEF Brown and JCS regarding his plans for the FY80 and 
FY81 defense budgets 
11 Sep 79:  Carter submitted increase to the FY80 Defense Budget and further increases in 
FY81, but short of the 3-5-5 plan 
14 Sep 79:  Carter sent letters to key senators clarifying his commitment to a 3% defense 
increase, but no more 
19 Sep 79:  Senate voted for approval of Nunn’s “3-5-5” plan for defense spending 
 
October 1979 
04 Oct 79:  PD-52 U.S. Policy Toward Cuba abandoned earlier hope for “normalization” of 
relations with Cuba in light of actions in Africa and Central America 
20 Oct 79:  Shah admitted to U.S. for medical treatment 
26 Oct 79:  South Korean president Park Chung-hee assassinated, initiating a military coup in 
that country 
 
November 1979 
4 Nov 79:  Hostages seized at embassy in Tehran 
9 Nov 79:  Foreign Relations Committee approved SALT II Resolution of Ratification 
14 Nov 79:  President froze Iranian assets 
 
December 1979 
12 Dec 79:  NATO agreed to theater nukes, military junta took control of South Korea 
18 Dec 79:  HASC preliminary look at FY81 Defense Budget 
21 Dec 79:  James Schlesinger editorial piece criticized RDF planning as ineffective 
27 Dec 79:  Soviets invaded Afghanistan 
 
1980 
 
January 1980 
4 Jan 80:  President announced sanctions on USSR for Afghan invasion 
20 Jan 80:  Iowa Caucuses, Carter offered weak showing relative to Senator Kennedy 
23 Jan 80:  State of the Union, Carter Doctrine articulated 
25 Jan 80:  Testimony began on FY81 Defense Budget 
 
February 1980 
20 Feb 80:  Decision to Boycott 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow 
21 Feb 80:  Final SASC hearings on FY81 Defense Budget 
 
March 1980 
03 Mar 80:  Final HASC hearings of FY81 Defense Budget 
 
April 1980 
11 Apr 80:  President gave go ahead to Operation Eagle Claw rescue mission 
21 Apr 80:  Secretary of State Vance resigned in protest of the rescue mission 
24 Apr 80:  Operation Eagle Claw failed (Ch. 7 Opening Vignette) 
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May 1980 
05 May 80:  Carter requested allies in Congress defeat defense increases in the Holt-Gramm 
amendment, including Navy shipbuilding increases 
19 May 80:  Mt. St. Helens eruption 
21 May 80:  Submission of Supplemental increase for the FY81 defense budget 
27 May 80:  “Kwangju Tragedy” in South Korea increases uproar against the junta 
29 May 80:  HASC Investigation Hearing on FY81 Defense Budget (Ch. 4 Opening 
Vignette) 
 
June 1980 
13 Jun 80:  Congress called for defense budget greater than Carter’s FY80-81 plans 
 
July 1980 
16 Jul 80:  Ronald Reagan nominated for Republican presidential candidate 
25 Jul 80:  PD-59 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy considered a revision of PD-18, 
examining detailed nuclear targeting options against the U.S.S.R. 
 
August 1980 
11-16 Aug 80:  Gen. Wickham interview interpreted as supporting the junta in South Korea, 
leading to his recall to Hawaii 
13 Aug 80:  Democrats nominate Carter, defeating the Kennedy challenge 
22 Aug 80:  Gen. Wickham returned to his command in South Korea after being supported 
by many within the Pentagon and State Department 
 
September 1980 
22 Sep 80:  Iraq invades Iran 
 
October 1980 
27 Oct 80:  Carter met with key senators at the White House regarding the defense budget 
and was openly challenged by Sam Nunn 
 
November 1980 
04 Nov 80:  Reagan defeated Carter in presidential election 
13 Nov 80:  NSC discussed military intervention in Nicaragua (Ch. 5 Opening Vignette) 
24 Nov 80:  Second additional FY81 defense budget increase for Persian Gulf RDF 
 
1981 
 
January 
15 Jan 81:  PD-62 Modifications in U.S. National Strategy, PD-63 Persian Gulf Framework 
articulated the final versions of Carter’s “Grand Strategy.” 
16 Jan 81:  Final terms for hostage release negotiated 
19 Jan 81:  FY82 Annual DoD Report published 
20 Jan 81:  Hostages released 20 minutes after Reagan’s inauguration, Reagan sent Carter to 
meet returning hostages in Germany 
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